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INTRODUCTION

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"Politics pervades the entire cause of war." Clausewitz ("War", vol. I, p. 19 Russian translation).

"War through and through is politics."

Chenin (from a speech about the war at the 4th Congress of Soviets).

"Politics is not a battlefield: it requires special knowledge to resolve. deciding whether war is necessary and when, and how to avoid it with honor.

Bismarck (Memoirs of Wilhelm I, Russian translation 1923)

"The war is spreading in all directions, not finding definite boundaries for itself," Yekhtel predicted the First World War a hundred years ago.

Many wars have passed in a hundred years, and a lot of blood has been shed while mankind remembered the precepts of a military thinker and put war in the category of social phenomena.

Today, of course, no one talks about war as some kind of special military event in the life of society - everyone considers it with absolute certainty a political act.

"War," Lenin said, "is an inevitable stage of capitalism, just as legitimate a form of capitalist life as peace ... If there are not a number of successful revolutions, other wars will soon follow. The tale of the "last war" is an empty, harmful tale, a petty-bourgeois "mythology". »

If such is the nature of war, then its character, forms and goals fully correspond to the social and historical environment in which it takes place.

The war of our day captures all areas of the life of society, it requires the exertion of all its forces and means, and therefore it is clear that the management of the war can only be in the hands of the state in deed and carried out with the assistance of the entire state apparatus.

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In the first book of our work, we have established the general foundations of the management of modern warfare, showing that it is conceived not only as

collective principles.

In the same place, we determined the place and role of the General Staff in directing the war. We pointed out that already in those times when the war was just beginning to expand in all directions, when more and more forces were attracted to its arena, under the commander, who was given "full power", a special auxiliary body was formed to prepare for the war and to management of it - zeneralnny staff.

Years passed. The importance of the General Staff as a body of control of the war gradually increased, and the custom gave it the name "mozga of the army", depriving, to some extent, the commander of his birthright.

On the threshold of the World War, and in the very course of it, the general staff played such a major role that the victors, sitting at the table in Versailles and sending into exile, like Napoleon, the notorious Wilhelm I, acted more cruelly with the defeated general staffs, deleting them from the list alive. The politicians of the Entente did not see the danger of a new wave of militarism in the former German emperor, but in the general staffs of the middle states.

Now, with the introduction of the "integral" commander into everyday life, the role of the general staff becomes large, but at the same time not clearly defined. Some people continue to give it its former meaning, which caused the death of the German and other general staffs allied to them; other thinkers go so far as to reject it completely.

We have already said that this disagreement in assessing the role and importance of the General Staff attracted our attention and our pen. We have set ourselves the daring task of studying the "brain of the army" of times that have just passed.

Our first book has already found reviews in our periodicals, and some of the reviewers have drawn our attention to the too ironic tone in the analysis of the activities of the former Western European general staffs.

We gratefully accept all the indications made of the shortcomings of our first kpigi. We by no means want to enter into a polemic with people who have carefully studied our first book and have given it an assessment. We only want to point out that in our literary activity we: 1) never create idols for ourselves and always take a critical approach to the figures of history; 2) by a careful study of the materials available to us on the service of the General Staff, we testify to the great work of the "brains of the army" we examined, and 3) at one time they warned that we did not have a "good tone". If we are told that our criticism is a denunciation and mockery of the Western European culture of the General Staff, then we cannot agree with this. We tried to take a neutral position and not be either a Westerner or an Easterner. Once, in 1812, the well-known Russian General Yermolov, in view of the dominance of the Germans in the Russian army and their influence on military affairs, jokingly asked for production in the Germans. We fully sympathize with the mouth; however, with all due respect to the high merits of non-medical,

unconditional request to be enrolled in the ranks of exemplary culture trackers. True, sometimes life is different.

In the first book of our work "The Brain of the Army", in the afterword, we pointed out that our research did not fit into the framework of one book, and warned the reader that we were forced to continue the story.

In the same place, we gave the reasons that prompted our pen to be more voluminous than we would like. The scope of modern warfare and its nature are so extensive that, naturally, even the description of the activities of such a control body as the General Staff cannot fit into several pages. This is all the more so because we have set it as our task to get acquainted with the "brain of the army" on the basis of history.

Once embarking on the path of historical research, we do not find it possible to curtail © it, leaving complete freedom to the reader - either to continue, together with us, wandering along this path, or on these lines to cut off acquaintance with our work.

In our first book on the "brain of the army," we introduced the person who honored it with his attention in sufficient detail to the structure of the general staff, to the essence of the work of the mouth organ. We introduced the reader into the office of the chief of the general staff, got acquainted with the personality of the modern commander, entered into communication with his employees and, finally, thought a lot about new acquaintances, giving them an assessment corresponding to our, of course, views. We shared our thoughts about the modern commander, about the significance of the general staff, about the nature of his employees, without claiming the immutability of everything that was said and by no means intending to write any commandments.

Subsequently, our narrative turned to the consideration of the functionary activities of the General Staff, which we reviewed in the field of domestic policy and the preparation of war from the economic side.

In the reviews of our first book, we are pointed out to the unfortunate architectonics of the whole work, leading to repetition. We didn't insure against this, while they themselves recognized that we would inevitably have to repeat ourselves. And how else can one act differently when decomposing one and the same phenomenon into 60-fold parts? If we have set ourselves the task of investigating, more or less completely, the constituent elements of war, then consideration of each of them in detail always affects other elements along the way, because in war everything is in a strong state of agglomeration, and not one of the subordinate phenomena can be analyzed abstractly, without taking into account other military factors. affairs. In these forms, we leave the previous plan for the construction of our work as the basis.

It did not cover all the activities of the "brain of the army" as a whole, and it is our duty to continue the work in order to bring it to a tolerable end.

In the first book, we expressed our fundamental views on the war and its character. We have shown with sufficient clarity that war is a social phenomenon and that the "primary" element in war is economic force, that it alone determines the nature and forms of war, that politics is "above-

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"Construction" of the economy or, in other words, "condensed economy". We also show there that in order to understand the essence of war in our days and in the near future, it is necessary to delve into the existing economic relations both within states and outside them. We have detailed, on the basis of a historical example, the entire influence of the economy on the development of military forces¹ and the preparation of the state for war.

Since politics is a "contented economy," we have pointed out that the nature of war is determined by politics and, above all, domestic policy, that foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy.

We have described in detail the work of the General Staff in the field of domestic policy and economic preparation for war. This is where our story ends. Now, continuing it, we must begin by identifying the significance of foreign policy in the war and the work of the General Staff in this area.

Everyone knows that his role in this arena was far from passive, and that the general staff of the defeated countries was even wiped off the face of the earth for it. Many pages have already been written about whether the General Staff really fanned the Torch of War or, on the contrary, turned out to be only an obedient instrument in the hands of diplomats.

We intend to introduce the reader in more detail to the circle of foreign relations between the states of Europe before the World War and shed light on the role played in them by the general staffs of the most important of these states. From our narrative, the reader himself will first of all form an opinion about the just or erroneous attacks on the General Staff, and then, together with us, will understand those vital questions of military affairs and foreign policy that have placed before us in full growth the experience of the recent past.

We retain our previous method of research, namely: by studying a specific historical example, to identify certain provisions, supporting them with an appropriate theory. In other words, we remain on the same path of method, by which we wrote the first book.

The historical object subject to our consideration remains the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, whose chief, Konrad, presented us with a solid and extensive work on his activities: "From my service 1914-1918." We will not here again repeat the merits and demerits of this work, for we have done it before.

Simultaneously with the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, we will also cover other headquarters, of course, not in such detail, but we consider it necessary to make the picture complete and replenish it with those details that we did not find in Conrad's work.

Then we must point out that before the World War the policy of the states of Europe so closely intertwined them into two hostile camps that without acquaintance, even in the most general terms, with the policy not only of Austria-Hungary, but also of other states, for us the entire nexus of events that led to the world war would be incomprehensible.

What has been said clearly testifies to the heavy responsibility that we shouldered upon our shoulders, embarking on a sea of diplomats. Bismarck used to say that "one never lies so much as before the war." Indeed, to understand the lies that enveloped Europe to

1914, constitutes a logical task, especially since they "lie" even in the nap dip. The acute question of the "culprits of the war" now compels us to throw a thick veil over those diplomatic steps, sweats and alliances with which Europe's political history was made before the war of 1914-1918.

We may be told that in the present time there have been published in a very small number of official collections of political and literary documents, from which the augora could confidently refer to in his narrative. However, he remembers that it is a secret to anyone how tendentiously these documents are selected, and how much they cause doubts, if not in authenticity, then at least in the polyote of their content. To trust them implicitly would have been, at the very least, a cautious step. We do not at all want to do it, and even more so to push the reader out to work on it.

Kos-one of the largest military researchers will put forward the interpretations of a "ready" history written on the basis of documents. We are not in this camp and are critical of "pure" history.

The well-known vociferous thinker Arland de Nick said: "One should not look for examples of pi in victories or conquests, nor also in official communications - they are found in the testimony of people, a lot of action! x, while tabih, which, acting, have seen."

According to the Internet, today there is a lack of "testimony of people" who "acted a lot" before the war and during it. A huge stream of memoir literature: ready to flood even the very war. Many figures wrote their memoirs about this grandiose event in history and continue to publish them even now. But it is white only in the fact that very few of the pvc "yekrenip" in their testimony. Speaking about the usefulness of memoirs for a military historian, Yolauevil notes that in them "usually they deliberately hide deflations, struggles and fluctuations of opinions, the preeminence of a great cause. This happens for political reasons, or it is simply forgotten all the more easily because everyone looks at us as if they were scaffolding thrown away at the end of a building.

All the same, oliako, the memoirs of non-materialists and military leaders of the first world war bark at the memory of many revelations that help them to correctly understand "pure" documents, and this is their ignorance for us. Memories inspire those scraps of paper that lead the states of Europe to their next armed conflict.

From here we do not want to say that our presentation of the diplomatic history of Europe on the threshold of the world war will be exhaustive. Even a "skillful" historian cannot be sure of em, and not only we, who are far from succeeding in this. Such is the fate of contemporaries-psgorikov in general.

If we risk boldly making a swap of conclusions in assessing the political history of Europe at the beginning of the 20th century, then this is only because without it it is impossible to talk about the work of the General Staff in general.

Some of the replicants of our first book drew attention to our excessive modesty, which is repeatedly emphasized, which, but they think, can turn into its opposite.

Modesty does not mean losing your own lead, and we tried to keep it on the pages of our work. But at the same time we are far from

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in the first book they talk about just this, because our "modesty" not only finds an excuse for itself, but is also expedient.

As for the "opposite" of modesty, which, in the opinion of the reviewer, we can reach, then such a path of Bonapartism does not appeal to us, because it is not individuals who create the history of military thought.

The Bonapartes have outlived their time, and we are well aware of this ...

Far from having a feeling of superiority, we wrote our second book, but followed the path of doubts in our abilities, leaving the reader who unfolded this book to make his own judgment about the shortcomings and modest insufficiencies of our work.

CHAPTER 1

KONRAD AND ERENTHAL

The economic state of Austria-Hungary at the beginning of the twentieth century. - Domestic policy of Austria-Hungary. - Its close connection with foreign policy. — Foreign policy of the monarchy at the beginning of the twentieth century. — Allies and Enemies. — Army of the Danubian Empire. — Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff Konrad. — Konrad the politician. — Political training of Konrad. - His theory of the state. - Konrad's views on politics and military dedo. — Duties of the chief of the general staff in political grandfathers. — Konrad on establishing a close relationship with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. — The duties of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the development of the armed forces in the concept of Konrad. - Konrad is a "sohdad", weighed down by political issues. - His imaginary apathy. — Konrad in economic matters. - Minister of Foreign Affairs Ehrental. — Konrad's first contact with Erental. -- The latter's role in appointing Koprada to the post of chief of the general staff. — Konrad's isolation in matters of foreign policy. — Independent ways of Konrad in foreign policy. — Conversations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and reports from Franz Josich and Franz Ferdinand. — Konrad's political tour.

The military thunderstorm that broke out in 1914 and raged for 4 years erased from the map of Europe a long-lived, prosperous and gradually declining state formation - the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Under the blows of arms, engulfed by revolutionary outbreaks of the working class and individual nationalities, the building of the medieval monarchy on the banks of the Danube collapsed. The "patchwork" empire sprawled at the seams, and on its ruins individual small states began to live, long prepared for this by the very course of history.

Years will pass - the memory of the former empire of the Haboburgs will fade completely, and only the inquisitive eyes of the historian will analyze its annals with the task of understanding those popes of other Factors that turned the wheel of its life.

One thing can be said with certainty that contemporaries hardly speak with regret about this once brilliant state, which in the last years before the war incessantly fanned the Torch of Mars. Only miserable fragments of former paredvordevs from the banks of the Danube in solitude

remember the glory and splendor of Vienna as the capital of a "great power" state.

We also would not engage the one who opened this book with stories about Austria-Hungary as a state entity, if only it were possible without this acquaintance to continue our story about the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. However, it is clear without evidence that you are talking about the latter, without taking into account the environment, the life in which the high body of military command had to work, does not seem POSSIBLE.

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In the first book of our work, we devoted two chapters to an acquaintance with the state of Austria-Hungary and its army at the beginning of the 20th century. We would not like to repeat ourselves, but we still consider it necessary to recall here the starting points on these questions, so that our further account of the work of the General Staff in the field of external responses will be clear.

As is known, the level of productive forces of a state determines its life and development. Only by taking into account the "economic force" and its influence, can one correctly understand the internal remissions that are taking shape in the state and its policy beyond its borders.

Austria-Hungary took slow steps along the path of industrial development, lagging behind large states such as Germany, England, France, but still overtaking the smaller states of Europe, especially the Balkans.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the Habsburg monarchy was a state with a developing industry, but at the same time, to a large extent, it still retained its agrarian character. Every year the industry of the state was strengthened, finding in its own state and sources of raw materials. True, the distribution of these sources over the territory did not correspond to industrial centers and sometimes created difficulties in their more intensive use, but, one way or another, Austria-Hungary could live and develop on its own raw materials. The industry found its greatest development in the Austrian semi-monarchy.

On the contrary, agriculture and cattle breeding constituted an inalienable property of Hungary and its constituent regions inhabited by Slavic and Romanian tribes. This monarchy's supply led a separate economic policy, and Austria-Hungary as a whole had to resort to the foreign market in order to satisfy its needs with those agricultural products that were available in Hungary. Romania and Russia were not the last suppliers of bread for the Danubian monarchy. On the basis of competition in the bread market and the importation of livestock from abroad, the Hungarian agrarians created serious conflicts with the neighboring Balkan states.

Slowly, but the continuously developing industry of the state still found a wide market at home, and therefore did not think about wide competition on the world market with other large European states. It was not she who was the promoter of the monarchy's aggressive policy, which, as is well known, was notable for its aggressiveness.

In world trade, the Habsburg monarchy also occupied not the first place, and if its goods were sold anywhere, it was in the Balkans.

The banking capital of Austria-Hungary also directed its way there, mainly. It must be said that the banks in the state received a fairly wide development and gradually moved from their territory to the neighboring straits, being the engine of Austrian imperialism.

The slow pace of the industrialization of Austria must be explained both by the composition of the population of the monarchy and by the interpersonal relations that developed in it.

A whole conglomeration of nationalities, for which the Germans and Hungarians were not in a particularly significant number, but on the territory of the Danubian Empire. Every year the productive strata of those or other peoples grew,

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and along with them, their aspirations for independent existence also expanded. Forcibly assembled into a state formation, with medieval forms of government, with the power of large agrarians, with a large army of officials, with a growing clique of banking and industrial rulers, the empires of Austria-Hungary were in constant fermentation. The middle of the 19th century turned it into a dualistic state, the beginning of the 20th century already brought with it nationalism, and the world war, as we know, finally put an end to this state system - by revolution, and not by evolution, bringing paradoxism to the path of independent life.

For many years, the struggle of these peoples for the right to live and develop within the framework of a national association was burning inside the country. Parliamentary feuds sometimes gave way to armed clashes. Civil peace very often hung by a thread. The "cracks" grew stronger every year economically, and after that, politically. Either by concessions or by harsh measures, the state power restrained the separate aspirations of individual regions of the state, but all this was for the time being! before time. Some of the statesmen of the monarchy, more far-sighted, clearly foresaw the downfall of the monarchy, correctly seeing the reasons for this, mainly, not in danger from other states, but above all, in those internal contradictions with which the life of the Danubian Empire was full.

True, it must be said that these contradictions were fanned by the constant breeze that blew from abroad. Austria-Hungary found itself surrounded by nationalities akin to those that were part of the monarchy. It was quite natural for the latter to strive to escape from the yoke of the Habsburgs and join the one-tribe state. On this basis, various irredentists arose in Austria-Hungary—Italian, Yugoslav, etc. Irredentism seized even the Germans, who had a party striving for reunification with Prussia.

The separatism of individual nationalities took root deeply, capturing various classes of the population, not excluding even the upper classes of the bourgeois class. Among the most advanced members of this class were groupings according to nationalities, and there were few "husbands" who unconditionally considered the imperial power of the Habsburgs necessary and justified.

The struggle against these national aspirations was the main question of the domestic policy of the Habsburgs.

To the extent that these aspirations of individual parodies found ground outside the border, as was indicated above, to the extent that in Austria-Hungary the policy of internalization proved to be most closely connected with the external. All the guiding lines for the latter flowed from domestic politics.

Indeed, as we have indicated above, the economic condition of Austria-Wepgreen did not place it in the ranks of competitors with the large states of Europe, which overtook it in industrialization and greedily sought to capture markets for their products outside their borders. The trade of the Dupai Monarchy was concentrated mainly in the Balkans, and the introduction of other capital, other products of sale here, directly affecting the interests of the Austro-Hungarian capitalists, provoked a rebuff from them. On this basis, friction and competition with Italy were created, and relations even with Germany were sometimes aggravated. Some ardent minds of Viennese diplomats

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Mats and capitalists made plans for Austria-Hungary to reach the Aegean, turn Thessaloniki into an Austrian port and achieve complete dominance over the eastern coast of the Mediterranean. Their aspirations captured even the shores of Anatolia, where the Turkish ports were partly to pass into Austrian hands. But only a few have been taken so far by Fantasy, and more sober politicians saw the foundation of the active actions of the monarchy on the external front in something else.

Austrian imperialism, rather peculiar and limited, was not so much looking for markets as striving to expand its borders with the decisive goal of putting an end to the centrifugal aspirations of its nationalities by incorporating into the monarchy the neighboring small states that disturbed the peace of the "loyal" Habsburgs.

In the first book of our work, we dwelled more or less in detail on the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary at the turn of the 20th century. In the future, we will deepen this issue, and at the present time we will allow ourselves to just recall briefly the external relations of the monarchy at the beginning of the 20th century.

Thrown out of the German Empire in 1866 by the power of Prussian arms, Austria-Hungary soon found itself in an alliance with its former enemies, Germany and Italy.

The skillful and dexterous hand of Bismarck turned Austria-Hungary from the west to face east, to the Balkans.

Here Austria-Hungary hoped to get revenge for the West, especially since from here the greatest danger threatened the internal integrity of the Dupai Empire.

The Congress of Berlin cut up the small states in the Balkans and immediately gave rise to a mass of contradictions between them. Russia suffered a defeat, which was immediately used by Vienna.

The internal unrest of the country, the strength of Russia, the main competitor in the Balkans, delayed for an indefinite time the development of Austria's aggressive policy in the Balkans, a policy that could be fraught with the inclusion of new Slavic states in the territory of the monarchy. It was clear that this would not be possible without the use of weapons, and military

happiness is quite variable. Going out alone to fight Russia was not part of the calculations of the Viennese diplomats, and Bismarck was not particularly inclined to provide the necessary support. For the time being, it was necessary to fight only for influence among the Balkan states and at the same time not to allow any of them to strengthen, so as not to create a dangerous neighbor on the southern border. Sadly, some chauvinists on the banks of the Danube said that since the Congress of Berlin, Austria-Hungary had ceased the active policy characteristic of the "great" power, which, according to diplomatic nomenclature, the Habsburg monarchy should have been.

These are the main lines of foreign policy of Austria-Hungary in the early twentieth century centuries.

Having embarked on the path of a diplomatic struggle, which could also turn into an open clash with Russia, Austria-Hungary was forced to attend to the search for appropriate allies.

By 1882, the so-called tripartite alliance of the middle states of Europe was formed from Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy.

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Trying to forget the bitterness of the defeats just suffered from Prussia, Vienna in 1879, under the threat of complications with Russia, concluded an alliance treaty with Germany. The latter needed Austria as a means of diverting Russia from interference in Western affairs and as an ally in the event of a possible collision with a possible dual Franco-Russian alliance. We have just indicated Austria's interest in supporting Berlin. For Bismarck, the disappearance of the Habsburg monarchy from the map of Europe was completely undesirable, and therefore Vienna was an ally, and one in whose interests the sympathies of the Danube Germans for Berlin were restrained. With the transition of Germany to an imperialist policy, her interests did not significantly clash with those of the Austrians, and the alliance remained inviolable, although sometimes clouds appeared on its horizon.

The alliance of Germany with Austria-Hungary was considered by both states to be the basis of their policy, and without it an active policy could not be conceived by the diplomats of either state. In the following exposition, more exhaustive judgments about this alliance will be given, not only ours, but also the statesmen of both countries, from which the reader of our work will form a clear idea of the relationship between the two allies.

Italy enjoyed less sympathy in Vienna. The union was concluded by both states "out of necessity". but in reality there were so many contradictions in their relations that neither side believed in the strength of this alliance. The Italian irredenta in Austria, the dreams of the Viennese diplomats about capturing again the lost Italian regions, and, mainly, the growing competition in trade and politics in the Balkans every year - sooner or later had to bring Italy and the Habsburg monarchy to military field by enemies, but not by allies in arms. The strained relations between Italy and France and the dreams of capturing Tunisia and Tripoli for the time being kept Rome in the bed of the tripartite alliance. The Roman government therefore had to check the development of the irredenta in Austria, showing courtesy to the court of Vienna.

This was the end of the allies of the Habsburg monarchy.

Austria-Hungary was in relations with France and Apglia, dictated, on the one hand, by the financial support that Vienna wanted to receive in Paris and Lopdon, and, on the other hand, by an alliance with Germany and its relations with these states. To this it must be added that French and English capital gradually began to infiltrate the Balkans, thus forcing the Danubian Empire in its foreign policy to regulate its steps in accordance with the moves of the French and British diplomats.

At the same time, as noted above, the Habsburg monarchy vigilantly observed, on the one hand, the policy of Russia, which sought to expand its influence among the Balkan states, and, on the other hand, the latter, invariably clashing their interests.

The occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina finally dragged Austria into the Balkan affairs, and there was no retreat.

It is known that the Balkan bonfire did not go out all the time, flashing here and there with bloody fires. Masked as "firefighters", Russia and Austria, in their aspirations to introduce "rehorms" in the Balkans, further inflated

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fire, while at the same time exacerbating relationships. Kopep ZhKh and the beginning of the 20th century are marked by the retreat of Rosspi from the Balkans to the Far East and the offensive of Vepa's dplomats. Distracted by the Far Eastern policy, Russia for some time turned out to be passive in the Middle East, thereby encouraging Austria-Hungary to take bolder and more decisive steps in the Balkan policy.

It seemed that the days were coming when Austria-Hungary could once again embark on the path of a "great-power" policy, that is, in other words, on the path of conquest and robbery.

The statesmen of the Dupai empire thought differently about the path to this: some believed it possible to achieve their goals in Badkapy by skillful bloodless politics, relying on the skill and sleight of hand of the Viennese diplomats; others believed that Austria-Hungary would regain its glory only by force of arms.

The sword of the Habsburgs - the army of the Danube Monarchy - over the last half of the 19th century gave up more than once on the battlefields and, of course, together with the country, experienced all the internal struggle that was in full swing in the state. The Weppers' revolution split the single Habsburg army into three parts: the "Caesar" (imperial) army and the armip of the two halves of the state: the Austrian and Hungarian landwehrs. We have no right to dwell in detail on the description of the Austro-Hungarian army, because we did this, more or less in detail, in the first book of our work. It should only be noted here that the supra-national hostility that was waged in the state was also present in the army, being one of the reasons for its weakness. Not a few other shortcomings of a material nature were experienced by this army. However, the military leaders of the moparchy made many strides in raising the combat effectiveness of the army, so as not to lag behind the army of their ally, Hermapia. In particular, the "hero of our story" Koprad, pachalpic of the Austro-Hungarian general staff, fought "continuous" battles for the development and improvement of the army. rusted sword

The Habsburgs, and meanwhile the political situation prevailing in Europe indicated that weapons should soon be needed.

According to the first book of our work, the reader should already be solidly acquainted with Konrad and his views. It is true that we have surmised very little about his views in the field of foreign policy. We will try to fill this gap now. We will allow ourselves here to briefly restore our impression of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff.

Before us is a man already elderly, with an outstanding mind, with a stubborn, strong character, sometimes with a good balance. Konrad was a quick-tempered nature who knew how to either love or hate. Devoted with all his heart to his work, a "faithful" servant of the Habsburgs and a mopolarch, the chief of staff was a bright representative of the ruling bourgeois class, burning with an active struggle for the interests of this class. Independent in his judgments, Konrad sharply defended them, regardless of who was his opponent or listener.

We will not repeat the military views of the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, but will focus the attention of the reader of our work on the political "creed" of Konrad.

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He pointed out more than once that he had not received any political training, but to work out his views on politics by reading historical literature, getting to know the history of the monarchy's nationalities and his own life itself.

Coming from an aristocratic family, Konrad from childhood, from his parents and mentors, perceived the need to serve "great" Austria, that is, aristocratic, medieval Austria, which he then considered his duty throughout his life.

School, service in various areas of the monarchy - brought Konrad face to face with an aggravated national strife, and from here, in the head of the future chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff, his own theory of the state structure of the monarchy, his own projects for the improvement of this collapsing building, was born.

A "soldier" by vocation, who repeatedly declared that he had no desire to engage in politics, Konrad, meanwhile, was widely interested in it.

In the first book, we have already characterized the theory of the chief of the general staff about a "united" and strong state, which, in his conception, Austria-Hungary should be. Konrad recognized the need to strengthen the central and supreme power in the mopolarchy, so that all subjects felt its firm hand. However, at the same time, he went for the autonomy of individual nationalities. Each of them must live and develop, but invariably be part of the monarchy. The ideal for Konrad was Germany - a union of various principalities. The same alliance, in the opinion of the chief of the general staff, was to arise on the banks of the Danube, publicizing its borders and including in them some of the neighboring Balkan states. In the place of the developing monarchy, a strong Rome of our day should arise - this is the basis of Konrad's thinking.

All the proposals of the chief of staff followed from it, and his practical activity was guided by it.

A monarchist by conviction, the stern butcher of the headquarters, more than once recommended Frapp-Joseph to restore order in this or that area and even among the cabinet of ministers with the powerful hand of a true dictator, without stopping before dispersing it. In a "strong" Rome there must be a "strong" government.

We will not now reveal the views of Conrad in the field of external relations of the monarchy, for they will be clear from the future, but we will establish only the "historical" task that, in the opinion of the chief of staff, lay with Austria-Hungary.

In Conrad's view, Austria-Hungary should be a "culttrager" among the Balkan Slavs. It had a duty to history - to introduce Western and Southern Slavs to European culture, uniting them under the rule of the Habsburgs. The cultural and economic development of Austria-Hungary required the opening of routes to the Balkans.

It is easy to understand that Koprads was an apostle of Vienna's active foreign policy, one of those "imperialists" who deplored the modest role played by Austria-Hungary in the political arena of Europe in recent years.

There is no doubt that in the field of foreign relations the dominant role belonged to diplomacy. However, as we know from the first book, Conrad

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"Unfortunately" he saw a close and direct connection between the preparation of the army for war and foreign policy, and therefore he could not imagine his work without close contact with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Pointing out that Austria-Hungary, surrounded on almost all sides by enemies, could not be ready for war on all fronts at the same time, Konrad said: "The chief of the general staff and the minister of foreign affairs had to maintain close contact in their work. The Minister of Foreign Affairs had to be guided by the Chief of the General Staff on the size of the military forces, in accordance with which he should conduct foreign policy, and together with the Chief of the General Staff from time to time clearly establish for which specific fronts specific military operations should be produced. preparatory work".

"The Minister of Foreign Affairs," Konrad continued, "must make it a rule not to pursue a policy in those directions that could promise an armed clash with a more powerful state or alliance of states. He must understand that long-term military training cannot change rapidly. This required far-sightedness, clear and definite goals from the policy, and a true statesman had to follow this.

The very position on the chief of the general staff said that "he is responsible for all operational and preparatory work in case of war", that "he is obliged, in view of this, to take part in all military-political questions", which "has influence on the resolution of all military and political issues".

Conrad did not want to refuse to participate in the resolution of these issues.

called, but looked at it as a heavy duty. He, as a "soldier", was not fooled by politics, but he spoke more than once about his apoliticality. How sincere these statements of the "soldier" in the general's uniform were, we will see later. As for Conrad's activities in the field of domestic policy, here we can right now refute his statements about non-interference in the internal life of the state with full right. A person who talks about the dissolution of the cabinet of ministers, who, at every opportunity, proposes the use of § 1% of the constitution, which gave the supreme power the right to carry out its decisions independently, without the permission of parliament, can hardly be called apolitical. However, the tradition was strong, and by calling himself a "soldier", being proud of this title, the chief of the general staff emphasized, thereby, his remoteness from the political affairs of the monarchy.

We noted above that Konrad developed his political views by reading historical literature. We do not know how many books he swallowed from this mirror of life, but we can say with certainty that the mirror was crooked and presented the general with past events in a perverted form. Of course, the hero of our novel was far from a Marxist appraisal of history and, having been brought up on bourgeois historical works, he introduced their understanding of the historical course of events into his judgments. For Conrad, the "primary" role in the life of society and its individual members of the "economic force" was completely incomprehensible - it was not she who, in Conrad's view, was the driving force. For a bourgeois figure, what was

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the chief of the general staff, feelings, ideas turned the wheel of history, and in them he looked for foundations and explanations for certain events. Thus, politics, in the concept of Conrad, was by no means a "concentrated economy", but rather the latter was directed by the former. We have already spoken in detail about the fact that even in purely military matters, Conrad completely underestimated the entire importance of economic, not to mention the fact that he could not recognize "economic strength" as the main and only basis in the external relations of societies and states.

We considered it necessary to recall this in order to subsequently correctly understand and clarify the course of thought of the Chief of the General Staff.

"The first and most important thing on my assuming a new position (Chief of the General Staff - B.Sh.)," Konrad writes in his memoirs, "was to establish contact with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, since the mutual internal connection of foreign policy © concrete preparation to the war, which was the responsibility of the chief of the general staff, was recognized by me as essential.

Indeed, immediately upon his appointment as chief of the general staff, Konrad wrote a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Erenthal, in which he asked for his orientation in the foreign policy of the monarchy, as well as support in joint work in the new post.

The response from Erenthal was restrained, but correct. Thus was laid the foundation for the relationship between these two leaders of Austria-Hungary, which ended in mortal enmity.

In the future, the identity of Foreign Minister Erenthal will be clarified

with sufficient completeness, and therefore here we confine ourselves to only a brief outline of this diplomat from the banks of the Danube.

Ehrenthal was a characteristic type of a Viennese diplomat, and, moreover, one who with his own forehead paved the way to a high post at the court of the Habsburgs. Raznochivets, who made a career only with his own hands. Erenthal had to show quite a bit of dexterity and resourcefulness in climbing the career ladder. One has to be not only a climber, in the full sense of the word, in order to rise to the top, but also a really smart person, so as not to suffer defeat in such a slippery field as diplomacy, and even in the face of the declining prestige of the monarchy in the eyes of neighboring states. We do not want to say that Ereptal was the Austro-Hungarian Bismarck, he was far from it, but that he was an outstanding diplomat, one cannot sympathize with this.

The natural mind, the dexterity of a diplomat, the gloss and charm in manners and appeal, appropriate for bourgeois circles, but at the same time firmness of character in achieving the set goal, facilitated Erenthal's path to the ministerial chair.

The ability to maneuver, which is so necessary in general in the Austro-Hungarian state, was characteristic of Ehrenthal and contributed not only to his promotion, but also to his strong position in the role of the all-powerful minister of the Habsburg court.

Enjoying the confidence of Frand-Jospf, Ereptal retained his best memories in St. Petersburg, where he was an ambassador for a long time. How much he knew how to win sympathy among the Russian ministers, we will see from what follows.

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Ereptal was much more familiar with the history of Austro-Wepgrip than Koprada: he was more fully oriented in the inner life of this collapsing state, and therefore he drew up a political program more or less corresponding to the state of the state on the outer Front.

Below we will textually familiarize ourselves with the views of the minister and foreign affairs on the intervening relations of the monarchy, but here we will only indicate that this statesman was far from taking the risky paths of the war to the intended goals. It was clear to him that the war was beyond the power of Austria-Hepgria, and that it was necessary to achieve success by force of arms. Bloodless diplomatic victories, accompanied, when necessary, by the brandishing of weapons, more than pleased the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and he irrevocably embarked on this path of conquest. For him, as a man of action, who knows how to balance the goal with the means, those tasks of military policy that were more achievable were primarily important. We will not hide that he was not alien to the broad plans of "Austrian imperialism", being an adherent of Austria's access to the Aegean Sea, but he considered this feasible only in the distant future (if only his views were recognized as sincere). Rather, one must think that such plans were expressed to them in order to please a handful of inveterate court activists, especially since they were far from being implemented.

Erenthal's influence on the affairs of Austria-Hungary was so great, and the position of minister so firmly established, that he was not afraid to enter into open contradictions even with the heir, Franz Ferdinand. Smart

The diplomat walked confidently along the slippery parquet of the Viennese court.

With such a figure, the newly appointed butcher of the General Staff, Koprad, had to "establish contact".

The latter did not suspect that he was not a desirable comrade for Ereptal in joint work. Rumors reached Konrad only later that the candidature of the former Minister of War Chitreich, whom the Minister of Foreign Affairs favored, was nominated for the post of Chief of the General Staff by Erenthal. Erenthal's candidate was rejected, and needless to say, his pleasure in this matter - and Erenthal was a man who did not quickly forget insults - was transferred to Conrad. In the latter, the minister saw a protege of Franz Ferdinand, a like-minded person of Conrad, and therefore extreme caution and restraint should have been shown to such a person.

Erenthal's adviser on military affairs, by friendship, turned out to be War Minister Schonaich, who, as we know from the first book, was also not a hurried man for the new chief of the general staff.

Thus, it could already be said in advance that close, sincere contact in the work of Coprade would hardly have been possible to establish with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Having received from Erenthal a discreet answer to his first letter, Konrad was not upset, because, according to him, he put business above all else, and not personal sympathies. Therefore, the chief of the general staff began his work in the hope of somehow establishing relations with the representative of the foreign

politicians.

Erenthal turned out to be so restrained that he decided not to

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deeply devote Conrad to the document: his departments. Suffice it to point out that the chief of the General Staff was not even aware of the Austro-German allied treaty, not to mention the fact that many important dispatches coming from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were a secret from the highest representative of the General Staff. Conrad isolated posteneino from foreign policy.

Principal differences between Erenthal and Koprad in their views on the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary joined this ego. Finally, Conrad's employees added fuel to the fire. In his reminiscences, he regrets that when he took office, there were no changes in the entire personnel of the general staff in Vienna, since he did not find support in him, but only intrigues that towered beyond the steppes of the institution, complicating the position of the chief of the general staff. headquarters in his relations © Minister of Foreign Affairs. We present evidence of this in its place.

Looking ahead a little, we must point out that the "contact" in the work of the General Staff with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs turned out to be so unsteady that Conrad came to the following conclusion: "Where the supreme power, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chief of the General Staff are united in one person, there one can expect an expedient and successful policy, but where this is not the case, where the three organs of state exercise their influence, it is necessary that they work in mutual connection, that each of them knows in every detail the work of the other. If one hand does not know what the other is doing; if because of mistrust, pride, jealous

protecting one's circle of duties or mutual resentment, the most important matters are delayed; if one or another seeks secretly, behind the back, to carry out the question in accordance with his opinion, then there will be only failure.

We know that the new Chief of the General Staff was not a person who could put up with the isolation of foreign policy. If it was necessary to contact work with Ereptal, then Koprad decided to go his own way. As annoying as it may be to him, as a "soldier," the chief of the general staff began to sort out all the external relations of the monarchy with neighboring states and to outline a line in these relations that would correspond to the military interests of Austria-Vsigria. In a word, Conrad led his political "line of conduct."

"The main lines for foreign policy and its sing must be firm! establish," says Kopral in his memoirs, "since a ship does not sail without a compass. Otherwise, it is absolutely impossible to foresee where he will go. »

Koprad lost confidence in such a helmsman of the ship as Erenthal was, and decided not to let go of the helm from his own hands. From now on, two different people were at the helm of foreign policy, which, frankly, did not bode well.

Contemporaries evaluate Conrad as a man who never hid behind other people's, more powerful backs, but always expressed his views to everyone, up to Franz Joseph.

It was the same in foreign policy. Conrad tried to spend his

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views in this area not only before the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but went with them to Franz-Josich, Franz-Ferdinand, verbally and in writing defending their correctness. In this struggle, as we shall see, the head of the general iggab fell, but by his nature he would not have gone to any other outcome - except, of course, victory.

Foreign policy captured the "sollat" so much that it accompanied him abroad, where, on business, he was seconded. And there the chief of the general staff created politics, being, as he tells us, apolitical. Whether it's fair or not, we'll see below, but in the neighboring states Koprad roared like a politician, as a representative of a "military party," that is, a party fanning the torch of war.

This concludes our preliminary acquaintance with the Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and we turn to an examination of the foreign policy of the monarchy and the participation of the General Staff in it.

We ask the reader of our work to patiently follow us in reading the apnals of the Habsburg state, and we hope that then together we will "explore" on the issues that will emerge in the course of our narration.

CHAPTER P

ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Annexation is the threshold of a world war. — Importance of annexation in foreign

policy of Austria-Hungary. - Konrad on the foreign policy of the monarchy by the beginning of 1907. - Memoir of the Chief of the General Staff of April 6, 1907 on the war with Italy. - The resistance of Erenthal and the refusal of Franz Josef. — Conrad's defense of his memoir. - Konrad's visit to Berlin and his first meeting with Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff. — Personality of Moltke (junior). - November 18, 1907 Konrad receives from Erenthal the main political lines for work on the war plan. — Proposal of Konrad Erenthal November 19, 1907 on the need to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. - The Council of Ministers on December 1 on the same issue; Konrad is not invited to the meeting. - Memoir of the Chief of the General Staff for 1908: annexation, war with Italy, Serbia and Montenegro. - Conrad's meeting with the German Chancellor Bülow. - Conversation of the chief of staff with Erenthal on April 2 about the memoir. Conrad's proposals for joint work with Moltke on the war plan and Erenthal's refusal. — Conrad's reports of 17 April: the possibility of a European war. - Erenthal's opinion about this. - The beginning of negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburg on annexation. — Indication of Franz Josef on Conrad's relations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. — Konrad's first trip to Romania in the summer of 1908, a letter about it to Erenthal and a conversation with him. - General staff and press. — Izvolsky's answer to Erenthal. - Little Turkish coup in Turkey and the acceleration of annexation. — Erenthal's letter to Konrad dated July 15 © excerpted from Byudlov's note. - Conrad's work with Moltke according to the war plan is postponed by Erenthal until autumn. — Conrad's correspondence with Erenthal about the political situation. - Decision of the Council of Ministers on August 19, with the participation of Konrad, on the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. — Erenthal's memoir of 9 August. - Meeting of Erenthal, Izvolsky and Titoni in September 1908 in Buchlau and an agreement between them. — October 5 Bulgaria declares itself an independent kingdom. - Decree on the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on October 7, 1908. — European states about annexation.

Konrad assumed the post of Chief of the General Staff in the autumn of 1906, i.e., on the threshold of the first Balkan Crisis caused by the annexation of Austria-Ventria to Bosnia and Herzegovina. From this crisis, Konrad in his memoirs proposes to begin the study of the history of the world war.

Saying that the world war did not appear suddenly, because of the Sarajevo massacre, but was a consequence of the tense atmosphere that enveloped Europe long before 1914, Konrad points out that during this long period the political situation became more and more aggravated, and preparations for war in all states every year assumed an increasingly intense character, especially in those of them that, with clearly defined goals, went towards the war.

"Whoever begins the study of the world war," says Konrad, "from the first day of the mobilization of 194% of the year, he will not understand the internal connection of the event.

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ty... The crisis created by the annexation (of Bosnia and Herzegovina) can be described as the first thunderclap, which has already illuminated the future situation to such an extent that it was possible to foresee the development of events to an undoubted end and the measures that should be taken".

Thus, according to the opinion of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, the 1908 annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the starting point in the study of the World War.

In his book *The Origin of the World War*, Poincaré writes that, having made a territorial annexation, contrary to the wishes of the population, the emperor Francis-Joseph destroyed the treaty (Berlin Treaty), approved by the international congress; for the first time he provoked the scourge of the war, shattered all the foundations of law and, moreover, offended the patriotism of the Serbs, who have always regarded their neighbors in Bosnia and Herzegovina as blood brothers. In short, the annexation of 1908 was the subject of the ultimatum of 1914. Both acts have the same content: "the first explains the second, the second completes the first."

If it is still excusable for the Austrian general staff's clerk to seek the birthright of the world war in the annexation of 1908, then the considerations of the Parisian politician cannot be justified from here. Everyone, of course, knows that the world war broke out not because of the Balkans alone, that even in 1905 the Moroccan horizon was so densely covered with military clouds heading for Europe that the latter was already on the verge of a war, if one of them had not been frightened of it. The instigators of the crisis in Morocco were Wilhelm II, who ordered "to retreat throughout the entire Africa in order not to bring it to war, since neither the artillery nor the Navy are ready for it." Thus, we could successfully include Wilhelm, and perhaps even Poincaré himself, among Franz-Joseph, if only we would begin to look for the perpetrators of the war in these or other personalities.

Any politician and historian of our day knows very well that with the entry of the large states of Europe at the end of the 19th century onto the path of imperialism, economic and political relations among them became more and more entangled, creating not one, but a multitude of knots of contradictions, which could be cut by only the sword of war or revolution. The danger of war lay not in personalities, but in mutual competition, in the struggle of the capitalists of various countries for colonies, for markets for raw materials and sales, and if we talk about individuals who pursued this or that policy of states, then only as about the figures who made the whole policy these states. Apparently Poincaré's memory had become bad, for he was already playing an important role in the political arena of France at that time, if one could even trust the sincerity of the statements of this diplomat!

True, for the Habsburg monarchy the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, without a hitch, was the first major diplomatic action since 1878, it was a prelude to that clearly aggressive policy in the Balkans, which the "pure" Austrians had long dreamed of on a wide scale. Kropotkin is right that, having decided on this step, the Danubian Empire was embarking on a path that inevitably led to an armed clash, the dimensions of which were clearly outlined in 1908.

For these reasons, we also tend to start with the annexation crisis.

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sis, by no means, of course, forgetting that he was not the root cause of the world war, as he tries to portray the brisk French pen.

The scope of our research does not allow us to dwell in full detail on the history of annexation and to acquaint in detail with all the documents that make up the material about it. We will, in an abridged presentation, highlight the main stages in the relationship between politics and strategy during this and the following crises that led to the Danube-

Russian empire to a world war. Those interested in details are referred directly to the work of Conrad himself and other works of statesmen of those times, as well as to the works of other persons who covered the era we are analyzing.

The beginning of the annexation crisis dates back to 1907, from which we will begin.

We dwell on the events of 1907 because each historical event has its own preparatory period, and for the annexation of 1908 it began a year earlier. In 1907, the ten-year term of the Balkan support treaty of 1897, concluded by Russia and Austria-Hungary in 1897, expired. It was clear that the policy of these states in the Balkans had to be either confirmed by an extension of the treaty or settled by a new diplomatic act. By 1908, there was neither one nor the other, and in St. Petersburg they were greatly alarmed by the plans of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary Erenthal for an economic and cultural offensive in the Balkans, which he developed before the Austro-Hungarian delegations. The case concerned railway construction in Sandjak and beyond, with access to Thessaloniki, i.e., that project of "Austrian imperialism" that we spoke about above.

For clarity, we must remind the reader of the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina, occupied in 1878 by the Austrians. This act was confirmed by Art. 95 of the Berlin Congress, with Austria securing the right to maintain garrisons in the Novobazar Sanjak. By the treaty of 1881, in a secret convention attached to it, Germany, Russia and Austria established the right of Austria to annex these provinces at any time, while maintaining the previous position in the Novobazar sanjak. Finally, clause 3 of the 1897 agreement between Russia and Austria demanded full respect for Austrian rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, indicating that this issue was not and could not be subject to discussion at all. This is the documentary side of this political issue.

It is known from the previous chapter that when he assumed the post of Chief of the General Staff, Konrad received a restrained response from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to a request for orientation in the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary. There was no necessary guidance, and the chief of staff was left to his own thoughts in the mouth area.

Konrad was not at a loss and formed a definite opinion about the external and internal situation of Austria-Hungary by the end of 1906, with which he and introduces us.

The internal state of the Danubian Empire, according to Konrad, is full of contradictions, and only one army is still a connecting element,—

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therefore, it is necessary to make every effort to develop it, so that it, like a whale, supports a crumbling state.

As far as foreign policy is concerned, according to Conrad, it must have in mind two main points of departure: 1) to keep the burdened borders of the state and 2) to include in it those areas which are necessary for the monarchy for its economic development.

The center of gravity of both these tasks is, in an evil way, in the Balkans, de, on the one hand, there was a threat of separation of the Slavic regions of the monarchy and a danger was created for its maritime power, and on the other hand, the necessary paths to the east passed along which from ancient times From time to time there was all the cake from the Danube trees.

In fairness, it should be noted that the influence of the economic conditions of the life of the state on foreign policy was reflected in the brain of the chief of the general staff.

Considering relations with neighboring states, the chief of the general staff came to the conclusion that an alliance with Germany was essential: it was necessary for both neighboring states. On the one hand, Austria-Hungary was the support of Germany against the policy of encirclement that was carried out in Europe in relation to the German empire, and on the other, the paths of Germany and Austria were connected in their striving to the east. Both from the political, and from the economic and military sides, both states turned out to be interested in each other. If their trade interests sometimes clashed, it was the work of single groupings and those parties that sought to break such a natural and lasting alliance. In addition to the fact that the German army was a weighty factor in the hands of the middle powers, Conrad was also concerned about the fact that with the conclusion of an alliance with Germany, preparations for war ended in the railway relation of the northern regions of the monarchy. They went. the construction of local and narrow-gauge railways, the directions of which could often not benefit, but even harm the army concentrating along them with the Front to the north. Many years of work were needed to eliminate the shortcomings of the railway network, otherwise, when the alliance with Germany was terminated, an enemy invasion of Bohemia could be expected.

In a word, the alliance with Germany was considered the chief of the general. Headquarters vitally inappropriate, and he notes with satisfaction the unanimity on this issue with Franz Josef and Foreign Minister Erenthal.

However, all these persons painfully guarded the sovereignty of Austria-Hungary, not wanting to fall under the scourge of the Germans from the banks of the Spree.

A different approach was from the outside: Conrad to Italy. This ally aroused not only distrust, but even hatred, which had long filled the heart and soul of the Chief of the General Staff. The Italian irredenta growing stronger every year, the restoration of the armed forces by Italy, the desire of Italian policy to gain a foothold in the Balkans and, finally, its attraction to France and England - all these were symptoms that exposed the cunning of an official friend. Kovrad once and for all enlisted "Italy among the irreconcilable enemies of the Danubian Empire, dispersing in.

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this with the majority of the Vienna and Berlin diplomats, and above all with Drenthal.

If Italy, therefore, was an unreliable ally, then Coprade considered Romania more sincere, where the personality of King Charles, as it were, guaranteed allegiance to an alliance with the Habsburgs.

Relations between France and Analia were determined by their policy towards

Germany. With the end of the Moroccan crisis of 1906, France tried to be loyal to both Germany and Austria. England pursued a policy of encircling Hermapia, but her attempts to wrest Austro-Hungary from the alliance were unsuccessful.

In the Balkans, Serbia and Chernoyuria were clearly hostile to the monarchy, with the latter falling between Russia and Austria, and Serbia was conducting propaganda in the Slavic regions of the monarchy. "Already in my youth," says Koprad, "while understanding the South Slavic question, I attached special importance to it for the monarchy and saw as the only way out for Balkan politics the inclusion of all the southern Slavs who lived within the borders of Serbia. , within the framework of Austro-Venaria. It seemed to me that the inclusion of Serbia could be carried out peacefully on the rights of a union state, like Bawarpi in Germany, and I was convinced that such an act was also vital for Serbia, since it would benefit from the use of sea routes, the navy of the monarchy , its industry, trade and communications. On the peninsula itself, Serbia's position as a member of a great power would have been stronger and more secure.

"Such an entry of Serbia into the boundaries of the Habsburg monarchy," Konrad continues, "would lead to the destruction of the antagonism between Serbia and Croatia. With the elimination of the mutual hostility of the Serbs and Croats, it became possible to form a strong Slavic association as part of the monarchy, which could resist the common enemy, especially - threatening its shores - Italy.

However, with the change of dynasty in 1903, the influence of Russia increased in Serbia and the great gray idea began to develop, the same unification of all the southern Slavs, but at the hands of Serbia. The paplavist ideas of the Serbs, reinforced by misconceptions with Hungary on the economic platform, apparently ruled out the peaceful entry of Serbia into Austria-Hungary, and from now on, according to Koprad, "a military operation in this matter seemed inevitable sooner or later." Koprad did not attach much importance to Serbia's economic struggle with Hungary and believed that pan-Slavist propaganda was the most difficult.

As a counterbalance to Serbia in the Balkans, Bulgaria developed. Although bound by a military convention with Russia since 1902, Bulgaria, however, in recent years has left the orbit of its influence, as a result of which the position of Austria-Hungary has been strengthened. Some obstacle was the strained relations between Bulgaria and Rumysia.

Thuria, due to internal weakness, was distracted by the reforms in Macedonia, just as Greece was chained by the same Macedonian events, however, going hand in hand with Rumania in them.

This is how the relationship of the Habsburg monarchy to the European states developed, which, according to Conrad, were drawn into the hands of Eduard UP.

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the policy of encircling Germany and Austria-Hungary. For the transition to open actions, the tripartite agreement lacked one more link - Russia, which was healing the ravages of the Russo-Japanese war and was going through the revolutionary movement of 1905. Russia could not yet think of open action on the fields of Europe, but it had already definitely turned around. Time to the west and set about restoring its military power. was coming

a time when the Russian armies could support the Western policy of parism, and with it the policy of encircling the middle states.

Of the rest of the European states, Conrad's attention was stopped by Sweden and Spain. In the policy of these states, Conrad turned out to be little oriented, but he took into account Spain's interest in African affairs.

The Chief of the General Staff attached great importance to Japan, which was gradually entering the orbit of British influence, and it was not known whether it would be possible to win Japan over to the side of Germany.

Summarizing the political situation by the beginning of 1907, Konrad characterized the main lines of the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary as follows: "The deepening of the alliance with Germany and Romania, distrust of Italy and slandering her as an enemy were the immediate tasks of foreign policy and military necessity. I brought to the fore our dal Kansbaya policy, since it was clear to me that events would develop there that should be decisive for the monarchy in the future.

"Here," Konrad continues, "domestic and foreign politics are combined."

In his opinion, the policy of encircling the middle states with a tripartite agreement was outlined with clarity; therefore, the latter had only one choice: either to give up their positions before this policy, or else to prepare in time for a rebuff, and in this case it was necessary to seek an alliance either with Russia or with England.

Germany and Austria-Hungary lived from day to day, content with the peaceful relations that were developing at that time with neighboring states. Without a certain singing before their eyes and not assessing the impending danger, the middle states, in the opinion of the chief of the general staff, were sitting on a volcano.

It was necessary not to give time to the hostile coalition to finish its work, and for the mouth it was necessary in turn to deliver their blows to opponents who were not yet dead. Such was the program of foreign policy that the hot head of the new Chief of Staff outlined for Austria-Hungary.

While it was crystallizing in Konrad's brain, Ehrenthal, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was also preparing a new campaign against the Balkans, keeping it secret from the General Staff for the time being.

On April 6, 1907, the Chief of the General Staff presents directly to Franco-Josich a memoir in which he proposes to declare war on Italy in the spring of the same year.

Outlining in his memoir the difficult internal state of the monarchy and all the harm it brings to the army, Konrad points out that the internal disarray is also reflected in the external situation, worsening it. Russia is not yet combat-capable, Serbia is in conflict with Bulgaria, Germany is in an alliance

and wants to strengthen the Austro-Hungarian army, France or England will intervene sooner or later, Montenegro will either remain neutral or will act

with Italy. "Thus," says Conrad, "there remains Italy, which is arming and clearly seeking to exploit the difficult internal situation of the monarchy. This must be prevented by preventive war. The rapid and unexpected mobilization of the army of the monarchy will contribute to the achievement of success.

Such a preventive war with Italy is also desirable from the military side, since so far the army of the monarchy, in terms of its equipment and readiness, is superior to the Italian one, and therefore it is necessary not to lose time. Proposing a number of measures to raise the combat readiness of the Austro-Hungarian army and prepare it for war, the chief of the general staff ended his report by pointing out that close connection between the martial law and domestic and foreign policy, which is especially necessary at the moment.

The proposal of the chief of the general staff was rebuffed by Ehrenthal and Franz Joseph himself.

On May 8, 1907, Ehrenthal informs Conrad that Berlin, after a four-year break, received an unexpected proposal from the Chief of the Italian General Staff to resume work on the transfer of Italian troops to the Western Front of Germany. The last development of such a transfer of troops from Vepa and Rome, carried out under an agreement with Berlin, dates back to 1903. Finding it desirable to take part in the work, Ehrenthal considered it necessary to connect this with the resolution of political issues, since otherwise the work would have no practical significance.

In his reply to Ehrenthal on May 13, 1907, Conrad pointed out that the Italian proposal only confirmed his assumptions about the military weakness of Italy, and should be considered as an attempt to buy time to complete his preparations for war, and at the same time to familiarize himself with the state of railways of the monarchy. The chief of the general staff remained on the point of view of his April memoir: either a preventive war, or secret and stubborn preparations for a war with Italy and the development of the armed forces of the monarchy.

For greater persuasiveness, Koprade accompanied his written reports with diagrams and tables drawn up in the operational and intelligence bureau and showing the comparative balance of forces of the monarchy and other states. These applications were, according to Conrad, to clearly outline the paths of foreign policy, since "every foreign policy that does not take into account real power is nothing but a building erected on the sand and leads to failure in the end of the end."

This first independent appearance of Conrad in the political arena failed, but it did not force the new chief of the general staff to change his views. Until mid-November of that year, Conrad remained a staunch preacher of a preventive war against Italy, counting on a one-on-one settlement with this future enemy. In a written report dated September 4, Conrad emphasized that only the government of Rome was loyal to Austria-Hungary, but not a country in which the Italian unification party was gaining the upper hand.

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At this point, we will cut off our acquaintance with the views and first steps of the Chief of the General Staff on the political front, and turn to

another event which was later to be significant in Conrad's work.

In the summer of 1907 Konrad established direct contact with the German General Staff, and through it with Wilhelm himself.

Having received an invitation from Wilhelm to come to Berlin, where they wanted to get to know the new chief of the general staff of the allied monarchy, Konrad, with the permission of Frann-Josich and with the consent of Erenthal, left Vienna on May 37.

On May 28, the first meeting of both Allied Chiefs of Staff took place at the apartment of Moltke (junior). Konrad briefly describes his colleague in his memoirs. He points out that thanks to Moltke's calm, open and quite clear judgment on political and military questions, the very best relations between him and Conrad were established. When the latter shared with the Chief of the German General Staff all those inner feelings that he had to experience when he was appointed to the post, Moltke, in turn, just as candidly told that he, too, was overwhelmed with doubts when he was appointed, especially in view of the fact that the appointment is associated with the name of his famous man. "Are you sure, Your Majesty," Moltke asked Wilhelm, "that you will win the lottery again ?!" However, he was appointed.

In view of the fact that we will have to meet Moltke more than once in the straits of our work, we will allow ourselves to draw attention to his personality.

Despite the fact that Moltke associated with his name the first, but decisive failure of the German weapons and, therefore, cannot be ranked among the host of "great commanders", his personality was subjected in all countries, and above all in Germanpi, comprehensive assessment. True, this circumstance was facilitated precisely by the catastrophe on Mary, which was so unexpected not only for the middle states, but even for the winners. Modern military literature is full of descriptions of the personality of this unlucky German commander. Many of Moltke's relatives, who came across him by chance, and even the doctors who used him at the resort, all contributed to fixing the tragic image of the Chief of the German General Staff for history.

A participant - in his younger years, in the role of a military officer - in the campaign of 1870-1871, Moltke, after graduating from the academy, spent his service either by serving on assignments under the old man Moltke, or commanding guard units. Close to Wilhelm, young Moltke was sent to Russia more than once as a representative of the German emperor at various celebrations.

Appointed in 1905 as a deputy to Schlieffen, Moltke plunged for the first time into the responsible and not particularly familiar work of the General Staff.

Feeling the superiority of his boss, seeing how hard he endures the impending resignation, Moltke himself accepted the new appointment with great hesitation, as we have just heard from Konrad.

Having set the condition for Wilhelm not to interfere in the leadership of large

maneuvers, Moltke agreed to take the post of chief of the general staff.

Possessing intelligence and even character, Moltke devoted himself entirely to the cause, striving to prepare himself for a high appointment, for modern command and control of troops. However, it must be admitted that the basic principles of military affairs and the essence of the difference between theory and reality were not thought out by Moltke.

Paying great attention to the training of troops, to the work of the general staff, Moltke the nephew, however, was not the leader whom history will put on the lists of commanders. He had no self-confidence, no faith in his star, and this could not be made up for by either the sense of duty or the harness of will that Moltke nevertheless revealed in his work. Such a person needed an intimate circle of advisers who would back up the chief of the general staff.

In the soul of Moltke himself, a mystic prone to pessimism in general, "undermined by his state of health, at the age of 66 years, doubts about his suitability for the post of chief of staff more than once arose and even broke out, for he felt that he, in the expression the writer Leskov, "well-known family, but unimportant talent." If Napoleon of the decision "gave birth", which is called "in passing", then for Moltke the birth was extremely difficult, foreshadowing the birth of either a sickly creature or simply a miscarriage.

However, it should be noted that both among the general staff and in the army, the "nephew" of the famous "uncle" enjoyed great respect and trust. The tradition was strong, and the whole question was whether the lottery, which Moltke himself spoke of to Koprada, would be happy.

In the course of our work, we will get acquainted with the views of the Chief of the German General Staff, with his steps, when the days of war were already approaching; before us will pass his difficult experiences and even tears. ... In other words, the appearance of Moltke will emerge more or less clearly, and therefore we hasten to return to new friends, leading a lively conversation.

Discussing military questions, both chiefs of staff touched on the contemporary political situation, and it became clear that they shared the same views on the impending danger of an armed clash and the need for the closest and most unfailing alliance between the two middle empires. Only in the opinion of Italpi Moltke did not agree with the chief of the Austrian staff, pointing out that the latter sees relations with the Russian state in a black light, while Italy is unlikely to dare to fall away from the union.

Moltke was deeply disturbed by the internal state of the Habsburg monarchy. He feared that with the accession to the throne of Franpa-Ferdinand, the moparchpya would be overturned by the Slavic movement. The coprad defended Franz Ferdinand.

After being present at the maneuvers, at the training ground when testing new types of field guns and howitzers, at the parade and various ceremonial breakfasts, during which Konrad met Wilhelm and the generals of the allied army, he returned home, satisfied with the

relations with Moltke, full of mutual trust. Such was the plot of the "romance" of two chiefs of the general staff, who did not suspect that the test of their loyalty was approaching.

On his return to Vienna, the Chief of Staff went about his usual business.

On the foreign-political front, everything seemed to be calm.

November 18, 1907 Konrad was unexpectedly invited to Erenthal. The conversation began with Italy, whose hostility, due to the overlap of interests in the Adriatic Sea, in the Balkans, in Trieste and on the coast, the chief of staff again tried to prove to the minister.

Then the interlocutors moved on to the general political situation, with Erenthal expressing the opinion that since Russia was recovering rapidly, the question of the western Balkans and, very likely, the straits (from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean) would be next in line.

On the part of Konrad, a wish was expressed to settle these issues peacefully, since Austria cannot fight on three fronts (against Russia, Italy and the Balkans).

Ehrenthal, for his part, believed that he could succeed in a peaceful resolution of the issue with Russia, even if this affected Germany's trade interests. The exchange of opinions of the interlocutors led to the conclusion that Germany would hardly oppose Russia, since in this case she could expect a declaration of war by France. For Russia, the issue of the straits is complicated by a possible obstacle from Turkey and the Balkan states. In addition, Konrad added that it was possible to expect England to speak.

Summing up their conversation, both interlocutors came to the conclusion that one should count on: 1) an agreement with Russia; 2) the calm position of Germany; 3) the likelihood of a conflict with Italy; and 4) the hostile position of England, although at present the best relations exist with her.

The main lines for the work of the head of the grain department are the preparation for war with Italy - not excluding, of course, other options - and taking into account the fact that Italy will first try to tie up the armies of the monarchy in the Balkans in order to divert them from the main theater of war.

Subsequently, the conversation turned to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Konrad reporting on the turbulent internal state in these provinces; that the policy of Minister of Finance Buryan is weak; that he, Konrad, raised a question before Franz Josich about the transfer of all power into military hands; that all revolutionary attempts must be resolutely suppressed so as not to divert troops to maintain order in the provinces in the event of a war with Italy.

Erenthal agreed that Buryan's policy is marked by weakness, that he, over his head, Erenthal, and the Minister of War, decides the affairs of Franz-Joseph, and that all this internal turmoil in the occupied provinces can only damage the entire foreign policy.

The next day, November 19, Konrad sent a letter to Ehrenthal about the conversation that had taken place that evening. It should be noted that the chief of the general staff considered it necessary to record his conversations with Erenthal on paper, apparently in order to have a document in case misunderstandings could always arise.

In the letter, based on the "strategic" requirements, perhaps less. diversion of troops from the Italian (main) theater of war, Conrad again pointed out the need to establish a firm order in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and "the main obstacle to this," in his opinion, "is the Treaty of Berlin." "Only after the annexation of these provinces can one have free hands," wrote the chief of the general staff. "This annexation is thus a necessity," he continued. What difficulties it involves, Conrad does not know, but. it would be good if, for the opening of the straits, it would be possible to obtain Russia's consent to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this case, "Germany would hardly have come out against it, being tied up, moreover, by France: it is possible to pay off with weapons with Italy and Serbia; Calm Montenegro. money; Keep Bulgaria and Romania neutral; England seems dangerous as a maritime power that can threaten troops with landings.

This was how the chief of the general staff planned the future situation, and he immediately considered it necessary to add: preparation for war and politics, I consider it necessary to express. your look. In this case, I allow myself to draw attention to the letter I sent you a year ago when I was appointed chief of the general staff, in which I raised issues related to the monarchy in a similar way.

"Politics," Konrad wrote further, "intrudes not only into questions of concentration, the strategic deployment of the army, but just as deeply into individual questions of the internal organization of the army and combat readiness."

"I do not share the point of view," the chief of the general general ended his letter, "that the army is a strictly closed organism, developing in itself, which is called up only at the moment of need, at the last moment, and for this I am very grateful that you, circumventing this principle, invited me to a lively and direct exchange of opinions.

Such is the prologue of the first drama in the Balkans. We say "prologue" because. the subsequent speech was not coordinated even with Germany, not to mention other states. The restrained Erenthal was true to himself, and only on December 1 did a council of ministers take place, at which they put forward the need for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council decided to accept this proposal, if the circumstances were favorable.

Conrad was notified of the meeting of the council by Erenthal only on December 17th.

Still not knowing about the decision of the council, on December 16, the chief of the general. Headquarters presented to Franpa-Josich, in writing, his thoughts on the necessary measures during the annexation of the provinces.

In them, outlining military measures, Conrad expressed his views on the direction of foreign policy. Here he put forward the need for preliminary negotiations with Russia, Germany, Romania, Bulgaria and France, and then the announcement of annexation, which, perhaps,

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calls for an armed clash with Italy. Although this proposal for a preventive intercourse with this state was rejected, thereby losing a favorable military situation, but at the present time it is not so bad that it is not possible to count on military success.

On December 17 a meeting took place between the Chief of the General Staff and Erenthal, which was later confirmed by Koprads in two letters dated December 18. Discussing negotiations with Russia about the straits, Conrad felt it necessary to keep Germany from moving against Russia, otherwise Austria would have to be drawn into the war. Erenthal thought it possible to maneuver between both sides, as in the Crimean War.

This time, Erenthal was more outspoken. He planned the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the annexation of Serbia, with the exception of the Bulgarian part, which should go to Bulgaria, as the goals of his Balkan policy. As for the Sandzhak railway through Mitrovica, Erenthal considered it possible, with the consent of Turpiya, to occupy the Sandzhak, which would not violate the Berlin Treaty.

The chief of the general staff spoke out more decisively and considered that the Balkan policy should be put to its full height and resolved by the annexation of Bosnia, Herzegovina and Serbia. "If we occupy Niš with troops and be masters there," Conrad wrote, "then our influence in the northwestern part of the Balkans and on the rest of the peninsula will be well secured."

As for the occupation of Sandjak, already in 1878-79. this seemed to Conrad a rather "naive" military measure, allegedly leading to the division of Montenegro and Serbia. On this he remained and pompous.

On January 15, 1908, the Chief of the General Staff presented a one-year memoir for 1908, in which he outlined his views on the political situation, the options for the war plan arising from it, and all those measures that need to be carried out to ensure the country's defense capability and to bring the army in combat readiness. Conrad says that what he said in his memoir, look! were the starting points until the end of the economic crisis, which is why we consider it necessary to familiarize ourselves with them in more detail.

"The organization and combat readiness of the armed forces, as well as operational and other preparations for war, are hardly in any other state in such close connection with foreign and domestic policy as in the monarchy,"¹ begins his memoir of the chief of the general staff.

Pointing to Spain, France, Russia, and Germany, which have theaters of war of fairly definite and limited size, Conrad says that Austria is in a completely different position both in terms of the extent of her threatened land frontiers and in terms of the diverse character of the terrain on future theaters of war.

¹ By monarchy, Conrad means the Austro-Hungarian Empire. B. Sh.

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This is reflected in the preparations for war, which cannot be improvised, but must be the work of several years.

"Organization, deployment and preparation for war," Konrad continues, "which would meet all possible future clashes cannot be carried out, since they would require such means that would surpass the forces of the monarchy."

"In these respects, it is necessary, first of all, to take into account and prepare that variant of a future collision, which is considered the most probable in terms of time."

"In view of the foregoing, in order to resolve military issues, one must always take into account foreign policy, and therefore the erroneous opinion must be discarded that the armed forces can be separated from politics, be an independent organism, just as domestic politics does not penetrate to a lesser extent in the organization, numbers, combat readiness, training and spirit of the army, as well as in specific military training.

Then dwelling on the influence of domestic policy on specific military training, Konrad says: "For a specific military training, it is not indifferent whether it is possible to throw all the forces against an external enemy or turn part of them to maintain internal order."

"Therefore, domestic policy should be directed towards the concentration of all means for the development of the army; care must be taken to ensure that, in the event of an external conflict, the armed forces! could be completely thrown to the Front; on the other hand, foreign policy must always determine the most likely case of war and take care that all armed forces turn against one of the opponents.

Based on the foregoing deep introduction of politics into the development and organization of the army and, especially, into concrete military training, the chief of the general staff considered it his duty to take into account the political situation, expressing his view: on it in the presented memoir.

Turning to a consideration of the present general political situation, Conrad says: "Every political consideration, in the present state of affairs, must begin with a consideration of the role which the East Asian peoples (China and Japan) will play in political life." Conrad sees this special role in their growing population, in the intelligentsia, labor force and military qualities of the population of these states. However, the influence of their might on the politics of Europe is still a matter of the future, but in modern conditions, with the penetration of the products of European industry into these countries and the development of trade, the competition of the European powers begins. This clash of trade interests of European states threatens military conflicts.

For Austria-Hungary, according to the opinion of the Chief of the General Staff, which is not interested in the Far Eastern policy, at the present time it is necessary to secure for itself those areas that lie geographically close to it and naturally gravitate towards it, this is the Adriatic Sea, the Balkan

peninsula, eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, part of North Africa, Western Asia (Levant).

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These are the basic lines of politics that must be adopted and from which the paths for the development of the armed forces of the monarchy are clarified.

Of the indicated policy objectives, the Balkans and relations with Italy are combat objectives. In the Balkans, the chief of the general staff resolutely rejects the policy of $\{a(a5(o)$, since, in general, he does not recognize stagnation in historical development.

"Only an aggressive policy with positive goals," Konrad philosophizes, "can overcome obstacles and achieve success."

"Whoever does not have the courage to turn to such a policy, he must come to naught. Such an aggressive policy must be pursued by the monarchy. as well as the corresponding military training. Only with such a policy can a reasonable direction be given to military training.

"Specifically in the Balkans, the monarchy should annex the occupied: areas and include Serbia with Nis inclusive in the monarchy."

"Independent Serbia is a constant hotbed," declares the Chief of the General Staff, "for various tricks and machinations, the latter being aimed at separating all the South Slavic regions." Such a falling away of the South Slavic regions would weaken the "great" power, and then would threaten to cut it off from the sea. In addition, the defeat of Serbia would have solved the issue of the Sandzak railway. The establishment of the monarchy on the coast of the Adriatic Sea creates the basis from which an aggressive policy can be developed - the development of the naval navy and maritime trade.

"It is natural," Konrad continues, "that the spread of the monarchy in the Balkans and the development of the navy must meet with resistance: from other states, and above all from Italy."

In the following, Coprade turns to a detailed examination of the position of Italy. Once on his strong point, Conrad proves the need to keep up with Italy in armaments and to reckon with her weapons, which, for the time being, is favored by the grouping of powers, and only a possibility. armed conflict in the Balkans hurts a little. It is possible that Italy will try to drag the monarchy into an armed clash in the Balkans, in order to then fall upon it. In this case, it would seem more expedient to settle accounts with Italy first, in order to have free hands for the Balkans. Conrad considers the preparation of the war with Italy his immediate task, attaching secondary importance to the Balkans.

Considering the implementation of the annexation in the Balkans and the accession of Serbia, Konrad believes that Italy and Serbia will stand in the way. Russia must be interested in the straits; one can also complicate its situation in Finland. Germany is on the side of the monarchy, Romania is neutral, Turkey will be held by Bulgaria, Greece is not yet worthy of attention, Montenegro should be bought, France will be balanced by Germany. Thus, the situation is favorable for a war with Italy, and possibly with Serbia and Montenegro.

Pointing again to the need to strengthen the internal order in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Chief of the General Staff moved on to discussion. other, possible in the bulush, options for armed clashes.

These include the possible conflict of Germany © Russia

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because of the Baghdad railway, in which Austria, as a matter of fact, has little interest, but will have to act ... as an ally, on the side of Germany. Italy can be considered either as part of a tripartite alliance, or, most likely, it will be neutral.

Then it is necessary to provide for the possibility of an armed clash between the allies (Germany and Austria) and the hostile European Union.

Konrad's attention is riveted by the developing contradictions between Bulgaria and Turkey, which may in a short time lead to an armed conflict between them, which, in turn, will put the whole Balkan question to be resolved as a whole. This conflict should find the monarchy quite ready, and it would be highly desirable if, before its onset, it were possible to pay off with arms © Italy.

As a result of the discussion of the external political situation, Konrad finds it necessary to have the following options: specific military training:

1. To develop in detail assumptions in case of war: a) with Italy, taking into account the hostile position of Serbia and Montenegro; 6) with one 'Serbia.
9. Mainly to work out considerations in the event of a war against Russia on the side of Germany; detailed work requires about 4 weeks, during which orientation from diplomacy is necessary.
3. Make calculations in case of war against Germany of the future Entente.
4. Take care of considerations in the event of an uprising in the occupied provinces.

This concludes our acquaintance with the memoir of the chief of the general staff for 1908, in which he expressed his main considerations in the foreign policy of the monarchy.

Without going into a detailed analysis of the memoir, we must, however, note that we listened to the frank thoughts of the Viennese militarist, who called on the monarchy with arms in hand to grab what lies nearby, while the "high powers" divide the more distant continents.

Conrad's proposals draw attention to themselves - in the conditions of the general political situation of 1908, to limit the war to certain powers, in other words, to localize it.

By order of Franz Josich, the memoir was sent to Ehrenthal and War Minister Schonaih.

Having poured out his soul, Conrad later began to work on holding

individual questions outlined in the memoir, entering © in written reports to Frand-Josich or communicating his views and assumptions to the Minister of War and Erenthal, as well as guiding them in those dangers of the internal situation that were growing with every passing day in Bosnia.

Meanwhile, the Minister of Foreign Affairs began preparatory negotiations on the implementation of the planned steps in the Balkans and, above all, "tried to reach an agreement with Germany, having secured her consent.

We have already heard that at the appointments of the Austro-Hungarian delegations

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Erenthal openly pointed out the need to strengthen the economic and trade policy in the Balkans, as well as brought it to the fore. the question of railways in Sandzak.

In late March, the German chancellor Bülow arrived in Vienna, with whom the common lines of foreign policy in the Balkans of the allied states were established.

On March 29, 1908, the Chief of the General Staff had a conversation with Bulow on questions of foreign policy. Bülow believed that Russia would begin again to pursue its "strait" policy. Koprad pointed out the possible resistance to her in this Apglia. Judging by the fact, - Konrad said, - that first of all Russia is restoring the army, and not the Navy, it is necessary. to think that Russia is preparing for battles on land. Bulow noticed that and. France will not support Russia on the issue of the straits.

Russia's position on the annexation issue began to interest how

chalpic of the general staff, and Erenthal. In a conversation between both on April 2: Russia's policy was subjected to a comprehensive discussion. Koprad pointed out that its turn to the west was beyond doubt, and the emergence of the Entente must soon be taken into account, but for now we have to talk about it only partially ... With the exception of the division left in the Caucasus, the rest of the Russian army will be concentrated on the western borders. At this time there is war. with Russia is hardly probable, but in the future it will have to be reckoned with. In this case, the grouping of powers would be as follows: Austria, Germany, Turkey, and probably Rumania, on the one side; Russia, Serbia, presumably Bulgaria and then France on the other; Italy is in doubt, but everything points to the fact that she will oppose the middle powers, and therefore it was not necessary to reject proposals to beat her in 1907. In any case, the chief of the general staff found it necessary now, if only a European war was possible, to enter in negotiations with Moltke to clarify questions on the war plan. - Erenthal described the policy of Russia as bifurcated: the court. the party is striving for the formation of an alliance of three emperors (Austria, Russia and Germany), while the liberal party is pushing for an aggressive stance against Germany, Austria and Turkey. The first strengthens the Fleet, the second ground forces. Minister of Foreign Affairs Izvolsky leans towards the liberal party. The question is which party will prevail. However, in view of the likely entry of Russia into the above-mentioned imperial Entente, it is premature to start talking with Moltke.

When the conversation turned to Conrad's sore spot - Italy, Erenthal again

pointed out that Italy, now distracted by Tripoli, would not particularly harm Austrian interests in Albania and, in general, was afraid of Austria-Hungary. To such an argumentation of the minister, the chief of the general staff objected that such fear is valid for the time being, namely, until Austria is bound by the Balkans.

In general, Ehrenthal recognized the political situation as satisfactory: Russia would be diverted, and then the preservation of \$5,424 (and in the Balkans could continue as long as Austria-Hungary wanted to.

No matter how solid Erenthal's arguments about the possibility of reaching an agreement with Russia on the issue of annexation, however, the head of the general

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The new headquarters considered it necessary to join Russia along with Italy along with potential opponents. April 17 Conrad presents two papers, from. of which one is purely operational according to the plan of war with Russia and Italy. In another report, he outlines possible groupings of states in the event of a crisis. If Russia and Italy remain neutral, then a sudden and decisive blow must be launched against Serbia, at the very least, with a tarnish of Belgrade. In the joint action of Russia and Italy, it is necessary to take into account the grouping of states on a European scale, taking into account Germany and France. Citing a number of military measures to be taken, the Chief of the General Staff, at the same time, asked that the Minister of Foreign Affairs be given instructions to: 1) continue to orient the Chief of Staff in a political situation and 2) especially save the Chief of Staff with information about the likelihood of war Austria is on the side of Germany in its clash with Russia and Italy. In the latter case, Koprade considered it necessary now, with the observance of strict secrecy, to begin a more businesslike relationship with the Chief of the German General Staff on the war plan.

On April 22, Conrad received the necessary orientation during a meeting with Erenthal. The Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed out that the time had not yet come to raise the Balkan question as a whole. At the same time, he noted the undesirable inspiring of the press by Franz Ferdinand, which led to bad consequences for the monarchy.

As for the possible intervention of Russia and Italy, then Erenthal. considered it impossible for the former due to lack of money; the second one should, in his opinion, be observed. If in 1907 they did not go to a preventive war with Italy, it was solely because of the unwillingness of the Hungarians. and financial difficulties.

To the suggestion of the chief of the general staff to immediately start negotiations on the war plan, which had been interrupted since the middle of the 80s of the last century, Ehrenthal replied that there was no need for this until the autumn.

On May 1, without informing Conrad, the Minister of Foreign Affairs already: entered into relations with Petersburg, proposing to discuss, to establish. unity of views, three questions: 1) about the Balkan railways; 2) on the agreement of 1897; and 3) on the reforms in Macedonia.

Preliminary steps had already begun to carry out the planned annexation, which, according to Erenthal, should have been completed in full.

As follows from the above, Erenthal was sure that he would receive consent to this from Russia through diplomatic negotiations.

Having great connections in St. Petersburg, Erenthal was well oriented in the position of Russia. In his memoirs, Witte cites rather curious data about this. The source of Erenthal's orientation in the weakness of Russia, Witte calls the state controller Schwabebach, who, with the consent of the chairman of the council of ministers, drew up a special note on the situation in Russia and handed it to Erenthal with a request to deliver it to Wilhelm, which Erenthal did. For the Austrian minister, it was still unclear how the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rossipi Izvolsky, who tried to bring Russia back into the political life of Europe, would behave.

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We already know from the first book of our work about the dual position in which the chief of the general staff was, subordinate directly to the supreme authority and at the same time being an auxiliary body of the minister of war. In order to clarify his position in relations, on the one hand, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and on the other, with the Minister of War, at the oral report to Franco-Joseph on May 9, Koprada asked for permission on all political issues that are connected with the specific development of a war plan. communicate in writing or orally directly with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

While Erenthal was tying up negotiations with St. Petersburg and Rome about his Balkan policy, Conrad also received a diplomatic assignment.

In mid-June, the chief of staff, having gone on a field trip to the border with Romania, on the orders of Franco-Joseph and with the knowledge of Erenthal, visited the Romanian king Charles in Sinai and had a conversation with him on political issues.

This first trip to Romania by Koprada was intended to sound out the political linings of Romania. The conversation began, for the sake of propriety, with questions about the field trip made, its methods, etc., and then turned into the realm of politics. Deviating from an assessment of the Anglo-Russian rapprochement, the chief of the general staff listened to Karl's opinion that the Macedonian reform project did not inspire confidence in him, that he was concerned about the aggressiveness of Bulgaria, and therefore he considered it desirable to conclude an alliance with Serbia, which covered would be the Romanian flank against Bulgaria. This way of thinking was not pleasant to Conrad, and he began to prove all the insidiousness of Serbia's policy against Austria. To Karl's fair indication that such a policy might change if Austria's trade policy with respect to Serbia was 'reconsidered', Koprada replied that one could hardly expect a state to fulfill a trade agreement if it was not politically loyal.

Expressing the opinion that at present it is difficult to foresee which side Serbia will be on in the event of a war with Russia - whether on the side of Russia and Bulgaria or, on the contrary, against them, Charles pointed out that Russia would not be able to wage a European war for a long time, not prone to mouth un war itself will not start. In Vienna, the combat readiness of the Russian army is being overestimated.

The conversation then turned to clarifying the position of England in relation to Rossip and Germany, with Charles pointing to the developing industry and 'commercial competition between England and Germany. Both interlocutors came to the comforting conclusion that Germany, having a first-class army, had nothing to fear.

The Sandzhak railway also caught the attention of Karl, who pointed out the great excitement in Russia and France caused by the project of this railway, to which Koprad, referring to his conversation with a Russian military agent, conveyed to his interlocutor that the road was preferable to a narrow gauge with purely commercial interests.

Charles said that he had long been interested in the project of a railroad across the Adriatic Sea through Serbia and Rumania and had already entered into negotiations with the Serbs on the construction of a bridge across the Danube.

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In addition to purely theoretical military issues from the experience of the Russian-Japanese war, the conversation also touched upon the topical issue of the railways from Moldova to Bukovina, which are important for the transfer of Romanian troops in the event of a war with Russia.

On June 29, the Chief of the General Staff, upon returning to Vienna, considered it necessary to personally initiate Erenthal into his diplomatic negotiations in Romania, and at the same time express his opinions on the emerging political situation, then supported by a letter on July 2.

We will not give separate conversations and letters, but bring them together.

Conrad's thoughts about the treachery of Italy were recognized by Erenthal as gloomy, with which, however, the chief of staff could not agree.

Pointing out that his orientation was based on several sources, Koprad emphasized that he would be satisfied if he were wrong in his assumptions. Conrad explains the failure of the agent and the disclosure of his relations with an officer of the Austrian service as a misfortune, which, however, will not force him to limit intelligence against Italy, which he has established with such difficulty. Along the way, the chief of the General Staff expressed several thoughts about the intelligence service, which we will discuss below. Italy, Coprade pointed out, is arming, and it is necessary to develop its own armed forces by all means, the initiative in which must follow from the government.

Pointing out in a letter to Erenthal that a revolutionary outbreak in Russia can be expected only in the Caucasus, and calm is coming in central Russia, the chief of the general staff did not share the opinion of the Romanian king about the prolonged incapacity of the Russian army, and therefore found it necessary to monitor its development .

On the Montenegrin issue, Konrad believes that Montenegro can be bought cheaper than a war with it will cost.

Reporting his private conversation with the Chief of the Bulgarian General Staff about the lack of Bulgarian claims to Nis, Konrad speaks out against Erenthal's opinion that the occupation of Nis is beyond the powers of the monarchy, and finds this quite feasible, as he already indicated in his

memoir for 1907.

Again, the chief of the general staff considers it necessary to raise the question of joint work with the German general staff on the plan for the war against the Entente and objects to postponing this until the autumn. To Erenthal's remark that Beck (former chief of staff before Konrad) was taking advantage of the winter campaign against Russia, as the swamps would become more accessible, Koprak replied that he considered these advantages problematic and that a war plan could not be built on them.

Returning to someone's inspiring the Vienna press in military matters, Konrad considers it necessary to assure that "the General Staff is far from all such publications", and that they, Konrad, "have again been ordered to refrain from participating in the newspapers." "What lies outside my rights," he writes, "for that I cannot bear any answer-

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"If I have stated all the questions indicated by Vipe," finishing the letter

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chief of the general staff, I ask you to see in this only that, inclined by nature to express my opinions openly, I considered it necessary to carry out this at the present time as well. On the most important issues, I am an enemy of any kind of silence and consider it the duty of my service in all military and political issues to exchange with you

opinion."

Erenthal had no time to answer the chief of staff's letter, because he had a more important document on his desk: Izvolsky's reply from St. Petersburg.

The Russian minister, point by point, expounded Petersburg's point of view on Erenthal's request.

1) On the issue of railways, Izvolsky wrote that "the Austro-Hungarian government has the right to seek a concession on the Balkan Peninsula that is useful for the development of its economic interests, just as other powers have the right to do this, and primarily the Balkan, in search of suitable railway concessions on the peninsula. This answer did not suit Vienna much, because it was by no means in its interests to allow foreign capital to the Balkans, and even more so through the Balkan states.

2) "We must first of all recognize," Izvolsky said about the treaty of 1897, "a complete similarity in views on the need to maintain the existing ai Chio for as long as the circumstances of this. allow, and establish the possibility of an agreement between Russia and Austria-Hungary to eliminate the accidents that may fall on the Balkan Peninsula.

Concerning the question of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Russian Minister. considered this a European matter, which could not be resolved by private agreement. "We are ready to admit that the same limitation applies to questions about Kopstapinople, about the territory adjacent to it, along the straits." However, Izvolsky hinted that St. Petersburg was not averse to discussing it. these are both issues with Vienna.

3) There is no disagreement on the question of reforms in Macedonia.

Having familiarized himself with the mouth note, Erenthal saw that the path of diplomatic negotiations, and not war, lay ahead with Russia.

For the time being, it would be possible not to hurry with annexation, but the situation in the occupied regions became aggravated, and the revolutionary mood quickly increased. July gave impetus to putting the Balkan question on track. A Young Turk coup broke out in Turkey, leading to regime change in Turkey itself. The occupied provinces became even more agitated, and it was no longer possible to delay the annexation of these regions by Austria-Hungary, since it would be difficult later to prove the necessity of this under the revolutionary government of Turkey.

On July 15, the Minister of Foreign Affairs replied to the letter from the Chief of the General Staff by forwarding at the same time an extract from the circular note of the German Chancellor communicated to Erenthal on July 1.

In the letter, Erenthal again indicates that there is no reason to begin joint work with Molotov on the war plan, especially since German diplomacy is calmly assessing the political situation. Russia is not ready for war with Germany and is afraid of it. Finally, strictly.

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secretly Erenthal reported that a few days before the mouth of the letter he entered into negotiations with Izvolsky, which will find out how far Russia is ready to go along with Austria in the Balkan issue; at the same time, in view of the ongoing negotiations with Russia, personal negotiations between Erenthal and Kopsch in July or August in Vienna are desirable.

An excerpt from Bülow's note attached to the letter indicated that Russia was not ready to pursue an aggressive policy. France, as a result of the decrease in population growth, has used all the masses of the people for military purposes and does not want to provoke a war with Germany. The excitement of England by the development of the German Navy is not of a serious nature; therefore, the German Navy will continue its strength, and in the event that the hostility of England will accept specific troops, Germany will take up arms. Bülow says nothing about Italy. However, the German Chancellor is concerned about the possibility of the formation of the Entente from Austria, Russia and France, why the speeches of the non-violent chauvinists should be extinguished. In Turkey, Germany is pursuing only economic goals, and in the question of the Macedonian reforms she will go along with Austria-Hungary. In conclusion, the dispatch pointed out that the German people could rely on their armed forces and hardly anyone would want to speak out against the alliance with Austria.

In his reply to the minister on July 18, Konrad indicated that he was concerned about Erenthal's underestimation of the possibility of a war between Germany and Austria, when Austria would have to fulfill its allied obligations and what one had to be prepared for. Bülow's silence on Italy's position convinces the Chief of the General Staff that he will fall out of the tripartite alliance. It is necessary to reckon with the war with Italy, with the possibility of an armed conflict in the Balkans and with the war with Russia.

On July 28, Konrad saw Erenthal and immediately the results of the conversation

FIKKSSsirovala in his letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, pointing out that he does this in view of the importance of complicated issues. The letter, for the most part, concerns the cleansing of Sapijak from the Austrian garrisons, which Koprad objected to earlier on grounds of moral order, and only for fear of diminishing the prestige of the monarchy. Nype, with a firm decision to annex the occupied regions, he does not object to the withdrawal of troops and uses them as a reserve in Sarajevo. The chief of staff is beginning to solve the Serbian question by an offensive with the occupation of the Nis region. For the withdrawal of troops from the Sandzhak from Turkey, recognition of the annexation and the renunciation of propaganda among the Muslim population of these areas should be demanded. Finally, Konrad asks to reconsider the possibility of an armed action by Russia in the event of annexation and to find out what the position of Germany will be in this case. Establishing contact © by the German headquarters is again considered necessary. "I am far from pessimistic, but at the same time I am responsible for ensuring that, in the event of a cop conflict, the highest military command is not unprepared," the chief of the general staff ended his letter.

The establishment of the Young Turk regime in Turkey, the benevolent attitude towards it on the part of England and France, the possible support of

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urged Erenthal to hurry with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The minister hoped - without starting a European war, to which France and England were not inclined - to come to an agreement with Izvolsky on the Balkans.

Having worked out the response of the Russian minister, Erenthal submitted his program of action for discussion by the Council of Ministers.

On August 19, 1908, a meeting of the Council of Ministers was held to discuss the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at which Ehrenthal delivered a memoir on Balkan politics. Conrad was also invited to the meeting.

Opening the meeting, Ehrenthal pointed out that both the other European powers and Austria-Hungary recognized the Young Turk coup.

Erenthal outlined the issues of this meeting: 1) the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 2) the cleansing of the Sandjak by the Austrian troops.

To the questions posed by the Minister-President of Hungary: 1) what is the position of the European powers on the question of annexation; 2) how it is conceived, and 3) how relations with the powers will develop after the annexation, Erenthal replied that Germany is for annexation; Russia will be distracted by the promise to take a favorable position on the question of the straits; Italy has no objection; Francia is distracted in Morocco; England is well disposed towards the monarchy; From Turkey's heels, opposition can be expected, but it is most likely that she will calm down when she receives an assurance that there will be no further attempts on the part of the monarchy in the Turkish regions.

Both minister-presidents, having received Erenthal's assurance that annexation could be achieved without a European war, for which Austria-Hungary was not ready both militarily and financially, gave their consent, subject to the prior consent of the signatory states of Berlin. treatise.

When the turn came to the chief of the general staff, he declared that the time for the announcement of the Nastakho annexation and the fear of conflict associated with it was no less than if there had been no annexation. According to Konrad, Germany is for a monarchy; Russia is hardly in a position now to wage a European war, especially when threatened by Germany; Serbia is not prepared militarily; Turkey is in conflict with Bulgaria, Greece and probably Romania; there remains, therefore, Italy, with which the moparchy is ready for war.

During the meeting, those present were acquainted with Erenthal's memoir of August 9, 1908 on the Balkan issue, in which, discussing the demands of Russia known to us, Erenthal, reinforcing his arguments with reference to Andrassy's memoir of 1879, found that the inclusion of Sandzak in the monarchy will not bring special benefits, because the ultimate goal of the Balkan policy is not through the New Bazaar, but through Belgrade.

After deciding on the need to annex the occupied provinces, the meeting of the Council of Ministers was closed.

From now on, the Chief of the General Staff faced the task of ensuring the annexation from the military side, just as Ehrenthal had to do it in the field of politics. In a number of relations with the Minister of War

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and in the reports to Franco-Josich, Konrad demanded that military measures be taken to alert the army in general and, in particular, to strengthen the troops in the occupied areas, referring to the low peacetime staffing that was in the troops of Austria-Hungary and which is known to us from the first book of our work.

While Konrad was preparing the army for possible hostilities, Erenthal had already gone on the offensive in the diplomatic field, successfully pinning down his main enemy - Russia.

Izvol'sky went on his usual autumn "tour" abroad and was invited in September to visit the estate of the Austrian ambassador in PZeterburg in Bhlau (in Moravia), where Ehrenthal and the Italian Foreign Minister Titopi arrived at the same time.

In Buchlau, an agreement was worked out on Balkan affairs between the three most interested states.

The agreement stated that:

- 1) Russia and Italy will take a favorable position regarding the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- 2) Italy and Austria will graciously respond to Russia's encroachments regarding the revision of the regulations on the straits in a more favorable direction for her.

The 3rd and 4th paragraphs dealt with Montenegrin affairs.

Thus, the agreement definitely established the intention of the Austrian

Hungary to carry out an annexation and one might think that the Russian minister

the date of its announcement was even announced, since, as is clear from the draft Russian-Turkish agreement on the same subject, which was being worked out at the same time in St. Petersburg, the possibility of such an annexation by Austria was envisaged "at the forthcoming congress of delegations in Budapest," i.e. autumn.

In the meantime, Izvolsky hurried to leave Austria in order to go round various capitals of Europe to cheer and prepare the ground for "Russia's inclinations regarding the revision of the question of the straits."

After the departure of the Russian minister in Vienna, another important decision was made. The forthcoming annexation, in fact, was not a secret to anyone - everyone knew about it. Izvolsky's laurels also kept another politician, Ferdinand of Bulgaria, from sleeping. Taking advantage of the impending speech of Austria, Bulgaria decided to declare itself an independent kingdom. Having visited Vienna before and after Izvolsky's arrival, Ferdinand of Bulgaria obtained Erenthal's approval of his assumptions (according to Poincaré, not without the knowledge of Berlin) and left for Sofia to await the course of events.

Izvolsky, having achieved well-known results in the question of the straits in Rome, moved to Paris, where on October 9 he received a private letter from Erenthal about the announcement of the annexation.

Indeed, on October 9, the Austrian ambassador in Niterburg announced the upcoming decision on October 7 on freedom of action in the occupied areas, on the renunciation of rights in the Sandjak, and handed over a memorandum "with an extremely suspicious proposal" to act jointly

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before other states on the recognition of Bulgaria as an independent
principality.

This assumption was already late, for on the same day Ferdinand of Bulgaria declared himself king.

On 7 October, a decree on the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was published in Vienna.

Ehrenthal excited the diplomats of Europe, making clear what was not a secret for any of the states of this continent.

In order to understand more correctly how much the Viennese diplomat risked by his actions to provoke an armed clash, and also to evaluate the considerations of the Chief of the General Staff that we have outlined, it is necessary to cast a glance at the relationships that by that time were developing in Europe.

Since August 18, 1907, from the date of the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian agreement, two main groupings of states can be considered established on the map of Europe: the triple alliance and the triple concord. The rest of the states joined one or another group, being partly the objects of their Politics.

Such a grouping is by no means caused by the "historical" tasks of this or that state, not by the intricacies of diplomats, not by the personal attachments of those plain rulers - representatives of the parity dipasts, but exclusively by economic reasons. World capital. fighting for markets, it was divided, by common interests, into the two groups indicated by us, leading the policy of their member states. We, due to the size of our work, cannot introduce the reader in detail into this economic distribution and the competition of other states. Let me just point out that politics was dominated by capital, which turned it in a certain direction, even if it did not want to enter into it.

Everyone, of course, knows that the formation of the main groupings of states did not take place without friction between them, since misunderstandings also occurred between the allies along the same path of economic competition. There are many contradictions in Europe, and the Balkans alone were not their place. The Moroccan question, the struggle for hegemony on the seas between England and Germany, the claims of Italy in Africa, Persia, the Baghdad railway, the straits, Turkey and finally the Balkans—these are the chief moments at which the interests of the European states collided and sharpened.

By the act of annexing, Austria-Hungary seemed to experience the unity of Europe after the Congress of Berlin, the decisions of which could only be changed by the decision of an international conference.

Leaving the political arena, Bismarck, according to the report of the Russian ambassador in London, Izvolsky, left the following testament to his successors: "Spare Russia, try to pinch her in the East, push Austria into the Balkans so that both these powers neutralize each other, ally France with Austria and, in the end, isolate England, instilling suspicion in everyone

to her politics.

Having embarked on the imperialist path, Germany partly followed the

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there his plan, pursuing the main goal - to break the Franco-Russian alliance, and then the tripartite agreement. In various ways, German diplomacy tried to break a hole in these groupings, directing the main efforts against England. However, it must be said that London followed the same path of isolation, but not of itself, but of Germany, advising the states of Europe to be "suspicious of its policies." The "encirclement policy" systematically carried out by England in relation to Berlin became more and more reliable and difficult fact.

We already know from Bülow's dispatch that Germany foresaw war only with England, excluding at that time the possibility of a European armed clash. According to the chancellor, Russia was not ready for war, and therefore Austria could take an active course of action in the Balkans. Poincaré suspects Berlin of approving the annexation. There are no words, consent to this was given, and by the way, fidelity to the alliance was testified to Vienna, but still the question of armed assistance remained open, the preparation of which Konrad was worried about and which Reptal found premature.

Italy, as we know, in Buchlau agreed to the annexation, but the decree on this, unexpected even for her, changed the views of Rome. But without reason, Conrad considered Italy among the enemies of Austrian policy. Roman cabinet no

took the point of view of St. Petersburg on convening an international conference to consider the annexation act. However, the impending Expedition to Ahrika and the unwillingness to complicate the situation on the Austrian border forced Italy to treat events with restraint. Nevertheless, the annexation served to bring Italy closer to Russia.

Thus, among the members of the tripartite alliance, in the annexation issue, Austria could only count on the support of Berlin.

Of the tripartite powers, the annexation hit Russia the most.

We cannot acquaint in detail with the policy of Russia during this time, since it is not the main arena of our work. A few words, however, must be said.

With the end of the Russo-Japanese war, the parish government began to pay more attention to European politics, and its foreign minister, Izvolsky, according to contemporaries, clearly and distinctly formulated the turn of Russian politics from the Asian Front to the European one.

Polivanov in his memoirs says that already on January 3, 1907, Izvolsky launched his program leading to "balance in the Far East, so as not to spend money on the Far East and save strength for resolving major issues in Europe."

In February of the same year, in the Council of State Defense, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated with sufficient certainty: "The center of gravity of our influence should be not in the Far East, but in the West - with your back to strife, but not your face." On August 11, Izvolsky said: "It is necessary to provide Rosspi MPR from Kamchatka to Gibraltar for ten years; an agreement with Japan is not sustainable if there is no agreement with Apglia; there will be complications in Europe, and we must be ready to submit our

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voice, otherwise we will find ourselves in the position of a half-forgotten Asian power."

Pointing out the need for Russia, in order not to become a "vassal" of Germany, to be in alliance with Francia and expand it by agreement with England and Japan, Izvolsky informs us that only when this program was approved by Nicholas did he accept the post of minister.

Developing his program, Izvolsky reached an agreement with England and Japan, supported an allied treaty with France, but at the same time did not miss a chance to come to an agreement with the opposite camp.

Focusing on Europe, Russian policy had to set certain goals for itself. Certainly not a simple defense against Germappi Mapila

new foreign minister. for him, more vivid tasks were needed, one of which the "straits" are again put forward to them.

There was no need to look for a pretext for active steps in the mouth direction. The end of 1907 was marked by complications in Bulgaria's resignations with Turkey; Kurdish raids on the Persian border regions also became more frequent. Russian chief of the zeneral shitad, des knowledge of the minister

Foreign Affairs, asked for permission and began to carry out military activities on the Caucasian frontier.

The issue of complications in the Caucasus was brought up for discussion by the Council of Ministers on January 21, 1908, at which Izvolsky developed his political program in detail. We will not dwell on it for a long time, because in its essence it has just been given by us. Izvolsky's summary was: it is necessary to prepare for an armed clash for the "historical" tasks of Russia.

The exchange of opinions revealed the unpreparedness of the Russian army for war, and the chairman of the council of ministers, Stolypin, formulated the decision of the council as follows:

"At present, the Minister of Foreign Affairs cannot count on any support for a decisive policy. A new mobilization of Russia would give strength to the revolution from which we are just beginning to emerge. Significant progress has been made along this path; Russia has shown amazing vitality and is gathering strength again. At such a moment it is impossible to decide on adventures or even actively take the initiative in international affairs. Any policy other than a strictly defensive one would at the present time be the delusions of an abnormal government, and would entail a danger to the dynasty. The Minister of Foreign Affairs now has a lever without a foothold, but Russia needs a respite, after which it will strengthen itself and again take its rank of great power."

The unpreparedness of the Russian army for war was once again testified to Izvolsky by the Minister of War himself. Polivanov informs us that at a meeting of the Council of Ministers on March 1, 1908, "the minister of war reported that the army could not fight because it had no reserves and was not trained." The Minister of War said sharply, addressing Stolypin: "The army does not study, but serves you."

We already know that Izvolsky did not accept the decision of the Council of Ministers for execution and continued to operate with a "lever without a fulcrum."

Not having consent to the opening of the "straits" either from France, or especially from England, crying out vague benevolence

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on this issue of Berlin, as an open recognition of Russia's rights to "prodives" - Izvolsky on July 19, 1908 had already entered into negotiations with Ehrenthal on this issue.

Thinking of convening an international conference to resolve the Balkan affairs, Izvolsky hoped to get "straits" for Russia from Austria for annexation.

As you know, Erenthal announced anpexia, using the "nonsense of an abnormal government" (Russian).

This government woke up with a heavy head on the morning of October 8, when the Anpexia was already an accomplished act. What were the subsequent experiences of Cheterburg, let us see later.

If the Viennese diplomat so easily put an end to the main opponent of annexation, then with the other members of the tripartite agreement this question was

even easier to fix.

Fraction, which should first of all support Russia, "is indifferent ... looks at international events when Frappia is not directly involved in them and when her most sensitive material interests are not affected." So the Russian ambassador from Paris reported to Petersburg.

Russia's allied peak, France, perfectly took into account the state of Russia and its armies, and therefore turned out to be restrained in its allied obligations. Poincaré, in his book *The Origin of the World War*, writes that "England and France, who had not yet given their consent to this co-op 4e {ogse of Austria, could not have been more Serbophiles than Serbia itself, and more Russophiles than Russia herself." M. Pokrovsky, in the preface to the translation of this book, pointing out that "France has discovered some unstoppable sympathies for Austria," sees the reason for this in the fact that she "or rather, is simply not yet used to the idea that she will have to fight together with Russia for Constantinople. M. Pavlovich, in his book "The Struggle for Asia and Akhrik", explains these "unremitting sympathies" of Franppni E of Austria by the fact that at the Algeziras conference of 1906 on the Moroccan question "French diplomacy enlisted the support of the powers on whose help Germany counted" . "Even the second ally of Germany, Austria-Hungary," writes M. Pchavlovich, "did not show much zeal in defending the German policy towards Morocco at the Alzheziras conference. The fact is that French diplomacy promised to give Austria-Hungary freedom of action in the Balkans if the latter supported France in Morocco, and Austria-Hungary found this proposal very advantageous. And therefore, when subsequently Austria-Hungary annexed Bospiya and Herzegovipa, French diplomacy reacted very condescendingly to this act on the part of the Danube Empire as a reward for the policy of the last Alzhezpras conference.

Morocco was so sensitive for France - and new clashes in this matter with Germany were not ruled out - that France could not lose the future support of Austria-Hungary in a dispute with Berlin.
wanted.

At that time, in France, the alliance with Russia was going through dark days, and the Parisian press even noted the "cordial" tone of the response letter

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the inter-resident of the republic to the message of Franz Josich about the annexation, especially since, under the treaty, France was not obliged to draw a sword in defense of Russia's interests until Germany acted.

We have already heard that Anzliya also could not be more Serbian Phil than Serbia itself. The Balkans were of interest to the politicians of England, since here its interests intersected with Russian and German ones.

The London cabinet has already reacted negatively to Erenthal's statement on January 28, 1908 in delegations about the construction of the Sandzak road. The new Young Turk regime in Kopstavtipole was greeted with satisfaction in Lopdopa. Finally, the active policy of Austria threatened to violate the Treaty of Berlin, to which England was also unsympathetic, because in London great importance was attached to the inviolability of treaties.

Erenthal was mistaken in London's benevolent position towards its steps in the Balkans, because behind him the British politicians also saw the advance of Germany to the same place, which Applia could not allow at all.

Pointing out that the Sandjak railway and the annexation of Bosnia and Herpegovina "are now an apple of discord thrown between the powers," the Russian ambassador rightly wrote in Londop to Izvolsky on October 25, 1908: war and will not use every effort not to reach this extreme,

Churchill in his memoirs also notes the independent solution of the issue with the recognition of apnexia by Russia, without notifying the British and Khrappu governments. With such a turn of affairs, Apgaia, according to Churchill, turned out to be a lone defender of "the sanctity of treaties and the rights of peoples." "The Teutons triumphed, but it was a Pyrrhic victory," Churchill concludes.

However, the British Minister, at the same time, points out that at that time the armed forces of France were in the process of reorganization, and Russia was weak after the Japanese war.

Thus, one cannot agree with Poincaré that "England and France could not have turned out to be more Serbophiles than Serbia itself, and more Russophiles than Russia itself." England was Anglo-Philian, and France Franch-Philian—this was natural, because politics was guided primarily by the economic interests of these states, which had not yet been significantly affected by the Austro-Hungarian uprising.

Nako pep, the third group of states that were most closely affected by the annexation were the states of the Balkans.

Franz Josich's decree touched Serbia most profoundly and above all. At the Berlin Congress, Russian representative Shuvalov assured Serbian representatives that the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina would last no more than 15 years. The second fifteen years passed, and Austria not only did not think about clearing the regions, but, on the contrary, constantly continued to oppress the Serbian part of the population and waged a sharp customs war with Serbia itself. Being at first in the orbit of Austrian influence, Serbia at the beginning of the 20th century was guided by Russia. With the change in the policy of Belgrade, in the occupied provinces, Dalmatia and Croapia, an intensified propaganda for the restoration of "great" Serbia began. Whatever they say now

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Serbian diplomats, but the fact of this propaganda, which was carried out with Russian money, is established with sufficient certainty. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a dire warning that the future holds the same for Serbia itself. The difficult economic struggle with Austria and the blocking of her access to the sea created difficult conditions for development for Serbia. For a small Slavic state, a struggle was to be fought against the Austrian offensive movement into the Balkans.

Montenegro was going through an internal struggle: the liberal party aspired to join Serbia, while the dynasty of the court party stood for the continuation of an independent existence. Nicholas

the Montenegrin sold himself, and at the same time the state, now to Austria, now to Russia, depending on who paid the most, and Conrad's hopes to buy Montenegro's peytrachity for a good sum were not unfounded.

The policy of Bulgaria in the years immediately preceding the annexation is defined by the British Ambassador Buchanan as a policy of a swing, a swing between the influence of Austria and Russia. After the Russian-Japanese war, the growth of Austrian and German influences in Bulgaria is revealed. The influence of Russia, with which Bulgaria was bound by military convention, was gradually dimming.

Ferdinand of Bulgaria had long wanted to declare himself emperor, ending Turkish sovereignty and thereby deliberately violating the Treaty of Berlin. According to Buchanan, Ferdinand's attempt to do this in 1907 was not crowned with success, because: "Austria, whose annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had not yet matured, believed that the psychological moment had not yet come for such an open violation of the Berlin treaty. Ferdinand therefore demanded a categorical answer to the question whether the independence of Bulgaria would be declared, and warned the prince that the emperor would never recognize such a change in the position of the principality.

However, we have already heard that Ferdinand made concessions, and the Bulgarian Ferdinand achieved his intended goal by declaring himself king two days before the publication of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By this step, Bulgaria was crossing over to the side of the triple alliance, breaking its military convention with Russia and could divert Turkey from its northwestern provinces, which have now been amputated from it.

Indeed, Turkey, which greeted the act of annexation with indignation, however, reacted with even greater hostility to the steps taken by Bulgaria, as something of its own neighbor and future adversary. The young Turkish government had no intention of giving away the old possessions of Turkey, and therefore immediately protested against the annexation.

Romania, which was in treaty agreements with Vienna and Berlin, met the annexation calmly. She was also most interested in misunderstandings on the Bulgarian border, but, as we know, even at court Serbia enjoyed certain sympathies as a possible ally against Bulgaria; therefore, Ferdinand did not find full approval of his policy in Bucharest.

One way or another, but Ferdinand took the first decisive step along the paths of "Austrian imperialism" and confronted Europe with an accomplished act.

The Vienna diplomat correctly took into account the emerging European political

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tic situation that made it possible to achieve success without the use of weapons. It was premature to think about a European war for annexation, and, of course, Conrad's calculations anticipated events.

However, one must still do justice to the chief of the general staff in his efforts to prepare for such a war, given that the intentions of a diplomat in a general's uniform stopped at more than one act of annexation. We know that he wanted to put the Balkan question in

sang, and the continuation of the annexation was to be the partition of Serbia.

It is difficult to say how the states of Europe would then react to this, but the possibility of a European war would not be excluded.

Everything depended on what position Berlin would take on this issue. The chief of the general staff did not slander Germany's active steps, while Erenthal believed that diplomatic speeches alone would achieve recognition of the steps he had taken, and therefore he postponed the joint one. Konrad's work with Berlin according to the war plan.

On October 7, 1908, European diplomats began to move, the pens of their offices creaked, couriers stopped by with notes and various projects, letters, etc. documents.

The hustle and bustle began, in which we will pay off ...

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CHAPTER III

DIPLOMATIC VICTORY OF ERENTADY.

Izvolsky's efforts to convene a European conference. — Konrad is intensively preparing for war. — Erenthal's restraint in military preparations. — His views on the European conference. - Communication by Konrad Erenthal of information on the plan of war with Serbia. - Berlin's first pressure on Izvolsky. — Conrad's memoir, November 3, 1908. - Approval of the variants of the war plan for 1909. — The position of Turdia on the issue of annexation. — Moroccan Crisis. — Russian military agent Marchenko at Konrad's reception. — Conrad's meeting with Erenthal on December 6th. — Konrad for starting the war after March. Erenthal agrees to correspond with Moltke on the war plan. - Conrad's first letter to the Chief of the German General Staff dated January 2, 1909 - The view of modern German historians on Conrad's correspondence with Moltke. - Correspondence between "Willy" and "Nicky". - Erenthal limits his political goals. — Plans for a military convention between Vienna and Bulgaria. - Reply to Moltke on January 921: - assistance against Russia and covering the rear from Italy. — Prophecies of Moltke. — Erenthal's plans for the neutralization of Bulgaria and Turria and the project of an "observational corps". — Reasons for Erenthal's concessions to Turkey. - Sending to Berlin Moltke Konrad excerpts from the war plan and letters. — Conrad's suggestion on how to keep Russia from speaking out. Loneliness of Konrad in the demands of war. — Conrad's dreams of disarming Serbia.—"Every war is a dubious matter" (Konrad).—Erenthal's program of 18 February. support. — Response letters to Moltke. — The position of Western states in the annexation crisis. - Russia's refusal from military demonstrations on the Austrian border. — Germany and England on the development of the Fleet. - Erenthal Agreement with Turkey. — Konrad on the isolation of diplomacy and the responsibility of soldiers. - The decision of the Council of Ministers in Vienna to strengthen the troops in the south. - The German ultimatum in St. Petersburg and its acceptance by Russia. - Receipt on March 31 in Vienna of a Serbian note recognizing the annexation. — Opinion of Konrad and Moltke on the failure of the middle states to use the favorable situation for war during the past crisis. — Conrad's memoir, April 2, 1909, on the need to strengthen the army. — Views of Erenthal and Konrad on preventive war and Konrad's classification of wars. — Expediency of war for Austria-Hungary in 1909. — Marx on the resolution of the Balkan question.

The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina entailed the second violation of the Treaty of Berlin - the declaration of independence by Bulgaria. It was on these two questions that the attention of the diplomats concentrated after October 7, 1908.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the "abnormal government", Izvolsky, having received notification of the publication of the act of annexation, continued his tour of the capital cities of Europe, putting forward, in contrast to Erentakh, a proposal to transfer both the discussion of annexation and a number of other issues on Balkan affairs to the European Conference. From its program, the Russian minister excluded the question of the straits, because its staging

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the discussion did not meet with approval in London. Gray gave Izvolsky a vague consent to resolve the issue of the straits in favor of Russia, and the Russian minister decided to carry it out through direct negotiations with Turkey.

Thus, Russia and England found it necessary to convene a European conference, France took an evasive position, Germany still did not give its consent. As for the main culprit of the crisis, Vepa, she did not object to the annexation, but after the recognition by the states of the act she published and as the final chord of the changes that had taken place in the Balkans.

We do not present here the conference program sketched out by Izvolsky, but we consider it necessary to note that one of its points was the correction of the vulgarities of Serbia and Montenegro in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina adjacent to the Sandjak.

As already known from the previous chapter, the announcement of annexation caused great excitement in Serbia. The information received by Vepa spoke of the military preparations of the Serbian army, the formation of gangs to support the uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the supposedly partial Serbian mobilization that had begun. All this not only worried Conrad, but even pleased him, as events were heading towards the war he so desired.

The next day after the announcement of the annexation, the head of the general staff. The headquarters asks Erental to answer whether Italy will attack or not, since the deployment of forces for operations against Serbia depends on this (with the neutrality of Italy, the forces on the Serbian front increased by one corps). Frantic work on the war plan begins in the general staff, about which Kopradow also informs the military minister.

The chief of the general staff, seeing Erental's firm steps on the diplomatic field, himself began to move quickly along the path of war. His correspondence with the Minister of Foreign Affairs revives. However, according to the size of our work, we are not in a position and have no right to devote the reader to a detailed analysis of these letters, but we will extract only the essential from them.

Conrad's development of energy in preparation for war should be partly explained by the low staffing of peacetime units, which was in the Austro-Hungarian army, as well as other shortcomings in its material support.

In his letters dated October 9, 13 and 18, informing Erenthal about the alleged mobilization in Serbia and Montenegro, Koprak insists that Austria-Hungary also take military measures of readiness. The Chief of the General Staff finds that: 1) the superiority of Serbia and Montenegro in operational freedom can lead to the fact that the war will begin with their invasion of the occupied areas; 2) this, in turn, will require changes and additions to the war plan, which can lead to catastrophic consequences; 3) the first failures can be harmful to the spirit of the army; 4) it takes time to concentrate stocks.

In the opinion of the chief of staff, one can use the training of opponents and thus justify one's military training as a countermeasure.

The time for declaring wars is not yet lost, but it must not be missed. Proposing to reinforce troops on the Serbian border, Konrad v. Montenegro

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finds it necessary to use the Albanians, supporting them with money and weapons, as well as developing propaganda.

In his letter of reply dated October 20, Erenthal did not give guarantees in the favorable position of Montenegro, the solution of which depends on Italy and Russia, but finds, however, it is possible to postpone the mobilization of the military forces of the monarchy, since, in his opinion, there was still time for this: Serbia is gaining time, but the adoption of military measures by the monarchy against this small state would lower Austria in the eyes of Europe, and therefore such actions are unacceptable. As for relations with Italy, the monarchy takes the position of military competition: both states are afraid to lag behind one another in the development of armaments, and therefore any military measures on the Italian border could only worsen the situation. All this leads Erenthal to the conviction that now it is not a burden to take military measures, which could be decisive.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Des Austria-Hungary, has not yet received a reply from St. Petersburg recognizing the annexation. However, as we have just said, Erenthal did not reject the proposals for a conference, and then by this time he already had real evidence of support for Germany.

In Berlin, Izvolsky rebuffed all proposals for revising the annexation at a European conference. Wilhelm, strongly indignant at. policy of encirclement of the tripartite alliance, defiantly declared that annexation was a matter of decision and that Germany would take part in the conference only when Austria and Turkey had reached an agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On October 2, the chief of the general staff, thanks to Erenthal for his orientation, wrote to him that, considering it his share of the service to keep the minister of foreign affairs on the course of the military situation as much as required by the connection between diplomatic shoals and military measures, he allows himself to inform you of the following plans for the concentration of the Austrian army with a request to keep them only for your own orientation: the reinforcement of the 15th corps can be carried out according to the schedule. peacetime on the 10th day in the main mass and on the 17th day is over; with partial mobilization against Serbia, the concentration will end on the 13th day; against Montenegro, the concentration of the 15th corps will end. on the 14th day and its staffing - on the 13th - 14th day; their total arrival at the theater of operations is expected on the 22nd day. pointing

that Montenegro can gather its army more quickly, Konrad emphasizes the dangerous situation on the Front until the end of the Austrian concentration. In the future, he gives data on what enemy forces have to be reckoned with now and when war is declared in the spring, and it turns out that the enemy has significantly increased his forces! and their material readiness. "These considerations of mine," writes Konrad, "should give concrete results. data for the beginning of their own planned mobilization, on the decision of which, for the most part, depends on the favorable outcome of operations, not to mention the political and moral consequences that the initial success of small states, especially the Black Sea, can produce.

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"If I," continues the chief of the general staff, "allow myself to 'orient you about the military situation, then I do it on the following grounds. I salute with joy that after thirty years of stagnation the monarchy, through apnemia, is again discovering will and strength, and it would be most regrettable if this were to be lowered by some initial, albeit trifling, military failure. The monarchy must show that it is in reality what it appears to be, and therefore I consider it my inapplicable concern to prepare in time,

strength."

Direct negotiations between Erenthal and Izvolsky were interrupted. Both accused each other of overexposure and threatened to publish other secret treaties with other states. The exchange of opinions between Petersburg and Vienna went on only along the dynastic line, but did not give any results, because the same ministers were the true authors of these letters.

Much more important was the fact that the German ambassador Pourtales, who had returned from vacation in St. Petersburg, handed over to Izvolsky Berlin's answer to the Russian program of *concherepy*. Germany did not refuse to convene a conference, but followed Austria on all points, and again stressed that the annexation was not subject to discussion. Pourtales openly explained that the rapprochement between Russia and Apglia was forcing Hermapia closer to Vienna. (From Wilhelm's later exchange with Nikolai, the ambassador's statements are confirmed.) In addition, on the banks of the Spree, they were offended that Izvolsky coordinated his program earlier in Paris and London than communicated it to Berlin. Of course, it is not a matter of resentment, but precisely in the policy of Russia, which more and more fell under the influence of England, which was well taken into account in Berlin.

In a word, Germany stood imposingly behind Vienna, and Erenthal could count on the success of his robbery.

"It is possible that the current political crisis will be resolved without armed conflict; given the great restraint of the great powers and the foreseeable difficulties of Turpia, it is even likely, but still the possibility of an armed clash is not ruled out, and it is necessary that the monarchy be ready if this occurs. So the chief of the general staff writes his political memoir dated November 3, which was presented to Franz Joseph on the same date. Pointing out that Russia is not ready for war, and Italy will not show hostility, although individual parties in these countries are in favor of war, which equally and England is unlikely to be among the enemies, Conrad refers only Serbia to such

and Montenegro. "There is no need to constantly talk about the weakness of small states and the power of monarchies, but you need to boldly embark on the road of a specific analysis of circumstances, figures and numbers. Of course, the monarchy has such means and forces to reckon with success with these states, but these forces must be used in time, so as not to lose time and thereby damage political and military prestige and exclude the possibility of an initial success of opponents. The course of political events should not lead to the success of the enemy. Noting the hostile position of Montenegro and Serbia, Konrad continues: "The time has come for the monarchy to decide: whether to confine ourselves to defense against these states or to solve the Serbian question as a whole. Under

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the last is a war with a complete defeat, the subsequent inclusion of Serbia into the monarchy and a similar defeat of Chervozoria, or at least leaving her a territory poor in any means.

"In accordance with these political goals, the military forces must also be calculated. These goals must be approved in order to develop a war plan. At the same time, it is also necessary to know what guarantees should be chosen to keep the rest of the states."

In the future, the report analyzes in detail the forces and means of the opponents, their probable actions, and outlines the necessary forces and means of the monarchy for the war in this theater.

The author of the report comes to the conclusion that "the Great Serbian issue should be resolved this year, i.e., the provocations and aggressive actions of Serbia and Montenegro should be answered with war." "Independent Serbia and unpacified Montenegro will be irreconcilable enemies at every step of the monarchy, at every political aggravation, a constant focus of agitation for the South Slavic regions; is the question of whether circumstances in the future will be as favorable as they are for the monarchy at the present time. Then proving all the usefulness for the southern Slavs of introducing them to the monarchy (06 we spoke of these views above), Konrad comes to the conclusion that "if these goals are accepted and it is decided to liquidate the Serbian question with weapons, then it is necessary now to use all means to prepare for war." On the same day, the Chief of the General Staff received the approval of assumptions about specific military training for 1909, namely:

1. Strategic deployment against Italy.
2. Strategic deployment against Serbia and Montenegro during the war with Italy.
3. Strategic deployment against Serbia and Montenegro.
4. Strategic deployment against Russia: a) by all means; 6) by all forces, with the exception of those assigned against Serbia.
5. Strategic deployment against Serbia and Montenegro while at the same time at war with Russia.

In the future, the work of the chief of the general staff was aimed at strengthening the army in general and on the southern border in particular.

The war has been postponed. |

We know that Turkey, greatly offended by the annexation, then lowered her tone and, in the ensuing negotiations with Vienna, tried to get as much money as possible for tearing away the previously occupied provinces.

At the same time, the conflict between Bulgaria and Turkey was also in the position of diplomatic bargaining. Both sides had not yet reached an average amount on which they could finally decide: the Bulgarians offered 82 million francs, the Turks demanded more.

To these two conflicts was added the situation in Morocco again exacerbated by Germany, caused by the inflated Berlin incident with the arrest of the hard-pump deserters who had hidden in the German consulate in Casablanca. England and Italy stood in the wake of France, and, in the opinion of the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, England for once was not averse to bringing matters to an armed clash. Germany assumed a warlike posture.

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Thus, in Europe, the annexation crisis has lost its acuteness, at least in the Western states involved in the settlement of relations with Berlin. Izvolsky was still alone.

Relations between Vienna and St. Petersburg continued only along diplomatic lines and amounted to mutual reproaches and explanations of the conflict that had taken place, without advancing the cause of the agreement.

However, St. Petersburg decided to start negotiations along another line - not diplomatic, because the continuation of diplomatic negotiations foreshadowed Russia's open recognition of its defeat. To find the ground in Vienna was entrusted to the General Staff. We do not know whether such steps were taken with the knowledge or on the direct instructions of Izvolsky, but on December 5, the military Saint of Russia, Marchenko, came to Conrad. In a conversation with him, the chief of the general staff explained the reasons for the annexation by the expectation of a Young Turk coup, which had released Austria, in order to prevent a revolutionary outbreak in the occupied regions and their falling away from the monarchy, to annex them. In Konrad's opinion, the formality was, in fact, fulfilled, since the Treaty of Berlin already assigned these provinces to Austria. There is no need to talk about any aggressiveness of Austria, and war or peace depends on the European powers, which should advise Serbia and Montenegro to abandon hostility. In general, Austria was very surprised that such an innocent thing as annexation caused such a fuss. In addition, Serbia and Montenegro are supported by other powers with weapons, ammunition, instructors and money.

To Marchenko's instruction that this was being done by various parties and other organizations, and not by governments, the stern Konrad immediately replied that he, in the place of governments, would force the organizations to dance to his own tune.

Along the way, Konrad also touched upon the Anglo-Russian alliance, surprised at its conclusion, since Russia and England have always been enemies. To this, Marchenko pointed out that the union was necessary as a counterbalance to Japan, and indeed

Izvol'sky—Anglo-Phil. According to Marchepko, the modern Balkan conflict has grown on the personal relationship between Izvol'sky and Erenthal, and, in addition, the "holy" family of the Montenegrin king through his daughters in St. Petersburg and Rome is intriguing.

To Marchenko's question whether to consider the conversation official, the chief of staff replied that he was not the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and therefore he had no right to make any official statements.

The conversation was smoky with Conrad's assurance that no mobilization and strengthening of the budgetary strength of the army was carried out, and he is not responsible for newspapers that report the opposite.

A day later, during a meeting with Erenthal, Koprad informed him of the content of his conversation with Marchenko, earning the full approval of the minister. We have given this conversation as an example of ordinary conversations between representatives of the General Staff and military agents of neighboring powers.

In this conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Koprad also raised two fundamental questions.

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Pointing out that now in Bosnia and Herzegovina the depth of the snow cover is more than a meter, the chief of staff believed that entering the war before March 1 should only be a last resort, if indeed, difficult political circumstances would force this. To Konrad's request to start a correspondence with Moltke, Erenthal agreed in principle and wanted to discuss this with Bulow.

On December 30, Koprade visited Erenthal again, informed him of the content of his letter to Moltke, and also found it necessary to enter into negotiations with Rumania, which by convention bound the war on the side of the monarchy, in order to discuss military considerations with the resumption of negotiations.

By the end of the year, in Erenthal's opinion, the annexation crisis was in such a state that it could be resolved by diplomatic means alone. Russia and Italy will remain neutral, France will avoid war, and thus one can be more assertive in negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro.

On January 2, by special courier, the Chief of the General Staff sent his first letter to Moltke, which began an interesting correspondence between them.

It must be said that Conrad's publication of his letters to the Chief of the German General Staff was met with great chagrin in the military circles of modern Germany. The reader will see the reason for this from those candid letters to Moltke, which he sent to Vienna.!

The letters mainly deal with specific considerations about the actions of the Allied armies in the event of a war with Rosspey; therefore here we shall speak only of those passages which concern the political views of both correspondents.

"The monarchy takes into account the possibility of military complications in the Balkans, then with an armed conflict with Russia and Italy, and this could

would serve as a pretext for Germany to come out on the side of the monarchy," Konrad begins the letter in this way and further reports that Ehrenthal, after communicating with Bülow, suggested to Franr-Josich to start negotiations between the two chiefs of general staffs on joint military operations.

"His Majesty agreed and ordered that I begin these negotiations in the form of letters, which I will address to you not only after bringing them to the attention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs."

1 The resentment against his immodest former ally went so far that the compilers of the "History of the State Archives" did not even find Konrad's letters to Moltke in the files of the former German General Staff, leaving the authenticity of the documents he published on the conscience of the Austro-Hungarian Chief of the General Staff. It could be assumed that Konrad's letters were kept in Moltke's personal archive, but the correspondence of the former chief of the German General Staff published by his wife also does not give them. The assumption remains that Moltke burned these letters ... However, such a hypothesis, in our opinion, does not hold water, and we are sure that with more thorough searches - in which we wish you luck - the state archive in Berlin will find documents copies of which were kept in Vienna! Of course, this is possible on one condition: if the State Archives wishes to achieve this and tell us about it. We have no reason not to trust Conrad's documents.

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"I was more inclined to discuss important issues in personal conversations and for this purpose go to Berlin in order to establish the basic starting data in direct communication with you. The Minister of Foreign Affairs did not agree with this, preferring first correspondence.

Konrad recounts the history of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which hastened the resolution of issues that have long been brewing. Great Serbian propaganda made Serbia and Montenegro enemies of the monarchy, which are partly morally, partly materially supported by European states. Especially the monarchy notices this support from Italy and Russia. Italy, in the opinion of Austrian diplomacy, will not act hostilely against Austria, or at least will not be active. Russia deserves less confidence, and therefore one must reckon with the threat of her intervention, i.e., the mobilization of her forces.

"If Germany," writes the chief of the general staff, "according to the treaty of 1879, took the side of the monarchy, then the question arises of actions against France. Thus, with the neutrality of Italy, a war of Germany and Austria against France, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro is possible, and it is believed that Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Greece will also remain neutral. Subsequently, Konrad moves on to a discussion of purely military considerations, which we omit for now. At the end of the letter, Conrad expresses his distrust of Italy and asks to know what position Germany will take if Italy were to oppose the monarchy.

Thus began the correspondence of the two chiefs of staff of the allied states under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, despite the fact that both allies had been bound by an agreement since 1879.

In the opposite camp, in the Khranko-Russian Union, annual meetings of the chiefs of staff were established on the war plan. Having ceased during the Japanese war, these meetings took on a regular character with the end of it. We do not dedicate the reader to the details of these conferences—and refer those who are interested to other works—because we consider it our task to study the activity, mainly, of the general staffs of the middle states. Since the spring of 1905, relations have also begun between the British and French general staffs according to the plan for local military operations.

Thus, by 1909, the established connection between the military institutions of Vienna and Berlin according to the war plan! in the East was more than timely.

The beginning of 1909 also saw the resumption of correspondence between Wilhelm and Nikolai Romanov. We will not dwell on this correspondence for a long time, because there was little sincerity in it on both sides. "Niki" prosp "Willy" to keep Austria from attacking Serbia, which threatened a "European war". Willy answered on January 9 as follows: "The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was truly a surprise for everyone, and especially for us, since we were informed of Austria's intentions even later than you. I consider it my duty to bring this to your attention because Germany is accused of urging Austria to take this step. The accusation is absurd and just as false as the one that took place

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in the case of the Sandzhak road... The fact is that since Austria, without consulting us beforehand, took such a step, then for us there could be no doubts about which way we, her faithful allies, should go. We couldn't join her opponents..."

Convicting Russia of joining France and England, and, consequently, of entering into a hostile alliance against Germany, Wilhelm pointed out that even in a real crisis, Izvolsky announced the conference program to Berlin later than it appeared in the French press.

"If Russia had consulted with us at the right moment, things would not have been so complicated and would not have been in that critical situation as they are now. Under the present circumstances, I do not see at all what I could do, except to advise moderation on both sides, which I have already done.

At the end of the letter, Willy said that he "had not the slightest doubt that Austria did not intend to attack Serbia" ... Bursting with indignation at the "small Balkan states" that are "extremely restless", Willy hinted that "the slightest encouragement from any direction makes them mad."

Berlin, no doubt, saw such "encouraging" of Serbia from Russia.

Annexation, as such, had lost its urgency, and now diplomats were concerned about the armaments of Serbia and Montenegro, which could provoke a retaliatory attack by Austria-Hungary.

On the other hand, the conflict between Bulgaria and Turkey was not resolved, which could also spark a war.

Petersburg tried with all its might to put out both of these burning fires, seeing that Germany had switched to active support of Austria in the Balkans, which had not happened before. Meanwhile, both of Russia's allies, England and France, distracted by Morocco, took a dubious position in Balkan affairs. Izvolsky did not reassure himself with the support of these countries, and even if such was provided, then only through diplomacy. The position of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was complicated by the public opinion agitated by the annexation of the bourgeois circles of Russian society, which warmed up the Slavs to fight against Austria. The "abnormal government" failed to follow the paths outlined by Conrad in a conversation with a Russian

military agent.

The situation did not improve when the south of January 1909 brought with it a curtailment of the political aims previously pursued by Erenthal.

Erenthal's only task now was to ensure the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, leaving the seizure of Serbia as a legacy to his deputy. Konrad explains this change in the songs by the influence of the Hungarian half of the monarchy, especially the energetic Stefan Tisza.

The chief of the general staff still continued to insist on bringing the conflict to the point of war, and therefore asked Erenthal to bring Turkey and Bulgaria to his side.

Here, Vienna's diplomacy had to solve a rather difficult task: it was necessary not only to settle its affairs with Turkey, but to reconcile it with Bulgaria and even make these yesterday's enemies allies. What

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As for Bulgaria, Conrad's wishes were not so difficult to implement.

On January 22, the military agent of the monarchy in Sofia announced that he had taken steps to grope the ground: to conclude a military convention with Bulgaria. His suggestions met with sympathy from the Minister of War and Ferdinand.

In his letter to Erenthal dated February 3, Konrad reported that he attached importance to the convention with Bulgaria only if the Bulgarian army could be used against Serbia, but at the same time, the chief of staff did not include a violation in the calculations, because of this conventions, a military agreement with Romania and a break with Turkey. The question of a military convention with Bulgaria hung in the air, especially since Izvolsky soon settled the issue of the Bulgarians paying 82 million francs, and Bulgaria refrained from binding itself to Austria.

Finally, Moltke received a reply letter dated January 21, 1909. First of all, the Berlin friend expressed his liveliest joy at the letter he received and brought allied gratitude for the joint work on the war plan.

Before starting a discussion of the possible situation of a future war, Moltke asks to accept an assurance, in full agreement with Wilhelm's mind, that "Germany, if Russia attacks the monarchy, will with all her might take the side of Austria-Hungary, as provided for by the treaty of 1879." "On this question," writes Moltke, "the

complete unanimity among the political leaders of both sides. Military assumptions will also depend on the development of political events.

Pointing out that the conflict between Austria and Serbia and Montenegro could end either peacefully or in arms, Moltke remarks that in the latter case the intervention of Russia by Konrad is taken into account quite correctly. Russia, according to Moltke, is weak militarily, and this is due not so much to the revolutionary movement as to financial difficulties. Despite the fact that the Russian government does not want to get involved in the war, under the pressure of public opinion, it will be forced to decide on it.

Not intending to be a prophet, Moltke sketches the following development of political events.

Serbia, under the influence of a severe economic crisis and internal difficulties, may rush into a separate war against Austria-Hungary and develop the strongest propaganda. "Then the monarchy has no choice but to go on the offensive against Serbia."

"I believe," continued the Chief of the German General Staff, "that only an Austrian invasion of Serbia could rule out the probable active intervention of Russia. This latter gives rise to Germany's action ... At the very time when Russia announces mobilization, Germany must announce it, and at the same time - of her entire army.

Then Moltke considers it necessary to examine the position of the closest neighbors, pointing out that for Austria the neutrality of Italy acquires special significance, and for Germany - of France. Of course, Conrad knows better the situation in Italy, which he can better appreciate, but since the Italian army is slowly moving along the path of perfection,

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and the earthquake in Messina compels wounds to heal, then, in Moltke's personal opinion, "Italy will not at the present time try to enter into a conflict © Austria and she can freely carry out her business in the Balkans." "If Austria," he writes, "is attacked by Italy, then I can assure you that Germany regards covering the rear of an allied comrade as a completely understandable duty."

"Much more serious, in my opinion," continues the Chief of the German General Staff, "is the relationship between Germany and France." Germany is convinced that France does not want war, but, no doubt, the mobilization of the German army will force France to mobilize as well. But two armies, like the German and the French, cannot stand mobilized against each other without an armed conflict. Then, according to Moltke, allied obligations will force France to come to the aid of Russia. With the current mutual position of the Entente and the triple alliance, "hardly one of the big European states can draw a sword without affecting the entire continent, which, according to the relevant obligations, will take one side or another." "Thus," says Moltke, "I believe that if Germany mobilizes against Russia, then at the same time she must reckon with the war against Frappia. Whether this war will spread further and whether it will be thrown across the sea - I do not want to go into predictions here.

If France declares war during mobilization, then this is only necessary

welcome, as the situation will immediately become clear.

"The situation outlined here," continues Moltke, "is well known to all European diplomacy and, perhaps, lies the guarantee that not one of the great powers will, because of the Serbian ambipy, ignite the Torch of War, which can set fire to the roof. throughout Europe. That, in the event of an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, such motives will compel Russia to remain neutral, this seems probable to me.

"I want to use these arguments to substantiate the position that in the event of a war between Austria and Russia, Germany, according to the treaty of 1879, will take the side of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy."

In what follows, Moltke proceeds to special technical-military considerations in relation to the war plan, which we shall speak of in its proper place.

Having once again expressed gratitude and confidence in receiving further considerations from Conrad, the Chief of the German General Staff ends the letter by indicating that Wilhelm is aware of its contents.

With a letter to Moltke, Conrad appeared on January 29 to Ehrenthal. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was very pleased and believed that the ratio of these, in the event of war, would be much more profitable than both chiefs of staff believe, since Russia would be forced to leave a significant number of troops in Moscow and St. Petersburg. At the same time, Erenthal said that, in response to Konrad's request, he promised Bulgaria freedom of action in Macedonia for securing the rear of the monarchy from Serbpi attacks, but on the condition that Bulgaria renounce its claims on the Romanian border. But the Turkish minister wants to guarantee the inviolability of Sanjak.

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If Erenthal limited his goals, then in order to put pressure on Serbia and Montenegro on the issue of recognizing the annexation, there was no need, in his opinion, to concentrate large forces on the southern border, and therefore, in a conversation with Konrad, Erenthal raised the issue of setting up an "observation corps" on the middle Drina. Naturally, the chief of the general staff objected to such a proposal, seeing in it nothing but a game of halves. Konrad continued to stubbornly stand for the decisive defeat of Serbia, since otherwise the victims of the war would not justify themselves.

Poincare sees one of the reasons for Erenthal's concession in the fact that "the Young Turk cabinet, attributing the declaration of Bulgaria's independence to machinations on the part of Vienna, stopped all commercial relations with Austria-Hungary." "Erental was forced to make an agreement with Turkey. He renounced in January 1909 the rights that were granted to Austria-Hungary by the Treaty of Berlin in relation to the Sandzak, promised to establish religious freedom for Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, undertook to pay 2!/> million Turkish "juntas" in damages and received recognition in return annexation".

We must note here that the reason given was quite weighty, considering the size of the export from Austria-Hungary to Turkey.

Imports to Turkey from England, Germany and Russia reached the following sizes:

1905.6 1908/9 States 'thousands Lb. sterling (thousand pounds sterling) lings) England 9.642
8.257 Germany 1.163 1.698 Russia „ee. .. 1.597 2.188

Austria-Hungary gradually increased its trade with Turkey, and in 1910/11. imports from Austria reached 6,772 thousand Turkish liras (Turkish Pound - \u003d / \, English Fx. Sterl.). In other words, Austria-Hungary was in second place after England in importing goods to Turkey, ahead of Russia and Germany. Such an economic interest of Austria in Turkey dictated moderate steps in politics. This was very clear to Erenthal and was completely not assimilated by the chief of the general staff, who was far from economics.

Worried about Erenthal's concessions, on January 30, at a report to Franz Josich, due to the ambiguity of the political situation, Conrad asked for an increase in troops in the annexed areas, and also reported that, according to the Serbian Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff Milyutinovich, Serbia would not blow Zotov to May 1909 On the same day, the chief of the general staff received permission to enter, with the consent of Erenthal, into contact with the Bulgarian general staff.

On February 2, a man sent from Vienna to Berlin for instructions under Conrad with a letter to Moltke and with excerpts from the plan for the war against Russia, necessary for the chief of the German general staff.

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In a letter dated January 26, Conrad, joining Moltke's opinion that the war of the monarchy against Serbia and Montenegro would not kindle a general fire, set forth his specific considerations on various variants of the plan. At the end of the letter, the Chief of the General Staff expressed confidence that, given the unwillingness of Austria at the present time to wage war, a timely and decisive statement by Germany to Russia that Russian modification would provoke a response mobilization⁶ in Germany might be sufficient to keep war chauvinism in Russia and France. , awakened by pan-Slavism and the intrigues of England. The letter ended with an indication that its contents were known to Franz Josich and Erenthal.

The emerging "military-political" situation at the beginning of 1909 was regarded by Conrad as quite favorable for waging war with Serbia.

Information from St. Petersburg indicated that they could have risked a war with Austria there, however, they were aware that Russia could in no way be at war with her and Germany.

In these views, Conrad continued to insist on sending reinforcements to the south and carrying out other activities related to the war.

But the chief of staff did not meet with sympathy from the leading circles. Franz-Josich, Franz-Ferdinand, Erenthal, and even the Minister of War were all against the war.

Erenthal resolutely opposed sending reinforcements to the south, as he was afraid that this would damage relations with Turkey. He intended to first negotiate with Turkey, then send an ultimatum to Serbia and hoped that

there will be no war with the recognition of annexation by Serbia.

In one of Conrad's conversations with Erenthal in February 1909, the conversation turned to the disarmament of Serbia, which would have to be demanded of it, and the chief of the general staff, relying on Napoleon's Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, proposed establishing a limited number of peacetime armies and oblige Serbia not to have guns. Poor Konrad did not suspect the variability of fate, which in 1918 transferred the measures he planned against Serbia in 1918 to Austria! Of course, Montenegro was not forgotten by Konrad, which also had to experience the heavy hand of the chief of the general staff.

Recognition of the anti-expansion has not yet come from anywhere except Germany, and meanwhile the Serbs continued their armaments.

On February 14, Konrad obtained an order to further strengthen the troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but two days later Erenthal prevented its implementation.

In a letter dated 16 February addressed to the head of the military office of the absent Franz Ferdinand, Konrad, orienting him about what was happening in Vienna, in the final part of the letter taught that "every war is a dubious matter, in this, however, one cannot look for reasons to avoid it when the situation leads to war, or if its outcome cannot be correctly predicted. One thing is clear," he wrote, "that it is necessary, if possible, to prepare well for the war and meet the coming events with calm humility and without primacy."

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Meanwhile, March 1st was approaching, the date set by Conrad for the completion of military preparations in the south. Far from everything was done yet, and most importantly, no further reinforcements were sent.

On February 18, in a conversation with Konrad, the Minister of Foreign Affairs developed his plan of action: first he finishes negotiating with Turkey, then in mid-March he presents an ultimatum to Serbia, having previously received consent from Bülow for support. Izvolsky's threats of Russian mobilization are considered by him to be a mere bluff, which, according to Conrad, was correctly assessed, especially if Germany announced that she would mobilize as soon as Russia took a step towards this. France is not inclined to war, and, finally, from Berlin it is reported that Italy's action against the monarchy is out of the question. Thus, according to Erenthal, there will be no obstacles on the part of the European powers to attack Serbia. If Serbia does not agree to an agreement, then, in accordance with this, the strengthening of troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be carried out.

Against such a plan, Conrad argued that the reinforcement of the troops should be made already before the start of negotiations with Serbia, since it would take 9-10 days to transport them; if at the same time the press is restrained, then such an increase will be unexpected for the enemy.

However, in a letter on February 24, Konrad again asked Erenthal to clarify the position of Russia, noting in passing the chatter of the press about a punitive expedition to Serbia.

The next day, Erenthal notified Konrad that the plan of action he had drawn up could not be changed, and also announced that he had received full

favorable response from Germany for support.

At the same time, a letter came to Moltke, at the end of which it was reported that, "analyzing the operational situation, in the interests of maintaining peace, he would still welcome if Austria and Russia could come to the

the wording '.

"In that case," wrote Moltke, "I can assume that the relations of the monarchy with Germany would not have been changed."

"If circumstances led to war," the chief of the German General Staff concludes the letter, "then I believe that important goals should overshadow secondary ones, that the defeat of Russia and France should be set first of all. If this is achieved, then the Serbian question for Austria will be solved easily."

On March 3, Konrad again received a letter from Moltke, in which the chief of the German General Staff, reporting data on the distribution of their forces by the Russians in the event of war, at the end noted: "It seems that France does not want war and is already exerting noticeable pressure on this against Russia." As I have pointed out before, Russia's restraint depends on how strong the government feels in itself to resist the new pan-Slavist upsurge."

In his reply letter dated March 8, Konrad wrote that, in his opinion, however valuable an agreement between Austria and Russia, Austria would always be on the side of Germany, and, in turn, an agreement between Germany and Russia would be desirable, about which he already wrote in a letter dated 4 February.

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The month of February nevertheless moved the annexation to a denouement.

Having concluded an agreement with Germany on Moroccan affairs at the beginning of February 1909, France tried by all means to settle the conflict between Austria and Serbia, so as not to be drawn into the war. "We honestly fulfilled the duty of an ally," the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France told the Russian ambassador at the end of February, "but since a very dangerous situation has arisen for our two countries, neither of which wants war, I consider it my duty not to take things to extremes. ". In the opinion of Izvolsky, France "with all its belongings" has gone over to the side of Austria.

The policy of England, which tried to give a European character to the dispute between Austria and Serbia and Montenegro, was not successful.

Although England intended to provide only diplomatic support to St. Petersburg, the situation in Europe in the spring of 1909, according to Churchill, was so serious that it was necessary to think about increasing the maritime power of the islands. Such an increase, in the form of the construction of four ships, was decided by the government of England.

Germany tried to come up with a proposal to demand from Serbia a cessation of armaments and direct negotiations with Vienna.

Izvolsky promptly advised the Serbs to come to an agreement and turn to the protection of European states. These steps by Serbia are not satisfactory.

Erenthal was allowed to do so, and he continued to insist on Serbia's full recognition of the annexation as an accomplished act.

Talk in St. Petersburg about military influence on Vienna ended in an admission of weakness.

In his diary (entry dated February 16, old style), Assistant Minister of War Polivanov notes: "Yesterday (February 28, N. S.—B. Sh.) away from all complications. The chief of the general staff reported the considerations of the chief of staff of the Kiev district on the possibility of mobilizing 4 Austrian corps on our border, in the event of Austria moving into Serbia, and that in this case we should also conduct "training gatherings" in the frontier regiments of the Kiev district; This is supposed to be avoided."

It is not known how long the diplomatic tricks of St. Petersburg and Vienna would have dragged on, but Germany and England, not agreeing on a program for the development of the Fleet, decided to take vigorous steps to end the crisis in order to free their hands for the future.

At the same time, in the first days of March, Erenthal reached an agreement on the recognition of the annexation by Turkey, having received a big trump card in his hands and having fulfilled part of his program. It was possible to avoid the war, but meanwhile, the chief of the Austrian General Staff, having taken the Torch of War in his hands, did not want to part with it.

Presenting on March 12 to Franco-Joseph for approval the plan of war with Serbia, Konrad noted the need to strengthen the troops. In his opinion, this measure not only could not cause a war, since if the latter is resolved in principle by the adversaries, then the strengthening of the troops will not stop the decision he made, but, on the contrary, if Serbia and Montenegro do not want an armed conflict, then strengthening the troops will only encourage them to go faster

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on concessions. On the instruction of Frand-Josef that a decision would follow within the next 1-2 days, on March 14 or 15, Konrad replied that one should dissociate himself from politics, since diplomacy would then close in on itself, and the soldiers would be responsible to the whole world.

On March 13, a ministerial council was held to strengthen the troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ending with the decision to start it on March 15 or 16.

On March 15, Ehrenthal wrote to Konrad about the approval of the decision of the Council of Ministers and at the same time informed him that Serbia was making concessions and diplomatic negotiations¹ with Serbia would begin within 14 days, which were not subject to discussion in the press.

The troops went south, and preparations for mobilization were in full swing at the General Staff and the Ministry of War.

At the same time, Erenthal tried through England and France to influence decisively Serbia, but to no avail.

On the other hand, the steps taken by the German ambassador in St. Petersburg, Pourtales, were more successful. On March 19, he handed over to Izvolsky a note in which the German

the government indicated that if Russia did not influence Serbia, then Berlin would give Austria "freedom of action".

On March 19, a meeting of ministers was held under the chairmanship of Nikolai TsP, at which, according to Polivanov, "the impossibility of war was established for us, and it was decided to answer the note evasively." "However, the German government was not satisfied with such an answer and sent an ultimatum, where it demanded a categorical "yes" or "no" regarding the annexation, anticipated that the evasive answer would be recognized as tantamount to "no", and that in this case, all responsibility would fall on Russia in further.

A participant in this meeting, Sukhomlinov, who was then the pachalpic of the General Staff, writes in his "Memoirs" as follows: In the village, under the chairmanship of the sovereign, a meeting was held on the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Austrians, and General Rediger was asked whether our army was ready for active operations.

"The answer was negative," continues Sukhomlinov, "and to the question of the Minister of Justice I. G. Shcheglovitov, to what extent our armed forces are capable in a defensive sense of protecting against an invasion of our borders, General Rediger just as categorically stated that they completely incompetent. There is nothing to describe the fright of the audience. From his explanations, it turned out that the Japanese war exhausted all the material part, which they could not replenish, and the reduction of service periods without prior warning and simultaneous demobilization completely upset the cadres of military units, which, at the same time, in such a weak composition set, were sent from the border districts in a significant number, at the request of the civil authorities, to the internal districts.

The "evasive answer" that was decided to be given to Germany at the meeting on March 19, the next day, March 20, was handed over to Izvolsky Pourtales.

However, on March 22, the German ambassador delivered a genuine ultimatum with

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a proposal to give an immediate and steadfast answer, and the very behavior of Pourtales and his tone indicated that Berlin had decided to bring the matter to a rupture.

Despite the fact that on the same day a kind telegram was sent along the dynastic line to Wilhelm, there was no answer to it.

Berlin had to submit, and "Napoleon, who began his career with Waterloo" - Izvolsky, without consulting either the French or the British ambassadors, accepted the ultimatum on March 26.

The subjugation of Russia, however, did not yet exclude the possibility of a war between Austria and Serbia; "Willy" didn't even hide this in his reply letter to "Nicky".

The possibility of ending the conflict with Serbia through a peace agreement attracted the entire Viennese government. Only one chief of the general staff

called for war, finding money for this.

According to calculations, the cost of the war for three months was estimated at 800 million crowns, which, according to the Minister of Finance, Austria-Hungary could spend.

Although Russia was now out of the game, Serbia was still slow to respond.

On March 29, a council of ministers was held, at which it was decided to send troops to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also to announce mobilization against Serbia and Montenegro. "Ehrenthal now considers the war," Konrad says.

With a sense of satisfaction, the head of the general staff left the meeting of the Council of Ministers, he did not think that in a day the entire crisis would be resolved peacefully.

On March 31, Serbia received a note in Vienna recognizing the annexation and bringing its army to the strength of the spring of 1908.

"When this note was received in Vienna, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of War and both Minister-Presidents declared that the monarchy had achieved great success and that all pretexts for an armed clash had disappeared; it is clear that the emperor and Franz Ferdinand added their votes to the majority of the council of ministers.

"I," says Conrad, "was of a different opinion" and "looked with heavy concern at the coming future."

On March 19, the Chief of the German General Staff, in a letter to Konrad, admitted that the political situation had not been clarified. |

Replying to this letter only on April 16, Konrad also wrote that "if the likelihood of a modern armed conflict with Russia has now passed, it seems that in the future it is, nevertheless, not excluded, because Russia will direct all efforts to strengthening its position in Western Europe, especially in the Slavic states, and will return again to his Balkan policy.

Recognizing then the whole usefulness of the exchange of opinions that had taken place, Konrad expressed confidence that Germany and the monarchy would also support each other, as documented by the German side now.

After a long period of time, on September 14, 1909, Moltke replied to Konrad's April letter. Emphasizing that in order to be successful

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the friendship of both staffs would be of great importance for joint operations, the chief of the German general staff continued: "I do not consider myself in the right to discuss the desirability of a possible collision. In this private letter, I can only fully agree with you that no use was made of the situation, which is unlikely to turn out to be favorable so soon. I am firmly convinced that if it were possible to limit the war within the framework of a clash between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, then the monarchy, after its victorious conclusion, would have grown stronger internally, would have strengthened on the external front and it would not have been so easy to start new conflicts in the Balkans. If Russia came out and a European war unfolded, then

the situation for Austria and Germany would now be many times better than it could be in the coming years. Let's look to the future with confidence. As long as Austria and Germany stand shoulder to shoulder, as long as each is ready to support the other, as long as they are so strong that they can break any circle. On this Central European bloc, teeth can now be broken.

After praising Conrad for his exemplary preparation for war, the Chief of the German General Staff ended the letter with the assurance that trust would be repaid with the same trust.

Today Konrad publishes this letter to Moltke as proof of the validity of his then arguments about the need to defeat Serbia.

The Chief of the Austrian General Staff considered it necessary to convey his view of the peaceful outcome of the conflict to Franz Josef in a special memoir on the political situation, presented on April 2, 1909.

In it, Konrad notes that the apparent success of the monarchy will only lead to the strengthening of Serbia and Montenegro, which they will not hesitate to do. Outlining the current favorable situation for the war, the chief of the general staff proves that Serbia and Montenegro, not included in the monarchy, will be a constant threat to Austria-Hungary, and in the future war is coming on several fronts, so Russia, Italy, Serbia and Montenegro will strengthen and prepare for war. Conrad sees the outcome in one thing: in the development of the armies and the Navy to the point of extreme tension.

When Konrad, in a conversation with Erenthal, raised the question of what danger threatens in the future with a delay in resolving the Serbian question, the Minister of Foreign Affairs replied: "There is nothing to think about a preventive war now" and at the same time referred to a similar Phrase of none other than Bis - brand. However, the chief of staff was not discouraged by the reference to such an authority and declared that he divided wars into: 1) expedient ones, which sooner or later, but will have to be waged, and therefore they must be entered when the situation is favorable; 2) aimless, which are carried out under an unfavorable situation, and 3) inevitable, into which one is forced to enter at the will of the enemy. As for Bismarck's teachings, Frederick the Great wrote to the English Minister Pitt on June 3, 1761 that "without a doubt, everyone, if he is only a little prudent, will not give time to his opponent to calmly complete all the preparations for war, but, on the contrary, he uses his advantages in this in order to find himself in the most advantageous situation.

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The soul of the militant commander of the Habsburgs has not humbled himself even now. In his memoirs, Konrad condemns the policy of Erenthal, who did not consider the war in 1909 to be a necessary form of social relations. The chief of the general staff considers "eternal peace" to be drowning, and, in his opinion, the people who drop their weapons from their hands, at the same time, predict their fate.

Arguing that after 1866, the entire policy of the monarchy should have been concentrated on the Balkans, and unfolding the history of the Balkan question before us, Conrad sees only half measures in the steps of the diplomat of the Danubian Empire. Meanwhile, long followed the Balkan question

solve with weapons. In 1878, the high diplomats of the Habsburg empire believed that one company with a music orchestra would be enough to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, but in reality it was necessary not only to make one partial mobilization, but also to turn to the next draft under the banner of the reserve.

The situation was similar today. Instead of defeating Serbia and Montenegro under favorable conditions, Erenthal left his deputy a heavy legacy.

This is how the Chief of the General Staff of the Danube Empire cherished the significance of the first Balkan crisis.

How was it in reality?

After the diplomatic defeat of Russia, England and France understood that a genuine war with Germany is beginning, that Berlin will not fail to create new crises, which may not pass as extinguished. There was an overdue Balkan misunderstanding. The crisis brought Austria closer to Germany, but, on the other hand, it finally pushed Russia into the arms of England. From now on, the possibility of a European war depended solely on Berlin and London, on their developing struggle for dominance. At sea, for world trade.

The military advantages were on the side of the middle states, the chiefs of the general staffs of which called for the use of favorable situation on the military field.

But is the solution of world problems achieved by war alone? For general staffs this was an axiom, while diplomats spoke out other considerations. Erenthal turned out to be an opponent of preventive war and limited his political singing during the crisis. Let us assume that happiness would accompany the arms of the Habsburgs in the Serbian fields, but it did not work. Would it not be followed by an even greater weakening of the implicated state of the monarchy and would it not bring a few more steps closer to ruin?

Bismarck said that "politics requires special knowledge to decide whether war is necessary, and when, and how to avoid it with a brush. Austria-Hungary, in the person of Erenthal, "honorably" escaped the war, while the "abnormal government" of St. Petersburg yielded in disgrace to the demands of Germany. The reasons lay in the fact that while Erenthal was aware that the war is currently dangerous for the monarchy, and therefore went to lower the requirements, the Russian government, giving up aware of his weakness, he tried to go through diplomatic contrivances that led him to a dead end.

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True, after all, annexation was the threshold of a world war; European states, as is known, were powerless in resolving the Balkan issue.

Speaking about the Balkan question, Marx writes: "Governments with their old-fashioned diplomacy will never solve this difficulty. This Turkish problem, along with many others, can only be solved by a European revolution."

This truth, however, was not assimilated either by bourgeois diplomacy, and still less by the general staffs. The latter saw a way out in one thing—in the use of weapons, in war, to which their governments were calling.

The nolithic barometer of Europe showed variable, but had a tendency to go to the storm ...

CHAPTER U FINDING NEW WAYS

“The East is a real nightmare, “ipe Boye A sigrg! zes” (a box of surprises), - Conrad's memoir of April 2, 1909. “Every policy must be based on military force.” - Ehrenthal and Schoenich vs Konrad. — Partial and temporary change in the position of the chief of the general staff. — Konrad's attempts to get in touch with the Romanian General Staff and Erenthal's opposition to this, — Conrad's meeting with Moltke on maneuvers. - Conversation between Wilhelm and Conrad. — Conrad's report, July 12, 1909. “Only an active policy is able to ensure the inviolability of the country.” — Trouble about increasing the army and Navy. - A proposal to attack Serbia now. — Letter from Conrad to Ehrenthal, 9% July 1909, requesting guidance on policy. — Two kinds of policies and their influence on military training. — Conrad's duties. — The need to prepare for war and options being developed by the headquarters. - Memorandum of Erenthal dated August 15, 1909. - Clausewitz in the concept of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. — Political results of the annexation. - The Serbian issue must be resolved within the monarchy. — The position of Russia and the possibility of a war between the Balkan states and Turkey. - The inclusion of Serbia by peaceful means into the monarchy. - The policy of gathering forces and waiting. — Erenthal on the development of the army and navy. - Political relations between the states of Europe for 1909 - 1911. — Conrad's memoir, 1909. - The need to have the most probable option for war. — Concrete military training requires a political situation envisaged for years. - Duration of work on the plan of modern warfare. — Enemies and allies. — Preventive war with Italy, Serbia and Montenegro. — Guiding lines of politics according to Conrad. “Konrad doesn't interfere with Erenthal's terms of reference. — Conrad's correspondence with Moltke in 1910. — The coprad wishes that diplomacy would prevent a European war. — Moltke's drafts on actions in the neutrality of France. - With the announcement of mobilization, it should be clear who is friend and who is enemy. - Romanian sorties in Berlin and Vienna: an exchange of views on the float of the war. -New friends. — The nature of Konrad's relationship with Erenthal in 1910. — Conrad's memoir, 1910. — Friends and enemies. — The essence of specific military training and the outlined variants of the war plan. — The need for a preventive war for Austria-Hungary. “War is like a major hinance operation. — The true understanding of Clausewitz as interpreted by Conrad. — Albanian uprising in 1911. — Turkish military agent at Konrad, the hidden ones sang Konrad's visit and answers, — Konrad's letter to Ehrenthal on September 94, 1911, about the need to use the Italian action in Tripoli, — An aggressive policy requires an attack. — Italo-Turkish war. - Military agents in Tripoli. - Conrad's dissatisfaction with the leave of ambassadors during the crisis. “Konrad is responsible for military agents, not Ehrenthal. - Friction in the union of the middle states and Conrad's troubles about the strength of the union. — Conrad is Wilhelm's confidant.

30 years after establishing Berlin Congress (1879), which tried
calm in the Balkans, Austria-Hungary, with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, again thickened
the atmosphere on the peninsula.

The situation in the Balkans attracted attention, and Wilhelm

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in his letter to "dearest Niki" dated May 8, 1909, he wrote: "Going to Corfu, I counted on quiet holidays. But, alas, it was not meant to be. Another revolution broke out in Constantinople. Apparently, we, poor rulers, are not allowed to enjoy holidays like mere mortals. The unrest in the East was very disturbing then (at the time of the annexation - B. Sh.,) it is still disturbing now. The East is a real nightmare, "unne Boie & \$0gr-rtsez" (a box of surprises).

In the previous chapter, we saw that the annexation was only the first surprise, which, at the suggestion of the chief of the general staff of the Danube Empire, should have been followed by others in the form of the destruction of independent Serbia, etc. From the correspondence between Wilhelm and Ni - prick P it is clear that St. Petersburg was aware of the possibility of winding up in the Balkans with new surprises from Austria.

True, Foreign Minister Erenthal wisely halted his offensive in the Balkans, leaving his successor to work actively. politics. The head of the general staff did not think so, seeing in this stop a disastrous future for the entire Habsburg monarchy.

The Balkan question led Konrad to the need to reconsider and establish the main directing lines of foreign policy. This characterizes the time after the annexation crisis until the start of the Tripolitan war in Italy.

Due to the size of our work, we cannot develop Conrad's views on foreign policy in detail and are forced to confine ourselves to general conclusions. |

As is already known, in his memoir dated April 2, 1909, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff expressed his disappointment at the peaceful march of the crisis.

The information coming to the General Staff spoke of the ongoing armaments of Serbia, and only profkhans, in Konrad's opinion, could, with childish naivety, not see the impending military storm.

Reflecting on the emerging political situation, Konrad saw two main lines along which the concerns of the defense of the monarchy should be directed: 1) the development of the armed forces of the moparchy with full tension and 2) the implementation of an expedient, in alliance with other states,

lots.

"Every policy," says the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, "should be based on the military force to which it could appeal. Where one's own means do not make it possible to develop military force to the limit, it is more prudent to confine oneself to a quite definite, with clearly expressed immediate goals, policy in alliance with other states; where, however, military might is not increased, but is counted exclusively on the allies, the danger of defeat must be reckoned with.

The annexation revealed differences in the views of three responsible leaders: Foreign Minister Ehrenthal, War Minister Jonaich, and Chief of the General Staff Konrad.

Cherenthal's diplomatic victory made him less accommodating, and along with him, his friend, Minister of War Shonaikh.

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The Minister of War, seeing how Konrad not only sought to take an independent position, but also deeply delved into the work of the War Ministry itself, with the end of the crisis began to insist on reducing the troops concentrated in the south, and equally took decisive steps to reduce shaping the competence of the General Staff. On April 23, 1909, Shopeich came in with a report to Franz Josef on limiting the rights of the chief of the general staff, especially in his directives to corps commanders.

On May 1, Konrad defended his rights and asked for a written order from Franz Joseph that the Chief of the General Staff has the right to give directive instructions to the corps commanders, the naval command and both ministers of national defense on all operational, equal and other issues, relating to specific military training, not limiting its directives only to instructions on the concentration of the army. At the same time, as we noted in the first book, Koprada asked that the military secretary agree with the chief of the general staff on the military budget before submitting it to the council of ministers. Konrad found such demands to be quite logical and fair, since, according to the situation, the chief of the general staff is responsible for the combat readiness of "all armed forces".

The fight against Erenthal was more difficult. The disagreements that arose during the crisis forced Franz Josef to issue a written order on April 15, 1909, that all the governing bodies responsible for the development of the armed forces should work in complete harmony. On June 9, 1909, a change was temporarily made to the position of Fr. Chief of the General Staff: "In the future," Frand-Josich ordered, "I authorize the Chief of the General Staff, for orientation, to communicate verbally or in writing with my Minister of Foreign Affairs."

It is one thing, of course, to give orders, and another to carry them out. Disagreements between Conrad and Erenthal could not be smoothed out by one order and threatened to develop even more in the future.

If the chief of the allies, Germany, Vienna established a written exchange of views on military issues, then with another ally, Romania, further negotiations, not supported by documents, with Charles and the chief of the Romanian general staff, things did not go forward. Although the latter promised Conrad to accept for development a plan for the deployment of Romanian troops against Russia in Moldova, in the Iasi region, the Austrian general staff was not sure that Romania would really stop at this concentration area, and would not attribute it to the southeast. current, for r. Seret, moreover, the fear of Bulgaria's intervention could force Romania to weaken itself on the Russian front, which was not included in Conrad's calculations. In these forms, he drew up a written instruction to the military agent in Bucharest, offering, together with the Austrian envoy, to achieve a personal meeting with Karl and talk specifically about the war plan with

him, or with the military minister, or with the chief of the general staff. At the end of the letter, it was stated that its contents were known to Frand-Joseph and Erenthal, who, in addition, gives direct instructions

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messenger. On March 8, 1909, Koprad forwarded this letter to Erenthal for further forwarding to Bucharest.

However, at the beginning of May, that is, two months later, the Minister of Foreign Affairs returned the letter to the Chief of the General Staff, accompanying him with his own, in which he indicated that at this time, in view of the change in the political situation, there was no need to rush, and besides, the reasons for the speech of Rumania. cited in Conrad's letter (based on the 1879 treaty) seem to him inconsistent with the circumstances. Erenthal's decision was approved by Franz Josich.

Thus, the joint development of the war plan by Konrad with the Romanian General Staff hung in the air. Until the fall of 1912, the matter was limited to Conrad's neo-official conversations with Granichapo (chief of the Romanian general tatab), which were conducted in the autumn of 1909 during maneuvers in Austria, and then in the winter of 1909-1910 during a visit to Vienna by Graniciano, as a private person.

In April 1909, correspondence between Moltke and Konrad almost ceased, but during that year they met twice at maneuvers, in Germany and Austria, having the opportunity to directly discuss the questions that had arisen regarding the war plan. Neither one nor the other initiates us into the details of these conversations. Konrad points out that complete unanimity was achieved on all topical issues, and the difference in views was revealed only in assessing the role of Italy. While the Chief of the Austrian General Staff had doubts about Italy's loyalty to the triple alliance, Moltke continued to consider Italy a reliable ally and, according to the concentration plan, counted on the assistance of Italian troops in southern Germany. Romanian military assistance was questionable. At the maneuvers in Austria, the chief of the Romanian General Staff, Graniciano, was also involved in the conversations of the two chiefs of staff.

as a guest.

During the German maneuvers, Konrad had a lengthy conversation with Wilhelm, in which the interlocutors touched on military, technical and economic issues. The chief of the general staff was fascinated by Wilhelm. Before him was the "powerful" ruler of Germany, "proud of his people and army"; in a word, he was a ruler in the spirit of Conrad himself. The latter notes with satisfaction that Wilhelm stood firmly on the need for a lasting alliance with Austria-Hungary. With all the "loyal" feelings of the chief of the general staff of the Danube Empire, the comparison was far from in favor of the old Frapts-Joseph.

We know that on April 9 Konrad submitted a report to Franz-Josich, in which he was critical of the peaceful outcome of the crisis that had just passed.

The policy of passive waiting, which Erenthal adhered to, was not to the liking of the Chief of the General Staff, and on July 12 he enters with a new report to Franz Josich, simultaneously sending it to Erenthal and the military

new minister.

"Proceeding from the situation," writes Conrad, "that only an active policy is able to secure the inviolability of the country and that, in case of inevitable

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In the event of the emergence of conflicts with neighboring states, armed clashes should not be avoided, when circumstances favorably develop for this, in 1907 I proposed to reckon with Italy in arms.

Pointing out that his proposal for war with Italy was rejected, Konrad notes that in 1909 again the favorable situation was not used to achieve military success in the Balkans.

Such a policy only worsened the military position of the monarchy, since its enemies began to arm themselves intensively and entered into closer unity among themselves. From now on, the monarchy must reckon not only with all enemies at the same time, but also with enemies well armed and prepared for war.

The foregoing leads the Chief of the General Staff to a very definite conclusion: it is necessary to develop the armed forces of the monarchy in every possible way and actively prepare for war. A war with Serbia would cost about 800 million kroons, and since war has been abandoned, the indicated amount should be allocated for preparations for a future war. "The responsibility for issuing this amount or closing the loan lies with the representative institutions of the monarchy," continues Koprad, "but I consider it my duty to prove the need for its release in the Whole."

To the report we are considering, the Chief of the General Staff appended a "Review of military armaments since May 1909", in which he indicates that if Serbia, Montenegro, Russia and Italy are considered adversaries, then 77 infantry divisions will be put up by enemies against the 46 infantry divisions of the monarchy. If it had been possible to keep Italy neutral, then 46 Austrian divisions would have been close to the enemy's 41 divisions, and the situation would be greatly improved if the Russians were pinned down in Asia; during the speech of Francia against Germany

the number of Russian divisions directed against the monarchy will increase from 27 to 621 /., and then 46 Austrian divisions will have against themselves

1121/, enemy divisions. Finally, there is no certainty that Rumania will chain 81/ Russian divisions to itself, since in military terms Rumania

lagged behind.

"That the monarchy is facing a 'solution of the great Serbian question,' Konrad continues, 'and that it can only be resolved with arms in hand, now this is a public fact thanks to Serbia's agitation and propaganda.'"

"Only the capabilities increased to the extreme limits and inspired by the idea of unity, the armed forces will be able to protect the inviolability and interests of the monarchy; the development of the army and navy does not tolerate any delay, for this is reflected in all operational work and work according to the war plan. Especially considering the latter, I consider it a failure and

duty to insist on it again."

Then making specific proposals for raising the combat readiness of the army, the chief of the general staff comes in with a proposal to crush Serbia now, and the sooner this can be done, the better. There is nothing to go far for a reason, as Serbia continues its propaganda and armament.

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When deciding to go to war with Serbia this year, it should be started no later than Abzust, in the normal state of the rivers, since the approaching winter will deter other powers from intervening.

On July 2, 1909, the Chief of the General Staff sends a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Drenthal, wishing to receive guidance from him on foreign policy issues.

Again noting that for the defense of a state like Austria-Hungary, the closest connection between politics and strategy is necessary, Konrad says that the possibility of war should always be kept in mind, and therefore it is good to prepare for it and enter into it when the situation is as far as possible. that allows human foresight to turn out favorably.

It is quite natural that the Chief of the General Staff should deal with political matters, and he asks the Minister of Foreign Affairs to guide him in the political situation.

At the same time, Yoonrad considers it his duty to draw Erenthal's attention to the difference that exists between an unstable policy built on a subjective assessment of moments, and one that comes from the geographical, ethnographic and cultural specificities of each state.

The first policy is kaleidoscopic, while the second is constant and extremely persistent.

The nature of military training under the first policy will be just as kaleidoscopic, fraught with the danger of failure in an unexpectedly unfavorable situation.

"Concrete military training, requiring long-term, months and even several years of work," the chief of the general staff instructs, "can be based only on the second kind of policy, the one that is built on the natural conditions of development and competition between states."

As an example of such a policy and the concrete military preparation corresponding to it, Conrad cites the policy of Italy and Serbia, which are actively preparing for a war with the monarchy.

Turning to the latter, the chief of the general staff sees the lines of her main policy directed to the Balkans and the Adriatic Sea.

The balance policy of the monarchy should pursue the incorporation or at least the accession to the monarchy of Serbia and Montenegro, which is dictated not only by the territorial expansion necessary from a military point of view, but also by the elimination of the permanent nest of agitation in

Slavic areas of the monarchy.

In the Adriatic Sea, it is necessary to gain dominance for a successful penetration into the Balkans, as well as in view of the developing trade.

With these aspirations, the monarchy will meet resistance: a) directly and directly - Serbia and Chernoloria, since the latter will be in solidarity with the first, and then Italy, whose interests in the Balkans and in the Adriatic Sea intersect with the interests of the monarchy, which cannot be excluded by the expeditions of the Italians to Ahrik; 6) Indirectly - Russia with France associated with her alliance, as well as, presumably, Analia: the first - due to her desire to be the patroness of all Slavs,

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France as an ally of Russia and Anglip as an enemy of Germany, a natural ally of the monarchy.

Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Greece are not regarded as enemies for the foreseeable future. On the contrary, Rumania, due to her desire to wrest Bessarabia from Russia and fears of Russia's expansion at the expense of Rumania, can be regarded as an ally.

It goes without saying that a firm alliance with Germany must be the basis of the entire system of foreign policy of the monarchy.

If Russia is not included among the direct enemies of Austria-Hungary, then this is done because the unpreparedness of its army and Russia's strained replies with Japan and England are taken into account. It is desirable to bring Russia to the side of Germany and Austria.

In view of what has been said, the clarification of relations with Italy, Serbia and Montenegro should be the first task.

"Y would have to bear a heavy responsibility if I had not drawn your attention to the need to strengthen the armed forces," continues the chief of the general staff, "for I proceed from the position that combat-ready armed forces are a necessary prerequisite for every successful policy and concern for the creation of such armed forces, in strict accordance with specific military preparations, are trans. my highest duty."

Subsequently, Konrad gives the measures that should be taken to raise the readiness of the army and, in general, to prepare the state for war, and says that if this attracts the attention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, then in the form of obtaining his assistance for amicable joint conduct of them in life.

Expressing confidence that prudence will prevail and the measures proposed by him will be taken, Konrad recalls that the events of spring have shown how necessary it is to have a combat-ready army. It is not necessary to count on the backwardness of enemies in military training in the future, and therefore the Army and Navy should be developed.

Considering it necessary to draw Erenthal's attention to purely military principles, Koprad writes that it is impossible at the present time to keep in the tap the ongoing preparations for war, which, of course, excludes

surprise. However, it does not follow from this at all that it is better not to conduct any preparation. On the contrary, he prefers to give up surprise and continue the preparations for war, as Italy is systematically pursuing. The most important thing is to keep the initiative in your hands, but for this, politics and strategy must go hand in hand.

As for specific military training, the Chief of the General Staff, for Erenthal's personal information only, reports that it is being carried out:

1) in the event of a war with Italy with simultaneous secondary actions against Serbia and Montenegro with the neutrality of other states;

2) in the event of a war with Serbia and Montenegro with the neutrality of the rest of the states;

3) in case of war with Russia, with simultaneous, but only strictly

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minor and limited hostilities against Serbia and Montenegro; this provides for an alliance with Germany and Rumania and the neutrality of Italy.

In addition, the possibility is envisaged that, bound by an alliance with Germany and Romania, the monarchy may find itself in a war with Russia, Italy, Serbia and Montenegro, on which option is being discussed jointly with the German General Staff.

The chief of the general staff of the monarchy ended his letter with a request to support the military demands that were so laboriously passed in high institutions, while the renthal was informed of the general guidelines of policy that seemed necessary from a military point of view. Finally, Konrad asked that all this be kept in strict secrecy and pointed out that only Franz Josich and Frapp-Ferdinand knew about these considerations.

Both documents of the Chief of the General Staff were reviewed by Foreign Minister Erenthal and returned on August 15 with a secret memorandum from Erenthal himself.

Erenthal takes Konrad's arguments as a canvas and gives an answer on them. For his part, reaffirming the need for a close connection between politics and strategy, the minister does not agree with Konrad that in the spring the situation was favorable for the conduct of the war and was not used by politics. "The decision whether to resort to war or to evade it falls within the competence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs," says Erenthal. "War according to Clausewitz," he continues, "is undoubtedly a continuation of politics, but only by means other than those used up to now."

"Whether these means will be diplomatic or political, only the responsible leader of foreign policy can decide and report his considerations to the competent state council," concludes the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In this council in March the foreign policy was considered

monarchy, and the war was rejected. Erenthal considers it necessary to repeat here the grounds on which such a decision was made. "The aims of our policy," declares the Minister of Foreign Affairs, "was to carry out the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina." With the resistance of Serbia and Montenegro, with the hostile position of Russia and England, the crisis created by apnemia assumed a dangerous character. However, the European states and Turkey, and subsequently Serbia and Montenegro, recognized the change in the 25th article of the Berlin Treaty, which achieved a diplomatic success. "Thus, there was no longer any reason for war," says Erenthal. If Austria nevertheless declared war on Serbia, then such a war would cost great sacrifices in money and people, and besides, in the current political situation, it was impossible to even think of staying in Serbia and Montenegro. The consequence of even a victorious war would be a complication of the state of affairs in Turkey and an increase in the likelihood of the formation of a union of Balkan states, which Izvolsky always thought about. Finally, even Romania would be dissatisfied with the complete defeat of Serbia.

"The foreign policy of the monarchy," continues Erenthal, "first of all

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the turn is determined by the state of affairs in Turkey." In winter, a "test of strength" was made for the monarchy, which aroused suspicion of imperialist designs. Such an opinion about the foreign policy of the monarchy was formed not only in Russia and Serbia, but also in Italy and even in England. All these countries take into account the further advance of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and take appropriate measures.

In his report of July 2, the Chief of the General Staff puts forward the need to direct the policy of Austria-Hungary along two lines and insists not only on the inclusion of Serbia and Montenegro in the monarchy, but also on achieving dominance in the Adriatic Sea. If we were to pursue these tasks now, we would have to reckon with the formation of a strong coalition with the participation of Russia, Italy and even Turkey, which could lead to disaster.

It is needless to say, continues the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that even a partial inclusion of the Serbian territory into the monarchy would not be of any use, since the solution of the heart question depends on the internal state of the monarchy. The Slavic question must first be resolved within the monarchy, and therefore there is no point in bringing it to the fore in foreign policy.

Erenthal has the same fear of solving the second problem - the achievement of dominance in the Adriatic Sea, which, of course, would entail the resistance of Italy. For the time being, she seeks to keep aa Chao in the Balkans, although she is preparing to exploit his disruption. (We must always reckon with Italy's political and economic aspirations for the Balkans. Italian diplomacy, relying on clause 7 of the alliance treaty, wants to receive compensation for our advance in the Balkans, and under the 1907 treaty in Dieso insists on mutual non-intervention and the elimination of third power interference in the Balkans In addition to all this, Rome wants to take part in the negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburg on Balkan affairs, but at the same time, one must take into account the attempt of Italian diplomacy to directly negotiate with St. Petersburg on the Balkan issue, and therefore the policy of the Danubian Empire should interfere with these negotiations.

"The restoration of cordial and friendly relations between the monarchs and governments of Germany and Russia," continues Ehrenthal, "serves as a characteristic symptom in the assessment of Russian politics." This rapprochement between Germany and Russia, after Germany decisively took the side of Austria in March, proves that Russia must pursue a policy of mustering her forces for some years. In the next decade, Russia cannot and does not want to pursue an active Karoi Lido policy, and therefore seeks to preserve az Chao in the Balkans, taking steps in Sofia and Belgrade to establish the best relations between these states and Turkey. Greco-Turkish misunderstandings only benefit Russia.

The whole question is whether Turkey herself will be able to preserve this \$a(\$ {io, which is desirable for all states, also for Austria. Austria's relations with Turkey have recently improved significantly. The second case that can be foreseen is this is the development of a new struggle in Turkey. The big European states are trying not to

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interfere in Balkan affairs, but an armed conflict could flare up between Turkey and the Balkan states. "Foreseeing such a case," says Ehrenthal, "we must keep the gunpowder dry."

Romania, without compensation, will not allow any Balkan state to become significantly stronger. Vienna policy must take into account the tension between Romania and Bulgaria.

In any case, the changes that might take place in the Balkans should not be recognized without the consent of Vienna. We have to reckon with the possible growth of Bulgaria, and therefore take into account its future relations with Serbia. In such a situation, if economic frictions are settled on the part of the monarchy and the policy of Sarajevo and Azram is changed 6, then, most likely, Serbia will try to rely on Austria-Henry, and 6 in this case, the incorporation of Serbia into the monarchy, first egonomically, and then 6 militarily will come by itself. The same can be said about Chernozoria.

The Albanian question, in the event of the collapse of Turkey, presents much greater difficulties, since, strictly speaking, there is no Albanian nationality. On our part, says Erenthal, we should be very careful in proposing Albanian autonomy, and in any case the existence of an "autonomous" Albania and a "great" Bulgaria as decisive political factors is a matter of the distant future. The idea of a protectorate over Albania or a military invasion of this country with the aim of appeasing it is not in the interests of the monarchy.

When the monarchy adopts such a course of foreign policy, the possibility of an armed clash with Russia and Italy, according to Erenthal, is very insignificant, and any preparation of Italy for war with Austria, until the expiration of the tripartite alliance, i.e. until 1912, can be considered excluded, unless those imperialist songs proposed in the report of the Chief of Staff of the General Staff are not suppressed by Austria-Hungary.

As for Serdia and Chernozyurin, they are pessimistic about the Young Turk regime, if only the monarchy will smooth out the economic

misunderstandings with these states, then it is possible that political replies with them will be mortal.

After the annexation, the Yuz-Slavic question should be consolidated within the state. Otherwise, with the desire of the monarchy to expand its territories at the expense of the Balkan states, the monarchy may find itself in a difficult war with Rosspey. During the internal crisis in Turpoi, the monarchy can again put forward for negotiations with Russia the question of the straits, which has already served well before the annexation.

"This policy of gathering strength and waiting," Ehrenthal continues, "is in full accord with the goals of Germany, our natural and faithful ally, and it should not be overlooked that Emperor Wilhelm is peaceful by nature and strives to reap in peace with all the great powers. The imperialist orientation of our policy will not find either in Wilhelm or in the German people the kind of friendly support that took place last winter, but, on the contrary, may even evoke a feeling of competition.

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"The general political situation in Europe and beyond," says the Foreign Minister, "is marked by economic and political contradictions between Germany and England." As an ally of Germany, Austria must take into account the possibility of an armed conflict between these countries. However, on the one hand, the unwillingness of France and Russia to pull chestnuts out of the fire for England, the peacefulness of Wilhelm and the prudence of the English people, and on the other hand, the need for England itself to find a common basis with its colonies for the consolidation of states - put off an armed clash between Germany and England. .

Agreeing with the example of Wallenstein, who, in a similar political situation, also at one time presented a report on the preparation of the army, but did not consider war necessary, Erenthal points out that even today "the monarchy must have a strong army, but not in order to so that contradictions in politics, which can only later be relevant, be resolved by a preventive war, and in the event that the dignity and dignity of the state are in danger or its hoarding interests cannot be resolved in a traditional way.

Agreeing with the requirements put forward by the Chief of the General Staff for the development of the combat readiness of the armed forces, Erenthal believes that these should be submitted to the Council of Ministers in 1910. Ehrenthal objects to Konrad's assertions that the responsible government agencies are not aware of the importance of developing the army and navy. Immediately after the end of the crisis of 1309, a very serious governmental crisis arose in Hungary, in the course of which the Minister of Foreign Affairs could not exert any influence. On the other hand, Ehrenthal notes that the strengthening of the army and the Navy comes up against the unsatisfactory state of the finances of Austria-Hungary. The increase in expenditures on armaments takes place during a difficult parliamentary struggle, since the new taxes are very burdensome for the population. The Austrian and Hungarian Governments have full right to note these circumstances.

Such was the political orientation, the guiding lines of the foreign policy of the monarchy, which the Minister of Foreign Affairs considered it opportune to inform the Chief of the General Staff.

We deliberately cited in detail the documents of both Konrad and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, because, on the one hand, both summed up the results of the past crisis, and on the other, each in his own way outlined the guiding paths for the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary.

With the acceptance of the German ultimatum by Russia, the agitated diplomacy of Europe calmed down, and reparations between the states gradually began to improve. However, everyone understood very well that such "years of calm" are very short and sooner or later, things will come to a military denouement, and moreover on a large scale. Such a course of life was clear not only for diplomacy, but also for the military and, above all, for representatives of big business, who were by no means willing to lay down their arms, continuing the struggle for markets in one place or another. The competition between capital and large-scale industry and the struggle for sales markets was carried on between the banks and large trusts of various states with the same intensity and even intensified every day. On this canvas diplomats

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they were already building their "projects" and writing notes, calling, when necessary, to supra-national aspirations, to historical tasks, to everything that, in their opinion, could move the masses towards the struggle for the cause of capital.

Erenthal's memorandum introduced us to the policy that Austria-Hungary was going to pursue in the coming years. In order to make our next narrative more understandable, we will now leave Vienna and see how relations between the states of Europe developed before 1912, the year by which, according to Conrad, Austria-Hungary should have been ready for war.

The chief of the general staff, with his "soldier's" pen, divided all the states of Europe and even distant Asia into 4 groups: a) direct enemies; b) indirect opponents; c) allies; and d) neutrals. Depending on the foreign policy goals pursued by this or that state, it was included in one of the named groups.

We do not consider ourselves in the right to involve the reader in detail in the political life of the states of Europe, and we will outline it in general terms.

The chief of staff considered Serbia, Montenegro and Italy to be direct enemies of Austria-Hungary.

Forced to submit to the threats of Vienna, Serbia and Montenegro, of course, did not leave hope for a change in the situation in a more favorable direction for them. The armaments of the Serbs developed, and a small state, harnessing all his might, preparing for a future clash.

Once in the orbit of St. Petersburg's influence, Serbia and Montenegro slowly but surely assimilated the idea of the need to create a Balkan Federation of States in order to resist the imminent onslaught on the Balkans. Izvolsky hardly promoted this union, because, on the one hand, no one believed in the loyalty of the policy of Ferdinand of Bulgaria, and on the other, it was difficult to make yesterday's blood enemies friends today. We have heard that Erenthal did not believe well in the formation of such a federation, however, he did not consider this combination to be an exception and considered it necessary in this case to "keep the gunpowder dry." Such foresight was not superfluous, for

On February 29, 1912, an alliance treaty between Serbia and Bulgaria was signed, and in Art. 9 meant that "both sides also undertake to provide mutual assistance with all their might when any of the great powers makes an attempt to annex or at least temporarily occupy a part. Balkan territory, located at the time of the conclusion of the treaty under. by the power of the Turks "... That this article was clearly directed against Austria, there was no doubt, because in the additional military convention concluded two months later, Austria-Hungary was even named as a possible and probable adversary.

Conrad listed Italy as a direct enemy, at odds with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Moltke, who considered Rome to be loyal to the alliance treaty.

Germanpi's secretary of state for foreign affairs, Jagow, in his book "The Causes and Beginnings of the World War" writes that already in 1902 Rome wanted to amend the union treaty, indicating that it was not directed against France. Italy's rapprochement with France, and through France with Russia, became more and more a fact, and Italy's position in Bosnian.

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crisis, according to Yagov, was even "hostile". "The descendants of Machiavelli were obviously playing a double game," concludes the Berlin diplomat.

We know that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, although pre-sanctioned by Tittoni, still made a bad impression in Rome. The Italian minister gave his consent in Vienna only on the condition of getting a free hand in Tripoli. The economic interest of Italy in the Balkans was so great that every benefit received by Austria here was painfully received in Rome. Therefore, Italy willingly agreed with Russia on the Balkan issue and even recognized the advantages of Russia in the straits, if only not to be isolated from the Balkans, to prevent Petersburg from reaching an agreement with Vienna directly, and by the way, to get recognition from Rossip of the advantages of Rome and Tripoli. The agreement was signed in the autumn of 1909 in Rakonidzh. Here Tittoni declared to Izvolsky: "We will leave the tripartite alliance at that time and day when we decide to fight with Austria." In the meantime, "there is no need to do this," said Tittoni to Izvolsky.

Jagow explains to us the reasons that kept Italy in alliance with Germany and Austria. "Essentially," he writes, "Italy was a Fictitious Great Power, since neither economic nor military forces really corresponded to this. She could maintain her prestige only in alliance with the central monarchies, as an equal ally.

On the other hand, the tripartite accord, well considering the mood of Rome, had nothing against leaving "a heavy weight on the legs of the tripartite alliance", which was Italy.

Having previously agreed with the tripartite alliance, and then already putting Berlin and Vienna before a fait accompli, Italy in the autumn of 1911 began the division of the Turkish inheritance by attacking Tripoli. Vienna, represented by Ehrenthal, agreed to this as early as 1908, and Germany was occupied in Morocco. "Italian's hour of action in Tripoli draws near,"

said the Italian prime minister when he learned about the sending of a German warship to Agadir.

"The Italo-Turkish war of 1911 shook the strength of Turkey and whetted the appetites of the Balkan imperialists, who decided to take advantage of the temporary weakening of Turkey in order to attack the latter and seize, hypocritically hiding behind one or another noble slogan, the Ottoman territory. This is how the Balkan wars began, opening the era of a new division of the Ottoman inheritance," writes M. Pavlovich in the book we mentioned above. All researchers of the political events of that time come to such conclusions. We shall return to this question later, but we consider it appropriate to add our voice to the above assessment of the Italian-Turkish war.

Thus, since Italy was launched into Africa and not transferred to the Balkans, relations between Rome and Vienna could not lead to a crisis. It goes without saying that neither side had faith in the duration of good-neighborly alliance; it all came down to when Italy recognizes it necessary to withdraw from the tripartite alliance and move

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to the opposite camp. Austrian activity in the Balkans could accelerate this. Of the indirect enemies, the most hostile towards the Danube Empire

was Russia. Relations between Vienna and St. Petersburg were improved with difficulty, - such a deep imprint was left by Zrenthal's diplomatic victory.

Some rapprochement between Vienna and St. Petersburg can be noted at the beginning of 1910, when Erenthal and Izvolsky again tried to reach an agreement on Balkan affairs. However, this time Izvolsky did not want to negotiate face to face with Vienna and made it a condition for the participation of other European states, and at the end of this year, Izvolsky's successor as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazonov, made a completely categorical statement in Berlin, that if it were necessary to come to an agreement with Vienna, then Russia would do this "through the mediation of German statesmen." The latter, "on their own initiative" assured Sazonov that "if Austria-Hungary had not remained true to the principles expressed by Erenthal and had shown a desire for a policy of conquest in the Balkans, then she would not have met the slightest support from her ally, not obliged to by no agreement and not inclined to such a policy due to its own interests.

This verbal statement was followed by a written proposal from Berlin to conclude an agreement on Balkan issues on the condition that in the event of a war between Germany and England, Russia would remain neutral.

Russia could not agree to the last condition, and therefore refused. from an agreement with both Berlin and Vienna. At that time, Russian diplomacy carried out intense preparatory work to isolate Austria by concluding an agreement with Italy and forming a Balkan hederation.

In addition, relations with England and France were far from what to expect from them real help in case of war, and their own army was still not ready for war. The former quartermaster general of the Main Directorate of the General Staff Yu. Danilov in his book "Russia in the World War

1914-1915" writes: "I cannot characterize otherwise the period of time from 1905 to 1910 inclusive, maybe even longer, as calling it a period of complete military helplessness. ; likewise, she would have to exert superhuman effort if assistance were required. military assistance to her ally France.

Buchanan, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, testifies to us that the annexation even served "to bring closer" Austria to Russia. On the other hand, the same Buchanan says that at the beginning of 1912, Nicholas expressed to him the proposals he had made to the powers of triple agreement to work out in advance "among themselves a general plan of action in the event of a sudden outbreak of a Balkan war or an offensive from Austria." One thing does not fit with the other, and more precisely, that Zeterburg decided to negotiate on Balkan matters first with his allies, then with Germany, and then only to negotiate: with Austria.

Already on July 17, 1909, Izvolsky warned the German state official

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Secretary for International Affairs Shen, that "a new step forward by Austria on the Balkan Peninsula could produce a crisis incomparably more acute than it was last winter, and if it is also supported by Germany, it will be very difficult to save peace in Europe."

The Italo-Turkish war, the beginning of the division of the Turkish inheritance, again put the question of the straits on the agenda, and Izvolsky, at that time already ambassador in Paris, strongly advised Sazonov to be ready to raise the Turkish question as a whole.

Therefore, on the one hand, by creating the Balkan "hederation", Russia, on the other hand, sought to support the new regime in Turkey and enter into an agreement with it on the straits and the Baghdad railway. The Turks, while sympathetically welcoming Russia's proposals, were at the same time in no hurry to implement them, and more than once Russian diplomacy, thrown off balance by Eastern stubbornness, reached the decision to fully influence Turkey.

But the question of the straits was slowly advancing towards a solution in the allied countries as well. England, first of all, and France after her, did not want to give St. Petersburg direct guarantees. The reasons for this must be sought in the friction that accompanied the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907. The "calico" imperialism of Petersburg in Persia created constant friction between Russia and England, and the agreement between Petersburg and Berlin on the Baghdad road made London fear that Russia would fall out of the tripartite agreement and turn its policy towards the Far East. It was not until 1912 that tensions gradually began to smooth out, and Anglo-Russian relations embarked on the path of closer cooperation.

We have already heard from Erenthal that events in Europe unfolded under the sign of Germany's competition with England.

The Apnexion Crisis has shown the British Isles that the future of their policy is not nearly as calm as it used to be. The retreat of France and Russia before Berlin forced Apglia to think about her future, especially since she was far from being combat-ready.

The Agadir Incident of 1911 forced England out of its state of sway over European politics, and on June 5 the Cabinet of Ministers clearly stated that it was impossible to remain aloof from the impending conflict and further actions depended on what position Germany took.

We have no right to delve into the description of the course of events caused by the Agadir incident, but let us point out that in his day England was seriously thinking about a possible war and revised both her treaty resignations with France and the plans for military action of the English army and Fleet.

Churchill, in his memoirs, recounts the meeting of Parliament on August 23, where reports were heard from the Land General Staff and the Admiralty on the proposed plans for military operations. While the land general staff insisted on sending an expeditionary force to the mainland, naval circles objected to this. This disagreement led the Minister of War to tell the Prime Minister after the meeting that he could not continue to hold himself responsible for

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preparations for war, if there is no man at the head of the Fleet who would work in complete unity with the land general staff, and if there is no genuine naval general staff.

As a result, Churchill was at the head of the English Fleet, who, although he was in solidarity with the plans of the British General Staff, was far from looking so optimistically at the Franduzov offensive, as Wilson, the Chief of the Operations Department of the English General Staff, had learned to himself.

In his memorandum, Churchill already proved then that the French would not be able to stop the German onslaught and on the 40th day they would be forced to fight near Paris. Churchill proposed to significantly strengthen the first echelon of the Anglo-French army and immediately develop the territorial

army. Agadir, according to Churchill, ended in the defeat of Germany. France, stirring at its own interest wherever it was

it is possible, its capital and spreading its influence in Morocco, was not inclined to enter into a period of crises, supporting the active policy of Russia. We know the role of Paris in the Bosnian crisis. It changed very little by 1911, despite the fact that France was supported by Russia and England in the Moroccan crisis. When the latter, in the Agadir incident, spoke to Berlin in a decisive tone in defense of France, Paris was frightened by the possibility of war and asked London not to be zealous, leaving France to come to terms with Germany herself.

The French bankers were ready to lend money to Hungary, Cathay and Finance the construction of railways on the Caucasian border of Russia, if only to get a good interest on the capital, regardless of the benefits of their ally. The Russian diplomat had to go to great lengths to keep the government of the union republic from giving help to the future direct enemies of the tripartite accord. True, Izvolsky paid off the French press with French money received through

loans, but the Fact remains the Fact. Russia not only could not count on outside support for its Balkan policy! France, but even met with obvious opposition to it.

Paris was afraid of one thing, it was a possible rapprochement between Russia and Germany, and only by the specter of this could Russian diplomacy keep the greed of French stockbrokers and speculators who did not want to lose their rear support during an offensive in Morocco.

The period from 1909 to 1912 in relations between Russia and France can be characterized as a period of gradual involvement of Paris by Russian diplomacy in Balkan affairs. Day and night, Izvolsky proved to the politicians of France the importance of the Balkans in international relations, for the same purpose he paid substantial sums to the press ... in a word, he acted energetically in the name of saving the Franco-Russian agreement, which continued to exist, but was not sufficiently strengthened by active cooperation in the international arena.

Having provided assistance to Austria-Hungary, Germany hoped to find warm sympathy in Vienna for this. However, Erenthal © with great restraint thanked for loyalty to the union, continuing to maintain the prestige of the monarchy 'as a "great" power, completely independent in its foreign policy.

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It should be noted that such restraint was justified, because, as we know, Berlin was not averse to reaching an agreement with Russia at the expense of Vienna, if only to obtain Russian neutrality in a future armed clash © England. "Willy" and "Niki" twice (1909 and 1910) demonstrated their friendship and even reached an agreement on the issue of the Baghdad railway, but the efforts of Germanias to wrest Russia from the tripartite agreement each time turned out to be futile.

Germany, having not agreed on a program for the development of the fleet with England, clearly foresaw the future clash and, willy-nilly, had to keep Austria-Hungary as an ally. Sometimes the trade interests of these states clashed in the Middle East, sometimes the press of both sides looked skeptically at the strength of the union, but the latter had not yet outlived itself, and Austria also covered the rear of Germany from the east, as Russia did in relation to France and England. Another thing is the active policy of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, here Germany could help Vienna only when it was in the interests of Berlin. Considering that every year German expansion in the Middle East expanded more and more, then it must be admitted that the time had come when, contrary to Bismarck's veil, Berlin had to sacrifice the bones of the Pomeranian grenadiers in Balkan affairs. It is necessary to consider Sazonov's tags as correct, who since 1910 decided to negotiate with Austria on Balkan affairs only "through the mediation of German statesmen." From now on, Russia's route to the Balkans passed through Berlin, and not through Vienna, where since 1908 the Russian diplomatic line actually decided not to look.

The treaty between Germany and Austria, concluded in 1879 "out of necessity", remained such to this day. This is how he frothed in Berlin, this is how Erenthal, Konrad and other politicians from the banks of the Danube looked at him, considering this treaty the basis of their policy. Neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary found new friends and were forced to continue cohabiting.

to live in an alliance created by the hands of Bismarck and Andrassy.

Italy, as we have already seen, was an unreliable member of the tripartite alliance, the same ally "in need" as the main links were.

Finally, the fourth member of the alliance, Romania, was more distracted by her Balkan affairs than pursued the goals of the entire alliance as a whole. Bessarabia was the only target that could compel Romania to take the side of the tripartite alliance. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the declaration of Bulgaria as an independent kingdom diverted the attention of the Romanians to the south, where "Great" Bulgaria could revive - a dangerous neighbor, against which measures had to be taken in a timely manner: combat readiness. While the idea of national unification at the expense of Austria-Hungary and Russia was growing stronger in Romania every year, in Vepa they dreamed of creating a "guard on the Lower Danube" from Romania, including this kingdom in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. But those were the distant dreams of the Austrian imperialists, so far groundless...

Such was the policy of the third group of states of Europe - the "allies", with whom the head of the General Administration of Austria-Hungary counted on joint steps in the implementation of the deeds planned by him.

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As for the group of "neutral" states, we will not go into consideration of their external relations, but we will only note that. while Koprads hoped in the face of Japan to meet a state diverting Russia's forces, in reality the Russo-Japanese agreement was gradually deepening, and Russia, in case of war, could calmly turn its back "to strife."

If we turn to Erenthal's memorandum, we must in all fairness note the perspicacity of this diplomat. True, even the minister did not exaggerate the active policy in the Balkans, but with sufficient accuracy. predetermined the readiness of Russia. The policy of "gathering forces", which Erenthal decided to adhere to, was really the most expedient for Austria-Hungary, because it was necessary to regulate internal relations in the state and only then turn to the offensive. on the outside front.

The Chief of the General Staff, as we have seen, did not share the thoughts of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, continuing to remain in the position of a man inciting to set fire to the roof of Europe.

On February 21, 1910, the Chief of the General Staff presented Franz Josef with a memoir for 1909, which we consider it necessary to refer to.

Starting with the fact that this memoir consists of an overview of: a) the military-political situation; b) development of the armed forces of foreign states; c) the development of the armed forces of the monarchy and d) the necessary measures for the development of the state's means of communication - Konrad notes that all considerations on specific military training reported. them separately, are excluded from this memoir.

Recalling again that the monarchy does not have such means to. to be ready for war with all possible options, the head of the general

The military headquarters indicates that in this respect those states that themselves determine the most probable variant of war, prepare for it and start it at a favorable time for themselves, are doing the right thing. Such. the policy was followed by Germany in 1866 and 1870. and Japan in 1904. It makes it possible to take advantage of surprise and thereby increases the chances of success.

The following military considerations must also be taken into account.

While the often changing political situation brings about diplomatic relations adapted to the new situation, with military measures it is quite different, because for its change. they take quite a long time. Leading to this evidence, the chief of the general staff says: "Thus, military. preparation cannot be made dependent on fluctuations in a rapidly changing political situation, but must be foreseen for years to come, be correctly calculated, as there are any omissions in it. cannot be made up at the last moment. Nor can it rest on temporary agreements guaranteed by parties or individuals, whose change will also make politics shaky. Due to temporary tasks, military preparations should not be missed, since. any changes in the former usually have a harmful effect on the latter.

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Only a policy based on force will succeed," Konrad continued, "so it is in the interests of politics to have this force available and properly used if diplomatic difficulties can be foreseen.

denial."

At the request of the Chief of the General Staff, one should not forget that. success in the annexation crisis was based on the combat readiness of the armed forces of the monarchy.

In addition to what was said above about the need for the policy to identify a certain, probable variant of an armed conflict, Konrad considers it necessary to add remarks about the nature of the work on the mobilization and concentration of the army.

"With the enormous size of the masses, which today in the form of people, animals, weapons, other military means, food supplies and other supplies are set in motion, at the speed with which the mobilization and concentration of these masses must take place now, so that immediately not to lose out, in the concentration of means of transport and transportation measures, military training corresponding to a certain option is a huge job, very long and requiring several months. Therefore, it is absolutely impossible to carry out these works at the last moment, as it can be in an unforeseen situation, just like with a pedal-like or vacillating policy.

"On the same grounds," says Conrad, "firm, predetermined guidelines are necessary for politics, which must be taken into account by military measures."

"The more insecure the politics based on the individual and the party, the more it must reckon with those grounds that flow from broad interests, natural needs and from the deep contradictions of the masses of people,

in short, from the natural, economic and moral, for example, national contradictions of states, for only these foundations, as permanent and natural, provide the initial data.

From this point of view, the speaker further considers the states that can exert one or another influence on the foreign policy of the monarchy.

Italy is in a tripartite alliance, but there is absolutely no guarantee that with a change in the composition of the government, or if Italy completes her planned military training, her policy will remain the same. "Italy," continues the Chief of the General Staff, "is systematically preparing for war with the monarchy, in order to threaten this war with the end of the triple alliance agreement and thereby harm the successful development of the monarchy, or turn to war itself if Austria opposes the aspirations of Italy." |

Conrad based Russia's policy towards the monarchy on contradictions in questions: 1) pan-Slavism and its struggle with Germany and all those states that were oriented towards Berlin, and 2) Russia's aspirations to the Mediterranean Sea in order to gain predominance in the eastern part of the Balkan peninsulas.

To counteract Petersburg, according to Konrad, it is necessary to include the southern and western Slavs in the monarchy, thus separating them from the eastern ones; As for Russia's access to the Mediterranean Sea, then in this

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On the question, besides Austria, Rumania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and the big states interested in the Mediterranean Sea, England in the first place, take a hostile position.

If we also take into account that Russia in Asia is diverted by Japan, then we should think that Russia is hardly inclined to wage war with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Thus, Russia's policy bifurcates between Asia and Europe and is directed, first of all, to healing the early days of the Russian-Japanese war in the army. This compels not only the formation of a penal army on the Volga, the strengthening of the army by converting 19 reserve brigades into 9 reserve divisions, but also the abandonment of troops within the state as a result of revolutionary outbreaks. However, in the event of war, Russia can still deploy a significant number of troops in the European theater of war.

Serbia, without hesitation, is striving for pan-Slavism, or at the very least, for the expansion of its territory at the expense of the Serbian regions of the monarchy - Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Dalmatia. Since the monarchy pursues the preservation of its Slavic regions, the maintenance of maritime power and the spread of its influence in the Balkans, then, no doubt, it will meet an implacable enemy in Serbia. Quite vague are the suppositions that Serbia, because of economic developments and security against Bulgaria, Albania and Turkey, will lean towards the monarchy. The present state of affairs of Serbia and Chernoyuria, on the other hand, puts them in the 6 number of obvious rivals of Austria. Serbia is now systematically and quickly arming itself.

Chernozoria seeks not only to defend its independence, but also to tear off the southern part of Dalmatia and Herzegovina from the monarchy. There is no evidence to count on economic rapprochement with Chernopogoria.

Bollaria is considered by the chief of the general staff as a counterbalance to Turkey and Serbia in the Macedonian and Albanian questions. Bulgaria is maneuvering, and it must be assumed that her armed forces can be used by the enemies of the monarchy. |

Turiya, which has not yet strengthened the new Young Turk regime, is in a state of fermentation, the end of which is difficult to foresee, but it can be established that the new government is concerned about strengthening its armed forces. Türkiye does not dream of the return of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its interests: intersect with the interests of all the Balkan states. There are no contradictions between the monarchy and Turkey, there is no reason to consider Turkey as a likely adversary, and unless the opposing party turns out to be on the side of direct enemies, then there is no need to support Russia against Turipi and negotiate with Petersburg at the expense of the latter. On the contrary, the Chief of the General Staff considers it desirable to use Turkey as an ally against Russia, Italy, Serbia and Chernogorip, all the more so as to take over the influence of allied Germany. Turkish soil

With Greece, Austria also has no direct intersecting interests, and it should be considered either as an ally or among very minor enemies.

In France, the policy is aimed at economic development within the state and the expansion of its colonial acquisitions. The idea of revenge in the Alsace-Lorraine question has many more supporters

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and may escalate if it comes to war © Germany. France's immediate political goals are in North Africa and bring her into possible conflict with Turkey, Italy and England. But above all, France at the present time, for financial reasons, seeks to avoid war. On the other hand, Russia is in a military alliance with Russia, and the center of gravity of French policy is the desire to keep Russia out of the war.

Anllia seeks to protect not only the entire metropolis, but also the colonies, from enemy invasion and to gather forces to maintain hegemony in maritime trade. Yoto will stand on this path of hers - that enemy. Avetro-Vepgria has no direct contradictions with England, and if England is considered an enemy, then only through an alliance with Germany. England is strong mainly with its fleet and it can threaten the shores of Austria, but you can not be afraid of significant desapts.

The alliance of England, France, Italy and Russia on the 6th side with Austria-Henry and Germany will have enormous superiority at sea, which, in the opinion of the Chief of the General Staff, can only be paralyzed by an energetic, arbitrary and happy waging of war on land. This circumstance once again emphasizes the need to develop the army of the monarchy. But it must be borne in mind that it is not in the interests of England to allow France, Italy and Russia to gain strength in the Mediterranean; besides, England is against the opening of the straits for Russia, and misunderstandings with the latter in Asia have not yet been settled. All this leads Conrad to the conclusion that it can be hoped that if the monarchy goes to war, England will be kept neutral, unless Germany enters the war. In the latter case, England, in order to maintain her hegemony on the seas,

will certainly be forced to draw a weapon.

Whether Greater Romanian ideas will prevail in Rumania, or whether Rumania will peacefully become part of the monarchy, is, according to Conrad, a matter for the future, and at the present time one should reckon with the friendship of the Romanians and strive to maintain an alliance with them.

"The alliance of the monarchy with Germany," Konrad continues, "is the main point in Vepa's political game with the European states... This alliance, with the joint loyal protection of the interests of each of the allies and with the peaceful settlement of emerging contradictions, from a military point of view very necessary." Even if competition should arise in trade in the Balkans and Asia, it should be immediately eliminated without spoiling allied relations.

Switzerland, although a neutral country, however, is actively preparing its army. The development of the Italian irredenta in the Italian cantons is noticeable, which forces Switzerland to take military measures.

It is impossible to sketch a correct picture of the political situation if Japan is not taken into account, says the Chief of the General Staff. After the war with Russia, Japan will continue to expand and pull away part of the Russian forces. China's position has not yet been revealed, whether it will be on the side of Japan or Russia.

Comparing forces, the chief of the general staff comes to the conclusion that Austria, in alliance with Germany and Romania, will be put at a disadvantage.

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a desirable position, having against itself Russia, France, Italy, Serbia and Montenegro, not taking into account England. In these aspects, the monarchy must reckon with a simultaneous war against Russia and Italy, which will be hostile to every advance of Austria in the Balkans. One has to regret that Serbia and Montenegro were not reckoned with in advance.

Conrad wonders whether Italy or Russia should be kept neutral in order to defeat the other. Military arguments, based on the weakness of Russia and her position in Asia, lead the Chief of the General Staff to the conclusion that it would be better for the time being to maintain friendship with Russia and destroy Italy: this is dictated by the limited means of the monarchy in its preparation for war.

Remaining convinced that the annexation of Serbia must always remain the main object of foreign policy in the Balkans, Konrad cannot agree with the program put forward by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to preserve the *Chao* in the Balkans.

"I believed that the spring of 1909 was a propitious moment for resolving this issue by military means," Konrad continues. — That the same can be achieved peacefully is a question. In any case, the entry into the path of power in the Balkans must be preceded by the overthrow of Italy.

"From a military point of view, therefore, the following policies guide the Lipia: a close alliance with Germany and Romania; friendly stance towards Russia, using Eastern

the Asian question and its wounds after the Manchurian War; speedy settlement of arms with Italy in order to eliminate the simultaneous action of Italy with Russia and, at the same time, to gain freedom of action in the Balkans and against Russia.

It is unlikely that Serbia and Montenegro will remain neutral, and therefore it is necessary to declare war on them at the same time as Italy.

The nearest goal in the Balkans should be the annexation of Serbia, at the very least, so that Serbia does not turn into a strong independent state.

Having outlined this political program for the monarchy, the chief of the general staff, proceeding from it, found it necessary "first of all, to the extreme limits of the possibility of developing military preparations," since the military preparation of Italy already gives her advantages.

"Only in such a premeditated and coherent relationship between policy and strategy do I see grounds for success," Conrad concludes.

He considers the end of the tripartite alliance (1912) to be a particularly important moment in military policy. All States strive to complete their preparations by this time. "It would be bad if the monarchy did not prepare for the specified period, it is necessary to be well-armed and combat-ready. This must always be kept in mind and relentlessly pursued."

"As before, under other circumstances," continues the Chief of the General Staff, "I noted that I was far from invading the terms of reference of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. However, with that internal dependence, which, especially for a monarchy surrounded on all sides by enemies, exists

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There is no difference between politics and specific military training, I consider myself obliged to draw the conclusions arising from this connection, which are necessary for my special service for specific military training, for which I am responsible.

In the future, the author of the report lists the measures that should be taken to raise the combat readiness of the armed forces, and for detailed acquaintance refers to the appendices, which we have listed above. As a summary of his report, the Chief of the General Staff puts forward the following statements.

"All the states discussed above are working on the development and improvement of the armed forces with the expenditure of large funds and energy, especially Italy, which is arming itself systematically and unsustainably, hoping to be ready for war with the monarchy before 1912."

"Since, in terms of the development of the armed forces, the monarchy lags behind its neighbors, especially Italy, it seems fair, on the basis of the military preparation that is being created, to make a proposal - the sooner the better, to enter into conflict with Italy; it is also advantageous because Russia is currently not ready militarily."

We will not go into a detailed analysis of the memoir of the Chief of the General Staff. Nevertheless, we must note here that the political situation in Europe, in his opinion, made it possible, without the intervention of other large states, to deal with Italy in arms and pour blood over Serbia and Montenegro. If we recall the statements of Izvolsky Shenu in 1909, we can say with confidence that such plans of Konrad were built on sand. In 1910, it was no longer necessary to think about a duel between the two states of Europe, even with the most skillful policy of neutralizing other states. Every point of contradiction between one state or another has always and invariably been dragged out by diplomats, even on the side of standing states, onto the European arena. It was only in the colonies that it was still possible to talk about the development of independent military operations, and even then to the extent that would not inspire fear in a competing state. How much France had to work in the diplomatic field before going up in arms in Morocco! The same is true of Italy with its expedition to Tripoli! Only representatives of the general staff of the "abnormal government", such as, for example, Palitsyn, found it possible to start a new Russian-Turkish war without causing a European one, but even they were brought back to "normal" in time. All proposals for a preventive war with Italy and even with Serbia were to find such an end.

But Conrad, sketching out his political program, wrote that it should be adopted for years. In his mouth, he withstood his temper and, until his resignation at the end of 1911, considered his arguments about the need to defeat Italy and Serbia as immutable. We shall see below that this was partly even the reason for Konrad's departure from the post of Chief of the General Staff.

We will not take time away from Minister of Foreign Affairs Ehrenthal, who is busy reading the drafts of a politician in military uniform, but will turn to Konrad's lively activity in the field of the same policy. |

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Conrad considered the inviolability of the alliance with Germany to be a strict necessity for the successful foreign policy of Austria-Hungary and its readiness for war. Although his strength was confirmed in 1909, however, it was necessary to warm up the flared fire of love, and on January 2, 1910, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff in a letter to Moltke expresses his friendly and comradely feelings, incidentally noting - the need for a close alliance between Germany and Austria.

In the beginning of January 1910, a person from Vienna went to the Chief of the German General Staff from Vienna for special assignments under Konrad to hand over to Moltke the annual study of the war plan and a personal letter from the Chief of the Austrian General Staff, and also with the aim, during a personal meeting with Moltke, to receive orientation from him about the general situation.

Conrad's personal letter to Moltke, dated 8 January, begins with the indication that it was written with the permission of Franz Joseph. Noting that last year's joint work on the war plan had by no means lost its value. values, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff provides the following possible options for a future armed clash: 1) France is neutral, the enemies are Russia, Serbia and Montenegro; 2) France is neutral, Russia enters the war when Austria is distracted by Serbia and Montenegro; 3) Russia, France, Serbia and Montenegro act at the same time; 4) Russia and France

neutral at first, but open hostilities when Austria throws more forces into the Balkans. All of these options accept an alliance with Romania, the neutrality of Italy, and the distraction of Bulgaria by Turpia. On the part of the latter, a striving for an alliance with the middle states is noticed, and if such an alliance were realized, then we can expect that Turkey will not only bind Bulgaria, but also divert the forces of Serbia and Montenegro.

As far as the alliance with Romania can be considered secured, Coprade doubts Italy's loyalty to the alliance, and therefore, listing: all the preparatory measures of the Italians for the war with Austria, the chief of the general staff of the latter "considers it his duty, when developing a war plan, to take into account the possible case of war. with Italy, which is the special pelio of this letter."

Konrad provides two options: 1) Italy, Serbia and Montenegro are in favor, Russia and France are neutral; 2) Italy, Serbia, Cherpogoria, and Russia declare war on Austria—then, under the treaty of 1879, Germany takes the side of the monarchies, which also provokes the action of France.

Conrad considers the first option possible, given the financial condition of France, as well as internal troubles in Russia and the state of its army.

In the second case, according to Konrad, Germany first delivers the main blow to France, in order to then turn for a final decision against Russia. By analogy, Austria first of all smashes Italy and then turns also against Russia.

Further citing operational considerations for the second option, which we will talk about in its place, the chief of the Austro-Wepger general staff admits that this option, in fairness, is difficult for Ger--

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mania, Austrian and Romanian, but not hopeless, it is desirable that diplomacy prevent it. "This, however, is out of my range of duties," Konrad continues, and goes on to say that the letter was written with knowledge. Franl-Yoshikha, in order to illuminate to Moltke those difficulties that may arise on the allied path.

Having handed over this letter, Konrad's envoy had a private conversation with Moltke. The famous uncle's nephew noted that the formation of a union of small loc4- grants in the Balkans would be the threshold of war. The whole question is who will soil it - Russia or England. Pointing out that Turkey was valuable to Germany, especially against England, as a country with a Mohammedan population, Moltke suggested that Turkey could also serve Austria well against the small Balkan states. The Turkish army will be good in a few years, and everything will depend on the new government, how strong it is. Pointing out that in Germany everything is prepared for. the case of an attack on the Russians, as well as the unlikely neutrality of France, the chief of the German General Staff did not lose sight of the possible contradictions between Japan and England.

On January 30, Moltke sent a reply to Konrad. Assuring them of personal friendship: of loyalty to the alliance and that, when developing the war plan, the German General Staff laid the basis for the joint actions of the Allied

kov, - the head of this headquarters began the letter with an assessment of Turkey. Although everything goes to the fact that Turkey is more and more drawn to the central powers, however, this should not be overestimated, since only after 3-4 years the Turkish army can become a real factor in military affairs. With joy Moltke notes the inviolability of the alliance with Romania. Italy. The Chief of the General Staff considers that France is in the same position in regard to Austria-Hungary in regard to Germany. If both of these states come out on the side of Russia, then the situation is serious, but on the other hand. clear and simple. The Austrian army attacks Italy with its main forces, and Germany attacks France. It will be more difficult if Italy and France first bide their time.

"The only radical way to prevent such a situation," continues Moltke, "is an immediate declaration of war on dubious neutral states. But this is impossible due to political and purely humane conditions."

"I propose, therefore," writes Moltke, "that if a war between the Allies and Russia is to be regarded as inevitable and inescapable, then the German government should be required from the French government to make an exhaustive and quite clear declaration of what position the latter will take in case of war. This declaration must be made immediately, for the decision whether to throw the main silt, west or east, cannot be reckoned with any delay. An evasive or double-dealing response should be considered tantamount to a declaration of war."

"If France wants to maintain strict neutrality, then Germany undertakes in the same way not to take hostile actions, that is, the western fortresses are not mobilized, and the protection of the borders is not intensified .. Nevertheless, the general mobilization of the army is announced, but that part of it that.

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will not be first of all thrown against Russia, remains in the places of its camps.

Pointing out that the German General Staff is working out the war plan in such a way that it also provides for the neutrality of France, Moltke notes that Germany is bound precisely by the fact that for a long time she must keep forces ready against her dangerous adversary - France.

"There is no doubt," the chief of the German General Staff concludes his letter, "that the war of Austria-Hungary and Germany with Russia, the Balkan states, Frandia and Italy is a life-and-death struggle. It would have been easier to carry out if the situation had been clarified from the very beginning. To fulfill this latter is the immediate and first duty of diplomacy. Your Excellency demands that diplomacy be able to avoid such a situation. One can only applaud if it succeeds. Without a doubt, the high command must firmly put forward the position: at the moment when mobilization is to be announced, complete clarity is necessary - who is friend and who is enemy.

We deliberately dwell on the letter of the Chief of the General Staff from Berlin in 1910, as it: 1) reveals a certain view of the man of war on the matter of politics and 2) outlines the program

actions before the war. Below we will compare these views with the situation at the beginning of the war in 1914, and now we earnestly ask those who read our work to carefully remember this letter.

At an oral report on January 31, Konrall acquainted Franz Joseph with his correspondence with the chief of the German General Staff and asked, by analogy, to adopt the same course of action against Italy, which Moltke outlined in Germany's resignations with France. Having been instructed to communicate in advance in writing with Erenthal and Moltke, Conrad complied with this.

In a letter dated February 93 to Moltke, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff, thanking for leading the development of the plan in Berlin on the basis of an alliance with the monarchy, for his part gave assurances of a similar course of work in Wepe and notified that in the event of a war with Russia, joint diplomatic or military influence not only on France, but also on Italy. Emphasizing the need to have complete clarity on the grouping of neighboring states by the time the mobilization was announced, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff ended the letter by indicating that Franz Josef and Ehrenthal knew its contents.

A month later, Moltke sent Conrad a letter dated March 30, in which he notified of the appeal of the Romanian envoy, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with a proposal to exchange views on operational questions on the war plan. Moltke replied to the German Foreign Office that he considered it necessary to notify Konrad of this, and to the latter, in the letter mentioned, he informed Rumanian considerations about the abandonment of defensive deployment behind the Seret-Galad-Focsani line and the adoption of an offensive plan to occupy Bessarabia. . Moltke doubts that these Rumanian operations will really secure the right wing of the Austrians.

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On April 9, Koprade informed Moltke that the statement of the Rumanians in Berlin was consistent with the exchange of opinions that had taken place between Conrad and the head of the Rumanian General Staff, Graniciano.

On April 12, Erenthal received a letter from the Rumanian envoy in Vienna with a request to orient the Rumanian general staff in the Russian deployment, since the Rumanian headquarters did not have sufficiently complete data. Konrad agreed to share the available information, but on the terms of mutual exchange of intelligence data, and on May 11 forwarded to Erenthal the answer compiled by the headquarters to the questions proposed by the Romanists.

Such were the relations with the old allies of the monarchy, with whom new friends were asking for an alliance. The Minister of War of Bulgaria, Nikolaev, turned out to be a supporter of rapprochement © by Austria-Hungary up to the conclusion of a military convention. Erenthal did not particularly trust the Bulgarian sympathizers and in a note dated May 10 suggested that the ambassador and military agent in Sofia, without interrupting friendly relations with Nikolaev, refrain from closer rapprochement.

The enemy of Bulgaria, Turkey, after the overthrow of Abdul-Hamid and the conclusion of a loan in Germany, also embarked on the path of rapprochement with Austria-Hungary. In a long letter-report dated October 16, the military agent in Constantinople, Pomiankovsky, gave Conrad a thorough understanding of the

the political life of a resurgent Turkey, its fears of England and Russia, its desire to move away from the future of the Entente and get closer to the Central Powers. The struggle for the influence of Khirma Creso or Krupp in the armament of the Turkish artillery, with strong sympathy for Krupp on the part of the Turkish military spheres, must end in his victory. German cars had the same success at the competition in Constantinople. The military attache came to the conclusion that the policy of Germany and Austria should go towards rapprochement with Turkey.

The chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff was far from suggesting friends and sought to strengthen military and political ties with Switzerland, which could play a role in the event of a clash between the monarchy and Italy.

Conrad's relations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Erenthal deteriorated more and more; the inner feeling of hostility grew every day and threatened to turn into open hostility.

The Chief of the General Staff informs you that his meetings with Erenthal, which happened quite often during the crisis of 1908-1909, in 1910 became, on the contrary, very rare. Konrad made no secret of the impending conflict with Erenthal, and in his report to Franpu-Josich on November 12, he frankly stated: "If Erenthal acts against me, then I must defend myself."

The main point of disagreement between the Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of Foreign Affairs was, as we know, the attitude towards Italy, in whose armament Conrad saw a direct threat to the monarchy.

We will return to this question a little later, but now we will consider Conrad's next important political document.

In the 1910 conference of the year, under the date of October 31, the chief of the general staff presented his annual memoir, which was communicated to the military at the end of November.

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minister and minister of foreign affairs. The report was accompanied by provisions, about the abandonment of which Franz Josef has the accurate hand of Konrad. I made a note on the draft.

Starting by presenting this memoir following the example of previous years, the Chief of the General Staff sets out the general provisions on the relationship between policy and strategy from which he proceeds, and the details are already known from the 1909 memoir.

"The once for all established direction in which the development of the defense of the country should proceed," says Conrad, "must be followed with complete consistency, which neither diplomatic approaches, nor internal turmoil, nor the fear of Financial victims should violate; it must always be remembered that the fate of states, peoples and dynasties is decided not at diplomatic conferences, but on the battlefields.

In the future, Conrad proceeds to consider the policy of the European states and Japan and their military training, revealing the attitude of these states towards Austria-Hungary. We cannot dwell in detail on the memoir of the Chief of the General Staff and will only briefly touch on the main ones:

thoughts, especially since his assessment of the political situation differs little from that made earlier.

The union with Germany Koprads considers the monarchy to be the core of his policy and military preparation.

Italy is, without a doubt, a hidden enemy, and the monarchy has every reason to see Italy as a hostile state and prepare with all energy for war with it. Serbia and Montenegro are such enemies in the Balkans.

The army in Russia has not yet been restored, the Finnish question has been aggravated, it is still not calm inside, and there is also a danger in the East; therefore, one should try to enter into an agreement with Russia, and in the meantime defeat Italy. But for the time being, Russia should be considered Kai at once, To the massacre with Which it is necessary to greet, moreover, a tafa war is conceived only in the 6th alliance with Germany.

Bolivia is both an enemy and an ally. Greece must be regarded as an enemy of Turkey. Türkiye can distract the Balkan states and Russia; its strengthening, especially at sea, is undesirable for Italy, and therefore it is necessary to support by all means the movement that has begun in Turkey in favor of rapprochement with Germany and Austria.

Romania should be kept in the union in general, and in the military in Os0-- bennosti.

France is the enemy of 'Germany', and although there is nothing to indicate her propensity for war, she must nevertheless be regarded as an enemy of the central states.

England's rivalry with Germany is based on trade and maritime competition, which causes England to move closer to France and Russia. England must be regarded as an enemy mainly at sea, and especially in alliance with the Italian Navy. This forces the monarchy to develop its Fleet and strengthen its bases on the Adriatic coast. It is not necessary to compete with England in increasing the Fleet, but it is desirable. threaten her dominance in Egypt.

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Belgium, Denmark and Holland must be considered as possible theaters of action for the Germans, the Keepers and the British, but the question has not yet been clarified, what position the mouths of the state will take - neutral or hostile to Germany.

Sweden is unquestionably on the side of Russia's enemies, and it would be desirable to take her armed action to capture Finland.

Switzerland, although neutral, must in any case play a major role. Two parties are fighting in it: Khranpuz and German, and therefore the task of politics is to support and strengthen the latter.

Japan must be regarded as an adversary of Russia, at the present time gathering strength for a new struggle.

Based on the outlined political situation, the head of the general

headquarters sketches guidelines: a) for specific military training and 6) for the general preparation of the army and navy for war.

Specific military training consists of: 1) establishing the combat composition of the wartime army; 2) in measures to cover mobilization and concentration; 3) in the strategic deployment of the army.

These works are planned for the following options: 1) war against Italy with secondary actions against Serbia and Montenegro; 2) war against Serbia and Montenegro; 3) war in alliance with Germany and Romania against Russia with secondary actions against Serbia and Montenegro; 4) war with Italy after the declaration of war on Serbia and Montenegro; 5) war in alliance with Germany and Romania against Russia in a situation similar to paragraph 4; 6) war against Italy, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro in alliance with Germany and Romania.

Presenting these six options, Konrad considered it his duty to apologize that plans were not being developed in case of war with Germany and Romania, because the monarchy was in alliance with the first, and joint actions were verbally agreed with Romania in previous years.

Further on, the Chief of the General Staff cites those measures of a general nature that must be carried out to prepare the country for war, and of which we spoke in the first book of our work.

The leitmotif of the entire memoir is Italy with its preparations for war. Conrad again recalls his rejected proposal in 1907 to defeat Italy, and in 1908 to do the same with Serbia, when the political and military situation certainly promised certain success.

Since both opponents, and with them Russia, are taking quick steps along the path of developing their armaments, the monarchy must also strain all its forces and means in order to be ready for war by the spring of 1912.

"A state threatened from several sides, whose military means are limited, can find salvation only in an active military policy, which is calculated to defeat one by one potential opponents and at a moment that seems favorable for it, This and for which the state is prepared; otherwise, such a state is in danger of being attacked simultaneously by all enemies and at an unfavorable time for it.

"In this sense," the chief of the general staff continues to teach, "war is not only a means of politics, but it is politics itself."

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"The amount spent on the armed forces will be money lost if the use of these forces for political gain is avoided. For some of them, simple threats are enough, but others may be achieved only with the use of military force, that is, in other words, by a planned war; if this is avoided, capital will be lost. In this respect, the war can be compared to a major financial operation.

"Only a false understanding of Clausewitz's theory (which is often observed with

the side of the Minister of Foreign Affairs) may lead to opposite conclusions. In the homeland of this deep military Philosopher, his theory was clearly realized in the expedient, well-prepared and timely wars of 1866 and 1870. carried out in practice; the diligent Japanese, thanks to her, achieved their unexpected success in the war with Russia.

"I would consider it incompatible with my responsibility if I had kept silent and most humbly did not report on the situation described above, did not express my views on it and most humbly did not ask, Your Majesty, for your decisive influence."

We will not go into an assessment for the time being, but will follow the course of history, the wheels of which quickly rolled along the path of war.

Foreign Minister Ehrenthal strongly disagreed. Conrad both on the policy of Italy, as well as on the need for a preventive war with her and with Serbia. Erenthal even tried by all means to limit the developing engineering defense on the border with Italy, energetically carried out by the chief of the general staff. In the accompaniment of Foreign Minister Schonaich, without the knowledge of Conrad, even drew up a draft agreement with Italy on the limitation of fortifications in Tyrol. True, the project did not receive approval and even its fate is unknown, but, in any case, the very fact of its drafting is indicative of the clarification of the existing relationship between the chief of staff and Erenthal.

In this way Erenthal and Conrad accumulated material for mutual accusations when, in the autumn of 1911, Italy itself moved forward towards a resolution of the burning dispute.

In the autumn of this year, the Chtalo-Pturets war began - the first division of the Turkish inheritance, which intensified the unrest in the Balkans.

Thus, the two most important, in the opinion of the Chief of the Austrian General Staff, the Chronite of Austria-Hungary - Italy and the Balkans - revived again and, of course, should not have left the circle of his eyes. Both of these Fronts caused an exchange of views between Konrad and Erenthal, their desire to establish a single political point of view and led to the final break of these prominent figures of the former monarchy, which ended with the fall of the chief of the general staff.

In the Balkans, already from the middle of May 1911, an outbreak broke out in Albania: insurrection.

Türkiye, which took military measures to suppress the uprising, did its best. to create for itself a favorable external political environment. It was clear that it was not in the interests of Austria to support the independence of Albania, and therefore, in Vienna, the Turks took steps in order to find the ground for

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convergence. On May 29, a Turkish military agent came to the Chief of the General Staff in order to find out whether Austro-Hungarian troops were really moving up in Bosnia on the Montenegrin border. If this is a Fact, then Turkey sees in it a sign of the friendly disposition of Austria. To this, Conrad replied that there could be no question of any concentration of troops. (having immediately told Erental about his conversation, the head of the general

headquarters received from him on May 31 an answer that the Minister of Foreign Affairs sees in the steps of the Turkish military agent, like Konrad, a desire to show that the pulling up of Austrian troops to the Montenegrin border would be very desirable for Constantinople, but that he, Drenthal, does not consider it's necessary.

The "sick man" had a hard time: the uprising in Albania was threatening to be complicated by the action of Montenegro, in Arabia, on June 1, he had to suffer a serious military setback.

We know that as soon as Germany decided to strike France in Agadir, the Italian prime minister had already announced Italy's approaching intervention in Tripoli.

Three days before Italy sent an ultimatum to Turkey, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff sent a letter to Erenthal on September 24, based on the personal order of Franz Josef, to maintain close contact with the Minister of Foreign Affairs in all important political matters.

Pointing out that the Moroccan crisis has not yet found a peaceful solution, Conrad draws attention to the possible intervention of Italy in Tripoli, which has both political and military significance for the monarchy.

Having stipulated that all of the following are personal views, the chief of the general staff proves to Erenthal that the operation in Tripoli is being conducted as a preparatory one before the war with Austria-Hungary.

Conrad considers it necessary for Austria to be ready for war with Italy. "I must especially emphasize here," writes the chief of staff, "that foresight speaks for the leader of an aggressive policy to start a war by attack, since this gives enormous gains.

year." "Failure to do so must carry heavy responsibility," Konrad warns and asks Erenthal to keep him informed of progress.

Although, on the one hand, the occupation of Tripoli may weaken Italy, on the other hand, the expansion of the country gives it new power in the future, as, for example, Bosnia for Austria, Algeria for Francia, etc. Thinking about the political situation, the chief of the general staff finds it necessary to use Italy's action in Tripoli in order to solve problems in those directions - for example, in the Balkans - where a clash with the Italians can be expected in the future.

Summarizing all that has been said, Conrad finds that military preparations are necessary: 1) for a war with Italy, if the monarchy wants to reckon with her, 2) giving active performances in the Balkans and 3) in case Italy comes out, but not against the monarchy.

Conrad, at the end of the letter, proposes either to attack Italy with her

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march in Tripoli, or use her predicament to advance in the Balkans.

The letter ends with the indication that if Erenthal wishes to speak with him personally, Konrad asks him to be notified of this.

Italy on September 27, 1911 gave Turkey an ultimatum, giving 24 hours to carry it out; On the 29th, a declaration of war followed, and on October 5, Tripoli was already occupied. Italy's attempt to occupy Pereveza met with a sharp rebuff from Erenthal and the condemnation of France and England, which forced the Roman government to confirm that it did not intend to "violate the \$ (a\$) Tao in the Balkans.

On October 11, a Turkish military agent again appeared at the Chief of the General Staff in order to find out Conrad's opinion about the possible actions of Italy on the continent and to get advice on what Gurdia should do. It is not my duty as a soldier to carry on politics. I can only express my personal views, as if we were "sitting in a kah." These personal considerations amounted to the fact that if Conrad were a Turk, then, in the event Italy's intervention in the peninsula, he would address a circular note to the powers, in which he would point out the danger posed by such actions of the Italians.

To some extent, unexpectedly starting hostilities, the Italian government did not want to allow military agents of foreign powers to the theater of operations, for which, having invited them to go to Tripoli, they did not land them on the shore, leaving them on the ship.

Such actions of Rome displeased Conrad, and on October 14 he sent a letter to the head of the office of Franz Joseph, in which, protesting, he complained about the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, resigned to this state of things. "If during the crisis of 1909 our Belgrade envoy," wrote the chief of the general staff, "was on a long trip, and if now, at the decisive moment of the Tripolitan surprise, our envoy in Rome was on vacation, in the same way ambassador in Konstantinople, then this is none of my business, but the military attachés are under my jurisdiction, and I am responsible for them, and therefore I have the right to ask to listen to my judgment, especially when only obstacles are placed on me on intelligence issues, up to the prohibition of official foreign holidays, as it was recently. Italy mobilized the Fleet, called up 100,000 men under the banner, and intensified military training; "and we," says Conrad, "send our military representatives on pleasure trips." Konrad asks to report his request to Franpa-Joseph.

Another officer of the general staff was sent to help the military agent in Rome. The reports of these persons, as well as those of military agents in other countries, depicted with exhaustive completeness the political situation, which was the result of Italy's action in Africa. They agreed that the Italian expedition was the work of the national party, that the military preparations, carried out rather secretly, preceded the decision of the government and even put pressure on it to some extent, that there was nothing incredible if one fine day the national party of Italy wants to declare war on Austria-Hungary.

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On October 30, Konrad was with Franz Joseph with a report, and from a conversation with the head of his military office, he learned that Erenthal was discouraged

Italian steps and at the same time very ill.

Meanwhile, Italy on November announced the annexation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica. However, the successes of the Italian weapons stopped, having met with stubborn resistance from the Arab partisan detachments organized by Enver Bey. This was joined by diplomatic negotiations with European states on their recognition of the act of annexation, which was met negatively by Britain and France.

Another hotbed of conflicts - the Balkans - at that time was silently worried. Turkey's predicament created a tempting opportunity for the Balkanian states to profit at its expense. Some signs of a Balkan alliance that arose later, in 1912, have already appeared: it began with the rapprochement along the military line of individual Balkan states, although not yet going beyond the distribution of orders to military representatives.

For the middle states, the days came when the special strength of the alliance was to be revealed, while both Erental himself and the press led by him not only treated Berlin with restraint, but even articles appeared in the Vienna press, corrected against an unconditional alliance with Germany.

We know that the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff placed the inviolability of the alliance with Germany at the heart of the foreign policy of the monarchy and its military training. Therefore, it is quite understandable that such clouds on the Allied horizon, threatening a split, hit him hard, and he instructed a military agent in Berlin to find out Moltke's opinion on this matter.

On January 20, 1911, a military agent from Berlin reassured Konrad that the attacks of the Viennese newspapers were regarded as private actions for which government spheres were not responsible. The military agent wrote that during a personal meeting, Moltke declared the previous strength of the alliance, which was also confirmed by the personal observations of the military agent.

However, the attacks of the Viennese press continued, and on September 9, the German military agent in Vienna brought this to the attention of the Chief of the Austrian General Staff. The latter replied that the press does not express the opinion of government circles, and at the same time he absolutely confidentially asked to inform Moltke that he, Konrad, had already reported to Franz-Josich the assumptions in the event of a war in Germany © France, but so far the decision has not been made, since Francp-Josich does not believe in the possibility of war.

On September 23, a German military agent notified Konrad in writing that Moltke, through a third party, had asked him to convey to the Austrian Chief of Staff a great deal of gratitude, greetings, and assurances of complete unanimity and mutual trust.

On November 4, doubts ended as the Moroccan crisis ended; but they are characteristic, as they show that the union of the central states of Europe was not so strong. Closer was the connection between the general staffs than between the leaders of foreign policy and even representatives of the two dynasties.

We have no right to pass over in silence the following characteristic report

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he prescribed all the time such a powerful remedy as war, and we must pay tribute to Erenthal, who managed in time to resist the Austria-Hungary taking the medicines of its chief of staff. Each of Konrad's documents that we read above can be regarded as a drug.

While ardently advocating a preventive war with Italy and Serbia, Conrad at the time tried to ward off the thought of a European war by suggesting diplomacy (in which he had lost faith) to avoid such a major crisis. Above, we have already expressed doubts about the possibility in 1910-1911 on the map of Europe of a war between two large states without the intervention of others. All assumptions about the neutrality of this or that state, which we heard from the lips of Konrad and his Berlin friend Moltke, must be recognized as poorly thought out. Both chiefs of the general staff were engaged in drawing preconceived pictures - an occupation harmful not only in military affairs, but also in the field of politics.

It can be said with certainty that none of the major states would have given free hand to Conrad either in the war with Italy, or even in the war with Serbia. He is right about one thing—that is, that the year 1909 for the monarchy is over and gone forever...

For Austria-Hungary, the only correct policy was the "gathering of forces", which was dictated to her by Erenthal. The events of subsequent years are witnesses ...

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CHAPTER U CONRAD'S DEFEAT

Tensions between the Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. - The principal side of the differences between Konrad and Erenthal: Italy. — Incident with Lake Garda. - Letter from the Roman ambassador Erenthal about the armaments of Italy and the conclusion of Konrad on it. — Conrad's insult. - Differences of the General Staff < the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the views on intelligence. — Conrad's clerical blunder. — The "Clique" of Erenthal and its game. — Konrad's memoir of September 9, 1911. — The Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not meet Konrad's halfway in preparing the army for war. - Documents talking about the preparation of Italy for war with the monarchy. — Erenthal is ready to support preparations for a defensive war, but against a preventive war. — Erenthal on the "war party" in Austria. — Conrad's rebuke about the need to prepare for war with certain, likely opponents. — Competence of the General Staff in the development of the Army and Navy. — Conrad's correspondence with Erenthal only through the Minister of War. - Border incidents and Konrad's protest against Erenthal's interference with the orders of the General Staff to cover mobilization and concentration. — Undercover intelligence and friction because of it between Konrad and Erenthal. - The need for officers to travel abroad. — Erenthal stands up for the Roman ambassador. — Konrad accuses Erenthal and the ambassador of a frivolous assessment of Italy. — Conrad's behind-the-scenes successors. — Franz Joseph's order to Konrad to write an apology letter to Erenthal and Konrad's categorical refusal. — Erenthal does not invite Konrad to a meeting of the Council of Ministers. - Erenthal's report of October 22 and its essence. "Politics should be entirely in the hands of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The army is the umbrella of diplomacy. - Konrad at Franz Joseph on November 15. - The policy of Erenthal - the kidnapping of Franz Joseph. "There should be no "war party" in Austria. - November 30 Konrad at Franz Josich: appointment as army inspector. — Konrad o

his resignation from the post of chief of the general staff. — Regrets to Moltke. — The diplomatic incident with Conrad's departure. — The press about Conrad's departure. — Erenthal's accusations and his demands for press restrictions. — Conrad's memoir, 1941. — Enemies and friends. — Conditions for the preparation of the war between Austria and Germany. - The political goals of the monarchy in the view of Conrad. — Four variants of the war plan. — The fourth option is a European war — a diplomatic defeat. - Applications to the memoir and the procedure for compiling the latter. - The significance of leaving the post of chief of the general staff.

Our foregoing narrative already shows with sufficient clarity that the relations between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chief of the General Staff on the banks of the Danube became more and more strained and inevitably led to a conflict.

It would be possible not to go into the details of the quarrel between the two "husbands" of the Habsburg monarchy, if it were not for the interest that the documents now published by Conrad on this subject represent for us. Of course, we will not occupy the reader's attention with a detailed interpretation of them, but will dwell only on the main conclusions from them.

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In any conflict of people, it is necessary to distinguish: 1) the fundamental side of the conflict and 2) its reverse side - the passion of people who have embarked on the path of a dispute, the petty attacks of the opposite parties, the intrigues of the environment of the disputing environment, which further exacerbate the conflict.

All this accumulated enough in Conrad's relations with Erenthal to bring the dispute to such an extent that the question arose of leaving one or the other from the official arena. The latter turned out to be close for both.

The principal side of the conflict was the divergence of views both in relation to the goals of foreign policy and in relation to the very concept of war as a type of social relations. Specifically, since 1909, Erenthal's disagreements with the chief of the general staff were sharply revealed in his views on the policy of Italy, which, according to Conrad, threatened the monarchy with war in the very near future.

The Bosnian crisis diverted the attention of the chief of the general staff from Italy, but not deeply and for a short time. With the end of the crisis in the Balkans, Italy was once again placed at the center of the entire thinking of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff.

From the previous chapter, we already know that in all his "memoirs" © 1909 to 1911, Conrad, of all potential opponents, primarily considered Italy the most dangerous and invariably offered to enter into a preventive war with her. Without limiting himself to words, the chief of the general staff, in all his oral reports and conversations, tirelessly repeated his proposal for a war with Italy, clarifying the views of Moltke on this subject, etc. - in a word, Italy had to experience the heavy hand of the chief of the Austrian general headquarters.

Until 1911, when Rome was not yet so intensely preparing for war, Conrad was not particularly persistent, but from 1911, when, on the one hand, there was only a year left before the end of the tripartite alliance, and on the other, Italy developed his military training, - Conrad began to strengthen

lazy to call for war with her.

On January 3, 1911, Conrad, in a letter to Ehrenthal, draws his attention to Italy's desire to be ready for war by the spring of 1912, adding that he considers it his duty to inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs about this.

In response to this, on January 6, Ehrenthal, taking into account the message of Koprad, promises to check his data through his authorities. Strictly confidentially reporting that the contractual obligations with Italy would end only on the 6th of 1944, Ehrenthal came to the conclusion that, in any case, the monarchy 00 this period was secured from attack by the Italians. At the present time, the question of renewing the treaty is not yet relevant, since, judging by the current political situation, one can think that Italy will remain in the union as before. If Italy is currently carrying out with tremendous energy the strengthening of its military power, then this is done, according to Ehrenthal, in order not to lag behind other states in armament, and also because of the desire to increase its price by renewing the treaty of the tripartite alliance.

It was in the mouth that the foundations of the divergence of views of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chief of the General Staff were contained. One looked at Italy

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on a completely loyal ally, and Drulai saw her feverishly talking about the war with the monarchy at once.

This exchange of letters was followed by another, which added fuel to the fire even more. According to the treaty with Italy after 1866, Austria-Hungary was limited in its right to maintain a military Phhotilia on Lake Garda, while Italy was completely free in this. The private merchant shipping company was entirely in Italian hands. Konrad was very sympathetic to the development of an Austrian private shipping company on the lake, seeing military benefits in his mouth. The newspapers, relying on the opinion of the Chief of the General Staff and noting his disagreement on this issue with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, launched a campaign in favor of the development of commercial shipping on Lake Garda.

On January 29, Ehrenthal, in a letter to Konrad, expresses his surprise: 1) at the very fact of disagreement on the issue of the Flotilla on Lake Gard and 2) publicizing strictly secret internal, interdepartmental affairs. To this the Minister of Foreign Affairs adds that such a newspaper campaign will force Italy to arm even more. Ehrenthal ends his letter with the indication that such a way of conducting questions can be harmful to the military preparation of the monarchy, and he, Ehrenthal, considers it his duty to draw the attention of the chief of the general staff to this.

Having received this letter, the latter was surprised by two circumstances: 1) that the letter was addressed to him, while the military penzura was subordinate to the military ministry, and not to the general staff, and 2) accusing him, Konrad, of a newspaper campaign.

The chief of staff, by his nature, of course, could not leave the letter without an answer, which followed the next day. Starting with the indication that Konrad himself is an opponent of the publication in the newspapers of business

pros and military measures, the chief of staff emphasized that he was also well aware of all the harm from non-compliance with this. In these forms, he considers it necessary to bring the incident to the attention of the Minister of War. On the other hand, he must point out that Italy's armaments are so obvious that it is hardly possible for a newspaper campaign to change them. As for the influence that the Minister of Foreign Affairs has on the development of merchant shipping on Lake Garda, Konrad knows absolutely nothing about this. "Although I am not inclined," wrote the Chief of the General Staff, "to discuss in the press the most important political and military questions, nevertheless I consider myself obliged in the mouth to draw your attention to the great danger that lies in the under-assessment of the military preparations of Italy and the backwardness of its preparation."

The newspapers continued to inflate the Garda incident, and in the maneuvers on other lakes they saw an analogy for future operations on Lake Gardo, bringing even more noise to this issue.

As mentioned above, Erenthal was going through his organs to check and dress the data of the chief of staff on the military preparations of Italy. On February 23, Conrad received from Erenthal, as a result of this check, a report from the ambassador in Rome addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The ambassador wrote that the armaments of Italy did not escape his attention

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and are exhaustively assessed by the military representatives (land and sea) at the embassy. A study of the military budget of Italy and its comparison © with those in other countries lead to the conclusion that the army and Navy of Italy at the present time cannot be considered the kind of bomb that could explode unexpectedly. According to the ambassador, the development of the army and navy in Italy is proceeding quite naturally, and all military programs are quite ordinary financial and political combinations. However, no program can guarantee real combat effectiveness, since no military secretary, no chief of the general staff, no commander of the navy is able to foresee what successful steps will be taken in developing the combat capability of the army and navy and what novelties will appear in the field. military equipment. Based on this, it is absolutely impossible to say that in this or in another year the Italian armed forces will achieve their combat readiness.

Subjecting further to a detailed analysis of the land and sea programs of Italy, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Rome comes to the conclusion that there is no need to talk about the combat effectiveness of the Navy by 1913, and this can be achieved only in 1918; with regard to the army, which certainly lags behind the armies of other states, then by 1912 it will restore its combat readiness, but not to the size desired by the government. Seeing evidence of this in the slow implementation of measures to develop artillery, engineering defense, and the railway network, the ambassador sums up his letter by pointing out that 4912 100 can by no means be considered a decisive step in the development of the Italian army and, even more so, the navy.

On the contrary, in the government, in the army, in the Navy and in Italian society, according to the ambassador, the fear of an attack from Austria-Hungary is growing more and more, which is one of the reasons for the development of armed forces by Italy.

Outraged by the arrogant and moralizing tone of the Habeburg diplomat from Rome, on February 24, the Chief of the General Staff sends a letter to Erenthal. |

Accompanying him with a detailed report on the development of armaments in Italy, Konrad notes that Erenthal's intention to verify the data of the General Staff back in January through the organs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he, Konrad, understood as a comprehensive assessment of these data. Meanwhile, the Roman ambassador reports information that has long been known to the General Staff. "I am not able," writes the chief of the general staff, "to suppress the feeling of surprise in myself that someone dares to teach me, a man who has been wearing a soldier's uniform for decades, who has 39 years of official service behind him, who has survived all the transformations of the army from a primer gun to magazine rifle and served for several years during these army reforms in responsible places - that the reforms of Italy were all the time continuous and intense.

"For every far-sighted person who understands the internal course of military transformations, it should be clear," Konrad continues, "that these reforms in their development cover those periods during which they become intense and are based on certain possible future armed clashes; likewise, each

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a far-sighted person would have to consider it necessary to set the date by which full combat readiness should be achieved.

"If Mr. Ambassador in Rome does not understand this, then it is not my place to lecture him," Konrad continues.

Regarding the final part of the ambassador's letter about the fear of an attack from Austria being noticed in Italy, the chief of the general staff points out that his data are by no means so superficial, and he does not base on them the need to be ready for war with Italy. For a superficial assessment of future enemies, Austria paid with the two best provinces - Lombardy and Venice.

"I cannot be an accomplice in such crimes," Konrad concludes his letter.

The tone of Conrad's last letter shows that both statesmen have already moved from official to personal ground, and it is unlikely that they have already left the latter.

Friction also appeared in another branch of the service of the General Staff - in intelligence. While Italy was flooding the frontier regions of Austria with her secret agents, Erenthal, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, created all sorts of obstacles to the dispatch of offenders to Italy for reconnaissance and intelligence activities. The same Roman ambassador, taking a position in this hostile to the General Staff, wrote that one should test the patience of Italy to infinity. His letter was sent by Erenthal to the Minister of War, and the latter to Konrad.

The Chief of the General Staff, in a letter to the Minister of War dated 4 July,

defending the need to strengthen intelligence, he wrote among other things that he did not understand how the ambassador in Rome could talk about the patience of Italy, when he should have known what a large number of Italian spies were convicted in Austria. Such statements by the ambassador lead Konrad to the conviction that the interests of the monarchy are being badly defended, while in other states this is the case.

Although the letter was addressed only to the Minister of War, Schoneich forwarded it to Ehrenthal, and this latter brought him to the attention of Franp-Joseph, accusing, by the way, the Chief of the General Staff of inspiring the press.

Today Konrad categorically protests against this, saying that he always preferred to fight with an open visor and not only did not take any part in the newspaper campaign himself, but even forbade the officers of the General Staff subordinate to him from any participation in the daily press.

These disagreements were joined by grievances caused by cases of a petty nature. So, back in 1909, Erenthal forwarded to the chief of the general staff a letter from one of the ambassadors, in which the latter made a philological error. Conrad, with his characteristic vehemence, underlined this with a colored pencil, making a note that if such a thing had been allowed by any of his subordinates, he would have severely exacted it. With this resolution, the letter was returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where it was scolded as a criticism of the latter, and, of course, taken into account.

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In addition to these clashes, there was a big behind-the-scenes attack on Conrad. We have noted more than once that Ehrenthal was closely blocking with Schonaich in the struggle not only against the chief of the general staff, but mainly against the last peak of Franr-Ferdinand, whose creature Konrad was considered to be. Francp-Ferdinais was outraged by the actions of this "clique", by the policy of "serving" Erenthal, and he intended to resolutely demand the resignation of Schonaich from the post of Minister of War. The "Clique" expected that during the maneuvers of this year there would be a break between Konrad and Franz Ferdinand, which greatly facilitated the departure of the Chief of the General Staff.

Konrad now writes that he did not take part in this behind-the-scenes intrigue, but went his own direct way.

Taking into account Chernin's testimony about Konrad as a straightforward person, far from hiding behind other people's backs, one can believe this statement of the chief of staff.

Convinced of the falsity of Erenthal's policy towards Italy, on September 9, the Chief of the General Staff presents Franco-Josich with an extensive memoir, which, in essence, was nothing more than a unifying act against Erenthal. In view of the importance of this document, we will allow ourselves to dwell on it in more detail. The report is accompanied by several annexes, which, in view of the revelation in them by Konrad of his point of view on various branches of the service of the General Staff, will also be considered by us. .

Starting his report with the fact that recently there has been a rather lively official correspondence between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of War and the General Staff, which is important for questions of the combat readiness of the army and the readiness of the monarchy for war in general, Konrad points out that in the part that As regards politics and the general staff, this correspondence was brought to the attention of Franz Josiah's military office.

"If I," continues the Chief of the General Staff, "in the spirit of the instructions received from you about an exchange of opinions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gave an assessment of the most important political events that could be of importance to the monarchy, then I did it solely for the purpose of establish the starting military data and link them with those requirements that I, in my opinion, considered necessary for the combat readiness of the army. At the same time, I must note that I recognized it as my duty not to give political events any other direction than that which is carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

"I must," writes Konrad, "with a sense of strict responsibility, state that the purely military measures necessary for these possible political events not only did not meet with sympathy from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but, on the contrary, were far from it, despite that the armed forces of the monarchy, ready for war, are the real factor on which foreign policy can rely in difficult moments in order to achieve its goals and show its strength, even if its intentions are directed towards peacekeeping."

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Seeing the Bosnian crisis as confirmation of what has been said, Konrad goes on to say that in recent months the main point of disagreement between him and the Minister of Foreign Affairs has been the policy of Italy. In detailing Italy's aggressive policy, the Chief of the General Staff says that he would be in breach of his duties if he left this Italian armament policy unheeded and did not insist on the need for the monarchy to take military security measures. In his mouth, he did not always find support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Confirming this with an extract from the minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers dated March 5 of this year, which we have already discussed in detail in the first book of our work, Konrad cites three more letters (his letter to Shonaikh dated July 25, Erenthal to Shonaikh dated July 22 and a letter Konrad to Schoenich on 30 July).

An extract from the minutes of March 5 recorded Erenthal's statement about the restrained nature of the foreign policy of the monarchy, why any increase in military credits turns out to be diametrically opposed to it and can only lead to an increase in the armaments of neighbors, which is by no means in the interests of the monarchy. Erenthal states that even now the forces of the monarchy have reached sufficient combat capability. |

In a letter dated July 25 to the Minister of War, Konrad notes the fact of a newspaper campaign in Italy against Austria and points out that, on the contrary, the domestic press does not see at all the armaments of Italy, which are clear even for the profane, and unnecessarily blathers about the military measures of Austria. The Chief of the General Staff asks the Minister of War to give the proper tone to the press, and also to convince him of the need to develop the Army and Navy of the military.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for which the combat readiness of the army must be very good.

Erenthal's letter of 22 July 1911 to the Minister of War is cited by Koprads as a reply from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the letter of the Chief of the General Staff that we have just quoted. Erenthal points out that if the Italian press is hostile to Austria, then this: 1) concerns the press of upper Italy and 2) is caused by Italy's fear of an attack from the Austrian stophon. If the chief of the general staff, taking the opportunity, demands new credits, then Erenthal is obliged to say that in 1910 and 1911 about 1,100 million crowns were issued, partly at a time, and partly for a five-year period. This must be credited primarily to both governments; in addition, Erenthal believes that he did a lot of money on vacation. You can't let go anymore, because you can go beyond the limits of the state's solvency.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs defines one political situation as safe for the monarchy: it is not threatened by any danger from anywhere, and relations with various states are developing at a peaceful and friendly pace.

There are no words to say that the state should carry out a thriving war and Olya should have a thriving armed forces, 6 than everywhere 6 Erental, the military department will find support. It's a bad business if they want to claim the Yoredites for a certain war. Against this, Erenthal objects and removes from his seat any responsibility for a preventive war with Italy, which is desired by the chief // lenerally intaba. Minister of Foreign

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In most cases, he does not close his eyes to the fact that the weak Italian government will not be able to restrain the public opinion of his country and Italy will turn out to be an enemy of Austria, but the reinforced armaments of the latter will make each Italian government decide that the attack on it by the monarchy is decided, and therefore, it will respond with military reinforcement.

If the opinion is formed in the leading circles of Italy that in Austria the "military party" has firmly decided to wage war, then any thought of co-operation must be discarded. Erenthal's task now is to maintain peace, as long as it is in the interests of the monarchy and is compatible with its dignity; Therefore, he resolutely speaks out against all increased military training against Italy, so as not to create a difficult situation for the renewal of the tripartite alliance. Moreover, relations with Russia are not as friendly as they seem, and in the event of a clash with Italy one must at least reckon with the hostile restraint of Russian diplomacy. Erenthal asks to bring the contents of this letter to the attention of the Chief of the General Staff.

It is clear that the latter could not leave this letter of Erenthal unanswered and, returning it to Shonaikh, wrote a rebuke.

If the Minister of Foreign Affairs objects to preparations for a "concrete war," then the Chief of the General Staff thinks of preparing "precisely for a Concrete War." To be ready for war with all neighbors does not allow the economic power of the state, especially one that is surrounded on all sides, and it is therefore necessary to clearly give yourself

'report, with whom to live in peace, and with whom to prepare for war. Possible conflicts with probable opponents are the grounds for Gonÿret's military subplot.

Further proving the fallacy of Erenthal's judgments about the peacefulness of Italy, Konrad notes that, on duty, he cannot pass by the neighbor's weapons without reacting to them. Whether or not a politician wants to wage war in the near future is another question, but it is always necessary to develop one's own weapons in order to keep up with those of neighbors. The requirements set by Konrad to increase appropriations do not exceed the limits of what is necessary, the right and the competence to establish which belong exclusively to the chief executive officer of the shitada.

"I am obliged," writes the chief of the general staff, "to work out concrete military preparations in such a way and exert such an influence on the development of the armed forces that would allow them, at a moment of danger, the arrival of which no one can foresee, to be a reliable support for foreign policy."

"Only the mouths of the main ideas are guiding me in my activities," Konrad continues, "and only in their spirit, among the means necessary for the development of the armed forces, did I have in mind the patriotic assistance of the press."

Asking the Minister of War to bring this letter to the attention of Ehrenthal, Konrad proposes, if necessary, to provide exhaustive evidence of the validity of his conclusions in relation to Italy.

Having briefly reviewed the documents attached to the report, from which it is clear that the opponents have already started correspondence through a third party, we return to the report of the Chief of the General Staff.

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Konrad considers it necessary to emphasize the fallacy of Ehrenthal's opinion about preparations for war and to raise objections to the accusation thrown by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that Konrad was the leader of a "war party". Considering the latter accusation as heavy and unfair, the chief of the general staff points out that Franco-Josich should be well aware, as Konrad openly expresses his views, and therefore any linking his name with a "military party" does not stand up to criticism - which is good, on the grounds of personal conversations with Konrad, Ehrenthal should have known.

How vain the hopes of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to manipulate the public opinion of Italy in his favor are shown by the border incidents on the Italian frontier. Subsequently, Konrad dwells on these incidents in detail, accompanying his report with appendices (certificate on the activities of the Italian irredenta since 1908, remarks on the case of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Serbian border, Erenthal's letter to Shopeichu dated June 22 and Konrad's response remarks on him dated August 2). |

Konrad considers it necessary to elucidate in passing the question of the regulation of the frontier with Serbia, which was carried out in the summer of 1911 and provoked an exchange of opinions with Erenthal. In the mouth question, Konrad suggested that all questions related to the establishment of the boundary have a special meaning for a state that does not conduct an active politiya; based on the need

the ability to maintain the prestige of the monarchy, which can be undermined. concessions to Serbip, as well as from purely military interests, Konrad suggested that Erenthal better not stop before breaking any agreement on drawing the border, rather than making concessions to the future enemy.

Erenthal's letter of 22 July was prompted by the crossing of the Italian frontier by the Austrian border guards and their occupation of important observation points. In the letter, the Minister of Foreign Affairs asks the Minister of War to answer whether this is a simple misunderstanding or whether it was caused by an order from the General Staff, as a verification of the instruction on the cover of mobilization, as indicated by the reports received.

The chief of the general staff ardently rebelled against the latter. Pointing out that the Ministry of War strictly instructed the frontier © Italy corps to avoid violating the border, Conrad notes that they also strictly observed this, and any attempts by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to lay responsibility for border incidents on the General Staff should be rejected. "What orders," Konrad writes, "are given to cover up the mobilization of the troops," this is outside the scope of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Every attempt to interfere in purely military affairs, as well as control over them, I must resolutely reject, which I ask you to bring to the attention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

For orientation exclusively to the Minister of War, Konrad reports that they were not given any orders to move forward observation posts. In concluding the letter, Konrad finds it necessary to emphasize that, according to the instructions, on all matters relating to the cover of mobilization and deployment, correspondence should be conducted exclusively with the general staff, on which he strongly insists.

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Referring to his documents, the chief of the general staff in his report, Frandu-Josich-Fu, emphasizes that the Italian press is trying to inflate every border crossing by the Austrians, meanwhile, while during the period 1909-1911. from the Austrian side there were only 8 crossings, the Italians-military personnel made 62 border crossings. As for the interference of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the instructions given by the General Staff to cover up the mobilization, the Chief of the General Staff is compelled to categorically oppose this proposition.

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Next, Konrad asks Franz Joseph to pay attention to the difference that exists between the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in their views on the development of undercover intelligence.

From the crisis of 1908-1909. there was clearly a need to strengthen intelligence in advance, since during a political crisis it is very difficult to expand the network of agents and obtain good data. Since the annual appropriation for reconnaissance is only 150,000 crowns, it is necessary to entrust part of the work to those officers who are sent abroad. Franl-Josich had already agreed to such a measure in advance, and also found it necessary to increase the appropriation for intelligence from the sums allocated for this to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

However, all attempts to implement the latter and bring appropriations to 500,000 krops annually met with a rebuff in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

which it was possible to accomplish this no earlier than 1912.

Although Franz Josef's permission was obtained to send officers for intelligence purposes to Serbia, Montenegro, Turkey and Albania, but under pressure from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such sendings were extremely limited. Meanwhile, complaints continue to be received from Serbia about secret missions of Austrian officers and, especially, officers of the General Staff.

Konrad considers it appropriate to note that in a conversation with Erenthal in mid-June 1911, he, Konrad, stated that not one officer had been sent to Serbia. Therefore, it seemed rather strange to the Chief of the General Staff that the Minister of War asked the Minister of War on this subject in August, to which Konrad was forced to respond, which is attached in a copy to this report.

In this reply, dated August 24, Koprak emphatically declares that reports in Serbian newspapers about the sending of Austrian officers to Serbia are a lie, since since the Bosnian crisis, that is, for three years, not a single officer has been sent to Serbia. As for Raikovich's trip, as the Ministry of War knows, it was undertaken on the initiative of the Military Geographical Bureau with a purely special topographic task, and Raikovich was warned that he was by no means entrusted with any secret assignments. This expresses all the undercover work of the Austrian officers in Serbia. Meanwhile, the Serbian press is constantly agitating against the monarchy and is trying to interpret every trip of the officers along the Danube or every exercise of the frontier troops as hostile actions. This position of the Serbian press has long been known, and during the Bosnian crisis, the Foreign Ministry itself

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strange affairs found it necessary to draw the attention of the Serbian government. on the press, just as now the representative of the monarchy in Belgrade makes the assumption that the press is inspired by the Serbian government. In conclusion, Konrad once again emphasizes that no sendings of officers of the General Staff to Serbia were made.

In the report, the chief of staff points out that despite the fact that Serbia has established: normal relations and even in October 1910 a trade agreement was concluded, despite unhindered visits. Serbian officials outside the monarchy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs first limited and then completely banned the private vacations of officers to Serbia, which, of course, were not connected in any way with intelligence work.

The same restriction of travel by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was extended to Turkey and, especially, to Albania, while the fugitives of other states traveled there quite freely. The motivation for such a ban is the lack of a security guarantee for the Austrian. oFiperov is unfounded, since the prestige of the monarchy abroad can also ensure the safety of its subjects, as well as other states. "In line of duty," writes the Chief of the General Staff, "I must: protest against the restriction on Philip's foreign holidays, yes. how can we, officers, especially officers of the general staff, get an exhaustive idea of the country not from books, but only from. direct acquaintance with her. These trips also achieve the study of foreign routes of communication, which, as was previously

reported, should not necessarily be associated with undercover work.

Konrad goes on to point out that the working conditions are few. The Austrian intelligence network beyond the borders is very difficult, as it has to deal with a patriotic population, while the intelligence of Italy, Serbia and Montenegro and Russia finds favorable ground among the hostile groups of the monarchy, especially in the border areas. In support of what has been said, Konrad encloses a table of those convicted of espionage in Austria, Italy, Serbia, and Russia.

The table shows that in the last three years 34 people were convicted of espionage in Austria-Hungary, of which 13 were spying for Italy and 21 for Russia. At the same time the Austrian agents were convicted. in Italy 4, in Russia 3 and in Serbia 5.

This ratio leads Konrad to the conclusion that there is not even any moral reason to limit the Austrian agents, and, on the contrary, it would be good if the Austrian ambassadors in Russia and Italy made a presentation against such extensive undercover work as conducted by these states in Austria.

However, nothing is known about such statements, but, on the contrary, Austrian. the ambassador in Rome made a proposal to limit the undercover intelligence of the monarchy, since the patience of the Italian government might run out. Now bringing this to the attention of Franz Joseph, Konrad reports that the messages he received from the Minister of War about the proposal of the Roman ambassador were answered, sent to the Minister of War for his information and in a copy attached to the report.

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In it, Coprade is surprised that the ambassador in Rome does not know how many have been convicted of spying for Italy in Austria; the proposal made by the ambassador suggests that the interests of the monarchy are poorly protected c. Italy. Konrad asks that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs be informed of his opinion.

The Minister of War did not fail to do this, forwarding the original letter from Konrad, which the latter did not expect at all and found out about it then. when he received, again from the Minister of War, Erenthal's letter dated August 7, to which, in turn, he answered on August 14. Both of these letters. Konrad in copies are attached to the report.

In his letter, Erenthal considered it necessary, first of all, to speak. for the protection of his responsible subordinate. The ambassador in Rome not only did not know the number of those convicted in Austria for espionage, but he should not have known, since this was not reported to him, even periodically. In the same way, he could not know the number of Austrian citizens convicted in Italy. As for the patience of the Italian government, the ambassador could talk about it, because at that time, in one month, there were three cases of condemnation of Austrian subjects for undercover intelligence, which, of course. compromised the ambassador of the monarchy. Erenthal quite agrees with this. and considers completely undeserved the reproach to the ambassador thrown by the chief of the general staff - the ambassador, who is not a novice in his own. deeds and proved himself appropriate to his important post. V. conde letter Erenthal declares that he strongly protests against. unfair criticism of Konrad and, in turn, asks for

content. of this letter to inform the latter.

In response, on August 14, Konrad informed the Minister of War that the note sent to him earlier by the hole was intended exclusively for her, and if otherwise, then the subordinate authorities were to blame, the failure of which had an adverse effect on service relations. About it. the chief of the general staff asks to inform Erenthal ..

In the report, the chief of the general staff says that this is only the formal side of the matter, but in essence Konrad had the right to react sharply. to the activities of the Roman ambassador of the monarchy, for already a year ago (1910), on a similar occasion, the Ministry of War asked that the Roman. the ambassador coordinated his statements with him in advance.

In the following, Conrad refers to the letters of the ambassador from Rome dated January. about which we spoke above and which were attached in copies to the report. On this question of the military readiness of Italy for the spring of 1912, and on the difference in this with Erenthal, who bases his judgments on the conclusion of the ambassador from Rome, the Chief of the General Staff remains of his former opinion and considers it necessary to note that on his the duty lies to follow the development of foreign and domestic armed forces, to draw up a general picture of their correlations and then, without cowardice and having exhausted all possibilities, to attend to the adoption of those military measures that can correspond to the developing situation.

"I consider it my duty to serve," writes the head of the general. headquarters, to remain steadfast in their convictions, despite the fact that ... they frivolously slander the continuing armaments of the possible.

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opponents or tendentiously they are considered, as, for example, Erenthal and the ambassador in Rome.

At the end of the report, Konrad points out that, although Erenthal himself admits that the letter of the Roman ambassador is harsh, at the same time he considers it possible to defend him and attack the chief of the general staff, 'accusing the latter of exceeding his rights and duties. Protesting against this, Conrad, at the same time, reports that he has informed Erenthal about the presentation of this document.

Such was the indictment of the Chief of the General Staff. After its delivery, it was clear that things should move quickly to a denouement, at which
we will stop.

) September, presenting his report, Conrad and verbally reported on his misunderstandings with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

On the same day, the Adjutant Wing of the heir came to Konral with the aim of inquiring about the results of the report of the chief of staff from Franz Joseph, and by the way, to report on the secret plans of Erenthal. The latter assumed 'that if Conrad remained, then Georgi, now Minister of the Austrian Landwehr, should be Minister of War; if Conrad leaves, then Auchenberg may be Minister of War; but to see Auchenberg and Konrad together in responsible positions was by no means part of the Foreign Minister's calculations. Frand-Ferdinand, according to the envoy, had to resolutely demand the departure of Shopich. .

On September 27, Konrad met with the chief of the military office of Franz Joseph, who conveyed to Konrad the order of Franz Joseph to restore the pom-pomny remissions with Erenthal and write him an apology letter.

It is clear that Koprade could not agree to this... "Before I write a scathing letter to Erenthal," answered the chief of the general staff, "I will allow my right hand to be cut off." Resolutely refusing to carry out the order, the chief of the general staff, Konrad, described in detail to his interlocutor all the struggle that he had to endure with the "clique" of Erenthal, adding that candidates had already been nominated for his place: either PSchonaich or Przyborsky, a relative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. No matter how hard Conrad tried to maintain a correct and precautionary relationship with Erenthal everywhere, he did not succeed. Erenthal's "clique" includes Shonaikh and Buryan, the Minister of Finance. The fall of Shonaich is very likely, and now the "clique" wants a reciprocal victim, which Conrad should appear.

The conversation ended with the decision that Konrad should personally report to the emperor on this issue.

Meanwhile, on September 24, as we know, the Chief of the General Staff sent Erenthal a letter about Italy's performance in Tripoli and invited Erenthal to clarify his proposals in a personal conversation.

The chief of the general staff waited in vain for an invitation telephone call from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The last one didn't call. Having lost his patience, Koprade addressed a letter on October 2 to Franz Ferdinand, and on the 6th with a report to Franz Joseph. 10 days later, the last one was followed by a resolution that it is necessary to prepare for war with all potential opponents, but that foreign policy is conducted by the minister

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Foreign Affairs in contact with both Minister-Presidents, according to the personal instructions of Franz Josef.

The enemy struck back. As we already know, by personal order of Franz Josef, the head of the General Staff was to be invited to meetings of the Council of Ministers, which considered budgetary issues. At the end of October, a meeting of the Council of Ministers was to be held on the question of railway construction in Bosnia. Conrad waited for an invitation, because the question was closely connected with the plan of war. However, Erenthal, in his letter to the head of the military chancellery Franz Josef dated October 22, found the participation of the chief of the general staff in the meeting of the Council of Ministers unnecessary, since: 1) the issue is not related to the military budget; 2) military interests will be secured by the presence at the meeting of the Minister of War and the Commander of Forces in Bosnia, and 3) the news of the presence of the Chief of Staff at the meeting may find its way into the press and be interpreted in an undesirable way for foreign policy. In general, the Minister of Foreign Affairs believed that the Chief of the General Staff should be invited to meetings of the Council of Ministers, even on budgetary matters, only if a new military program was being considered, associated with an increase in the budget. Erenthal asked that Franz Josef be reported on this letter.

On the same day, Erenthal submitted to the latter an extensive report, in

in which he charged the chief of the general staff with imperialist tendencies, with an erroneous assessment of Italian policy, with agitation in the press and with the formation of a military party in the general staff. The Minister of Foreign Affairs concluded by writing: "The direction of foreign policy must remain in the hands of a competent and responsible Minister of Foreign Affairs appointed by the Emperor. The chief of the general staff is responsible for preparing for war for various possible combinations, however, without the right to influence the choice of one or another of them.

This report was not known then to Conrad, and he only now gives a rebuke. The Chief of the General Staff points out that Austria-Hungary could not be ready for war in all cases, as well as for war when attacked from all sides; it was necessary to prepare for certain combinations only, decided in advance. It is very convenient, in Konrad's opinion, when directing foreign policy in peacetime, to have an organ on which, in the event of war, responsibility could be shifted. The diplomats of this school look upon the army as an umbrella to save them when it starts to drip; but the diplomats of Austria's opponents looked upon the army as a real instrument of politics, which was appointed for a certain purpose and would be set in motion when that purpose was desired to be achieved.

By November 15, the chief of the general staff had prepared his annual memoir, and went with him to Franpu-Joseph. After Konrad reported the memoir, Franz Josef, very excited, demanded an end to all attacks by Konrad on Erenthal. To the words of Conrad that he expressed his views, the old emperor replied that the attacks against the current policy were nothing more than attacks on Franpa himself.

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OH YE aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaand Joseph, for he directs politics, and the policy of Erenthal is the policy of the emperor.

For all his loyalty, Konrad was not embarrassed and objected that in: the memoir he sets out the policy as he understands, and if he is mistaken, then: Francp-Joseph has the right to point it out to him. With a few words, the chief of staff laid his memoir on the table.

Excited, Franp-Joseph replied: "My policy is the policy of peace .. This policy should be binding on everyone. In the mouth direction, my foreign minister is pursuing my policy. It is possible that it will come to war, but it will begin only when Italy attacks us.

In response to Conrad's remark that Austria's chances would then be unfavourable, Franz Josef continued: "Until Italy attacks us, there will be no war. In general, we should not have a "military party".

"Besides the one," objected the chief of the general staff, "who is obliged: to take care that everything is ready for war, if one breaks out, so as not to immediately fall into a difficult situation; apparently impossible to pronounce. even the words "war", since one can be accused of belonging to a "military party".

"It is necessary to prepare for war," replied the old Habsburg, gradually fading away in his anger. Making another allusion to the German Crown Prince about his chauvinism in Parliament and pointing out that nothing

this cannot happen in Vienna, giving the speaker a transparent hint at Frand-Ferdinand, the emperor calmly finished the report and left. let his quarrelsome servant - the chief of the general staff.

On November 29, on the orders of Franz Ferdinand, the adjutant wing of the latter warned Conrad about his reception on the 30th by Franz Joseph, at which he would be asked to take the post of army inspector. Francp-Ferdinand advised to accept this appointment for the time being, and not to resign... to which Konrad pointed out that he did not intend to Fkhronndprove and, even when he was appointed to the post of chief of the general staff, said that he would like to. take a position closer to the troops.

In the evening Konrad received an order to report to Schönbrunn on the 30th. Entering the next day into Franz Josef's office and greeting s. him, the chief of the general staff was waiting for orders.

Those didn't slow down. "I'm sorry," said Francp-Josich, "after. mature reflection, I am forced to dismiss you from your position and. appoint an army inspector. You know the reasons, so about them. nothing to say." Friendly then thanking for the service and counting. in the future, always use the experienced advice of Konrad in the most important matters, Frann-Joseph noted that he decided to tell Koprade himself about. dismissal, finding it in a direct, better way. Expressing confidence that they part as friends, Franz Joseph said goodbye to VKonrad.

In its place, in the first book, we have already said with what feeling: of relief, the chief of the general staff left his difficult post. Conrad rejoiced that he was returning to the troops again and, finally, having received personal freedom. "I could," writes Conrad, "regulate my work at my own will, make business trips of my own choice,,.

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to ride, not shy of time, to visit his mother, children, friends and acquaintances.

"It was a respite after five years!" exclaims the now former Chief of the General Staff.

On December 2, an order was issued to appoint Konrad to a new position, with the award of an order for his work as chief of the general staff.

The trumpets sounded victoriously in the Foreign Office... Erenthal won.

The main tasks for field trips, military games and maneuvers for 1912 had already been given by Koprade, and he, having transferred the post to his deputy, calmly left the general staff.

Conrad's departure was saddened by his Berlin friend, the chief of the German General Staff, who sent a letter full of sympathy.

In his reply letter, Conrad wrote to Moltke that the joint work for five years left him with a feeling of ardent attachment to his former fellow writer. Further recounting his conflict with Erenthal, Konrad briefly says that he was dismissed from his position as chief of the general

ral headquarters. "If it brings good," writes Konrad, "then he leaves willingly, but whether it will be good or not, the future will show." Then speaking in defense of the German military agent in Vienna and assessing him from the best side, Konrad asks not to attach importance to the fact that, through the fault of this agent, the German ambassador received information about the departure of the Chief of the Austrian General Staff later than they entered the press and appeared order. Concluding his letter, Konrad expresses his strong desire to see Moltke once more in person and to exchange views.

It turned out that, according to a Viennese newspaper, on November 29, that is, on the eve of Koprade's conversation with Franz Josich, the Italian ambassador already knew that Konrad was leaving. This circumstance was immediately used by Erenthal for his attacks on the General Staff and the War Ministry. In his report of December 20, Ehrenthal points out that already on the 30th the Italian ambassador informed the German ambassador that Konrad was leaving, that he had been sacrificed on the altar of the triple alliance, and the Italian ambassador refused to Erenthal to name the source from which he received the information. The German ambassador, in turn, was angry that he received such important information from the Italian ambassador, and not from his military agent. Something from the highest ranks of the Austrian General Staff blabbed about the upcoming change at the top, a note appeared in the newspaper, and two foreign ambassadors and a military agent turned out to be compromised, and, according to Erenthal, a serious offense was committed against the Minister of Foreign Affairs - disclosure secret information. The German ambassador irritably pointed out that one had to be very restrained with representatives of the Austrian General Staff, since confidential conversations ended up in the press. Ehrenthal does not enter into an analysis of how correctly the censorship bureau in the War Ministry functions, but asks Franz Josef to order to limit the communications of the War Ministry with the press to only the most necessary and oblige the Minister of War: 1) to keep in touch © with the censorship bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 2) given in print the most important information to be published only with the knowledge of the Minister of the Court and him, Erenthal.

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On this one could drop our pen, describing the departure of Konrad from the post of chief of the general staff, but we would act unfairly if, at least in general terms, we did not stop at his swan song - a memoir for 1911, which, in part, was the reason for his quick resignation.

As is already known, this memoir was presented to Franco-Josich on November 15, 1911, and at the report of this memoir by Koprade, the old Habsburg had already lost his temper.

Konrad begins his document by indicating that his aim is to give a clear picture of the military-political situation on which specific military training should be based, as well as to outline the requirements that are necessary to increase the combat readiness of the armed Sia.

To apologize for the fact that in his memoir he will repeat those principles that he had repeatedly reported to them before, Konrad asks Franz Joseph to pay special attention to them.

Further, the chief of the general staff really repeats the entire

the principal part of the previous reports, which we already know.

Conrad then proceeds to assess the neighboring states of Austria-Hungary.

Starting with the identification of potential opponents, Conrad puts Italy at the head, then Russia, Serbia and Chernoyuria. Gurtzia is counted as an adversary of Russia and Italy. Bomaria can be used as an ally, Rumania must be kept in a tripartite alliance.

Despite the possible clash of economic interests between Germany and Austria in the Balkans, an alliance with Germany must be the basis of all policy of the monarchy, and all military assumptions are based on it. Conrad considers it necessary to emphasize this, that a change in the Ruhr policy towards Germany should be planned for a few years in advance, because a war against this state would require great efforts to improve the road network.

France and Atlia are enemies of the monarchy, as an ally of Germany.

Of the rest of the European states, Schbetzia cherishes as an enemy of Rosspi, Denmark is neutral, Belgium and Holland will take the side of the opponents, defending their neutrality, Spain is a possible enemy of France because of Morocco, Switzerland is an ally of the monarchy in case of its war with Italy.

Of the Asian states, Japan and China are Russia's enemies. North America is a possible enemy of Japan. Every difficulty Russia has in Asia must be welcomed by the monarchy.

Conrad's assessment of the states allows him to outline the political goals that should be pursued by the monarchy.

Keeping South Tyrol and all the coasts in the hands of the monarchy is essential, and every attempt on them must be considered as a pretext for war.

Ownership of the coast depends on the security of the hinterland, the threat of which must cause imminent war. It is impossible to lose a single region of the monarchy, because this will have a heavy impact on the defense capability of the state, especially the loss of Galicia.

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As for the expansion of the monarchy, it, having no colonies and limited, more or less economically, on other frontiers, will find political and commercial advantages in spreading only in the Balkans. Expansion to the Balkaps leads to the annexation of Serbia with the region of Nis inclusive, which is caused both by geographical conditions and by the constant danger that threatens the monarchy from the small Balkan states.

To preserve the sea power of Austria, a strong Fleet and a secure connection of the coast with the interior regions of the monarchy are necessary.

"In the capture of Serbia, I picture the immediate aggressive task of the monarchy," writes the chief of the general staff. To what extent the expansion of the monarchy can come at the expense of Poland is still unclear to Conrad,

a) in a war against Russia, provided that it is conducted jointly with Germany, with the neutrality of Italy and with secondary actions against Serbia and Montenegro, until a decision is reached in the main theater;

c) in a war with Italy, if the neutrality of Russia is ensured, and minimum forces are assigned against Serbia and Montenegro:

The armed forces of the monarchy, according to the chief of the general staff, do not allow us to count on success in a simultaneous war with Italy, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro. In these sports, politics must create such a situation in which one could reckon with a weapon with the nearest, directly threatening enemy.

1) Option P - war against Russia in alliance with Germany and Romania with the neutrality of Italy and the deployment of small forces against Serbia and Montenegro:

3) option B - war with Serbia and Montenegro with the neutrality of all other states, however, with the presence of sufficient forces within the country to act against Italy or Rossip, in the latter case, in alliance with Germany;

4) the variant of the IR is extremely unfavorable, which it is desirable to avoid, is the war of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Romania

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with Italy, Russia, France, Serbia, Montenegro and, presumably, England.

If the first three options are worked out in detail, then the fourth option is only in general terms and it is desirable that the policy does not bring events to its application.

Subjecting again to a detailed consideration of these options, but with

from a purely military point of view, the chief of staff comes to the following conclusions: a) war with Russia is possible only in alliance with Germany or if Russia is distracted on other fronts; 6) a war with Italy is necessary, an alliance with it brings only one harm to the monarchy, and it must be ended before the spring of 1912; c) it was necessary to put an end to Serbia earlier, but now we have to limit ourselves to secondary actions until success is achieved in the main theater of military operations.

Expecting that with the present grouping of powers it will be possible to wage an independent war with Italy, Conrad also outlines those political goals that could be achieved: by this war, up to the seizure of new lands from Italy, indemnity, raising the prestige of the monarchy and the spirit in the army.

Conrad is very worried about the 4th option, this is a future world war, which requires the development of military preparations on a new basis. In these views, the chief of the general staff points out that policy must take into account the correlation of forces and avoid this chance: if it comes true, then this should be considered a serious diplomatic defeat.

Konrad notes that he took into account in an evil way the ratio of the military power of the states, which for her, according to her duty, is decisive, and he realizes that everything he has stated above was based on a comparison of the number of divisions of the first and second stages. However, it is also necessary to take into account other military data: weapons, technical means, engineering defense, etc.

If we take into account what has been said - and this must be done - then the Chief of the General Staff considers it his duty to pay attention to those modest appropriations that go to the armed forces of the monarchy.

The report was accompanied by the appendices: 1) a certificate of the necessary measures and means for defense; 2) a statement of the cost of the new budget program; 3) a certificate of engineering defense on the Italian border; 4) a map of the Italian border defense engineering; 5) a certificate of organizational measures necessary for the army and for the protection of borders; 6) a certificate on the development of artillery and technical troops; 7) a general calculation of the amounts needed to improve the supply and mobilization reserves; 8) a certificate of the total amount required for appropriations for five years (from 1911 to 1915), and 9) a certificate of the necessary measures to improve the network of roads (railway and dirt), the communications network, and waterways.

The memoir was developed in various bureaus of the General Staff, while the summary was completed in the operational bureau.

On the mouth, we finish our story about how Ivan Ivanovich and Ivan Nikiforovich quarreled in Vienna ...

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If we analyzed the quarrel in more or less detail, we did it: 1) in view of the fundamental interest in the quarrel between two statesmen on the banks of the Danube and 2) in view of the vitality that is characteristic of the event described.

The hero of our story, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, fell ... If in Austria-Hungary such an event was an era, then in other countries, such as, for example, in the former parish Russia, such bureaucratic leapfrog was a common occurrence, no one surprising... It didn't even take such a long struggle to dismiss an unfit or overly active chief of the general staff. The matter was limited to 'a simple order and no one was particularly worried!

We are far from recognizing such a kaleidoscopic change of persons in responsible posts as normal and are inclined to dwell on the fact that the change of the chief of the general staff is indeed a lie in the military preparation of the state, since, although not individual individuals make history, but all by their activity they leave a trace in the latter, 'and it would be bad if each of them tried to find new ways of preparing for war, forgetting the paths trodden by his predecessor.

The search for new paths is always connected with the arrival of new people... It is known that the matter of preparing a state for war is not combined with crossing from one road to another, but should be directed along the presciently outlined middle path, which Philo always advised to follow. of war Clausevid ...

CHAPTER U!

KONRAD - ARMY INSPECTOR AND THE FIRST BALKANS WAR

Death of Erenthal. - The new Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary, Berthold. — Troubles of Vienna about the autonomy of Albania and a categorical refusal to provide Serbia with a port on the Adriatic coast. — Russia before the first Balkan war. - The interest of France in the Balkans and the restraint of England. — Peacefulness of Germany. - Moltke about "Balkan dogs". - The questionable behavior of Italy. — The determination of the Balkan states to fight. — Conrad's thoughts and his "notes" on the political situation. — First note dated October 28, 1919. — Dreams of a "great" Balkan union. — First addition to Konrad's note — dated November 8, 1919. — Konrad proposes war with Serbia and its inclusion in the monarchy; autonomy of Albania - The second addition to the note - dated November 16, 1912. — The Albanian question in the understanding of Konrad. — Second note from Konrad, November 19, 1913. — The monarchy must wage war with Serbia, which will probably cause a European war. - Verbal note from Vienna about Serbia. - Konrad is far from hanfaronade. - Third note of Konrad dated December 6, 1912. "To miss the time would be a grave mistake." - Thoughts and concerns of Izvolsky about the outcome of the Balkan war. — Russia's program at the London conference of ambassadors. — St. Petersburg's fears for the fate of Constantinople. — Speech by Pourtales in St. Petersburg and Sazonov's repulse. — Sazonov's instructions to Izvolsky not to tie Russia's hands in the question of the straits. - Sazonov's opinion on the straits. - The Russian Naval General Staff and its efforts to open prodices. Sazonov's concession on the issue of Serbia's right to the port. — Militancy of France and her perplexity about Russian concessions. - Izvolsky and the French press. — Justifications of Poincaré. — An Austrian military agent on the French press. — Restraint of England. — Anglo-French military agreement. — Peacefulness of Germany and its causes. — Moltke's report of December 12, 1942. - The participation of Ludendorff in it. — The possibility of a European war. — Significance of the Balkan question for Austria-Hungary. — Defensive alliances in Europe. — The aggressive nature of the tripartite agreement. - Offensive in politics also predetermines the most powerful mode of action. - Threatening of individual members of the tripartite alliance. Ludendorff's explanation: Moltke has a low opinion of diplomacy. - Offensive

against France. — The need to strengthen Germany's armaments. — The performance of Italy on the side of the tripartite alliance. - Anxiety in Paris caused by the behavior of Itazlia. - Familiarization of Poincare with the text of the Russian-Italian agreement. Causes of Italy's cooling off towards France. — Plans of the Balkan states. - Conrad's diplomatic mission in Romania. - Agreement on the deployment of the Romanian army on the Russian border. — Conrad's report on his trip.

We said goodbye to Konrad as Chief of the General Staff. In the struggle with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Erenthal, Konrad fell, being now far from the affairs of state administration. A hot "patriot" in a military uniform, in his moments of leisure from military service, was reading newspapers, drawing from them orientation in political life, since others

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sources for him were forbidden. Only the intelligence reports of the General Staff on the events of the Italo-Turkish, and then broke out: the Balkan war gave Conrad additional information about the unfolding events outside the monarchy.

No less important events took place inside the latter. Fate, punished the "blood" enemy of Kovrad: on February 17, 1912, Erental died. Conrad does not tell us his inner feelings on this matter, but—let us be forgiven for a bold assumption—we think that the heart of the former Chief of the General Staff began to beat violently upon receiving the news of the death of the all-powerful Minister of Foreign Affairs. Indeed, Conrad was not the only one who was happy about the upcoming change in the head of the foreign policy of the monarchy, because, although, according to Chernin, "Erenthal's policy ... pursued: the imperialist sang with tremendous force and energy", it still did not: satisfy the Vienna imperialists, one of the brightest representatives of which was Konrad. From now on, a ray of hope shone in their midst for a real return to the path of activity in external affairs, what for. Erenthal has been avoiding lately. In his memoirs, Poincaré says that the German party of Austria-Hungary could not forgive Erenthal: his restraint towards Germavia after her help in 1909, and when this outstanding diplomat for his time went to the grave, his memory quickly faded.

Erenthal's successor as Foreign Minister was Berchtold, the former Austro-Hungarian staff in Russia. The drama of the world war is connected with the name of this diplomat. We would not stop the reader's attention on this person if we did not consider it necessary to show who, at the beginning of 1912, the foreign policy of the Habsburg monarchy was headed: and what was its influence on the general staff.

First of all, of course, let's listen to the opinion of Konrad, the former chief of the general staff. In his memoirs, he declares that he had no chance to know Berchtold before, and now, in his service, as an army inspector, he was far from communicating with him, avoiding meetings and at various times. court celebrations. However, one of the politicians of the monarchy brought these two future associates together, inviting both to dinner and giving them. them the opportunity to make acquaintances and exchange views on certain political issues. Conrad's opinion of his interlocutor boiled down to the fact that Berchtold, despite having his own views. on a particular issue, willingly listens to the opinions of others. Although it did not correspond to his views, Berchtold does not reject someone else's

opinion and, in any case, is not inclined to blindly follow the paths of his predecessor. In what follows we shall see how relations developed between these two men and what the new foreign minister was like. affairs.

Buchanan writes in his Memoirs of a Diplomat: "The death of Count Erenthal and the appointment of Count Berchtold in his place caused a marked improvement in Russo-Austrian relations. Grah Berchtold, being an Austrian ambassador in St. Petersburg during the Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909, carried out his difficult mission with such tact and modesty that his governments did not respond to his reputation. This diplomat, who

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'Roma was destined to play such a fatal and decisive role during 'during the negotiations preceding the great war, there was a 'regzopa stay' (an important person - B. Sh.) at the Russian court, and this circumstance contributed to the mitigation of the tension that existed between Russia and Austria tension,

Poincaré characterizes Berchtold as "a somewhat careless otap 'seeaspeig'" (great gentleman - B. Sh.), which in reality was the new minister of foreign affairs, who was more interested in collecting a collection of canes than in the diplomatic affairs of the monarchy.

Of course, not only were there no traits of Bismarck or similar diplomats of bourgeois society in Berchtold, but, on the contrary, he was a typical "Viennese" politician: weak-willed, developed, gallant, listening to everyone and everything, cautiously expressing his personal opinion and always in an indecisive tone, obediently fulfilling the plans of the stronger people from the ruling clique of Austria-Hungary. In a word, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs was an accommodating person, if not to say more: a weak-willed offspring of the degenerating Viennese aristocracy, a plaything in the hands of people of strong will.

Such was Erenthal's successor, on whom the burden of the active policy of the monarchy had to bear, after the death of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who stopped in time and thus saved both his name and the prestige of Austria-Hungary.

Tired of fighting at every stage and having left the stage, Koprade did not trouble anyone for a long time, and in particular the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with his political projects - until the specter of war again rose at the door of the monarchy.

The Italo-Turkish war dragged on. Italy tried to extract more and more benefits from it. The position of Italy again awakened in Conrad the former distrust of this power.

But while Italy was not terrible. The situation was worse in the Balkans, where, according to Buchanan, "the Turkish-Italian war sowed the beginning of a general upheaval," in case of which even Erenthal advised "to keep the gunpowder dry."

In February 1912, with the assistance of Russian diplomacy, Bulgaria and Serbia concluded a defensive alliance. Soon Greece joined this union, and then Montenegro, and the Balkan federation was formed.

We cannot introduce the reader into all the details of the diplomatic moves and intricacies that ended with the 1st Balkan War. For us it is only interesting to establish the general political situation in Europe by the autumn of 1912.

Let's start with Austria.

Poincaré in his book *The Origin of the World War* notes: "Geshov and other equally informed Bulgarians claimed that from the very beginning King Ferdinand, who was on the best terms with the Austrian court, informed him of the Balkan alliance." Thus, the impending crisis in the Balkans was not unexpected for the Austro-Hungarian dynasty. August 14 Berchtold is already feeling the ground among

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European states for the purpose of collective action in Constantinople with a proposal from Turkey to carry out broad reforms in Albania.

Through the broad autonomy of this province, the Vienna Minister tried to create a barrier against the possible spread of the Serbs to the sea, and then in general to divert part of the Serbian forces to the southeast from the Austrian border. We will meet with this project of creating an autonomous Albania one more time.

On August 16, the Vienna ambassador in St. Petersburg handed Sazonov a note on this issue, which emphasized Vienna's desire to enter into an exchange of opinions "especially with Russia."

Having only diplomatic support from France in case of complications in the Balkans, Sazonov tried to keep the Balkan bloc out of the war and initially refused the Austrian proposal to influence the Turks, but a month later he was forced to meet the demands of the Bulgarians for reforms in Macedonia and offered Chariz and Lon - Don to exchange views.

The Balkans, as we have already pointed out earlier, were becoming a matter of common European policy, and Vienna's hopes to reach an agreement with Russia alone should now be regarded as futile.

France, refusing to take the initiative in changing 54a Cio in the Balkans, on September 22 transmitted, however, to England and Russia a program of pacification of the Balkans, to which Austria and Germany were to join. The program warned the Balkan states about their calmness, threatened them with influence, even military ones, for disobedience, and offered Turkey to carry out a series of reforms in its Slavic regions. All states made an amendment to the Formula, and Russia demanded that Austria not take sole action in the Balkans, and also not occupy the Sandjak.

On October 16, the Austrian ambassador in St. Petersburg confirmed that "Austria is not looking for territorial extensions for itself in the Balkans", does not object to the expansion of the territory of Bulgaria to the limits of the San Stefano Treaty, even agrees to the territorial increase of Serbia, but "in no way could let her way to Thessaloniki be cut off, and therefore she could not reconcile herself to the expansion of Serbia to

seas". MShosol explained this important requirement for Austria-Hungary to gain access to Thessaloniki; however, "having reason to think (says the Russian document) that in Vienna they would not be averse to binding us in advance with some kind of agreement in the event of a redistribution of the Balkan Peninsula, Sazonov preferred not to enter into a more detailed discussion with the Austrian ambassador for the time being. issues raised."

Thus, Vienna put forward an ultimatum demand: Serbia's refusal to have access to the sea.

The Balkan Federation declared war on Turkey the next day.

While facilitating the conclusion of the Balkan union, Russia did not notify not only the text of the treaty, but even the fact of its existence to its allies — England and France. Both states recognized this

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Sazonov's mistake, and when they met on August 10, Poincaré reprimanded the Russian minister for this.

Russia again fell into a difficult situation, because, on the one hand, it had to support the Slavic states, on the other hand, in the event of Austria speaking out, it could only count on the diplomatic support of Paris and London. Sazonov himself admitted that in the face of the Balkan Federation he created an "instrument of war", and was forced to take all measures to avoid it.

In a report on his autumn trip abroad, Sazonov says that "it would be impossible to count on the assistance of England if the further aggravation of events required some kind of energetic pressure on Turkey."

France, according to the minister, is afraid of a conflict for two reasons: 1) so as not to be drawn into a war on the side of Russia and 2) so as not to suffer those material losses on capital placed in the Balkans, which may be caused by a war that flares up there.

Having the promise of only diplomatic support, Petersburg on October 17 was confronted with the Fact of the beginning of the first war in the Balkans. The victory and defeat of the Balkan federation created an equally difficult situation for Russian diplomacy. In the event of the victory of the Slavs, one could expect the performance of Austria and Romania, and, therefore, Russia should be ready for this. The defeat of the Balkan Federation led to the need to influence Turkey, and, moreover, Russia alone, in order to moderate the appetites of the winner. Sazonov asked the chairman of the ministers to give an indication of our military readiness.

France, indeed, in recent years has extended its Chinese expansion to the Balkans, in the summer of 1912 even placed a Bulgarian loan in Paris, and thus this or that course of events in the Balkans was by no means indifferent to it. It was clear that in the event of Austria intervening in the war, German support was inevitable, and thus the specter of a European war arose. That is why at first Poincaré treated Russia's independent policy in the Balkans with great anxiety and even came up with a proposal to convene a European convention.

However, on September 12, Poincaré assured Izvolsky that although "France is undoubtedly in a completely peaceful mood and does not seek and does not want war, Germany's action against Russia will immediately change this mood, and he is convinced that in this case, and parliament and public opinion will fully approve the government's determination to provide armed support to Russia." "Further on, Mr. Poincaré told me," Izvolsky informs Sazonov, "that, in view of the critical situation in the Balkans, the highest organs of the French military administration are studying with increased attention all military accidents that may occur, and he knows that knowledgeable and responsible persons are very optimistic look at the chances of Russia and France in the event of a general collision; Roth's optimistic view is based, among other things, on the assessment of the sabotage that the combined forces of the Balkan states (with the exception of Romania) will carry out by pulling back the corresponding part of the Austro-Hungarian military forces. A favorable element for Russia and France is also the mobilization of Italy,

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associated both with the African war and with special agreements with France.

Thus, according to Poincaré, the strategic situation was favorable for a tripartite agreement.

If Poincaré was politically restrained, then the influence of England showed itself in this. We have already heard that London refused to seriously support Russia in the event of Russian intervention in the Balkan war, but Gray assured Sazonov, according to the latter, that in the event of a clash with Germany, England would make every effort to deliver the most sensitive blow to the German sea power, and even introduced him to the Anglo-French agreement. Sazonov explained such restraint of England by the unwillingness to arouse the Mohammedans, of which there were many in the possessions of Britain. Whether this was also resentment at Sazonov's silence about the creation of a Balkan bloc by Russia is unknown, but Poincaré wrote in a letter to the ambassador in London dated October 12: "It would be very annoying if the British government took past mistakes harshly."

We must note here the revival of negotiations between the British and Khrenpuz military and naval circles in 1912 to establish a joint plan of action. Although the representatives of the British cabinet were afraid of publicity of such negotiations and even more - of taking on any obligations to France, nevertheless, 1912 ended with the conclusion of a naval convention between England and France, and on October 30, 1912, a political exchange of letters between Cambon (French Ambassador in London) and Gray, as will be discussed below.

"As for Germany," Sazonov wrote in his report, "in itself, the war between the Balkan states worries her little, but she, following the example of France, is afraid of being drawn into a European war by virtue of her allied obligations, and therefore is ready to do everything possible to eliminate the Balkan war... In Berlin, they doubt the inclination of the Vienna Cabinet to listen to the advice of the northern ally, and therefore prefer not to put their influence to the test in Vienna for fear of not finding the former submissive response there. It seems to me that this state of affairs is explained to a certain extent by the fact that Austria is not averse to emphasizing its independence from Germany, taking advantage of the need

for the latter to hold fast to its alliance with it and the fear of remaining completely isolated among other great powers.

Germany had just emerged from the "unfortunate" Moroccan history, as Moltke described it. The Italo-Turkish war worried the Chief of the German General Staff, because it could lead to further complications in the Balkans. "When Balkan dogs bark," he wrote to his wife on October 1, 1911, "no one can say what will happen." Meanwhile, Germany was in no hurry to increase its military power. "No one thinks of war," Moltke further chuckles in April 2%, 1912, "Germany is peacefully disposed, as well as the rest of the powers, but no one can know what can happen, and therefore the strengthening of the armed forces is extremely necessary." "It would be funny if it weren't so sad," exclaims Moltke.

Of course, the Balkan events interested Germany to a greater extent,

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than Sazonov thought. The economic interest of Germany in Turpia increased every year, on this basis there were frictions even with Vienna, and it was safe to say that Germany would not allow the strengthening of Russia's influence on the peninsula. So far, Berlin could operate in the Balkans through Austria and at the same time maintain a free hand in case of European complications. In Berlin, the hope has not yet disappeared of reaching an agreement with England on a fleet and thus splitting the Entente.

Another member of the tripartite alliance, Italy, was occupied with a war with Turkey, which dragged on beyond Rome's expectations. As they say, appetite comes with eating, and Italy tried to expand her conquests beyond what she had previously agreed with France and England. Strained relations with France developed, and in the autumn of 1912 the Italo-French treaty on the neutrality of Italy in the event of an attack on France hung in the air, arousing great misgivings in Poincaré about the strength of this treaty.

True, we heard from the lips of the same Poincaré that Italy is currently bound by her colonial war and agreement with Francia, but if the former really kept Rome from taking more active steps, then the agreement with France began to fade gradually. Italy again gravitated towards Berlin, playing a dual game.

Complications in the Balkans attracted the attention of Roman diplomacy, but since Austria did not significantly violate $\$ai5$. Chaos on the peninsula, and especially in its western part, Rome remained calm and even supported Vienna in her refusal of Serbia to enter the Adriatic coast.

As for the Daleian states, they irrevocably embarked on the path of war. It was necessary to wait for the outcome of the first clashes in order to judge the real guiding lines of their policy, about which, for the time being, only assumptions had to be made. Secret dreams carried them far away: the Bulgarians saw themselves in Constantinople and on the shores of the Sea of Marmara, and the Serbs, regardless of Vienna, firmly established themselves on the shores of the Adriatic and Aegean seas.

Let us return again to the banks of the Danube, where Konrad, who was removed from "high" politics and engaged in ordinary "combatant" affairs, was staying. in disgrace.

Could Koprade be satisfied with the new circle of his duties? Of course not! He was appointed a member of the Supreme Privy Council, and therefore considered himself obliged to give advice for the benefit of the monarchy in only the purely military, but also in the political sphere of the life of Austria-Hungary. As an ardent patriot, as a "faithful" son of the monarchy, the former chief of the general staff, orienting himself in the political situation only by the press, considered it necessary to make broad proposals in the field of foreign policy.

As a member of the secret council, he now sent his "notes" only to the office of Franz Joseph and the heir, as well as to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Berchtold. When the head of the military office of the heir suggested that Konrad send his "notes" to the chief of the general staff -

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Shemois, Conrad resolutely rejected this proposal, pointing out that he, as a member of the council, is subordinate only to the emperor and heir, and if he directs notes to Berchtold, then as a private lime. Conrad emphasized that he does not send his creations even to such a friend of his as Auchenberg, at that time the minister of war, because he avoids intruding altogether. in the life of the military administration of the monarchy.

We willingly want to believe the sincere feelings of Koprade, but the thought involuntarily creeps in on us: does the former chief of the general want to. headquarters with their "notes" to constantly remind you of yourself? Too already. people are weak, and sometimes numerous "projects" are poured out from those dismissed "for retirement", having a deluge reminder of the existence of "great. kih", but not recognized talents.

Konrad's notes are more interesting for us in another respect. They reflect his views on the political situation that developed for the monarchy by the end of 1912, and since soon Konrad was again appointed as a head of the general staff, then, naturally, his views, expressed in the notes of a member of the Privy Council, found reflected in it. performance in the new position.

Following the Italian-Turkish war with great interest, Kovrad retained his former mistrust of Italian policy, considering it an enemy of Austria.

By this time, "unexpectedly", according to Conrad, the Balkans were covered with clouds, and now he wonders how the diplomacy of the monarchy could. view the preparation of the Balkan federation for war and, in general, osvedo-. whether she was wondering about the creation and tasks of this Federation. From the above. it can be seen above that Vienna was perfectly oriented in the future situation -
novke.

On September 30, the Balkan Federation announced mobilization, on October 8. Montenegro opened hostilities, on October 17 Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece declared war on Turkey, and on October 23 Allied victories over Turkish troops began.

For Austria-Hungary, according to Koprade, the moment has come for the adoption of a decision: to stay with Serbia or against it.

Worried about the threatened position of the monarchy, Conrad October 28, 1912 draws up his first note on the "modern situation of monarchy and the nearest political lines.

Starting with the fact that it is impossible to foresee the imminent end of the Balkan war and possible intervention in the war of other states, Konrad writes that "when he was appointed chief of the general staff in the autumn of 1906, he recognized it as irrefutable that foreign and domestic policy, on the one hand, and the development of the armed forces and concrete military training, on the other hand, must go hand in hand, as if they were in the closest inner connection.

"In these views," Konrad continues, "the questions of foreign policy are mine. I considered them to be within the circle of my official duties and even then I expressed the view that the Balkan problem was the most important for the monarchy).

Pointing out that he always insisted on the inclusion of Serbia into the monarchy and the defeat of Italy, in which he met opposition, Konrad says

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rit: "Zaz Chao, which I have always considered non-essential and which Erenthal regarded as the basis of his policy, is now eliminated, and there is hardly any prudent person who would believe in his restoration.
innovation."

Based on this, Konrad notes that it is necessary to pursue the most important goals, and not go with the flow, and further notes these goals.

The alliance formed in the Balkans is expanded by the entry into it of Austria-Hungary, and the small Balkan states remain in it in the position of Bavaria in Germany.

If this were not successful on the whole, then at least the community should be expressed in a single economic policy, in a common council, in which each state includes its own minister of foreign affairs, the minister of war, and the chief of the general staff, the minister of finance. General questions should be: foreign policy, preparations for war in general, the development of the armed forces and their organization in principle (in detail, each state independently), Chinese and commercial policy and means of communication.

If it were possible to put the Austrian emperor at the head of the union, then it would be a huge success.

The alliance must first of all embrace Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Greece, and of the remaining Romania and Albania it is desirable to bring the former into the alliance, and make the latter autonomous, however, under the protectorate of Austria, meaning in the future, its entry into the union.

Subsequently, Conrad proceeds to prove all the benefits associated with the proposal he makes, even if at first glance it seemed alien to the modern politics of the monarchy.

The last one, consisting of the Slav, cannot lead an anti-Slavic

politics in general, that is how its military power is projected on them.

The monarchy excludes the influence of Russia among the Slavs, and if Russia or Italy turned out to be the enemies of the new alliance, then they would finally comfort the sympathies of all the Slavs. In Bosnia and Herzegovina there are 69 battalions of the imperial army guarding these provinces from Serbia and Montenegro; in the presence of an alliance with other states, these forces can be thrown against Russia or Italy, which increases the combat readiness of Austria. Thus, the alliance also brings benefits militarily.

If such an alliance had not materialized, then, according to Conrad, the forces of the monarchy could not have grown to such a size as to surpass the forces of Russia, Italy and the Balkan states (at least Serbia and Montenegro).

If Serbia and Montenegro do not enter into an alliance, then a threat is created to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the sea coast. The importance of the latter "for the monarchy is great, because only by owning the sea, it is possible to develop trade, industry and means of communication. Before such benefits of the Sotoz, petty agrarian interests must recede into the background, and any political deviations dictated by local interests must be vigorously arranged by a strong penal power.

The ground for such an alliance, according to Conrad, should be created by

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First of all, within the empire, by granting the independence of Croatia and Slavonia and drawing the Ruthenians and the South Tyrolean population to the side of the monarchies in order to tear them away from Moscow and Italian irredenta.

The union can be realized if there are two conditions: 1) the desire to enter it on the part of the Balkan states and 2) the recognition of the union by other states.

The first is beyond Conrad's doubts, since the small Balkan states will receive only economic, geographic and ethnographic benefits from the union, at the same time becoming under the protection of a powerful union.

As for the recognition of the alliance by the "great" powers, then, of course, it will cause their displeasure, but hardly anyone will encroach against it with an armed hand. The evidence is there. Russia will not dare to fight with the alliance without the support of Italy, and then Germany will intervene. The Russians will not decide on a European war, because neither the dynasty nor the court party wants war, because they are afraid of revolution. The pan-Slavists and the Polish party want war. Italy is now shaken in her military power by the Turkish war and will not risk a war with the monarchy. However, one must always reckon with a war on two fronts - against Russia and against Italy, which is a great danger. The task of diplomacy is to prevent such a simultaneous action by Italy and Russia. France, interested in Russian finances, hardly wants war, especially given the peaceful aspirations of her government. Germany, of course, will not rejoice at the defeat of the Turks and the formation of an alliance, but the new political situation will hardly place Germany in the camp of the enemies of the alliance, since, on the contrary, the strengthening of Russia would threaten her with greater danger. It is difficult to ascertain the attitude of England towards an alliance that will compete with her.

in eastern waters. In view of England's constant fears of her dominance in the northern waters, contested by Germany, the possibility can be admitted that Apglia will not be hostile to the alliance. The benefits of bringing Romania into the union would be very small. We must not close our eyes to the fact that the Romanians dream of separating Semigradia, Conrad believes that with the entry of Romania into the union this will be eliminated.

In view of the claims of all the Balkan states to Albania, it is necessary to give the latter autonomy, and not otherwise than under the protectorate of Austria, just as the British established their protectorate over Egypt. Conrad considers the capture of Albania necessary in order not to transfer direct routes to the Aegean into other hands, to strengthen his position in the Adriatic and, in particular, to strengthen himself in Valon, which is necessary for the development of maritime power. Albania under the protectorate of Austria will no longer be an apple of discord between the Balkan states, and the influence of other states, especially Italy, will be excluded in it; at the same time, Albania is very penpa for the monarchy in commercial and economic terms.

It would, of course, be undesirable to go straight for the capture of Albania. It should follow as a result of the request of the Albanians themselves, which would paralyze the intervention of other states. Next, Conrad dwells in detail on the implementation of autonomy, thinking to himself the following gradual

10 The brain of the army. Book. 2.145

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its course: military occupation, the formation of an autonomous government, the organization of a national Albanian army and the construction of communications. Given the occupation of Albania, Konrad considers it necessary to move at least three divisions.

If the "great" Balkan alliance had not been formed, then the monarchy, in any case, should strengthen its position in Albania and expand its economic influence in the rest of the Balkan states.

We have to think about the situation that can be created if the war is blown out by the Turks. In this case, the monarchy must resolutely come out in defense of Serbia and Chernoyuria and include them in the composition of the Danubian Empire.

Konrad considers the inclusion of the Serbian-Montenegrin regions into Austria-Hungary in one way or another as the basis of the policy of the monarchy.

We drew the reader's attention to Konrad's mouth document, which was the maximum program of Vepa's active politivi in the Balkans. The grandiose project of Koprada amazes us with the rich fantasy of a politician in the uniform of the general staff. The implementation of such a project of union could not follow immediately, as Konrad dreamed of it, and, of course, with painful experiences. We agree that, first of all, the ground for such an alliance had to be prepared, but this led to broad autonomy, primarily in Austria-Hungary itself, in other words, the complete abolition of the state system of the monarchy. For this, as you know, it was necessary to go through a world war and revolution, and even then the individual nationalities of the former Austria-Hungary and the Balkan Peninsula did not reach the ideas of the former chief of the general staff. The road to that paradise that Konrad dreamed of is not as short as he imagined it to be.

As for the recognition by other European states of the "great" Balkan alliance, what has already been said about the economic interest of these states in the Balkan Peninsula suggests that without weapons, without the victory of Austria-Hungary, such an alliance would never have been recognized. only by triple agreement, but even by Germany.

After several days of hesitation, Konrad sent a note to the addresses indicated by us above, and in a letter to the head of the military candelaria, Frapts-Joseph, he wrote that the note was caused by his "patriotic feelings", and that if his proposals had been rejected earlier, now the Balkan problem has again risen to its full height and we must reckon with the new political situation.

"Thinking this over day and night, I, in the attached memoir (or whatever you want to call it otherwise), writes Konrad, "set out my views and ask you to keep in mind that this work is a product of awareness only through the press."

"I believe that the monarchy has now again come to a turning point, and only decisions of exceptional importance can be useful," Conrad concludes his letter.

Meanwhile, events in the Balkans developed rapidly, the Slavs went from victory to victory. On October 28, the Serbs occupied Durazzo on the Adriatic coast, and on November 8, the Serbian envoy in Vienna announced that Serbia intended to stand firmly on the coast.

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Worried about this, on November 8, Conrad draws up the first addition to his note, sending it to the previous addressees.

Noting at the outset that the defeat of the Turks dramatically changed the picture, Konrad points to the need to take into account: 1) the partition of Albania in the attempt of Serbia to establish itself on the Adriatic Sea, 2) the possibility of intervention by other states, and 3) the fate of Asian possessions Turpies.

Recognizing the failures of reasoning of the alliance of the monarchy with the Balkan states that have suffered a collapse, Conrad puts forward two positions: either 4) Serbia will take a friendly position, or 5) Serbia will openly become an enemy at once. In the first case, all conflicts are excluded, and in the second, the monarchy must firmly reveal its will.

If the Balkan alliance turns out to be hostile to the monarchy, then, with the assistance of Rumania, the war promises success. If, however, Russia takes the side of Serbia and Montenegro, then a war on two fronts is conceivable only with the participation of Germany in it, and Italy will be neutral or on the side of the monarchy.

Making a calculation of forces, Konrad comes to the conclusion that against the Serbs: minimal forces should be thrown, and everything is directed to the main theater.

Bearing in mind the defeat of Serbia, Konrad does not lose hope of accomplishing this by keeping Russia from speaking out. The politician in uniform is looking for this path and sees them in the offer of freedom of action to Russia in the straits and the occupation of the Bosphorus with the fact that Austria's hands are freed in Albania and, in particular, in the occupation of Valona. Such a proposal would cross the interests

Russian with English and Bulgarian.

As regards Italy, it is possible that by proposing to expand her interests in the Aegean and in the Asian possessions of Turkey, it will be possible to draw her away from Albania. If the mouth fell away, then with the neutrality of Russia and on the condition that Romania binds Bulgaria, one could risk waging a war on two fronts.

Conrad sees the goals of the war for the monarchy: 1) in the autonomy of Albania under the Austrian protectorate, 2) in the occupation of Valona, 3) in trade and economic benefits.

The most important thing is that Russia and Italy, or at least one of these states, be neutral.

If, however, Russia, Italy and the Dalmatian alliance come out in concert against the monarchy, then for the last slaughter on three fronts, with the support of only Germany and Romania, the gas will be unbearable. In this case, it is necessary to wait for an opportune moment, prepare for it, and then vigorously achieve your song.

As for the division of Turkey's Asiatic possessions, Conrad does not undertake to judge here the tasks of the monarchy and invites economists and diplomats to do this. —

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Remaining convinced that none of the European states is not inclined to war, Conrad stops at the choice of the moment of declaring war. Considering that the Balkan states are striving to finish the zoina by winter, Konrad points out that the winter campaign for the modern European

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army is very difficult, especially for the Austrian, which lacks winter supplies. If things go to war, then diplomacy must try to put it off in a way that is favorable to the strategy of time.

Returning to Albania, Konrad resolutely insists on the refusal of the Serbs to provide a port on the Adriatic coast and proposes in return to provide the Serbs with transit to the north Dalmatian harbors, for which the monarchy receives the same access to Thessaloniki. R

Meanwhile, on November 8, 1912, the Greeks occupied Thessaloniki, a point to which the eyes of the Vienna imperialists had been attracted for more than 50 years.

On November 16, 1912, Konrad gives a second addition to his note of October 28, caused by the spread of information about the possible sending of an Italian expeditionary corps to Albania.

Concerned about this, Conrad considers it his duty to recall Erenthal's policy, which did not lead to a break with Italy, and now finds it necessary to point out again that the monarchy must not allow Italy into Albania.

The addition to the note considers the interest of: Austria-Hungary in Albania with their respective subdivision.

In order to protect the naval interests of the monarchy, according to Konrad, it is necessary that:
1) only Austro-Hungarian warships could have the right to stay in Albanian harbors for a long time; 2) the naval police was maintained by Austria-Hungary; 3) Valona was an exclusively Austrian military harbor with the necessary bridgehead on land for defense. "Valona is the Austro-Hungarian Gibraltar," Conrad accurately formulates his wishes.

Military interests on land lie in the fact that Albania: 1) will take over part of the forces of Chernogorip and Serbia; 2) can put up a good independent army. It is necessary to watch carefully so that the Italian influence in Albania does not prevail.

The commercial interests of the monarchy in Albania, Konrad does not undertake to blame, considering himself insufficiently competent in his mouth, but nevertheless points out that it would be a great loss for Austrian trade if the Serbs received their harbor on the Adriatic Sea and, thus, import and export goods on their own.

The general political interests of Austria-Hungary in Albania will depend on the policy towards Serbia and Montenegro: whether it will be friendly or will be reduced to the defeat of both states.

In the future, Konrad considers these two roads and comes to the conclusion that a hostile politiba in relation to Serbia and Chernoyuria will aggravate the internal polity of the monarchy and can lead him to war with Russia. The defense of Austrian interests in Albania might also lead to an armed clash with Italy, but it would be much easier and more promising than a war with Russia and the Balkan states.

If Austria takes the path of war with Russia and the Balkan states, then the active assistance of Germany and Rumania, the neutrality of Bomaria and either the active assistance of Italy, or at least her neutrality, are necessary.

Having then considered military preparations for a clash with Russia and

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Laying down a number of measures that need to be carried out, Conrad comes to the conclusion that it is much more profitable to secure dominance in Albania without getting involved into war with Russia and the Balkan states, and defeat Italy, if need be. If the situation leads to war with Russia, then it is necessary: 1) to consolidate allied ties, 2) to intensify preparations for a war, and 3) to prepare the Albanians for an armed uprising: against Serbia and Montenegro, supplying them with weapons, money, artillery, etc. . d.

Summing up, as usual, the results of his report, Konrad again notes all the importance for the monarchy of the Balkan problem and expresses the idea that it would be very good to tie the hands of Russia and Asia, that we ourselves, on the contrary, should have them untied in the Balkans and northeastern borders. .

Thus, the Albanian question, exacerbated by the occupation of the harbor in Duradzo by the Serbs, was the most relevant at the present time for the policy of Vienna and attracted the attention of the "private diplomat" Konrad, pen

which ran with excitement over the paper, Fixing the thoughts and thoughts of the imperialist from the banks of the Dupay.

Meanwhile, in the theater of war, the Bulgarians were stopped by the Turks at Chataldza positions, the Serbs occupied the Monastery, and the Greeks a number of islands in the Aegean Sea.

On November 19, 1912, Konrad writes a new note and begins it with the words of Moltke: "First weigh, and then decide," citing them as confirmation that irrevocable decisions must be made.

Pointing out that if, in general, it is possible to end Serbia peacefully, then one should take this path, Konrad, however, immediately notes that the current position of Serbia excludes the RTO, threatens the prestige of the monarchy and its political and economic interests, by forcing Austria will come to arms.

In these aspects, Konrad finds it necessary: 1) all the proposals that he developed in 1908-1909. in the event of a war with Serbia, implement and 2) begin to implement the military measures drawn up by him in the event of a war with Russia and indicated in the second addendum to his first note.

Then it is necessary to send a note verbale in which to list all the misdeeds of the Balkan states, not only against Austria, but also against other European states in general, and declare that the monarchy is forced to take up arms.

At the same time, Conrad warns that the monarchy must clearly realize that its military campaign against Serbia is very likely to capture the whole of Europe, that as a result of this speech, a great economic shock will blow, that the war will affect not only the monarchy, but all of Europe.

If Serbia, after the note verbale, continues to retreat from its position, then Austria can wage war at will.

The note verbale should be sent at a favorable moment, and as soon as any of the states begins to mobilize, they must immediately mobilize themselves, in order to start a war on their own initiative.

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Konrad ends the note by indicating that if in 1908-1909. If his proposal for a war with Serbia was accepted, then the situation would now be different.

Sending this note to Berchtold, Konrad accompanied it with a letter, 'in which he assures the minister that he is far from fanfare, inciting, etc. aspirations, and that for him it is more important than all deeds, and not empty words, which is confirmed by various 10c4 gift eagles. These feelings are stupefying Konrad now, and he draws Berchtold's attention to the fact that monarchies, if creations are to develop further, there is nothing left but to put everything on the map. The current difficult stalemate, according to Konrad, is a consequence of the erroneous politibi Erenthal.

Confirming that he is far from being a Puvunist, Conrad now in his memoirs feeds on press articles full of chauvinistic attacks - articles that, according to him, were inspired by the heir.

The political talents of the former chief of the general staff were duly appreciated by the supreme power, and at the end of November he went to Bucharest on a special military and, in part, political mission. We will not talk about this trip of Conrad for the time being, but will continue his reasoning upon his return from Romania.

On December 3, 1912, after an unsuccessful attack on the Chataldzha positions, the Bulgarians signed a truce. Serbia, having completed the actual military operations against the Turks, began the return transportation of its mobilized army into the country.

The danger of a Serbian concentration on the Austrian border forces Konrad to submit a new note on December 6, 1912, in which he adds this danger from the Serbs, adding that no more than three weeks remain before the conclusion of peace, and that if it is decided to use weapons to influence the Serbs, then you need to prepare for this now. Everything costs money, but "wasting time would be a grave mistake," Conrad concludes.

Without officially interfering in the affairs of the General Staff, Konrad lived his life and continued the work of the chief of staff, as he would have led before. The "notes" we have cited and the "additions" to them compiled by Konrad were nothing more than a prelude to his future activities again as chief of the general staff of the Danubian Empire.

Having failed in his project of a "great" Balkan union, Konrad still does not lose hope of bringing Serbia into the bosom of the Habsburg empire by peaceful means; if she refused this so flattering offer, then by force of arms she would have to be forced to fulfill the predestinations of history. In any case, Serbia should not receive any port on the Adriatic coast, and Albania should be autonomous under the protectorate of Vienna. The member of the Privy Council is aware of the potential for European complications and recommends a number of political measures. So, for example, it is desirable to keep Russia from coming out by beckoning her again with the straits, knowing in advance that England will be against him. In any case, a European war is too much for Austria, and diplomacy should not lead to it. Conrad also throws away the paths that must be followed.

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to become a politician by starting preparations for a war with Serbia by sending a verbal note.

We do not know to what extent the Viennese diplomacy and supreme power accepted Conrad's advice and suggestions, but subsequent events show that some of the documents were unconditionally used by Berchtold.

The policy of Vienna took on a "mysterious" character, as it was characterized in St. Petersburg and Paris, but nevertheless Berchtold openly and firmly pointed out that Austria-Hungary could not agree to the provision of a port to Serbia,

and at the same time put forward the project of an autonomous Albania.

Vienna did not refuse to take part in the London conference of the 1940s, but rejected in advance the principle of disinterest in the division of the Turkish inheritance.

At the same time, a law was passed in Austria-Hungary on a two-year term of military service, a law on increasing the contingent, and higher credits were issued for the army than last year. A partial mobilization of troops was carried out on the southern border and against Russia.

All this again marked the determination of Vienna to support its demands with weapons.

We know from Conrad's documents that the main resistance in Vienna was expected from Russia.

We heard how the Viennese imperialist was thinking "day and night" about the difficult political situation that had arisen for Austria and the sorrows of her future.

A few hundred miles away, in Paris, another imperialist, the Russian ambassador Izvolsky, was suffering from insomnia, who saw an impending crisis fraught with consequences.

A week before Conrad's letter to Berchtold, with the forwarding of a "note" in which he reported on his thoughts about the political situation, Izvolsky wrote to Sazonov on October 23, 1912:

"Day and night thinking about the various accidents that may occur, I involuntarily dwell on the following three possibilities: a decisive victory for the Balkan states; the same victory for Turkey; prolongation of hostilities and, as a result of it, riots and massacres of Christians in Constantinople or in other parts of the empire. |

The first of these possibilities, the least probable, it seems to me, would be at the same time the most fraught with dire consequences for the establishment of universal peace; it would immediately put forward, in all its historical growth, the question of the struggle of the Slavs not only with Islam, but also with Germanism. In this case, one can hardly hope for any palliative means and one should prepare for a great and decisive common European war.

"Somewhat less dangerous from a pan-European point of view, but a decisive victory for Turkey would be extremely painful for us. Such a victory will cause a strong excitement in our public opinion and impose on us a moral obligation to come to the aid of the Slavic states. On this occasion, I cannot help but recall that when, during my administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the military convention with Bulgaria that did not take place at that time was discussed (I don't know if it took place subsequently),

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The Bulgarians declared that in the event of a war with Turkey alone, they do not require any other help from us, except for the mobilization of the Caucasian Military District. I also recall that at the end of 1906 or at the beginning of 1907 the then Chief of the General Staff, General Palidin, on his own

almost started a war with Turkey on our Caucasian border. He naively thought that such a "little war" could remain localized. With the help of the late Stolypin, I abruptly stopped these encroachments, and my main argument was the indication that any clash between us and Turkey, even if only on the Caucasian border, would immediately be a signal for the action of the Balkan states against Turkey. Now this argument is no longer valid, and it seems to me that it is necessary now to foresee that events may force us to resort to the aforementioned comparatively safe and at the same time effective means of pressure on Turkey.

At his own risk and fear, Izvolsky started talking about this with Poincaré, frightening him first by proposing an isolated action by Russia, and then, proving that no harm would come from this, not only calmed the interlocutor, but even aroused his interest.

As for the "prolongation of hostilities", Izvolsky considered this case "particularly favorable for the collective mediation of the powers", believing that he would probably save Russia "from the need for sole active intervention."

The latter smiled least of all on the leader of Russian politics, Sazonov, and therefore he quickly agreed to the Khravdud proposal to convene a conference of ambassadors in London and to the program of this conference outlined by Poincaré.

On October 20, Sazonov, in a circular dispatch, giving instructions to the ambassadors, indicated: "In our opinion, the intervention of the powers in the war can be successful only if it is relentless."

"The general interest in the preservation of the security of Constantinople requires the retention of a defensive zone under the real sovereignty of the Sultan. The zone is determined by the line already known to you from the mouth of the Maritsa, including Adrianople, to the Black Sea.

"The rest of European Turkey, on the basis of the rights of actual possession, is subject, in our opinion, to an amicable division between the allies"...

"In principle, we recognize the possibility of forming a coastal Azbanian autonomy under the sovereignty of the Sultan, and the need to satisfy Serbia's desire for access to the Adriatic Sea cannot be overlooked."

"Between Bulgaria and Romania, on the basis of an agreement, a correction of the Granida should be established in order to give the latter just satisfaction for her loyal course of action during the war ... We would fully allow the possibility, by agreement between Austria and Serbia, of establishing some guarantees for the free transit of Austrian goods through the territory newly annexed by Serbia.

Such were the desires of St. Petersburg.

Among them, of course, the first place was occupied by concern for Constantinople:

as long as it does not fall into the hands of the Bulgarians. Without raising the question as a whole at the present time, Sazonov secretly again raised the problem of the straits for resolution.

Izvol'sky's talk about the possibility of an isolated action by Russia, the statements of the Austrian ambassador in Paris about the categorical refusal of Vienna to provide the Serbs with a port on the Adriatic coast, the available information that Italy will support Austria-Hungary in this demand, worried Poincaré. Germany's attempts to separately negotiate with France and England on Balkan affairs, and then to act as a united front against Russia, were so serious that the Balkan question as a whole was put by Poincaré for discussion by the Council of Ministers.

The decision of the Council of Ministers was that the territorial "seizure of Austria affects the pan-European balance, and therefore also France's own interests."

On November 6, informing Sazonov about this, and also about the fact that England was putting forward a project "to neutralize and internationalize Constantinople," Izvol'sky asked for instructions.

Simultaneously with the proposal of a joint discussion of the Balkan question in Paris and London, Germany also took steps in St. Petersburg, with the intention of influencing Russian diplomacy by the method of 1909. However, this time Pourtales received a rebuff from Sazonov and a warning not to repeat the story with the ultimatum, since now this could lead to war.

Sazonov was ready to go with England and France in the fight against the triple alliance, but still did not want to bind himself completely, especially on the question of the straits.

Pointing out to Izvol'sky the desirability of obtaining confidence that in the event of the necessary intervention from Russia, France would not remain indifferent, Sazonov wrote:

"On the other hand, since, in view of the rapidly changing situation in the Balkans, it is difficult to foresee all possible contingencies that could require us to take certain actions to ensure our vital interests, I would consider it necessary to carefully avoid in our negotiations with foreign cabinets everything that could come later! be embarrassing for us. From this point of view, it would seem to me desirable to avoid too positive statements in your proposed written address to Mr. Poincaré, such as those suggested by the words of the Minister of France: "he is hostile to any seizure of Turkish territory by any great power." zhavai" — since this could also apply to Russia in the region of the straits",

We have seen how Konrad advised Berchtold to offer Russia, in the form of compensation for her neutrality in the war between Vienna and Serbia, the settlement of the question of the straits. Thus, Russia's attraction to the straits was not a secret even for the opposing side. Poincaré, through his ambassador, probed the soil with Sazonov as to how Russia would react to raising the question of the straits in the event of any demands from the Bulgarians on this issue. Izvol'sky thought about the straits "day and night," but they did not let Sazonov sleep, and, as we shall see below, to some others.

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However, Sazonov, realizing that this question was insufficiently prepared to solve it not only by means of guarantees, but also by real force, which could create a new situation, refused to put the question of the straits up for discussion. Moreover, he did not want to bind Russia with them in protecting the interests of the warring states. If we take into account that the Chataldza positions put a limit to the offensive of the allies, that is, the straits were out of danger of being captured by the Bulgarians, then the wait-and-see position that was taken by Russian diplomacy in this matter becomes reversed.

Sazonov with great restraint rejected the proposal of the Vienna Cabinet (perhaps following the instructions of Konrad) for freedom of action in Constantinople to give Austria-Hungary complete freedom in the western part of the Balkans.

We cannot go into the history of the question of the straits in detail, but we consider it necessary to note it from a side that is interesting to us.

"5(a \$ 4io" did not suit either Austria or its main opponent. Stop recalling how in Vienna the chief of the general staff, who was a preacher of a "preventive" war, rebelled against this principle. In Rosspi, the role of such an "advisor" to the Ministry of itself not a "land" general staff, but a "naval" - the second "iatron" of these armed states, generally inclined to create foreign policy to a much greater extent than its counterpart on land. Tsushima belittled the Russian Navy, its authority in the eyes not only society, but also the ruling circles of the state was undermined. Cautiously, gradually creeping into confidence, the Naval General Headquarters began to carry out its programs for the expansion of the Fleet, the need for which, of course, could only be justified by major political tasks, to solve which Russia needed naval power.

The straits turned out to be a trump card with which the naval general staff could play, and the outbreak of the Balkan war increased its importance in the political game.

"Opening the straits" was a "historic" task for Russia, which the Naval General Headquarters now insistently urged to solve, going in unison with the hidden desires of Russian politics and finding good in it.

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In the following presentation, we will show the aspirations of the Russian naval general staff in preparation for the "opening of the straits." As for the land general staff, it turned out to be restrained in its aspirations for a close and direct resolution of the issue with Constantinople. Both Sukhomlinov and Danilov, in their memoirs, speak of their critical attitude towards the landing on the banks of the Bosphorus to erect a "cross" on the Ayasophia mosque in Constantinople. In our place, let's get acquainted with their statements textually, and now let's return to the outline of the political course of events in Russia.

According to Russian diplomacy, if the Turks succeeded, the possibility of a "massacre of Christians" in Constantinople was not ruled out, and therefore measures should have been taken! to prevent it. Mary: these could be expressed in sending military ships to the waters of the Bosphorus, and by October 20 two of them had already been sent to Constantinople.

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By October 24, when the Bulgarians were approaching the Chataldzha positions, the concern of Russian diplomacy for the fate of Constantinople so intensified that it turned for "help" to the Minister of the Sea, with the full approval of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The Naval Minister, by telegram, on the night of October 25-26, asked for permission from Nicholas, who was at that time in Snal on a hunt, to send to Constantinople, through direct communication with the Russian ambassador in Turkey, "an unlimited number of warships or even the entire squadron". "From the very beginning, the requested measure, which I agreed to, should have been applied," an urgent telegram from Spala told the Minister of Marine.

A certificate from the Naval General Staff dated October 20 provides explanations for the telegram of the Naval Minister. Pointing to the possibility of sending ships to prevent "the massacre of the Christian population" and "anarchy" in Constantinople, the certificate emphasized the desirability of having "some units with machine guns" on the landing ships and provided for further support for the weak landing force.

"It would be very important to take advantage of the slightest pretext and transfer at least a small detachment to the European coast of the Bosphorus, occupying Buyuk-Dere, if only to ensure the safety of our security detachment in Constantinople and serve as a reserve for it."

"The occupation of the Upper Bosphorus could be delayed for a very long time, and then it would be easier to stay there forever." "The firm occupation of the Upper Bosphorus already half resolves the sore point about the straits."

"If there were no suitable pretext for such a speech, then it would have to be created artificially, bearing in mind the enormous state significance of the Upper Bosphorus for us, if it would not be possible to master all the straits."

As mentioned above, the stop of the Bulgarians in front of the Chataldzha positions changed the anxious mood of Russian diplomacy to a calmer one, and the question of the straits was postponed indefinitely.

But this is not how the naval general staff thought about the mouth ...

On November 25, 1912, the head of the 9th operational department of the headquarters, Nemip, submits an explanatory note, which was intended to analyze "the question of Russia's political tasks in eliminating the Slavic-Turkish war from a naval point of view."

Beginning with the proof of the "economic" importance for Russia of the opening of the straits, Nemits says that the existing "political situation is highly disadvantageous and as humiliating as no industrial country would suffer." "Being a great country and becoming an industrial country, sooner or later Russia is forced to change this situation: to ensure for itself, unconditionally and for all time, the freedom of trade navigation through the now Turkish straits."

Pointing out that one should not be carried away by the interests of the Slavic states, that "the big political question of the Turkish straits has also become the turn of the resolution - the question for us is not a common Slavic, but a purely Russian one," Nemits formulates the task in this way: Russia time is needed

to take possession of both, now Turkish, straits - the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. This one is final. political goal of Russia in the south of Europe, unchanged,

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right up to mastering them, a "political object" for all the strategic efforts of Russia in the southern seas.

If it is impossible to resolve this issue "now", then, according to Nemid, "everything that in the future will facilitate Russia's mastery of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and can be acquired through diplomacy is now desirable to acquire."

In the future, Nemits analyzes three possible forms of resolving the issue and puts forward military demands for the free navigation of Russian warships in the straits, the right to equip strong points for the Russian Navy, without fortifying the straits with Turkey, etc.

If the mastery of the Upper Bosphorus provokes a retaliatory step by other European powers with the intention of also capturing some part of the coast in the straits or at the exit from them, then, according to Nemirp, "it is better not to raise the question of mastering the Upper Bosphorus at all." On the European coast, it is desirable that Turkey retain the territory up to Chataldzhi, as well as the preservation of the islands of Lemnos and Tepeiros, and Imbros can be given to Greece, but without the right to fortify it.

On the same day, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Lieven, submitted a report to the Minister of the Navy, in a copy communicated, by order of the latter, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The report largely repeats Nemipa's note and proves, first of all, the great economic importance of the straits for Russia.

For complete dominance over sea routes, according to Lieven, it is necessary to master not only the water space, but also the territory surrounding it. "So, for a complete and final solution of the problem of ensuring a free exit from the Black Sea, we need to add to the state not only Asia Minor and the Balkan Peninsula, but also all the islands of the Greek archipelago, not excluding Crete, under the condition of dominating the Black Sea. Aegean seas by means of a first-class Fleet. "Frightened by such plans himself, Lieven immediately makes the reservation: "Such an exhaustive solution of the problem is obviously beyond our strength now, and it is unlikely that it will turn out to be feasible for Russia alone in the future."...

Lieven is not afraid of the "neutralization" of the straits and does not advise "to be afraid of international guardianship", since "the acquisition of Asia Minor and the Balkan Peninsula" is "such a spontaneous upheaval that presupposes the development of enormous power, before which, obviously, any international agreement will face powerless."

With a strong Fleet, Lieven finds it unnecessary to seize the Upper Bosphorus, as this may cause the necessary concessions to other powers.

In the subsequent correspondence with Sazonov about the cession of the islands of the Archipelago to Greece, the Naval General Staff is finally inclined to think that from the point of view of the interests of the Russian Navy, it is desirable to keep

the islands of the Aegean in general are in the hands of a weak power, since their passing into the hands of a strong one may in the future be a threat to our fleet; the transfer of the islands into the hands of Austria is especially undesirable.”

Thus, the solution of the problem of the straits was precarious at this time.

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Sazonov and the Naval General Headquarters, but such permission, obviously, could be achieved so far only through diplomacy, and not by force, which had no special price. In view of this, Russian diplomacy, to the surprise of many states, reacted very reservedly to the immediate resolution of the question of the straits.

Refusing to resolve the "Russian" question, Sazonov made concessions on the "all-Slavic" question.

True, the Russian minister, summoned by Nikolai at the end of October to Spala, where he was hunting along with the great Kiyaz Nikolai and other generals, received, according to Buchanan, instructions to support the Slavic states, even if this involved Russia in an armed conflict.

Sazonov tried to do this, but, as indicated above, in addition to diplomatic support, one could not expect another from England and even France, and Germany again tried to make a "test of strength". The Russian Foreign Minister was forced to change his point of view on the question of Serbia's right to a port in the Adriatic Sea. In early December, Sazonov pointed out that it was only necessary to provide Serbia with access to the sea, but without transferring ownership of a section of the coastal strip to it, stipulating for it the right to free and duty-free transportation of goods, both commercial and military. Russia yielded in the second important issue as well. A categorical instruction about this was also given to Belgrade.

"Regardless of what caused the peace-loving direction of politics at the end of the year: whether it was the advice of the ministers, or the fear of an outbreak of the revolutionary movement in the clash of the Russian army with a serious enemy, it came in handy," writes the British ambassador. Buchanan.

For whom it was "by the way," the ambassador does not explain this. An examination of the attitude of other cabinets towards the Balkan question will make this clear to us.

"Very recently," writes Izvolsky on December 18, "the government of the Khronpuza and the local press were rather inclined to accuse us of inciting the Serbs, and the dominant note was the phrase: Frandia does not want war because of the Serbian port."

"Now," Izvolsky continues, "here, with bewilderment and disguised apprehension, they regard our seeming indifference to the act of Austrian mobilization. These fears are expressed not only by the French ministers in conversations with me and with our military agent, but also penetrate into the general public and into newspapers of the most varied shades; they are so strong in the French General Staff that, as stated in my telegram No. 4%5, the Minister of War considered it necessary to draw the attention of Poincaré to this, who showed me M.

The telegram of Mr. Georges Louis, transmitting the answer received by General Laguiche from our General Headquarters, did not in the least dispel the bewilderment of the French; I was shown the text of the oral telegram, according to which Lagish was told not only that the Austrian armaments are attached to a purely defensive significance in our country, but that even in the extremely improbable case of the fall of Austria into Serbia, Russia will not fight. Like

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The answer plunged Poincaré and all the Khran-Puz ministers into extreme astonishment. According to all information received here, Austria is currently completing the full mobilization of ten corps, with some of the mobilized troops demonstratively deployed against Russia; This mobilization places a heavy burden on the already disorganized finances of Austria, and therefore one can expect some categorical statement from the Austrian cabinet any day now. This speech, as they think here, can provoke a rebuff from Russia, and the second, in turn, will automatically and inevitably involve first Germany and then France in the war. The French government regards such a possibility quite calmly, consciously and with firm determination to fulfill its allied obligations. All necessary measures have been taken on his part; mobilization on eastern border checked; the material part is in full readiness, etc. And just at that moment France, as it were, is faced with a completely different attitude to the situation on the part of her ally, who, it would seem, is most interested in it. The conclusion is drawn from this - either that we are not aware of the warlike intentions of Austria, or that, for some special reason, we do not want to talk to France at the present moment.

Izvol'sky reports that it is necessary not only to create "the mood that is desirable for us" among the government and political circles, but also "to act with all our might on the press." Izvol'sky is pleased with his work and admits that the "distribution of subsidies" "with the participation of French ministers" to newspapers (distributed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance) "is quite expedient and has already had the proper effect ... Grach Berchtold and the Austrian ambassador in Paris complained several times M. Poincaré for this campaign."

In conclusion, the ambassador reported: "In recent days, I have no longer had to fight with the notion that France could be drawn into the war because of interests alien to her, but rather with the fear that we are too passive about a question that affects the position and prestige of all three - stvenny union "(i.e. Entente. - 6. Sh.).

Based on the above correspondence between Izvol'sky and Sazonov, one could make a definite judgment about the position of Frandia in the first Balkan war.

However, the one whom Izvol'sky recommended as the most faithful friend of Russia, as the person most needed for parism, as a Figure who, sitting on the presidential chair, gave Russian diplomacy confidence for at least seven years that her deeds in Chariz would be perceived be taken in the same way as in St. Petersburg, the one who "expressed with emotion his deep gratitude for conferring the royal order on him," Poincaré, in his book The Origin of the World War, casts doubt on the validity of the documents we have cited.

"France showed from the very beginning of the Balkan crisis," he writes / "impartiality and independence in judgment and never blindly followed Russian proposals, doing, on the contrary, everything to carry out friendly mediation between Austria and Russia. Useless I guess

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refute the information that appeared in the Moscow Bolshevik press and which Germany reproduced in one of its white books. This applies to just those dokumengov, which we announced.

It turns out that even on the eve of the crisis, according to Poincaré, "the constant thought of the French government was not only to strengthen the European concert, but also to prevent that among the powers. the tripartite consensus group opposed the tripartite group

union."

Torn to pieces just to keep the peace, the "unfortunate" Poincaré nevertheless succeeded and now says: "I consider myself entitled to say that from September 1912 to January 1913 not a single day passed when I did not lead lengthy negotiations not only with the ambassadors of Russia and England, but also with the ambassadors of Germany and Austria. At the end, conps. I have achieved great mutual trust in relations with these latter".

In a word, Puncaré assures us, France was filled with ultra-peaceful aspirations, and if anyone pushed her onto the path of armaments, preparations for a world battle, it was Germany and Austria; The mouths of the states, "having had the opportunity to hold on to the Balkan states, were not outraged when hostilities were declared." Not only that: "at the London conference, the Vienna and Berlin cabinets are active. zealously sought to inspire Europe with solutions favorable to their own interests and contrary to the wishes of the Balkan states." The triple alliance was renewed ahead of schedule in December 1912. A few weeks earlier the German General Staff, led by Moltke and Ludendorff, had taken the new military measures which he considered necessary, he said, to secure to Germany "the influence which she ought to have in world affairs."

Only after Germany had taken upon itself such a terrible initiative, continues Poincaré, Briand, President of the Council of Ministers, and after him his successor Barthou, in full agreement with the Minister of War Etienne, first proposed, and the second defended in Parliament, a law, establishing in Francia a three-year term of office. This law was considered by the leaders of our army, in the face of the threat of armaments from Germany, as an imperative duty for our national security.

So, a picto other than the ill-fated Ludendorch, and with him the German General Staff, were the culprits of the impending storm.

And Izvolsky?! It turns out that this ungrateful man wrote some letters to Sazonov, filled with fantasy, outlining the intentions of the French government in a false form. The Russian ambassador fantasized, but ... the terrible Bolsheviks published his nonsense, passing it off as "documents" and are now disturbing the peace of both Poincaré and France...

We will not go into lengthy discussions about the veracity of Poincaré's own refutations, which are an ordinary subjective treatise on the perpetrators of the imperialist war, full of self-justifications. Let us bring to the attention of the leafing through our work only the following.

On February 1, 1913, an Austrian military agent in Paris writes to Konrad about the position of the Frappuzian press, whose hostile character towards the monarchy he had often described earlier in his reports.

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"The mood of the French press during its crisis," writes the agent, "did not change at all, and all the efforts of the embassy to exert influence in order to stop the ongoing attacks, at least against the highest Os06, had no success."

The reasons for such a hostile attitude of the press lie in its sympathy for the policy of Russia, which is recognized as peace-loving and which Austria with its aggressive policy, with the oppression of the Slavs, is getting in the way. "Austria-Hungary is a state," according to the French press, "where the impudent German government and the "military party" armed the enslaved Slavs © in order to throw them into a fratricidal battle with their fellow tribesmen."

"The French press," concludes the agent, "is Russian, that is, it works for Russian money... Public opinion here, as elsewhere, is venal, and Russia knows that the money given to cultivate it will bring good interest."

We do not think that Izvolsky conspired with an Austrian military agent, giving a description of the French press, and now it is published not by the Bolsheviki, but by the chief of the Austrian general staff, and not in Moscow, but in Vienna.

What Poincaré says about this is a matter of indifference to us, but, for our part, we must note that the position of France, or rather, her government, was far from peaceful tendencies ...

On the contrary, we find quite a fair assessment of the policy of France, which was given in his report by the Russian ambassador in London on February 25, 1913. "All powers," he wrote, "really strive for peace, and only France would accept war with the greatest firmness of spirit."

If we recall, the military circles of France found the strategic situation at the end of 1912 favorable for a tripartite agreement. Poincaré and the entire Council of Ministers of France agreed with them, surprised at Russia's compliance.

The reasons for such compliance must be sought in the behavior of the third member of the tripartite accord - England, which, even before the start of the Balkan war, turned out to be very stingy with various promises of support, and Buchanan, her ambassador in St. Petersburg, constantly conveyed "advice about moderation."

Both the Russian ambassador in London and the Serbian ambassador in Berlin testify in agreement that England will not go to war because of the provision of a port to Serbia, because "public opinion" will never agree to such a war.

On December 5, 1912, Izvolsky reported: "From the beginning of the present crisis, Mr. Poincaré did not cease, at every possible opportunity, to call the London cabinet for confidential conversations in order to find out the position that would be occupied by England in the event of a general European conflict. The British side has not yet made any commitments in this regard. The London Cabinet invariably answers that it will depend on the circumstances and that the question of peace or war will be decided by public opinion. On the other hand, between the Khranpuz and British general staffs, discussion of all possible accidents has not only ceased, but the existing military and naval

agreements

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have recently been even more developed, so that at the present moment the Anglo-French military convention has the same complete and exhaustive character as the same guardian-Russian convention; the only difference is that the first bears the signatures of the chiefs of both staffs only and is therefore not binding on the governments. Recently, the Chief of the British General Staff, General Wilson, came to France under the strictest secrecy, and on this occasion various additional details were worked out, and, apparently, for the first time, not only the military, but also other representatives of the scrawny fellow took part in this work. government."

Buchanan writes in his memoirs: "Sazonov repeatedly pointed out in our conversations during the Balkan crisis that Germany and Austria were allies, while England and Russia were only friends. Russia, he assured, was not afraid of Austria, but she must at the same time reckon with Germany. If Hermapia supports Austria, then France will take the side of Russia, but no one knows what England will do.

This uncertainty in our position," the diplomat explains frankly, "was prompting Germany to aggravate the situation."

It is known from Sazonov's report that Germany was afraid of being drawn into a European war because of the Balkans. We also know that Berlin made attempts to negotiate separately with England and France, and then Pourtales repeated his "test of strength" on the model of 1909, but met with a sharp rebuff from Sazonov.

The former Serbian ambassador in Berlin, Bogajević, testifies with a clear conscience that already in October 1912, the main goal of Germany at the end of the Balkan war was to maintain peace in Europe.

In a conversation with him in November 2020, Kiderlen-Wächter, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, expressed the opinion that the Balkan war was only the first stage of a grandiose Russian plan to establish Slavic hegemony in the Balkans, and the whole policy of Serbia in the Adriatic issue was the work of Russia. Austria can hardly put up with Serbia's provocative outbursts for long, and relations between these states are becoming more and more aggravated.

In the opinion of Kiderlen, expressed by him later, it is hardly possible to maintain a European peace at all, since Germany does not believe in the sincerity of France's policy. He hopes that each of the statesmen

The Triple Entente still recognizes its responsibility for the decision to break the peace, for it must understand the terrible consequences of the European war.

Bogaevich says that with the death of Wiedeler at the end of December 1912, his successor Jagow also pursued peaceful goals and in some cases put pressure on Vienna to such an extent that there, bowing with a sour face, they were forced to follow the advice of an ally.

Bogaevich suggests that if Germany wanted war, then the political and military situation for her at the end of 1912 would be much more favorable than in July-August 1914.

Berlin itself thought differently about it. The Russian ambassador in Berlin, Sverbeev, in his letter dated January 17/30, 1913 to Sazonov, described

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Berlin moods: "The more I look and listen here, the more I come to the conclusion that in Berlin they want to avoid war at all costs, and that in Vienna this, in all likelihood, was made clear. The other day, I was informed in a confidential manner that during the stay of the Eri-Herpog Franz-Ferdinand, the question of the possibility of a military clash with Russia and France was discussed and that the German government expressed, as if, in this case, the conviction that a favorable the outcome of this struggle is now extremely doubtful in view of the military training that has been observed in Russia in recent years. On the other hand, the French army, according to the Franco-call themselves, has not been at its current height for a long time. As for England, Germany is apparently far from certain of her neutrality.

"Knowing clearly all this and knowing also that the war © by Austria and Germany at the present moment would be met with enthusiasm not only by the public opinion of Russia, but even in France itself," Sverbeev ends the letter, "the German government willy-nilly one has to think about it, all the more so since even in the event of its final success, German trade would be in danger of complete ruin if England participated in the war. Nevertheless, I consider it my duty to testify that, concerned about the possibility of strengthening the Balkan alliance with Russia at the head, Germany stands fully armed in order to oppose the unity of the Slavs with an equally unanimous rebuff from solid Germanism.

Indeed, in November a new law was passed in Germany to increase the army, a capol in the Reichstag delivered a belligerent speech, giving an assurance of Austria's support, and at the same time negotiations were underway for the neutrality of England in the event of a European war.

Finally, in December, the chief of the German General Staff presented the report that so excited Poincaré. Hardly, of course; It is possible to pass over this document without examining it, which is why we turn to the work of the German General Staff.

We heard from Poincaré that at the end of 1912 Germany was responsible for the aggressive policy in Euron, while the general staff and, in particular, the head of its operational department, Ludendorch, fanned the Torch of War.

This man, whose name is now known to everyone, already in those days turned out to be such a dangerous figure for the European world that they were interested in him. politicians not only in their own country, but also abroad. True, the first steps on the ladder of popularity for the colonel of the general staff were rather unsuccessful, because they were smothered by the fact that they had to slip from the large general staff to the modest post of commander of an infantry brigade. We have already spoken about this and would not repeat ourselves if it were not for the importance that even now is attached to the report of the Chief of the General Staff of Germany of December 12, 1912 on the increase in the army, the author of which was Ludendorff.

We know that Moltke himself was thinking about the future of Germany, when the "Balkan dogs" would begin to bark. The young Ludendorff was also seized by these thoughts, writing a report in the quiet of the office with the

idea of strengthening the army.

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The first part of Moltke's report deals with the military situation in Germany.

"An armed clash between two great military powers, thanks to mutual treaties, will cause a general European war," - this is how the chief of the general staff began his report.

Then the author of the report considers which states will oppose each other, and says that "against the forces of the triple agreement, the triple alliance has the entire German army and Navy, and also, with appropriate exceptions, the land and sea forces of Austria-Hungary, Italy and Romania".

Pointing out that Austria will be forced to allocate part of the forces against Serbia, Romania - against Bulgaria, and Italy is tied "in a direction that has nothing to do with the major political goals of the tripartite alliance," the author of the report suggests taking this into account when calculating forces.

"At the present time, the triple alliance is indisputably a reliable alliance of states of very great political importance," the report says, and further considers the forces that the allies can put up and actually deploy.

Austria-Hungary, if only for the sake of its own existence, will put all its forces against Russia, since they will not be diverted by one or another Balkan state"; against Italy, as a result of the coming rapprochement on the Albanian question, Austria can leave nothing.

"The reason for Italy's participation in the war will not be the struggle for existence, as for Germany and Austria, but exclusively assumed by it, by virtue of existing treaties, obligations. Therefore, naturally, it will hardly be possible to unconditionally count on the full use of its armed forces. She will follow a cautious course of action, waiting for how the situation develops on the other side of the Alps, in order to be able to avoid unnecessary losses on the way if both of her allies are defeated.

"The foregoing finds confirmation in those conversations that I had

recently with a representative of the Italian General Staff sent here. Italy, under various pretexts, contrary to what we had worked out several years ago, will not send her third army to the upper reaches of the Rhine. Nor does the compiler of the report believe in Austria's long friendship with Italy, since with the solution of the Balkan question the enmity of these states reappears. "Unless," says the report, "the Balkan question is not resolved by a complete victory of Austria, political and moral, it will be a great loss for the tripartite alliance in terms of prestige, but for Austria, in particular, the consequence will be irreparable her weakness. The empire will inevitably undergo an intricate disintegration, which must never be overlooked.

"The triple alliance was concluded as a defensive alliance, and is fraught with all its inherent weaknesses. In the event that any of its constituent states is attacked, both others are obliged to come to its defense; in other words, they, without being attacked themselves, will be released to engage in a war which the flock will very likely neither wish nor understand. Only if the whole people is imbued with the consciousness that the damage of an ally threatens his own

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interests, he will be capable of self-sacrifice, which is now so necessary for any state for the perverse conduct of war, since no one else wants cabinet wars.

"The tripartite accord, just like the tripartite alliance, considers itself a defensive alliance. However, while the latter is really based on defense, the tripartite agreement has strong aggressive tendencies, i.e., positive goals, to which the powers that are part of it will strive.

These goals are listed below.

"Russia is filled with an understandable desire, after the defeat of Austria, to become a nervous Slavic state in Europe and, with the help of Serbin, open its way to the Adrmatic Sea. Austria, out of purely defensive motives, must prevent this.

"France seeks to regain the lost provinces and to give revenge for the defeats of 1870. Germany, on the other hand, wants only to secure her real possessions.

"England is striving, with the help of her allies, to free herself from the nightmare of German world power. Germany does not think of destroying the English Fleet, and in her mouth she pursues only purely defensive matters.

"Thus," concludes the author of the report, "we see aggressive targets on the one hand and defensive ones on the other. And this, in the case of war, gives greater inner strength to the tripartite agreement, compared with that of the tripartite alliance, since the desire for certain goals, or, in other words, the offensive, by its very nature, predetermines in the field of politics , - just as in the conduct of war - the most powerful course of action.

"The essence of the tripartite alliance, not only for the current political tense situation, but also for a fairly long future, can be briefly characterized as follows: the most threatened politically of its three counterparties is Austria, in the military, Germany, the least interested in the political and militarily Italy. In the event of war, there is no doubt that the main burden will fall on the shoulders of Germany surrounded on three sides.

"Despite this," the report says, "we, if we succeed, will form Saziz Bay in such a way that the whole people, as one person, will enthusiastically take up arms, which, in the current situation, allows us to look with confidence at our serious tasks. However, the size of our army, taking into account the size of the able-bodied male population, is far from what the state can provide. That is why her strength is not sufficient to solve the problems that will fall to her lot.

Now Ludendorff accompanies this part of the report on the formulation of the causes of the war with the following note: "General Moltke was concerned about the possibility of premature steps on the part of Austria-Hungary, which would force us to intervene, without that! it concerned our vital interests. In addition, gen. Moltke had a low opinion of our diplomacy, doubting that it would be in place at a critical moment.

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The report further states: "If the political situation does not change, Germany, due to her central position, will be forced to wage war on several Fronts, and we will be forced: to defend on one front in order to act offensively on another."

"An offensive course of action is possible only against France, since here a quick decision can be expected, while an offensive war against Russia will drag on for an indefinite period. However, an offensive against France would require the violation of Belgium's neutrality.

Reporting that in the latter case one will have to deal with the Belgian troops and the expeditionary corps of the English, the author of the report notes that at the same time, "Italian assistance will not go further than diverting the weak French forces on the Alpine frontier."

"In other words, Germany is left to herself, and if so, then there will be no excess in strength."

Turning to a comparison of the figures characterizing the armed forces of both sides, and finding out how much Germany is inferior to its probable opponents, the compiler of the report, however, takes into account the superiority of the German army in artillery over France, the backwardness of Russia in the reorganization of the army, supplies and weapons. France can catch up with Hermapia in preparation, because "the only question is money." As for Russia, "the tripartite alliance now has nothing to fear from an armed clash with it." "But anyone looking ahead must reckon with the fact that, spending huge sums to raise the fortune of her army, Russia will grow stronger every year. Just as Hermapia cannot aspire to surpass England in sea power, she cannot hope to surpass Russia as a land power.

"But, of course," the speaker continues, "again, one cannot fail to use all the means at our disposal in order to keep Germany in the position she has occupied in relation to her neighbors, expecting that the latter will equal us in terms of armed strength and continued to grow even stronger.

Pointing out that the danger threatens the eastern provinces, which may be subject to invasion, and that in order to cover them "it is very important to strengthen our troops here and increase the combat readiness of the fortresses", the author of the report says: "I think that I have sufficiently fully elucidated the need strengthening our armed forces and improving our defenses. This is urgently required by the political situation. Kopechno, the fulfillment of all the listed requirements, which are discussed in more detail in the second part of the report, will cause great personal and property sacrifices on the part of the population, but they are far inferior to those sacrifices that we would have to make if we lost the war.

Having briefly enumerated all the great sacrifices that Germany's neighbors are making in the development of their armed forces, the author of the report repeats again: "Germany must also make sacrifices. The program outlined in the second part of the report, which satisfies the most necessary requirements, must be carried out with full energy, so that Germany, with her own forces, can in the future place at the disposal of the government a force on which it would always be fully armed.

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We will not touch on the second part of the report, as purely technical, because we will return to it in due time.

Here is the report signed by "Von-Moltke", the author of which was Ludendorff, which was then recognized by the Chief of the General Staff himself - the report, the content of which so frightened France and provoked a reciprocal step on her part towards strengthening the readiness of her army.

On the basis of this report, Poincaré now ascribes aggressive tendencies to Germany, while the compilers of the report found the same tendencies in the entire tripartite agreement, in particular in France, and considered the odorona to be the essence of the tripartite alliance. In a word, there was speculation on the "defense" of the state on both sides. This principle was pleasant for politics and was recognized as a correct strategy in the field of foreign relations.

From the cited report we see that Moltke did not place great hopes on the active action of Italy.

Italy pa this time decided to support the tripartite alliance. Having agreed with Vienna on the division of the Sanjak between Serbia and Montenegro, Italy took a sharply negative position in the transfer of the port on the Adriatic Sea to Serbia.

On November 20, Izvolsky reported to Sazonov that the Italian ambassador had declared to Poincare that Italy supported, even armed, Austria on the issue of the Serbian port on the basis of the 1900 treaty, which was concluded before Italy's agreement with France and Russia, and therefore is considered valid.

Poincaré was greatly alarmed by this decision of Rome and, in turn, informed the Italian premier that France would provide armed support to Russia in her war with Austria and Germany.

At the same time, Izvolsky asked Sazonov to let him acquaint Poincaré with the content of the Russo-Italian agreement. Sazonov gave his consent for acquaintance "only personally to Poincaré, from whom," as Sazonov wrote, "we expect a promise to keep silent about this not only in the council of French ministers, but even in front of his closest assistants," and in exchange for a message from Franco-Italian agreement.

On December 5, Izvolsky reported: "The mutual communication took place today, in accordance with your instructions, face to face, in an oral form and without any transmission of any written presentation."

The text of both agreements made it possible for Italy to always interpret them in its favor, and in the event of a clash between Russia and Austria and Germany, according to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Italy would interpret "in a negative way its obligation of neutrality."

"In general, they think here," Izvolsky wrote in another letter, "that neither a tripartite agreement, nor a tripartite alliance can count on the loyalty of Italy, that the Italian government will make every effort to preserve peace, and in case of war it will start with what it takes wait-and-see position and then join the side on which the victory will be. However, according to the military, at the beginning of the campaign, with the current lack of military readiness of Italy on the French border, the fate of the war will be decided before Italy has time to concentrate serious forces of pro-

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against France. Therefore, from a purely military point of view, the Prussian government does not attach paramount importance to the position that Italy will occupy at the start of military events.

The ambiguous policy of Italy so aroused suspicions that on January 3/16, 1913, Sazonov was informed from Paris: "France considers it necessary to be very careful in its contacts with Italy and not confide anything secret to her."

What served to alienate Italy from the tripartite agreement? The answer to this is given by the same Izvolsky in a letter dated February 28 (March 13), 1913, in which, speaking about the last speech in the parliament of the Italian prime minister and the articles that appeared in the Roman press commenting on the delivered speech, he points out that "Trippia is suspected of intending to assert their undivided dominion over the Mediterranean." The prime minister "at the same time deliberately evaded the question of the islands of the Archipelago occupied by Italy and thereby gave reason to think that the Italian government intends to take advantage of the circumstances in order to finally take possession of them." The opinion of the French Foreign Minister on this matter was as follows:

"The implementation of such an intention will meet with vigorous opposition from France and England ... Italy more than ever gravitates towards a tripartite alliance and blindly obeys orders emanating from Berlin."

Today, of course, there can be no doubt that the papionalist circles of Serbia have long cherished the secret idea of joining Bospip and Herzegovina to the Serbian kingdom. However, it was clear that it was impossible to get these provinces by force of arms without the help of Russia. Austria was strong. It was first necessary to strengthen at the expense of the ruling Turkey and prevent the Bulgarians from gaining an advantage in Macedonia.

Bogaevich, the former Serbian envoy in Burlip, in his book "The Causes of War" cites his conversation with the heir Alexander, who said that already at the conclusion of the treaty on the Balkan Federation, Nicholas II told him that soon it would be possible to talk about a war between (Serbia and Austria. In August 1918, the Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pasic, told Bogaevich: "During the first Balkan war, it was possible to conquer Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would lead to a European war, but since I was afraid that we (Serbs?) will then be forced to make big concessions to the Bulgarians in Macedonia, then I wanted to first secure the possession of Macedonia for Serbia, and then move on to the conquest of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Montenegro, in the lead of its government, directed all its efforts towards capturing Scutari in order to include this important city of Albania within its borders, and was not averse to bargaining with the Vepsian diplomats and St. Petersburg, meaning to be on the side of the one who pays the most.

Bulgaria, on the one hand, had not yet reached its goals - Adrianople was stubbornly held by the Turks - and on the other hand, it was not only worried about the upcoming division of Macedonia, but also forced to protect its own territory from possible attempts by the Romanians.

To put an end to the political activities of Koprad in office

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army inspector, and along the way to get acquainted with the policy of Romania, we will briefly consider his trip to Romania. |

The purpose of this mission is to keep Romania as an ally in case of war with Russia, and therefore try to smooth her relations with Bulgaria and achieve a written military agreement with Austria-Hungary.

In mid-November, Conrad was summoned to Frapp-Ferdinand, who suggested that he go to Bucharest under the most innocent pretext of transmitting a personal letter from Frand Joseph to Karl with condolences on the death of some second cousin's grandmother.

Although the trip was chiefly of military importance, it was entrusted not to the chief of the General Staff, so as not to stir up various rumors, but to Konrad.

On November 17, Konrad received the following oral and written instructions from Berchtold:

- 1) Give a letter to Karl from Franpa-Joseh.
- 2) To assure that in the present situation Romanian interests will be supported by Austria-Hungary.

3) Report an interview with Bulgarian Prime Minister Dapev, who assures that Bulgaria wants to conclude a preliminary peace treaty. and it would be good if Rumania were friendly to Bulgaria.

4) Strictly confidentially indicate that it is desirable to renew the dismal alliance (the treaty with Rumania was renewed three years later and ended on July 25, 1913), as well as expressing the hope that the alliance will continue in general and henceforth. |

5) Report Austrian military preparations and try to establish military obligations with Rumania similar to those of Germany, and, if possible, achieve a written agreement.

In a conversation with Charles, it turned out that Romania was not inclined to influence Turkey for a quick end to the war; she is willing to renew the triple alliance, but is skeptical of Italy.

When Koprads turned the conversation to military preparations for a possible war with Russia, Karl pointed to the preparations being made by Romania for this war, about which the chief of the general staff, Averescu, would discuss with Konrad in detail. Konrad learned that 1% of the divisions of all 15 divisions of the army were deployed in the Galati-Byrlat-Nemolossa-Fokshapy area and to the north, against Roman, only the TU Corps was concentrated. On the wish of Koprads to change the concentration more to the north, Karl refused and indicated that the Romanian army in a certain area was concentrated on the 10th day and would launch an offensive from there, having against itself the UP and USH Russian corps and part of the III Caucasian Corps .

To Koprads's proposal to conduct joint preparations for war, similarly to how it is done with Hermapia, and to fix mutual obligations in writing, Karl replied that Konrad would agree on this in detail with Averescu.

Turning to allied obligations, Karl revealed to Konrad that Italy had promised to send Romania, as support, one division, and according to another version, 40,000 people, and since the sea is not free, the transportation of this

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The divispi must be made through Austria. Information about this was received by Charles from the Italian envoy. Konrad turned out to be not oriented in this matter.

Subsequently, the conversation turned to a general political situation, with which Konrad listed to his interlocutor the minimum requirements of Austria: the autonomy of Albania; the exclusion of any possibility of providing a harbor. Serbin on the Adriatic coast; Serbia uses a "free" harbor .. like Hamburg, to which Serbia can build a road. Such. the harbor can be either one of the Dalmatian ports, or Antivari, or, in extreme cases, S. Giovanni di Medua, but, of course, without the right to territorial possession.

Concerning Konrad's statement that Russia can support Serbia in its demands for granting the port ownership and bring the matter to a close. armed conflict, Karl expressed doubts about this, pointing out that barely

whether Russia will start a war.

When Konrad spoke of the solidarity actions of Germany, Austria, and Romania, as well as Bulgaria, in the event of a joint action by Serbia and Russia, Charles replied by pointing out that this fully corresponds to his political goals and the Rumish government is trying to establish friendly relations with Bulgaria, but , of course, with well-known compensation from the side: the latter.

Konrad's conversation with the minister-president, who was concerned that... maybe the king let slip or went too far in his promises, was of a more moderate tone. The minister-president's summary was that in an attack on Austria, Romania would fulfill its allied obligations, but would not provide assistance if Austria was blowing the attacking side.

On November 30, Conrad met with the head of the Romanian. of the General Staff for Military Affairs, which ended with the signing of the developed plan for the deployment of the Romanian army and its closest ones. purposes, which we will discuss in detail in its own place.

On the same day, Konrad again had a conversation with the Minister-President .. who, in response to Konrad's firm statement about the need to show Russia that the triple alliance with arms in hand would protect their rights, tried to convince Konrad that it would be good to put an end to all this . peacefully.

On the same day, Conrad left for Vienna.

Such is the content of Conrad's report, presented to Franz-Josich, Franz-Ferdinand and Berchtold, from whom, in addition, he had a personal report.

Regardless of the report, Konrad petitioned: 1) to give instructions to the ambassador in Bucharest on the conclusion of a military convention; 2) on the acceptance on preferential terms at the Austrian factories of the Romanian order for weapons; 3) to consider the proposal of the head of the department of the Ministry of Trade on the conclusion of a trade agreement with Romania. Heir Coprada handed over a preliminary plan signed by Averescu for the deployment of the Romanian army.

Although Konrad highly regards the results of his trip to Bukha-

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rest, however, by treating it impartially, we must lower its value. Romania, or rather Karl, was on the side of the tripartite alliance, but at the same time she was worried about the Bulgarian border.

Thus, by the end of 1912, Europe again entered a period of crises. The contradictions between the states that have accumulated in recent years have again led them to a European clash. A conference of ambassadors gathered in London to stop the bloodshed in the Balkans, and at the same time to maintain peace in Europe. This was the last attempt by diplomats to agree on common lines of political behavior among states, the last conference before the falling "twilight" of Europe.

The war that broke out in the Balkans gradually died out, and only in some places guns still rattled, reminding that these were not the last peals of a military thunderstorm, but only a temporary respite before new wars, much more bloody than the first Balkans that had just died out. - <what a war.

The forthcoming division of the won booty ...

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CHAPTER UP

KONRAD AGAIN CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF

Appointment of Konrad chief of the general staff. - His! thoughts about a new appointment. — Renewal of the tripartite alliance on December 7, 1912. — Conrad report, December 14, 1912. — Necessity of war with Serbia. — Welcome letter from Berchtold and reply from Konrad. — Evaluation of Konrad's appointment abroad: victory of the military party in Vienna. — Letters from Konrad to Berchtold about the need for war with Serbia and a protest against neutral Albania. — Konrad's instructions to military agents of December 30 on the desirability of war with Serbia. — Konrad is busy with the transfer of a military flotilla from the Danube to Sava. — The unpreparedness of the Austrian army and the protest against this Konrad. — Konrad Berchtold's advice on January 9, 1913 — to find out the position of Germany. - Information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the mood in Berlin. — Conrad's conversations with Italian and Romanian military agents. — Conrad's memoir for 1913. — Necessity of war with Serbia. "Sooner or later, Germany will have to settle the Eastern question with weapons. — Political preparation for war with Serbia. — Correlation between the military forces of the Triple Alliance and the Entente. - Conrad's view of the activities of military agents and his instructions to them. — Correspondence with the Romanian chief of the general staff. — Letter from Konrad to Berchtold dated January 27, 1913: fear of war with Russia and the "gravediggers" of Austria-Hungary. - January 1913 in the political life of Europe. — Letter from Frand-Josef to St. Petersburg dated February 1. "Konrad is busy moving artillery to Zemain. - Konrad on the desired start of the war no earlier than March 1. - Sending weapons to the Albanians and correspondence between Berchtold and Konrad. — Berchtold's assessment of Romania. "Konrad is on the Romanian side. — Exchange of letters with Graniciano. — Correspondence between Konrad and Moltke in February 1913. - "The fate of Austria will be decided not on the Bug, but on the Seine" (Moltke). — Moltke for a peaceful settlement of the Austro-Serbian feud: the latter contains no slogans for rousing the German people to war. - Moltke "is also not a politician", but sees in the European war the struggle of Germanism with the Slavs. — The attack must come from the Slavs. - Konrad does not agree with Moltke about directing all forces against Francim. -- "Common" interests require winning the first battle < Russia. — Difficulties in deciding to wage war. — Konrad is against national war. — Letter from a military agent from Berlin about a conversation with Moltke. Wilhelm does not want to wage wars "for the sake of a couple of Albanian cities." — Arrival in Vienna of the Chief of Operations Bureau Montonari and Conrad's conversation with him. - Reports of a military agent from Rome: women's politics. — Reports of a military agent from St. Petersburg on the need to demobilize Austria. Berchtold is against war with Russia. — The peacefulness of Frappets-Ferdinand. - Demobilization of Austria and Russia. — Negotiations on the peace of the Balkan Union with Turkey. — Question about Scutari. — Conrad's proposals for war with Serbia and Montenegro. "War must be waged with all our might, not with half measures" (Konrad). — Germany's restraint and Italy's insistence on the Scutari question. — Franz-Ferdinand's instructions to Konrad not to influence Berchtold and Konrad's response. —

The Shkodra incident and Konrad's proposals. — Departure of warships to Cattaro. - Konrad constantly insists on war with Montenegro, and then with Serbia. - Meeting at Berchtold's on March 24 and the decision to announce private mobilization, - Austria's participation in the international naval demonstration and Konrad's displeasure with this. — His proposals to Berchtold and explanations for

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the last restraint of Vienna. - The question of the island of Corfu and Konrad's indignation at Germany. — Demands made by Konrad of Germany. — Konrad on the brewing Serbo-Bulgarian conflict. - The fall of Scutari on April 23 and a meeting with Berchtold. - On April 26, Franz Posifkh gives permission for private mobilization against Montenegro. — April 29 Berchtold limits the aims of the war. - Konrad's protest and his proposal to go on an independent path. - The Council of Ministers is against sending an ultimatum to Chernogorpi. — Konrad's indignation. — Concessions to Montenegro and their assessment by politicians and Konrad. - The London Treaty for Peace in the Balkans. - The policy of Berlin and the chagrin of Konrad. — Reasons for Italy's intervention in Balkan affairs. — Change of mood in Romania. — Russia on the issue of Scutari. - Russia's fears for Constantinople. - Sazonov on the armaments of Turkey. — Paris's fear of a European war because of Scutari. — Restraint of England.

Upon his return from Bucharest, on December 6, 1912, Konrad received an order to appear on the next day to the heir, and the friendly correspondence of the head of the office spoke of some important decisions that would be made on December 7.

At 09:15 am on December 7, Konrad entered Franz-Ferdinand's working room. The "high person" stood in thought at the table, on which maps of various war plans of the war plan were scattered... . The Serbo-Chernogorski variant, the variant in the event of a war with Russia and the same variant against Italy seemed to be relevant.

Then Franz-Ferdinand, quite unexpectedly for Konrad, said: "I have one more thing to tell you: you will be appointed chief of the general staff again."

Konrad, according to him, was amazed and said that such a quick change of the appointed chief of the general staff only a year ago would be undesirable and undeserved for Shemua (Konrad's deputy in the position of chief of the general staff - B. Sh.). Habeburg pointed out that the main motive for the appointment of Konrad was to call him, as the creator of war plans, in view of its imminent possibility; as for Shemois, he will be moved with honor.

In a word, misfortune struck, and they seized on a man who a year ago had been recognized as harmful to peaceful work. True, this phenomenon is common and encountered on the banks of the Danube alone, and in some places on other rivers.

On the same day, Konrad was twice called to Franz Josich, "graciously" received, received the appointment of chief of the general staff, defended the resignation of his friend, military minister Aufhchenberg,

his appointment as an army inspector.

On December 13, an order was issued for the new appointment of Conrad.

"I returned from the report," writes Konrad, "with a feeling of a heavy burden, heaped again on the mop's shoulders, with a gloomy foreboding that after that. how favorable moments for the manifestation of the initiative were missed, the moparchy found itself in a position in which its fate depended more on the will of its enemies than on its own. "Not a fun picture in the future! › exclaims Konrad.

"Again, fate heavily invaded my life," continues again

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appointed chief of staff, - I reluctantly left my position (army inspector - B.Sh.), with my office occupied only a year ago.

Koprad's new work as chief of the general staff began with an orientation on what had happened during the year of his absence from the general staff, especially in purely military matters, in particular in the condition of the Austro-Hungarian army. We will not go into detail about the course of this orientation, because we have already partly introduced it in the previous chapter.

Koprade points out that he brought his views, expressed in the notes and additions to them submitted to him in October and November 1912, to his new position.

On December 7, another political event took place: the tripartite alliance was renewed, although its term expired only in 1914. The resumption was given the character of publicity and, perhaps, demopstracin.

On December 14, the new chief of the general staff presented a report, beginning with the words: "Having been appointed the chief of the general staff, I consider it my first duty to give myself a clear account of the position in which the monarchy finds itself."

This situation is determined by the contemporary Balkan war.

"Serbia, as an independent state, was and is now the main danger to the monarchy," Konrad concludes.

Proceeding from the fact that the unification of the southern Slavs must inevitably take place, Konrad says that the issue can be resolved either by eliminating these Slavs 6 from the composition of the monarchy at the expense of the independence of Serdia, or, alternatively, by uniting them under the ethos of Serbia at the expense of the monarchy.

In the latter case, the monarchy will lose the south-Slavic regions and almost the entire coast, and together with the loss of prestige, this will reduce the monarchy to the role of a small state.

The situation for the monarchy is no longer worse and will worsen even more every year, because: 1) Serbia is strengthening territorially and militarily; 2) Serb agitation in the southeastern regions of the monarchy will develop more successfully; 3) Russia is getting stronger in the military

otherwise, and 4) in Rumania, the situation may develop in such a way that it calls into question friendly relations with Austria.

"If the monarchy wants to solve a vital issue for it," the chief of the general staff declares categorically, "then it would be most expedient to immediately declare war on the Serbip."

An analysis of the military situation leads Conrad to the conclusion that an attack is to be expected from Serbia, which has an already mobilized army at its disposal, inspired by the successes just achieved against the Turks. If the Serbs had been successful in this, it would have had a great influence on the southern Slavs of the monarchy and on the general political situation. In these types, the butcher of the headquarters proposes: 1) to show 6 initiative on the part of the monarchy in the war and 2) to be completely ready to counter the initiative of Serdia. For the war with Serbia it is necessary now to mobilize forces, secretly concentrate them and take all the necessary measures to prevent an attack by the Serbs.

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To this report, Koprad attaches considerations on the concentration of forces against Serbia and specifically petitions for inclusion in these III corps.

On December 15, 1912, the new chief of the General Staff received a letter of congratulations from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Berchtoll, which began with an expression of the "living joy" with which Berchtold received the news of Konrad's appointment.

"I have no doubt," wrote Berchtold, "that in you I will be the most sincere collaborator in the service in the interests of the dynasty and the fatherland in that difficult time that we are now experiencing."

Konrad immediately answered with gratitude and assured that he was happy that such a responsible ministry as foreign affairs was in the hands of Berchtold and promised, for his part, to do everything for the good of the cause.

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Konrad's first report to Franz Josef, on December 16, touched upon the general political situation. Old Habeburg was aware of the extremely difficult external situation of Austria, but hoped, however, to resolve it by peaceful means.

We noted earlier that in the political situation Konrad was guided not only by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but also by military attachés subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff; his eyes and ears were abroad.

A military agent from Paris, in his report of December 18, reported, among other things, to Coprade the assessment of his appointment by the chief of the general staff, made for the grapipei. It was quite definite: Conrad's arrival on the General Staff was trumpeted as a victory for the military party in Wep. According to the personal recollections of the author of this work, the Russian general staff also looked at the appearance of Konrad in his former role as chief of the general staff as a sign of an imminent war.

Describing the political situation, the military agent recognized the

serious and believed that if Austria fell upon Serbia, then Russia would hardly remain neutral, and then France, Rumania, Italy and Albania would come out, while they were waiting. In short, a world battle threatened to break out, and Germany, according to the observations of the military attaché, was very worried about this.

Another military agent, Sheptytsky, now known from our war with the Poles in 1920, in his role as commander of the front in the Polish army, in reports from Rome, described the position of Italy as officially friendly, on which the state was forced to take up due to military and financial weakness during the Italian-Turkish war.

On December 16, Konrad met with Berchtold and, as is customary to put the most important conversations on paper, on December 23 he sent a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The message began with a formidable indication of the results to which Austria's wait-and-see, purely peaceful policy in the Balkan crisis could lead. "These results were: 1) in the loss of prestige, in the weakened political and economic power of the monarchy; 2) in undermining the allied states' faith in the power of the monarchy; 3) in increasing activity

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opponents, mainly Serbia; 4) in the growth of revolutionary structures in the Serbian regions of the monarchy; 5) in the fall of patriotism among the other nationalities of the state due to the apparent weakness of the monarchies; 6) in the fall of the military spirit and in the loss of faith in one's own strength in the army; 7) in despondency in the official corps; 8) in danger of losing the southeastern regions and the coast; 9) in the loss of the economic well-being of private enterprises and the entire state as a whole due to the ongoing crisis.

"The only way to avoid such a fall," writes Konrad, "is to inflict a military defeat on Serbia, not looking back at the possible consequences of an attack, but on the basis that further passivity leads to the steady fall of the monarchy, while active steps will give just one benefit."

"If the monarchy," Konrad continues, "has not decided to go to war now, it will still have to be waged in the near future under more unfavorable circumstances."

Konrad sees the solution not in achieving one or another advantage in the question of a harbor for Serbia or in the Albanian question, but mainly in making a mess with Serbia. This should make up the main peril for monarchs.

If Austria embarks on a peaceful path, this will lead to the strengthening of Serbia and Montenegro, and therefore in the future it will be necessary to wage a war for three. Fropta.

The threat of an approaching war speaks clearly for the need to develop the armed forces of the monarchy and prepare them for war, and for this, funds must be allocated. In addition, the task of diplomacy should be the isolation of one of the three opponents - Russia, Serbia with allies: or Italy - and keeping Romania in the alliance.

It should be borne in mind, Konrad warns, that if the military power of Serbia is not more magnificently destroyed, then the requirements for material sacrifices from the monarchy will increase.

The reports of military agents on the meetings of the London Conference and on the situation in the Balkans itself forced the Chief of the General Staff on December 24 and 1915 to forward two letters to Berchtold.

In November, he proposes to reach an agreement with Cherpogoria and protests against the proposal put forward by the Austrian ambassador in London to declare Albania a neutral, not an autonomous country. The first was caused by the need to concentrate efforts against the main opponents, and the second gave Konrad hope in the future with an Albanian army of 120-150 thousand people to threaten the rear of Serbia and Montenegro.

On December 26, Berchtold replied to Konrad on both letters. The essence of the answer was that the Viennese diplomats in Montenegro's flirtation saw only her desire to get Scutari, which Vepa could not agree to. As for the neutralization of Albania, Berchtold considered this the first step towards the further independence of this country.

On December 30, Konrad presents a brief report to the heir, anticipating at the beginning of it that, according to the custom of previous years, he draws up a detailed one:

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We will not present this document, because it, in essence, was a repetition of a letter to Berchtold.

The reason that prompted the presentation of this report, apparently, was that Konrad was not sure of Franz-Ferdinand's inclination for war. Rather, it seemed that, under the influence of Berlin, the young Habsburg, who was eager to prepare for the war, nevertheless strove to avoid it.

Despite the fact that Franz-Joseph and Franz-Ferdinand, as well as Berchtold, sought to peacefully get out of a difficult situation, Konrad had an opposite opinion on this issue and, in his orientation to military agents in London and St. Petersburg on December 30, indicated that the inclusion of Scutari to Montenegro, as well as any change in the borders of Albania and the transfer of at least part of its territory into foreign hands are unacceptable to Austria.

"I strictly confidentially inform," Konrad wrote, "that, solely in my personal opinion, an armed clash with Serbia would be the only correct and correct solution to the issue."

On January 2, 1913, the new Chief of the General Staff came to the young Habsburg.

Konrad drew the latter's attention to a significant deterioration in the situation, when one had to reckon not only with the Serbian, but also with the Rumanian danger.

Then Konrad began to insist on the transfer of warships from the Danube to the Sava at this time, in order to ensure a quick passage of the Austrian army across this river in case of war. Berchtold, who did not want to aggravate relations with Serbia, objected to this proposal, despite the protests of the chief of staff.

Francp-Ferdinand took Berchtold's point of view and pointed out the predicament of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. "What should a politician do," said Franz Ferdinand, "if he was told in the council of ministers by Schemois and Aufenberg: the army is not combat-ready, it is worse than in 1866!"

"I hear it today for the first time," Konrad exclaimed.

"Yes," answered Frapp-Ferdinapd, "I am annoyed that I was not in the Council of Ministers, as I would have refuted it."

"The army has not yet been deployed to the desired limits," Konrad continued, "it now has less chance of victory than in 1909, "this is true, but it is also true that only now can we still take risks. "Of course, it is not easy to make this decision, but if the situation requires it, it must be taken so as not to be late."

The question of the transfer of ships to the Sava did not move forward even after the explanations personally given by Konrad to Berchtold on January 9th. The Minister resolutely refused to agree. Along the way, Koprade had to explain to Berkhtold what the mobilization of the army was and how long it would take to complete it, for the minister believed that the army could open hostilities as soon as war was declared.

When the conversation touched on the general situation, Koprade dreamed: "It would be the best if Russia could be defeated, then one could be calm for a hundred years."

"Who knows if Germany will support? the minister doubted.

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"It is necessary to find out," the chief of the general staff taught, "and ask Germany. The year 1909 was the last favorable year, but now perhaps the last opportunity to achieve success is coming. Outlining the situation, Conrad advised: "We must decisively risk war."

"The result of which," replied Berchtold, "will be only the preservation of prestige!?"

"But we will get Serbia too," Konrad objected.

"Yes," continued Berchtold, "but Germany, France, Russia, and... everyone is against us."

"We must now risk war," the military interlocutor insisted, "but first of all I ask you to prevent Rumania from opposing us. The desire to bring things to a big war, it seems to me, does not exist anywhere. Wilhelm is well versed in the situation, but he also restrains himself."

At the end of the conversation, Konrad advised: in the event that, when making peace, it comes to a war between Bulgaria and Serbia, it is imperative

intervene, because then there will be a favorable situation.

The position of Germany thus remained vague, and Conrad was not slow to take steps to clarify it. On the same day, having lunch with the German envoy and discussing Balkan affairs, Conrad declared: tripartite union, - © another. The question is whether the powers of the triple alliance will decide to cut through these contradictions.

In response to the ambassador's remark that "it would be good if Ballilats [Foreign Minister — B.Sh.] asked Berlin by mouth," Conrad replied that he had already raised this question with Berchtold today.

On January 13, Conrad appeared with a personal message to Franpu-Yosikh. Insisting on the need to transfer the ships, the chief of staff asked that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, before reporting military affairs to Franio Joseph, coordinate them with Conrad,

Konrad's advice about clarifying Germany's position was not in vain. On January 17, he was already visited by an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had traveled with his mouth to Berlin and returned from there. The impression was that the Chancellor was trying to avoid war. However, this did not discourage the chief of the general staff, who decided that the chancellor was not Germany and that Viennese diplomacy should strive to reconcile Bolaria with Romania and provoke an infl ite with Serbia. In this case, Russia will quickly step in, and then Germanilus will also intervene.

The Chief of the General Staff gave his views on the current political situation through conversations with military agents of friendly powers.

Conversing twice with an Italian military agent, Conrad persistently tried to find out what kind of song the expeditionary corps was preparing for in Italy. Having received an evasive answer that the landing was apparently intended for Tripoli, Conrad moved on to discussing the situation in the Mediterranean. With a map in hand, the chief of the General Staff seduced the Italian

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the representative of those benefits that Italy acquires; owning Tripoli, Tunisia, Corsica and the Tirenian Sea. Konrad proved that. The Adriatic Sea loses all significance for the Italians, and therefore there can be no misunderstandings with Austria because of it.

On behalf of the emperor, Konrad definitely declared to the Romanian attache that Austria was all the way on the side of Rummyvia.

We have already become acquainted with Conrad's main views on the present political situation, and now let us dwell briefly on his memoir, which was presented on January 20, 1913 in the usual manner.

Konrad begins his report by pointing out that the development of the independence of the Serbian state is the main danger to the monarchy, to eliminate

which is possible only by force of arms. The greatest success would have been a victory over Russia, since then all other questions would have disappeared, in particular the Serbian one.

Sooner or later, but Germany will have to decide the Eastern policy by force of arms, and therefore Germany must prepare for the establishment of a tripartite alliance with the Entente.

Listing the benefits for Austria from the war with Serbia, the Chief of the General Staff points out that "the chances of success in this war decrease with every delay." "Therefore, it would be desirable to hold it in the spring of this year, and therefore politics must already now have this goal in mind ... not succumbing to the peaceful advances of Serbia."

"The political preparation for this war," Konrad continues, "should: 1) establish friendly relations between Romania and Bulgaria, so that Romania would have free hands against Russia; 2) neutralize Bulgaria; 3) to arm Albania and induce her to an armed uprising against Serbia; 4) in order not to cause the intervention of other states in the war, address them with a threat (approximate motivation is attached), in which it is indicated that the small Balkan states are to blame for the latest crises, and that the monarchy is forced to "put things in order", and therefore declares war on Serbia.

"All political negotiations," writes the Chief of the General Staff, "must be conducted in such a way as to announce the mobilization against Serbia on March 1st. and on the 15th to start military operations.

Anticipating Russia's action, Konrad expects that even in the first week it will be possible to mobilize against Russia at the same time. with her.

"I see all the difficulties of this decision," says Conrad, "but I think that this is the only road that leads to the restoration of the monarchy of its power and which one should follow."

Conrad is not afraid of French action against Germany, because France is not yet ready for war, but seeks to beat her opponent in the financial field, trying at the same time to economically tie the Balkan states to herself.

If the tripartite accord had the Balkan states on its side, then the general situation would be unfavorable for the tripartite alliance.

As evidence, Conrad compares the forces by divisions:

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Triple Alliance of the Entente
Hermapia..... - 100 France 83 Austria-Hungary 48 Russia 84 Italy
35 Serbia 15 (with new areas) Romania 14. Montenegro 4

i Bulgaria 24 (with new regions) 97 Apglia..... 6 216

Sooner or later, Germany will also have to decide by force of arms.

Thus, the Entente outnumbered the alliance of the Central Powers by 19 divisions or 280,000 bayonets. Albania will tie up part of the Serbian forces, but Greece will also take the side of the Entente.

Proving by the above comparison of forces that Germany is threatened by a ring of enemies, which it is better for Berlin to decide to break earlier, Conrad advises to talk about this with Germany in the most frank manner.

On January 25, the Chief of the General Staff made a note to the memoir, in which he points out that the coup in Turkey could cause Russian intervention and distract it in Asia, which should be used, damn it! cut the knot in the Balkans.

We have noted more than once that the chief of the general staff in political matters received guidance from military agents who sent reports to their chief from all sides. Conrad frankly says that military attaches, in addition to their official position, could carry out a certain line of politics, as private people. This gave Konrad certain comforts, and he did not leave his agents without proper instructions.

Reports from London told the Chief of Staff that the Conference was going nowhere. Reports from Sofia and Bucharest reported on the aggravated relations between Romania and Bulgaria, and both states counted on active support from Austria.

The Viennese diplomats leaned against the wall with the course of things and had to reveal their platform. But ahead of them was Konrad, who, in his letter to a military agent in London on January 21, wrote: we (apparently Konrad and Berchtold - B. Sh.) stand for Romania, but at the same time we wish that the Romanian-Bulgarian misunderstandings were ended in peace. In expressing his views, the Chief of the General Staff stipulated that they were his personal and were communicated exclusively to a military agent.

Personal views were given full play in the exchange of letters from the chief of the general staff with the military attaches. Describing the situation in Rumania and her attitude towards Austria, the military agent from Bucharest, in the concluding part of his letter of January 11, definitely outlined the guiding lines of Vienna's policy. They were supposed to consist in the support of all the demands of Rumania. |

A letter from the Chief of the General Staff of the Romanian Army dated December 29, 1912, convinced Konrad of Romania's loyalty, and therefore, in his response letter to Graniciano, he did not hesitate to wish Romania complete success, no matter how the situation in the Balkans turned.

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On January 27, Konrad ended his letter to Berchtold with the following indication: "I know very well that the fear of war with Russia lies at the basis of everything, but I believe that if we constantly be under the guinness of this danger, we will diminish our importance, turning into own gravediggers".

So insistently the chief of the general staff called the Habsburg monarchy to war.

January was the most difficult month in the negotiations between Russia and Austria-Hungary, which, in addition to the London conference, were also conducted directly between the two states.

The armaments of Vienna provoked Russian countermeasures. In the districts bordering Austria, it was ordered to carry out maneuvers on the border, and verification mobilizations proceeded at an accelerated pace. But the most effective measure was to keep under the banners up to 300,000 to be discharged in

stock.

Meanwhile, St. Petersburg, wanting to avoid conflict, made further concessions, especially when Sazonov's project on a naval demonstration of states off the coast of Turlia was not supported by either London or Paris. The latter hinted quite transparently at the need for more clear pretexts for war in the Balkans.

Germany, although it supported Austria, did not want to bring matters to war. Seeing that in Turkey, with the coming to power of Enver, the influence of Germany is growing every day, the Berlin cabinet did not want to contribute to the further successes of Vienna in the Balkans, because they could already directly threaten German interests. On January 30, the Russian ambassador in Berlin wrote to Sazonov: "Knowing that a war with Austria and Germany would at the present moment be met with enthusiasm not only by the public opinion of Russia, but even by Francia itself, the German government willy-nilly have to think, especially since even in the event of its final success, German trade would be in danger of complete ruin. Nevertheless, I consider it my duty to testify that, anxious about the possibility of strengthening the Balkan alliance with Russia at the head, Germany is fully armed to oppose the unity of the Slavs with an equally unanimous rebuff on the part of united Germanism.

Following the surrender of positions on the issue of the Serbian port, Russia recognized the autonomy of Albania at the London conference; no agreement has yet been reached on belonging to Montenegro or Albania of Scutari, as well as the regions of Dyakovo and Dibra.

We heard from Konrad that Berchtold was always willing to listen to the opinions of others, and seldom himself openly expressed his own assumptions. So it was this time. The Minister of Foreign Affairs patiently listened to Conrad's calls for war, and at the same time he was already drafting a letter from Frand Josich to Petersburg, which was supposed to ease the crisis and lead

to an agreement.

On February 1, the letter was sent to St. Petersburg. The letter did not make any specific proposals, but the very fact of sending it marked Vienna's desire to reach an agreement. The letter remained unanswered. However, since Austria-Hungary did not dismiss the reservists called up under the banner,

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Russia did not do the same, and thus the tense situation remained, but without the threat of leading to an armed clash. As a matter of fact, as we shall see below, in Vienna they still did not understand well enough the extent of the assistance that would be provided, in case of danger, by Berlin, and therefore the Viennese diplomacy continued to stubbornly make concessions.

We know that the Chief of the General Staff did not obtain consent to the transfer of the military flotilla to Sava. Persistent Conrad was not discouraged by the refusal in his mouth, and he again turned with a proposal to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and an idea to Frapp-Josich about the transfer now to Zemlin (on the Serbian border) of artillery in order to cover this point in advance.

Asking Berchtold to support this proposal in a letter dated February 3, Konrad, at the same time, strictly confidentially reported: "Our considerations on concentration are drawn up in such a way that they can be implemented at any time; it is more profitable to coincide with the latter by March 1, but not earlier, since the considerations revised for March 1 already take into account new railway lines.

The answer came from Franz Josef, the butcher of the military office, who wrote to Konrad that the transfer of artillery could not yet be carried out. The offended chief of the general staff immediately reacted to his friend's letter and wrote on February 11: "It is regrettable, but symptomatic, that even the most insignificant military measures are rejected for fear of diplomatic difficulties. Such actions will not lead to anything good, but their influence on the spirit of the army is quite

known." -

The Chief of the General Staff did not find support from the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Albanian question either. On February 6, Berchtold wrote to Konrad that he had received information about the alleged large shipment of weapons and cartridges for arming the Albanians, and, according to the explanation of the Minister of War, such a shipment could only be made on the directive of the General Staff. Considering it his duty to point out to Coprade the danger of sending weapons, Berchtold sought to prevent measures that would create difficulties for diplomacy.

In his response letter dated February 8, Konrad argued the need to arm the Albanians, for which 12,000 rubles were allocated in order to divert part of the Serbian forces during the war, the possibility of which at that time the chief of staff was considering.

"I am far from going beyond," the Chief of Staff concluded the letter, "not to complete the political justifications you have given, but I ask you to take into account also all the heavy responsibility that lies on me if it comes to an armed conflict, as well as my obligation - concern not to be late with the above-mentioned event, especially since it cannot be said that the monarchy was not in danger of being drawn into a big war.

For the latter, according to Conrad, it was necessary to keep Romania on its side. The Romanian-Bulgarian dispute caused quite a bit of trouble for the chief of the general staff, who personally sympathized with the Romanians and

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who wanted to put pressure on Berchtold so that the Viennese policy resolutely stood on the side of Bucharest.

However, Berchtold thought differently. (The dispute between these states, in the opinion of the minister, could in no way change the main lines of the Austrian policy, because Rumania will win or lose in the oral dispute -

piya, it is already entering the orbit of influence of French politics. In addition, Russia must be well assessed in order to decide whether its defeat is desirable or not. There are two Russias — “parish” and “liberal”. How useful is the existence of a “parish” Russia for the monarchy, just as dangerous is the victory of “liberal” Russia. “Tsarist” Russia itself repels Romania, while “liberal” Russia will seek to resolve the Bessarabian question and thus oppose Romania to itself. Thus, in both cases, the interests of the Romanians are closer to the interests of the monarchy than to the Russians. We must try to have Rumania and Bulgaria on our side in the event of a clash with Serbia, since even now it can be expected that the Balkan alliance is close to collapse. considerations of the minister, Conrad wrote to him: “Is it possible in the future to hope for the allied loyalty of Italy, will it not endure

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washing away one's aspirations in the Semigradie - these questions remain open, as well as the future of Russia, and not “tsarist”, but “national” Russia, the attack of which must be foreseen.

“I am concerned that the monarchy will be faced with an even more powerful coalition of enemies, a coalition that it will not be able to surpass militarily.”

“What would be a great advantage if we could achieve an alliance with Germany and Russia—I have said this before.”

In concluding his letter, Conrad says: “If Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy and Rumania (and perhaps Bulgaria) in close unity could manage to break the power of the tripartite agreement, then a different future would open up for these states than when they will leave events to their natural course ... It is possible that I am mistaken.

Meanwhile, on February 18, Konrad received a letter from the Romanian Chief of the General Staff, with which the latter transmitted “interesting” data on the internal state of Russia and a possible Austro-Russian war. They consisted in an excerpt from Sazonov's speech in the Duma about the need to pursue an active policy in the Balkans at the expense of Austria-Hungary, and then in the “source's” considerations that Romania should determine its position in the event of an imminent war.

Konrad immediately sent a response, in which he noted that the author of the “data” had in mind an “important political case” and was aware of the need to focus all attention on achieving the mouth goal. “Who knows what the future holds,” wrote the chief of the general staff, “but under all circumstances I hope for the joint actions of Rumania <monarchy.”

Having sent the letter, Conrad immediately informed Berchtold about it.

Meanwhile, in Bucharest more and more began to overestimate the policy of Austria, not seeing any real support from her. It' about-

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Panini's position worried Conrad, who, in his letter dated February 14, suggested to Berchtold that he resolutely take the side of Romania and defend her interests with the same zeal with which Serbia is being fought for access to the sea.

"I mean," Konrad says, "that we must quite openly and unconditionally be on the side of Romania, resolutely declare it with our mouth and seal it with documents, otherwise no one will believe our friendship."

"Each further maneuvering," declares the head of the general staff, "seems to me a great danger."

So Konrad tried to keep Romania in the bosom of the tripartite alliance.

The position of another ally of the monarchy, Germany, is partly known to us from what has been said above. Here we will focus only on the correspondence of the two allied chiefs of staff. |

On January 24, Chief Quartermaster of the German General Staff Waldersee visited Conrad on his return from Rome, where he had been sent to negotiate with the Italian General Staff on a plan of joint action on the French front.

Waldersee assured Conrad of Italy's loyalty to the tripartite alliance and announced Rome's agreement with 16 divisions to attack the French and even Italy's offer to conclude a naval convention with Austria-Hungary.

Taking advantage of his visit to the Waldersee, Conrad resumed his correspondence with Moltke, sending a letter from the Waldersee to the Chief of the German General Staff.

On February 12, Conrad received a letter from Moltke.

The letter began with confirmation of Waldersee's words about Italy.

Then, pointing out what forces Germany, in case of war, could send to the east for joint operations with Austria, the Chief of the German General Staff moved into the realm of high politics and strategy.

"The waging of a great war by a triple alliance against a triple agreement," Moltke wrote, "even against Russia and France alone, in order to bring it to a happy ending, will require the exertion of all forces and the use of all means. The dispersal of forces brings with it danger. If Austria must throw all her strength into winning the war with Russia, then Germany must do the same against France. I would even intercede for our forces being concentrated in the east to be thrown to the west, if we did not have to look back at Austria. In the outcome of the struggle between Germany and France, in my opinion, lies the center of gravity of the entire European war, and the fate of Austria will be decided not on the Bug, but on the Seine. -

The chief of the German General Staff textually repeated the thoughts of his predecessor Schlieffen, using his last considerations of 1912 on the war plan, delivered to Moltke after the death of the field marshal. Obviously, under the fresh impression of this document, 'Moltke was ready to follow in the footsteps of Schlieffen. As is known, the Chief of the German General Staff did not "petition" for the concentration of the army deployed in East Prussia in the east of the USH. Now he reveals the reason for this - joint actions with Austria, but we

which, however, was not possible. However, we must note here that Moltke really always wanted to help the Austrians, and this desire played an important role in the subsequent transfer of two corps to the east in the midst of the battle of Marne.

Making the reservation that he expresses "only his personal views," Moltke proceeds to assess the current political situation. Pointing out that now, after Serbia had made concessions, there was a growing opinion, especially in Germany, that the Austro-Serb conflict would end quickly, Moltke continues: "It was generally expected that the Russian proposal for simultaneous demobilization would defuse political heavily affects the general life; in particular, in Germany, the further you go, the stronger it makes you feel. This expectation did not justify the hopes.

"You know that a war in which the existence of the state is hindered," continues Moltke, "requires a willingness to sacrifice and the inspiration of the people. The feeling of loyalty to the alliance with Austria is strong and alive in Germany, and will no doubt come to light in the most ordinary manner if the integrity of Austria is threatened by an attack from Russia. But it would be very difficult to find real slogans if a war now follows from the Austrian side, for which it is difficult to find a response among the German people.

Turning to the Balkan alliance, Moltke foresees its quick end and believes that it is useful for Austria to have Bulgaria on its side, which, moreover, seeks to free itself from Russian influence. If Serbia is bound by Bulgaria, then Austria will be against Russia alone. Moltke is upset by the Rumanian-Bulgarian dispute, the resolution of which, with the mutual consent of these states, would be beneficial for Germany and Austria-Hungary.

"You will read," continues the Chief of the German General Staff, "these arguments with astonishment. They have no place in the correspondence of two purely military lindens. I am not a politician either, but our friendly relations give me the courage to speak to you with full confidence in private, also about these things. Politics and war are still in internal interaction. As I said above, I mean that sooner or later there must be a European war, and in the final analysis it is based on the struggle between Germanism and Slavism. Therefore, to prepare well for it is the duty of all states that are carriers of the German spiritual culture. But the attack must come from the Slavs. Whoever expects this war must clearly realize that it requires the unification of all efforts and, above all, the full consent of the people to a world historical decision.

If we recall Ludendorff's note to the report of December 12, 1912, about Moltke's fear that Viennese diplomacy would not go too far, it becomes clear that the Chief of the German General Staff, "with an expression of sincere respect and assurances of comradely attitude," "had the honor" to teach his colleague in Vienna, presenting him with the rules of restraint and restraint.

On February 15, Konrad sent a reply to his friend through a military agent in Berlin.

Beginning the letter with an indication that he had assimilated the loyal position of Italy, he noted that an Italian military mission had not yet arrived in Vienna to work out a naval convention.

Thanks to the allocation of forces to help Austria in the fight against Russia, Conrad does not agree with the point of view of Molteuil, "that all efforts should be directed to the West, because if Russia and the Balkan states achieve territorial and political success, then victory will be in France. weaken considerably. Arguing then for the need to allocate sufficient forces to action against the Russian armies, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff thinks that the common interest requires action against Russia from the beginning of the war with sufficient forces in order to provide. winning the battle."

Agreeing with Moltke that "under the present political and military situation, the defeat of France must be the first aim", Conrad, however, believes that "German and Italian forces are sufficient to achieve this".

Then the chief of the Austrian general staff considers it necessary to express "exclusively his personal views" on the general political position.

"Of course," writes Konrad, "there is nothing more difficult and more responsible than for a government agency to decide on "war" or "peace".

"Experience, theory and reflection have well instilled in each of us a clear idea of the depth of the tragedy of war and the variability of its course and consequences, and none of us, without a comprehensive assessment of the situation, will lightly take this decision. However, whoever occupies a responsible place does not have the right to reject this decision from himself and must accept it: with complete disregard for personal interests.

"The whole difficulty for a responsible leader lies primarily in the fact that a decision "for" or "against" a war can be fraught with very grave consequences, since refusing to wage war in the current favorable situation will lead to the loss of advantages, which can no longer be reached."

Turning then to Moltke's assumptions about the coming European war, which is based on the struggle of Germanism with the Slavs, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff considers it necessary first of all to point out that if it comes to this, then one can hardly count on inspiration in the struggle with their fellow tribesmen of those Slavs who make up 47 % /, the settlements of Austria-Hungary. "Today, the sense of historical solidarity and discipline in the army is still strong, but whether this will be present in the envisaged case is a question. Thus, the monarchy should not allow a national war, but it should strive for the political and cultural separation of the southern and western Slavs from the eastern ones and for the liberation of the former from the influence of Russia."

First of all, according to Konrad, Serbia should not be allowed to grow and become stronger, in which Russia sees its main assistant in the destruction of the monarchy.

With regard to the Romanian-Bulgarian dispute, the chief of staff expresses his personal point of view on the need for open support for Romania.

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Regarding the delay in the demobilization of the Austrian forces on the Russian border, Konrad gives the following arguments: 1) the ambiguity of the situation in the Balkans and the position of Russia, and 2) the small peacetime states, significantly inferior in number to the Russians.

The letter was personally delivered to Moltke by an Austrian military agent in Berlin, who had a conversation with the Chief of the German General Staff and sent a written report to Konrad about it.

The military agent wrote that the Chief of the German General Staff read the letter with great interest, indicating that in it he finds support in the desirability of postponing the start of the world war. The immediate future, according to Moltke, is still shrouded in the darkness of uncertainty and it is difficult to say whether it will be possible to eliminate the war in the Balkans without a European war. It would be desirable, in spite of the persecution of France, to avoid war. England, bound to France by a military convention, will be on the side of the latter, although it must be pointed out that England's contradictions with Russia and France are great. The situation of the Turkish army is sad. It would be advantageous for Austria to resolve the Rumanian-Bulgarian dispute by mutual agreement. The antagonism between Serbia and Bulgaria has always been and is now becoming more acute.

To this conversation with Moltke, the military agent added information about the mood of Wilhelm himself, who, being at the Austrian ambassador on January 30, spoke in peaceful tones, although he found that if Austria got involved in the war, Germany would come out in support. However, according to Wilhelm, it would be very difficult to prove to the German people the necessity of war, since the question of Fools does not tell him anything. Wilhelm felt that it was not worth bringing matters to the point of war "for the sake of a couple of Albanian towns". The military agent explained Wilhelm's mood as follows: 1) his desire to peacefully celebrate the 25th anniversary of parishing and 2) fear of England. Regarding the last naval attache of Austria, I spoke with Prince Heinrich of Prussia, who described the position of the German Navy as not very satisfactory, since the Kiel Canal was not completed by deepening for the passage of battleships of the Kiel Canal, and in order to connect squadrons, one had to go around Denmark; moreover, the fortifications of Heligoland are 'not finished'.

We have dwelt more or less in detail on finding out the moods of Berlin, since, no doubt, they made the weather in Vienna. Knowing Konrad's views on the current political situation, one can say with confidence that he was unpleasantly surprised by the restraint not only of Berlin diplomacy, but also of the General Staff. Moltke misunderstood Konrad in his judgments about the European war. The Chief of the Austrian General Staff, it is true, drove away the thought of the possibility of this war now, but he was not afraid of its coming, if only! he was inevitable. Konrad built his main calculation on a possible war at the given time with Serbia and Montenegro alone, because Russia, in all likelihood, would not dare to fight, held by France and England.

As for Italy, she was not afraid, bound by her adventure in Tripoli, and at the present time she really leaned on the side of the tripartite alliance.

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On February 4, Montonari, Chief of Operations of the Italian General Staff, arrived in Vienna with a personal letter from Chief of Staff Pollio to Conrad, in which Pollio proposed to discuss all operational issues on the war plan, gave preliminary consent to the discussion of a naval convention, so that the united Fleet of the triple alliance would acquire dominance in the Mediterranean. At the same time, Pollio assured of Italy's full loyalty to the union.

In a personal conversation, Montonari unfolded before Conrad, with frankness, the whole plan of Italy's proposed actions on the side of the union, and, in response to Conrad's request for an assessment of the general political situation, as it is conceived in Italy, he described it as follows: "We we know that war is probable, but we do not think that it will start now; we can't pull troops out of Tripoli yet."

To this Montonari added: "It is firmly decided in Italy to attack the French with full energy in order to achieve a quick success."

On the same day, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff sent a letter to Pollio, via Montonari, assuring him of his complete sincerity.

The military agent in Rome, Sheptytsky, confirmed the desire of the Italian General Staff to conclude a naval military convention of the triple alliance, however, at the same time, he indicated that Rome was not averse to supporting Russia in opening the straits.

It is difficult to understand such a dual position. "One thing is clear to me," the agent wrote, "that the Italians are preparing for all sorts of possibilities, both in the field of politics and in the field of military."

Italy is now weakened and therefore tends to draw closer to Austria, but in two or three years she will be strengthened and then return again to her former course, that is, to the path of hatred of the monarchy. As a fact of such fawning over Austria, Sheptytsky cites a prejudicial attitude towards him and his wife, the wife of the chief of the general staff, Pollio, who speaks German (she is a nee Venka), tries everywhere to show that she is a countrywoman, often visits the house of a military agent, etc. "A few months ago there was nothing to think about," Sheptytsky reported.

Such were the attitudes of the Allies at a time when, in Konrad's opinion, Austria entered a decisive period in her history.

"What could be expected from Russia?" — was a nail in the head of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff.

According to the report of the military agent, the letter in St. Petersburg was greeted by the party of the world, to which the "court" belonged in the first place, with a sense of satisfaction, as giving the opportunity to exit with honor from the conflict that was flaring up and leading to war.

On February 17, a military agent informed Konrad that, however, there was a great danger on the part of the military party. Although the leading circles are trying to avoid war at the present time, it cannot be guaranteed that this spring the war party will not take the floor. -

Before this letter was sent, the military agent was personally with Konrad on February 8 and spoke in the same tone about the politics of Petersburg, reporting that "

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in his opinion, the "court" party may not be able to restrain the military party. At the same time, he insisted on the demobilization of the Austrian corps bordering Russia, seeing this as evidence that could improve relations between the two states.

On February 22, the military agent again appeared in Konrad's office and definitely reported: "If we continue our armaments, as we are doing now, then we will find ourselves in war with Russia in no more than two months. If we do not want war, then we must show Russia that we are reducing our strength, it goes without saying - when Russia announces the dismissal of the annual contingent it detained in the army.

Peaceful tendencies were characteristic of more than one military agent who breathed in the fresh northern air in Petersburg. Viennese diplomats also rushed towards peace. In a conversation with Konrad on February 10, Berchtold's assistant clearly revealed the minister's desire to avoid war with Russia and to resolve the entire Balkan Crisis peacefully.

Mentioning the "last" moment when the monarchy can still reveal its will in the European arena, Konrad pointed out to the diplomat that if Vienna's proposals on the issues of Scutari and Albania are rejected, "then there is nothing left but to reconcile with the loss of prestige or to come forward decisively, for which you must be prepared."

"We soldiers," continued the Chief of the General Staff, "must know if there is a possibility of war, so that we can be ready if it comes to her."

The question of the demobilization of forces on the Russian front was, meanwhile, becoming decisive. The need to make concessions was spoken not only by a military agent from St. Petersburg, but also by the Minister of Foreign Affairs himself.

Konrad thought this was still premature. "I can only undress this from the military side," Konrad said. "It would be very undesirable if a big war breaks out now, but we must reckon with the possibility of it, and it would be best to end the conflict now with Serbia."

"I do not associate my name with the war against Russia," Berchtold declared on February 22, 1913, to the chief of the general staff, adding that "Franz-Ferdinand is absolutely against the war."

Thus, Konrad's belligerent intentions did not find a response in the Foreign Office. There was no more sympathy for them.

We know that Franz Josef "with his own hand" proposed to St. Petersburg to settle the Balkan issues without the use of weapons. Franz-Ferdinand, the only person on whom Konrad had high hopes, stood in this position.

However, Konrad began to receive first-hand information about the peace-loving aspirations of the heir. The chief of the military chancellery of the latter warned the chief of the general staff that the young Habsburg would speak out resolutely against the war with Russia, and at the expense of Serbia not

wants to profit neither an extra centimeter of territory, nor an extra ovpoy. Conrad got excited, argued that the war must be reckoned with, that he would present his considerations in writing to Franco-Ferdinand, but the danger of the heir's peaceful deviations was a fact.

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On February 26 and 27, the chief of the general staff had reports from Franz Ferdinand and could finally be convinced of the validity of the information he had received earlier.

"In the future," said Francp-Ferdinand, "we must go with Russia, and it would be good if Germany learned this as well. Then we could turn against Italy and Serbia in order to defeat them, but at the same time not expand the territory at the expense of Serbia.

To Conrad's frightened questions about what to do with Austria's prestige in Albania, with her interests in the Balkans and, in general, with the South Slavic question, Frand Ferdinand answered that this should be postponed until internal relations in the state are improved. .

The heir read Wilhelm's letter to the chief of staff in excerpts, which spoke of the need to avoid war with Russia now, adding that he fully shared such views. The reason was the danger for the strength of the dynasty. Considering the Serbs to be "parakillers", Francp-Ferdinand admitted the possibility of their military punishment, but by no means expanding the territory of the monarchy at the expense of Serbia.

"War with Russia must be avoided," said Frand-Ferdinand, "because it is being pushed by France, and especially by the Freemasons and anarchists who want to destroy the dynasty in the monarchy in a dump."

Pointing out that Wilhelm's letter was saying just that, Habsburg fashionably ended with the words: "no war."

The Chief of the General Staff, of course, immediately presented a number of arguments against such peaceful decisions, but Franz-Ferdinand stated pastily: "Our main enemy is Italy, with whom we must wage war and again take Venice and Lombardy."

The last resort, in which Konrad hoped to find support in the decision "for" the war, was not on his side, and the chief of the general staff was forced to postpone his warlike plans until a favorable time.

March 1 marked a decisive turning point on the road to peace. Vienna and St. Petersburg agreed to disband the conscripted and detained reserves, and Turkey agreed to the mediation of states in peace negotiations with the Balkan hederadiya.

We traced the tenacity and perseverance with which Konrad called for war. Needless to say, once again called to the post of chief of the general staff, he considered this his victory, was not afraid for the strength of his position and therefore was confident in his steps, even if on the political path.

Of course, it could not be said that the Balkans had already been established or that

calm will be established in the near future, as the division of the won booty was coming. The time has come to test the strength of the Balkan Federation.

The winners reacted rather reservedly to Turkey's consent to the mediation of states for peace. Serbia stubbornly defended its rights to Ipek and Diakovo, and the Bulgarians to Thessaloniki and lands in Macedonia. The Montenegrins persistently besieged Scutari in order to secure it for themselves by taking it.

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The London Conference of Ambassadors had not only to be persuaded, but also threatened with military reprisals in order to force the Balkan federation to accept certain conditions worked out at the conference.

Scutari soon became a dentro, around which the fire began to flare up again. There was a threat of a separate action by Austria.

At the same time, Sazonov wrote to the ambassador in Sofia at the end of March: "Further expansion of Bulgaria and its desire to have access to the Sea of Marmara would meet strong opposition from our side. We cannot allow freedom of navigation through the straits to depend on the discretion of Bulgaria." A second node was being created, where Russia was no longer an arbiter, but an interested party.

We know that the return of Serbian troops to the interior of the country aroused the fear of Konrad, who saw this as Serbia's preparation for an attack on Austria-Hungary.

On March 2, Conrad visited the sick Berchtold.

Berchtold had doubts that Montenegro, having occupied Scutari, would not submit to the decision of the London conference on the liberation of Scutari, and therefore he made a proposal to send Austrian troops there.

"It's not so easy," Conrad protested. - If our troops land there, they will face Serbia and Montenegro, which will hardly tolerate their presence, and then - "war." war

should be fought with all our might, not half-heartedly."

However, the Minister of Foreign Affairs immediately rejected the war and suggested that Konrad look for other means that would force the Montenegrins to submit to the wishes of Vienna without a war.

"The first remedy," replied Konrad, "is to starve Montenegro into concessions. This should lead to: the closing of the land border, the blockade of the sea so that not a single ship could pass, and the uprising of the Albanians, also organized in Sapjak. The second means is the use of armed force, in other words, war.

"Only against Montenegro?" Berchtold asked.

"No," came the reply of the chief of the general staff, "most likely, Serbia will support Montenegro, and if Russia thinks about peace, then it should give us freedom of action."

Berchtold declared bitterly that he could only find "support". in a "military environment".

While agreeing that peaceful tendencies were deeply rooted in Vienna, Konrad believed it was time to send weapons to the Albanians.

That was the prelude to the question of Scutari.

On the soul of the chief of the general staff, not only this, but also another, no less important, question lay like a heavy stone: the morale of the reservists drafted into the ranks of the army in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was impossible to keep the strained nerves of the reservists, among whom a demobilization mood was already noted, in a long tension - either war or demobilization was needed.

A few days later, Berchtold, in the presence of his assistants in the ministry, had a conversation with the chief of the general staff, and Berchtold declared the need to end peacefully

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with Scutari. Diplomats turned to the previous proposal: by occupying Mount Lovcen, to force Montenegro to make concessions.

"But this is also a war ... You can't win a war with small trump cards," said the chief of the general staff, again insisting on war. Along the way. the diplomats were informed that for the war it was necessary to move at least 300,000 people and that hostilities, with a preponderance in favor of Austrian weapons, would begin on the 14th - 16th day.

The restraining factors for the Bensk policy were not only the mood of the St. Petersburg cabinet, London and Paris, but to a greater extent the mood of their friends, Germany and Italy, who are on the issue of Scutari. took a decidedly passive stance.

On the contrary, the German ambassador in Montenegro quite openly went not only against the Austrian demands, but even refused collective pressure on the Montenegrin king from all the ambassadors. Conrad did not hesitate to inform Berchtold about such actions of the ambassador, offering him to find out the point of view of Germany itself.

The military agents of the neighboring states, including the Russian, dropped by in turn to the chief of the general staff, trying to find out the position of Austria in the brewing conflict.

Conversations about the "warlike" mood of the chief of the Austro-Hungarian. of the General Staff reached Frand-Ferdinand, on whose behalf, on March 15, his head of the military office came to Conrad with a proposal to moderate Conrad's influence on the Minister of Foreign Affairs and not to drag the latter into active action.

"I cannot refuse to communicate with the Minister of Foreign Affairs," replied the Chief of the General Staff. "One cannot ignore the fact that up to 60,000 people are concentrated on our border, and one must clearly imagine what will happen if Serbia and Montenegro do not leave it."

"His Highness," Konrad continued, "cannot free himself from the influence of the German emperor; we were held back in 1909, and they want to force us to do so now. This is where all the mistakes of Vienna come from. in Turkish politics. On the other hand, I am convinced that the Germans are indifferent to our interests, while we are obliged to think about them. Germany. calmly plays with us, if by doing this she will achieve good relations. with Frapcia, and possibly sacrifice us."

"In December," Konrad finished his answer, "I was called to the post of chief of the general staff, when hostilities were foreseen ... His Highness can fire me again at any moment; I'll go by. stairs, as I entered it, and I will calmly leave.

All of Konrad's arguments use the Scutari issue as an excuse. wars, did not get a response.

However, fate smiled at him, showing that there are times when. must be discarded in the politics of "decency".

Returning on March 17 from the report, Konrad found in his office a report that after the shelling of Fort Medua by the Turkish cruiser, the Montenegrin lieutenant, by threat of execution, forced the Hungarian steamer Shkodra, which was at that time in the port, to transport the wounded, and the crew of the steamer. recognized as "Austrian spies."

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"The case is small", but, according to Yoonrad, "very revealing", talking about how low the authority of the monarchy and its subjects fell in the eyes of the Balkan states. Montenegro should have been punished.

With such a proposal, Conrad immediately went to Berchtold, advising him to immediately send a squadron and fire on enemy ships. "Yes, but Russia?!" exclaimed the Minister of Foreign Affairs. As for Russia, Konrad reassured him, believing that she would hardly get involved in the war.

Returning home, the pachalpak of the general staff immediately wrote his proposals, sending them to the military office of Franpa-Josia, the minister of foreign affairs and the military. They said:

- 1) telegraph to demand confirmation of the report of the captain of the steamer "Shkodra";
- 2) immediately send a warship or several to the Albanian-Montenegrin waters to protect their ships and subjects;
- 3) demand an apology from Serbia and Montenegro;
- 4) in case of refusal on the part of the latter to open the actions of the Austro-Hungarian Navy against the military means of the belligerents, to destroy them and bombard, as far as it is possible for the Navy.

Troubled days have come for the Chief of the General Staff. The Minister of Foreign Affairs began to invite him every day to meetings, the essence of which was to influence Montenegro with armed force, as it were, without starting a big war. So, to protect the Zhatoliks in Scutari, Berchtold planned to send an expeditionary

'detachment in the form of "humanitarian" police. Conrad categorically rebelled against such proposals, considering any petty use of troops harmful, which could lead only to failures and an even greater loss of prestige.

On the evening of March 18, Berchtold and the chief of staff appeared at Frapp Joseph with a report on the need to send a detachment of warships to Catarro, which should have been there in full combat readiness. The proposal was approved, and a written order was given to the commander of the naval rafts by the chief of the general staff, and in words Konrad confirmed that it was by no means necessary to carry out a landing in order to avoid a possible failure. On March 19, military ships were on their way.

Summoned on the evening of March 19 from the theater to Berchtold, Konrad again had to insist on major decisions. "Only no half-measures, no game, etc.," said the chief of the general staff.

"It would be best to start the offensive immediately if the demands are not met," was the suggestion of interlocutors from diplomacy.

"We are in reinforced formation, but not mobilized," Konrad replied, and when asked how long it would take to go on the offensive, he explained: "For top secret information, 16 days."

On March 21, the Commander of the Naval Forces asked for specific instructions for action, the draft of which was outlined by Konrad.

On March 23, the chief of the general staff considered it necessary to address Berchtold with a special letter in which he expressed his views on the current political situation.

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"In my opinion," wrote the chief of staff, "our demands should have been formulated in the following way: the cessation of hostilities in Albania and the cleansing of the Albanian regions by Serbia and Cheriogorpei; These demands should be presented in the form of a short-term ultimatum, and if it is not fully and on time fulfilled, then mobilization should be announced according to option "B", i.e. against Montenegro and Serbia; At the same time, the actions of the fleet must continue, but not in the form of a blockade, but as a decisive attack.

"I must propose the need for action on a grand scale," continued the Chief of Staff, "based on military considerations as the only correct ones, and to speak out against any half-measures or those steps that take small roads."

Events were growing, but the chief of staff did not change his personal regimen, and, as was the custom of many years, on the evening of March 2, he was at the Green Anchor restaurant, when he was summoned from there to Berchtold. The latter, besides his assistant, had the headmaster of the court of Frapts-Yosikh and the military minister. The topic of the interview was again the events in Chernogorpp, and Konrad came up with the proposal to mobilize "B".

The meeting, without following Konrad, so as not to make "noise in Europe", stopped at a partial mobilization (XU and XU corps) against

Cherpogorpp, deciding only then to announce the mobilization of "B" if Serbia joins Cherpogoria. On the 25th, Berchtold was to submit Franpu-Joseph for approval of the proposal for a partial mobilization.

Already at 7 o'clock. 30 min. On the morning of the 25th, Konrad was again summoned to Berchtold, in connection with a telegram received from the Austrian ambassador in Montenegro, who proposed to prepare a detachment of troops. Koprade seized the opportunity and pointed out to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that only strictly responsible officials should be invited to these meetings, which took place on the evening of 24-0, and meanwhile he was attended by the zofmeister - a person far removed from affairs.

Svidapius Berchtold, Konrad and the military minister visited almost daily, and the situation that had arisen was discussed at them, and the chief of the general staff did not give up his positions, although the minister of foreign affairs spoke of the favorable attitude towards Austria of other "petty powers" in the Scutari question .

At one of these conversations, on the evening of March 29, Berchtold orpepted his interlocutors that the monarchy did not need an armed action, since the "great" powers had decided the question of Scutari's belonging to Albapia; that on the 30th there will be a collective speech by the ambassadors in Belgrade; that England agreed to an international naval demonstration, but not to a blockade; that Rossypa will not take part in the oral demonstration.

All these arguments were far from convincing for Koprade, who, suspecting that Russia, England and Germany wanted to reach an agreement at the expense of the moparchy, suggested that they be ready to protect their interests single-handedly.

However, instead of this, on April 2, a decision was made to participate in an international naval demonstration, for which an order was sent to the Fleet Instructing them to wait for the arrival of foreign ships, with the commanders of which to agree on joint actions.

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"Nothing to be expected from an international naval demonstration," Conrad wrote to Berchtold on April 2, as this would only strengthen Montenegro in the belief that other powers would hold Austria.

"If neutrality has already been violated," Konrad continued, "the following measures must be vigorously carried out:

- 1) at sea: blockade, prohibition of Serbian transports, importation of weapons into Albania;
- 2) on land: closing the border and, if this proves invalid, mobilization "B".

Vessels with food for the population of Scutari should no longer go through Catarro, since the Serbian and Montenegrin troops use these supplies for themselves. |

On the same day, Berchtold gave an answer. Recognizing the fairness of Conrad's conclusions about the significance of the naval demonstration, the minister wrote that it was still necessary to observe the gradual use of means, which he thought of as follows: demonstration, blockade and landing, if necessary.

If the minister carefully moves forward, then this should be explained by the unwillingness to worsen the general political situation for the monarchy, to spoil its relations with the powers, and above all with Italy. Every independent step taken by Austria will throw Italy into the arms of Russia. Austria cannot fight on three fronts, and therefore for the time being it is necessary to act in agreement with Italy, and only if nothing comes of this, then take the path of settlement with this state.

Instructions of a similar nature were received on April 4 from Franz-Ferdinand. His head of the military office wrote to Konrad that Francis-Ferdinand "firmly stands on the fact that as long as at least formally there is a European concert, independent performances of monarchies are impossible."

The situation in the Balkans, meanwhile, became even more complicated. On March 96, Adrianople fell and part of the Serbian troops were liberated, which, according to the General Staff in Vienna, left either for the Austrian border or for Albania.

The question with Scutari did not go beyond "academic" conversations: Conrad with Berchtold, as the former chief of the general staff now calls them. The minister hesitated in making bold decisions, and Konrad persistently called for them.

The naval demonstration near the Montenegrin coast did not reach the peak, since the commanders of foreign ships resolutely rejected the proposal of the command of the Austrian Navy to blockade the coast. The situation was no better on the land border, where the all-imperial Minister of Finance opposed its final closure.

On April 16, in a letter to Berchtold, Konrad spoke out strongly in favor of closing the border, believing that the land blockade of Montenegro declared on the whole of Europe, which was not actually carried out, would only lead to. to worsen the situation.

The controversial issues in the Balkans were joined by the issue of the Greek claim to the entire opposite coast against the island of Corfu, and the Greeks were supported by Germany in their mouths. According to Berchtold,

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the Italian general staff believed that the strait between the island and the coast, allowing the passage of first-class ships, could therefore serve as a base, which in Berlin was considered "ridiculous." Berchtold put forward a proposal to neutralize the strait if the coast passed into Greek hands.

On April 14, Conrad, in a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, added his opinion to the judgment of the Italian General Staff and was skeptical about Berlin, seeing the desire of Germany not only to support the Greeks, but also to associate them with the Serbs, at a time when Wilhelm was against the Bulgarian king.

"We have paid dearly for the Turkish Philanthropy of Germany," wrote the Chief of the General Staff, "and therefore we must be especially prudent with regard to its Serbo-Filia and Greek Philanthropy."

"We will not lie if we say that our prudent policy in a real Balkan war depends for the most part on the restraining and open peacefulness of Germany, which does not change even Bethmann's speech, but in the future we must demand the unanimous action of Germany and, above all, demand so that Germany, in relation to our Balkan neighbors, pursues our views and our needs."

It would be desirable if Serbia entered into an alliance with the monarchy quite loyally, Konrad concludes, but since this is impossible, the only means is to restore by force the prestige lost by Austria.

"If Germany does not want a mouth," Konrad warns, "then she must know that the monarchy is a Slavic state, which in the future can be seen on the side of Russia and France."

As for the strait near Korhu, Konrad joined Berchtold's conclusion about the need to neutralize it and forbid the Greeks to strengthen the coast.

On April 5, the chief of the general staff appeared at a report to Franco-Josich and before him again unfolded the evidence of the need for an independent and decisive action by the monarchy, incidentally pointing out the indecision of Berlin. The report, as usual, did not end with anything.

Konrad's thoughts revolved not only around Scutari. His attention was drawn to the looming Heart-Dollar Joonfleet, which he also decided to use.

"Finally," Konrad wrote to Berchtold on April 18, "a favorable situation is again being created that calls the fate of the monarchy to get out of the passive situation forced by the great powers and pursue its own interests."

The road to this, according to Konrad, led to war with Serbia and Montenegro.

Meanwhile, on April 23, Scutari fell.

Immediately, Konrad, Admiral Gaus, and two assistants to the Minister of Foreign Affairs gathered at Berchtold's with a pell to discuss by what means the Montenegrins and Serbs could be forced to cleanse Scutari, and the minister proposed landing troops: in Antivari and Dulcinho.

Konrad began by saying that if you ignore the powers, you can solve the problem with sufficient clarity. "Dekho is moving towards that," he says.

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ril Konrad, - that we can save our prestige only by a war with Montenegro. We shouldn't stop half way."

Admral decrees that he can land no more than 2000 people who can take only one point and all actions will actually be of little success.

The chief of staff even found them dangerous, for if the Montenegrins attacked this detachment, then this would be a pretext for war.

"And if you master Tsetpnye?" Berchtold asked.

"It's out of the question," the chief of staff replied decisively. There are 25-30 thousand Montenegrins there. If we can do anything, it is to send 30-50 thousand people. This is war."

"We cannot wage wars," said Berchtold's assistant.

"Then one should not pursue an active policy, and in this case it is not possible to offer anything," the strategist pointed out to the diplomat.

Berchtold entered into the conversation, declaring that wars could not be waged either with Montenegro or with Serbia, and still continued to look for a way out of the situation.

The chief of staff gave him one thing—immediate resolution of the Great Serb question. "Now," he pointed out, "the last moment has come" and "if we decide to wage war, then we must firmly say that we will include Montenegro in the moparchip."

Such a proposal scared the diplomats. "We can't annex anything," Berchtold's helper said. "Europe would then be against us, and we would find ourselves in the current position of the Montenegrin king."

"After the war, everything will be different," said Koprade, listing all the benefits, the cop would have been sewn with apnexpey. He was equally critical of the agreement © by Italy.

The debate ended with the acceptance of the proposal of the chief of the general staff on the request of the powers, and Berchtold went to Franz Josich.

We deliberately dwell on the conversations that took place in order to give the reader an idea of those hesitation in policy and decisiveness of strategy, which were observed in Vienna in the past few days.

Chadepie Scutari, which marked the defeat of Austria, aroused poorly concealed joy in Rome, which was immediately brought to the attention of Conrad by a military agent.

The powers to which the monarchy had appealed responded on April 26: "to catch up with the blockade." Berchtold reacted to this as critically as the chief of staff, deciding to take serious steps.

On the evening of April 26, Berchtold and Koprade appeared in Franz Josef's office with a proposal to mobilize "B", if the conference of ambassadors in London would not take drastic measures. The result of the report was the old man's agreement to make a partial mobilization of the XIII, XU and HUR corps against Montenegro, while remaining in a waiting position against Serbia.

The dispatches of a military agent from St. Petersburg said that Austria could take the path of decisive diplomatic action.

So, Berchtold was inclined to speak out, but on April 29, in a conversation with the Chief of the General Staff, he already limited the goals of the war, namely only the purification of Scutari, while Conrad had in mind inclusion in 00-

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becoming moparchpi of all Montenegro. The minister pointed out the need to act in harmony with other powers and, especially, Italy.

Negotiations were held with the latter on joint military operations, at which Rome considered the punishment of Montenegro unfair, demanded that actions be carried out in such a way as not to affect the territory of the country, to resolve the issue of Scutari not in isolation, but in connection with the general decision on Adbanni.

Needless to say, the Chief of the General Staff strongly opposed such proposals by the Italians, both in a report to Frapts-Josef on April 29, and in a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the same day, in a copy sent to the Minister of War.

If the monarchy does not want to completely refuse to raise the prestige it has lost and protect the interests of life, if it does not want to miss the last opportunity to forestall those grave consequences that should be revealed as a result of the current course of the Balkanian crisis, then nothing else remains for it but to immediately at your own peril, solve this question, while refusing any joint actions with Italy and rejecting all the conventions of the great powers.

The chief of staff finally erupted in a benevolent repulsion from the latter towards the monarchy, and, perhaps, not without slander.

On May 2, a council of ministers was held, at which the call for a hand storm was decided, 9,500 million crowns were allocated in anticipation of war. As regards the political program of action, the council of ministers decided: 1) to complete negotiations with Italy on joint action as soon as possible, without, however, binding itself; 2) regardless of this, present an ultimatum to Montenegro within three days to clear Scutari and 3) in case of refusal, declare mobilization against this state.

However, information was received that the Montenegrin king was inclined to evacuate Scutari.

On May 4, at the council of ministers that met again, with a sharp protest from the chief of the general staff, it was decided not to send an ultimatum, but to limit itself to transmitting a note containing a threat - in case of failure to fulfill the demands of the moparchy, present an ultimatum.

Both at the meeting of the Council of Ministers and in the next three letters to Berchtold, the chief of the General Staff strongly spoke out in favor of sending an ultimatum; he rejected all joint actions with Itasia in order to give her the opportunity to gain a foothold in southern Albania; spoke against sending an expeditionary corps to Albania and, in general, argued against the development of major actions in that country.

The chief of staff felt that "the time has come when diplomatic moves must submit to military demands," namely, the war with Montenegro and Serbia.

Conrad sees the only possible case for a peaceful solution in Montenegro's agreement with the monarchy, while Scutari remains behind Cherpogoria, Albapia is left to its own fate.

Just in case, the chief of staff instructs the operational bureau to prepare

new, by allocating one battalion from each corps (from No. 1 to No. 14), so as not to violate the concentration plan.

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Now Konrad explains why he so resolutely rebelled against the sending of large siches to Albania. The reason for this was the impending conflict between the Serbs and the dollars, which was supposed to serve as the starting point for the new political situation;

Montenegro submitted to the demands of the monarchy.

The Viennese kidnappers regarded this as a great success, for Montenegro yielded out of fear. Conrad thought otherwise. In his opinion, Montenegro made concessions not out of fear of the success of Austrian weapons, but out of necessity. The politicians of Vienna did not have to trumpet their victories, since the big questions, and above all the great Serbian one, were still unresolved. So thought the chief of the general staff when Berchtold asked him a question: what would happen if the Montenegrins were defeated? "Maintaining prestige, nothing more," replied Koprad.

Thus ended the dispute about Scutari, which could lead to a separate action by Austria-Hungary, and consequently to such a deepening of the Balkan conflict, which would probably end in a big war.

On May 30, a Turkish-Balkan peace treaty was signed in London, which did not satisfy either the Balkan countries or Austria. True, her desire to create an autonomous Albania was satisfied, but from now on her southern borders were dominated by a strong Serbia and Montenegro, unsatisfied in its aspirations.

We heard that the Chief of the General Staff in Vienna was disillusioned with the London conference of ambassadors and advised Austria to take its own path.

The monarchy, in his opinion, did not find support not only from its hidden enemies, but also from allies.

In part, we have already cited Conrad's views on the policy of Berlin. She followed a different path than the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff wanted. In Montenegro, the German representative not only clearly went against the Austrian interests, but even refused a collective speech of all the ambassadors before the Montenegrin king. In Serbpi, where every year Germany became more and more interested economically, in a country from which the monarchy was in mortal danger, even there the politicians from the banks of the Spree proved restrained. In Greece, German influence was growing stronger every day, as well as in Rumania. In Turkey, the German ambassador treated the policy of the monarchy with undisguised hostility.

In a word, there was no solidarity in the political actions of the allies in the Balkans. As for supporting the demands of the monarchy before the European cabinets, Germany provided it there as well, insofar as it did not threaten war. We know that Conrad even had doubts that at the expense of Austria Germany would not agree

fought with the rest of the states.

In his frequent conversations with the German military agent, Konrad repeatedly lamented Berlin's restrained policy. True, Chancellor Bethmann's speech delivered in April in the Reichstag served as some

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support for the activity of Vienna, but even that, according to the chief of staff, was belated.

The military agent of Germany invariably pointed out to Konrad that it was difficult to raise a German burgher to war with France for the sake of Albania.

"No no! the chief of staff responded briskly. - It's not about the German burgher, but about the German emperor, who says: "For the sake of Albanian goat pastures, however, no one will wage war."

Only the Zermansky general itad, according to the aent, was convinced of the inevitability of a long war and reckoned with it.

However, at the decisive moment of the Austrian demands for the cleansing of Scutari by the Montenegrins, a military agent encouraged Conrad by pointing out on May 2 that Germany was absolutely on the side of the monarchy, even to the point of conflict.

The German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Jagow, in his book "The Causes and Beginnings of the World War" writes that the occupation of Scutari by the Montenegrins created a "critical moment", which was eliminated only by the "firm performance of Germany and Austria at the conference."

It must be admitted that it was difficult to actually rouse the German people to war because of the Balkans, and Berlin was well aware of how unpleasant this was for Vienna. A global dump was inevitable, but not because of petty Balkan dealings.

Berlin delayed the start of this massacre.

As for the other ally, Italy, as we know, in view of the contradictions with France in the Mediterranean and the weakening of its armed forces by the war in Achrik, it sought to become a loyal member of the tripartite

leg union.

However, it was difficult to erase the contradictions that existed in the relations between Rome and Vienna and were further exacerbated by the unfolding events in the Balkans.

We have already heard that the fall of Scutari caused a hidden joy in Italy, and then, when the question of an expedition to punish the Montenegrins came up, Berchtold began to coordinate his steps with Rome, foreseeing his inevitable opposition to individual actions of the monarchy. We also heard how the chief of the general staff of the monarchy spoke out strongly against any agreements and joint actions with Italy.

According to a report from a military agent dated April 27 from Rome, the government was forced to blindly follow the "public" opinion in the question of Scutari, which was against any punitive expeditions to Montenegro. Responsible politicians in Italy told the agent that they could not

to do so, because a revolution would immediately break out in the country. The Austrian embassy in Rome had to be guarded by an armed detachment.

Meanwhile, the government tried to maintain quite friendly relations with Vienna.

Officially, Conrad also had to observe the allied endearments. Having received from the Italian chief of the general staff Pollio the history of the war in Tripoli with his own letter, Conrad thanked Zollio in his answer, and did not fail to express the opinion that it would hardly be possible to compete with France and England at sea.

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The conclusion by the tripartite alliance of the maritime convention proposed by Italy was not yet moving forward, and Italian military representatives, whose commanding had been promised, did not arrive in Vienna. Despite the fact that this conveppia was very desirable for Berlin, the heir Franz-Ferdinand was skeptical about it and on April 9 ordered the Chief of the General Staff to refrain from taking real steps to implement it.

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The young Habsburg's order provoked an exchange of opinions between Konrad and Berchtold, both of whom spoke in the sense that the isolated actions of the Austrian Navy in a big war were doomed to failure, and for both the motives of Franz Ferdinand's speech were incomprehensible. However, the Austrian naval headquarters spoke out against the convention, as they did not trust the Italians.

In short, mutual distrust continued to lie between the two allies.

Indeed, Rome decisively put obstacles in the way of Berchtold's active policy.

On April 18, 1913, the Russian ambassador in Paris, Izvolsky, informed Sazonov: "Pishop (French Minister of Foreign Affairs — B. Sh.) told me today that, according to all the information he has, the Italian government is acting in the most energetic way on Austria in order to keep her from active action against Montenegro. If, nevertheless, the Vienna Cabinet decides on such a speech, Italy will not take part in it, but will take some points on it. Albanian coast, probably Valona and Duraptso. This is known to the Vienna Cabinet and, of course, has a moderate effect on it. In addition, Pichon has reason to think that the Roman cabinet once again confidentially informed the Austrian government that if Austria were to be involved in the war on its own, Italy would not consider itself obliged by the treaty of alliance to support it and would remain on the sidelines. This last information is confirmed, by the way, by a very secret source, which I had the opportunity to mention.

In a letter dated April 26, Izvolsky describes the relationship between the states of the tripartite alliance as follows: As soon as the discussion turned to the sole act of Austria against Montenegro, the Roman cabinet used the most energetic and sincere efforts to keep the Vienna cabinet from such a step. When the Austro-Hungarian government announced in Rome its firm decision to achieve by force, together with the rest of the powers, and

in the event of their refusal - single-handedly, the evacuation of Scutari, the Italian government replied that it would not participate in such an action against Montenegro, but, for its part, would act actively in Albania. This announcement was followed by lively negotiations between Austria, Italy and Germany, which at one point took on a very sharp character. The Vienna Cabinet tried with all its might to prevent the landing of the Italians in Albania and, with a mouthful of pell, offered to facilitate the acquisition by Italy of any island in the Aegean, for example, Rhodes. Only after Italy had expressed its absolute determination that, in the event of an Austrian action against Montenegro, to prevent parallel actions in Albapia,

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The Vienna Cabinet decided to reach an agreement with Italy on the basis of mouths, and Germany, which cared mainly about maintaining close ties between the powers of the tripartite alliance, spoke very ardently about this agreement.

"According to Pishop's conviction," Izvolsky continues, "the Italian government unquestionably preferred not only a peaceful outcome of the Scutari question, but even the collective intervention of the powers, and only under the threat of Austria's sole action did it decide on parallel actions. Mr. Tittoni also confirmed Italy's similar attitude to this question. For its part, it was only with the greatest difficulty that the Vienna Cabinet decided to give its consent to the Italian intervention in Albania and, in particular, to the Valona comma, to which Vienna had been accustomed before. still look like at sazaz bay. According to Pichon, the real rnizod almost led the tripartite alliance to an acute internal crisis, which was averted only by the vigorous pressure of the Berlin Cabinet on Vienna and Rome.

The fourth member of the tripartite alliance, Romania, was busy with the settlement of the border with Bulgaria, which we will discuss a little later. Relations between Vienna and Bucharest remained loyal so far, but from the reports of a military agent, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff could already see unfavorable symptoms. The idea of uniting all Romanians, and not as part of the Danube Monarchy, as Koprade dreamed of volume 0, became more and more popular in Romania, which began to gravitate towards the future Entente. The commonwealth of the two general staffs, however, still continued, and during the maneuvers of 1913, the arrival in Austria of an assistant to the chief of the Rumanian general staff was planned. Romania continued to make orders for weapons in Austria, but the latter began to supply rather bad guns, which sincerely upset Conrad.

Such were the relationships within the tripartite alliance.

Let's turn now to the opposite side.

As we know, Russia yielded to many disputed issues with Austria, finding no support in Paris and, especially, in London.

The stubbornness of the Montenegrins in the siege of Scutari caused, indeed, the displeasure of Petersburg, and the Russian government energetically rebuffed the claims of the Montenegrins to Scutari, going in agreement with the rest of the states and even invited them to conduct a joint naval demonstration, although she herself did not participate in it. was going to, and laid this

mission to Fraction.

Scutari fell. "An extremely critical situation has arisen," writes Buchanan, "for if the Powers had not taken any decisive measures jointly, it might have been feared that Austria would act separately, which will easily serve as a pretext for drawing Russia into the war ... Fortunately, when the situation became completely hopeless, when I considered war inevitable, King Nicholas on May 4 announced his intention to give Scutari to the powers.

Indeed, the situation was critical. In his blast sent dated April 24, Sazonov, reporting Chernogorin's agreement to concede on the Scutari question, wrote: "If a peaceful outcome had not been found on this basis

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out of the crisis that threatens the European world, then, given all, it would undoubtedly be that the moral responsibility for the mouth would fall not on Montenegro, but on Austria.

Noting that he pointed out to the Austro-Hungarian ambassador the seriousness of the situation, Sazonov continued: "If Austria showed intransigence even under such conditions, the general situation would undoubtedly become much more complicated."

"I believe," the minister ended the note, "that a wise policy dictates to Austria reasonable compliance with its weaker neighbors and, especially, with Serbia, which has shown complete correctness, which cannot but be recognized by the powers."

No matter how weighty Sazonov's note is in its threats, however, we believe that Russia's "wise policy" depended more on that fear for Constantinople, which we have already spoken about.

The idea of resolving the issue of the straits and Constantinople by force of arms has so far been shelved by Russian diplomacy.

With the fall of Adrianople on March 13, Constantinople found itself under the threat of an offensive by the Bulgarians.

On March 15, Sazonov telegrams the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, Girs, with the consent of the Minister of Marine, about the renewal of the ambassador's right to call the Black Sea Fleet if a threat arises to the capital of Turkey.

On March 22, the alarm is sounded by the one who ruined his ministerial career in the straits. Izvolsky writes to Sazonov: "In view of the danger of the movement of the Bulgarians to Constantinople, the following thought came to me, which I hasten to throw down to your good faith." This idea was that, having interested France and England, to tie Turkey together with them by money ties.

On March 26, Izvolsky informs Sazonov that Pichon has put forward a project for the dispatch of united squadrons by six powers to the Dardanelles, Rodosto and Bosphorus. The French minister wanted by this to prevent Austria from acting alone on the question of Scutari; but at the same time, - wrote Izvolsky, - "if the Bulgarians break through the Chataldzha lines and enter Constantinople, the appearance of our Fleet in Bosporus may also give

Austria a pretext for a one-man action against Serbia and Montenegro.

But Pichon is sure that the presence of a united squadron in the Sea of Marmara will keep Austria, and by the way, which Izvolsky did not sign, it also tied the hands of Russia, preventing the possibility of her "single-handed" performance, threatening a European war.

Gray in April put forward a project on the introduction of all-European control over Turkish Finance. We know how painfully Sazonov felt about the intervention of other states in the question of the straits; that is why the mentioned English project aroused his objections, set forth in a letter dated April 18 to Izvolsky, who tried to prove the expediency of the project.

Sazonov was afraid of Turkey's arms reduction. "If the defense of Constantinople and the straits," he wrote, "is not sufficiently equipped at the present time, then this circumstance, instead of meeting our interests, may serve as a dangerous temptation for the Bulgarians, then

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how the untimely raising of the question of the straits may, in turn, put us in an extremely difficult position."

The Minister was not afraid of Turkey's armaments "after the unparalleled defeat she experienced." "If the question of the straits," he wrote, "and the possibility of staging it in the near future put before us a number of the most serious tasks that require systematic implementation, then as long as this entire program is carried out, it would be it is dangerous and premature to talk about reducing the means of defense of an already weak Turkey... On the other hand, we unwittingly have a fear of too much restricting the freedom of our actions in relations between Russia and Turkey in the event of the establishment of pan-European control in it."

Sazonov expected that Turkey would fully take into account all the benefits from its rapprochement with Russia, and "Russia can derive more benefits from direct and direct relations with free Turkey than by binding it to subordination to European control, and itself to the most inevitable participation in the latter, if it were to come true."

The same point of view was shared by Minister of War Sukhomlinov, who admitted that "when the time comes to resolve the mouth (torrential — B.Sh.) issue in the sense desirable for Russia, then such a resolution will be much more difficult for Russia. and more difficult than in the absence of control.

Naval Minister Grigorovich, joining Sukhomlinov's thought, wrote to Sazonov on May 9: "Now the Turkish straits, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, sooner or later will inevitably become Russian property, because the main trade route passes here." Pointing out that "the mouth of a fair look meets the sympathy of France and England" and that "the course of international events in Europe makes it very likely that the mouth question will be raised for a solution in the near future", the Minister of Marine again insisted on the creation of a strong Fleet in the Black Sea. sea. "Until we create this sea power on the toga, it is important for us that the question of the straits should not be raised at all, that no other power encroach on them and that in

At the corresponding time, Turkey was strong enough on the European coast in order not to let Bulgaria go to Constantinople and the Dardanelles.

The limit of the latter was set by Sazonov, who put forward a project for a new border along the Enos-Media line, leaving the Chataldzha positions covering Constantinople in the hands of the Turks.

Thus, while Constantinople and Serbia were not in danger, Russia did not bring matters with Austria to a rupture, but ... it is difficult to vouch for the future. The upcoming second Balkan war again confused all the cards of diplomats.

As for France, according to the information available to Conrad, she did not want war at the present time and moderately influenced St. Petersburg.

Indeed, when the Scutari crisis arose, the Government of the Republic sounded the alarm. "From my successive telegrams," Izvolsky wrote to Sazonov on April 21, "you could conclude the degree of anxiety experienced by the French government during the last days. Last Sunday it was most felt here that the crisis had reached its culminating point, and that from the outcome of the

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The meeting of ambassadors in London depends on the preservation of the common peace... Pichon saw in our intention to categorically speak out against the action of Austria - a break in the all-European agreement with its inevitable consequences, the withdrawal of the Hranco-Agglian squadron, the closing of the London meeting of ambassadors and the provision of a dominant role in the events Austria and her allies."

"In the future, according to Pichon, such a turn of affairs would inevitably lead to an armed clash between Russia and Austria, and, consequently, to a general European war. Therefore, as you know from my telegram, he instructed Delcassé, who was to return to St. Petersburg on Monday, to P. Kambov to support the idea of litter 9 in the most energetic way. Gray on the definition of known boundaries for the risky action of Austria.

"Anxiety ... intensified even more when they learned here about the proposed parallel performance by Itasia in Albappi," Izvolsky pointed out.

In a word, Paris tried in every possible way to keep Austria from separate actions, knowing that they would be followed by Russian intervention, just as Petersburg had to be kept from individual actions in Constantinople, the results of which would also be a European war.

"After all," writes Poincaré in his book, "it was we who in 1912 demanded and achieved that all Eastern questions be considered as questions of a general European character." Poincaré considers this a masterpiece of French peacekeeping policy, we already see otherwise, namely: the system of alliances in Europe was such that it was enough for one of their members to be active, as almost automatically others had to intervene in the war; therefore, France sought to delay the start of the war, which did not correspond to its financial deals, and also to achieve a greater military readiness than that which was in 1913

year.

England followed in the footsteps of Paris, whose policy held back the active actions of both her allies, and at the same time the English Navy was actively preparing for war.

If Poincaré at the end of 1912 found a strategic situation, with the appearance of a strong Balkan federation favorable for a tripartite agreement, then now the Balkan alliance was tearing at all seams and threatening a new war among the alliance itself, being, thanks to the mouth, not a force, but a source of weakness for triple agreement.

In such a situation, it would be better to wait for the results of the second Balkan war and postpone the start of the world war.

All the "great" powers of Europe came to this decision in preparation. to new events in the Balkans...

CHAPTER SH

SECOND BALKAN WAR

Konrad writes to Berchtold about the need to use the Serbian-Bulgarian conflict to attack Serbia. — Konrad's conversation on May 6 with a Bulgarian military agent. — Berchtold for the non-intervention of Austria in the conflict. — Konrad and Berchtold are against demobilization. - "Armed people" and a long state of reserve under the banners. - The main enemies of Serbia. — Konrad insists on mobilization according to option "B". - "Great Bulgaria" and "Great Serbia". — Redl's spying. — "Searching" for a war with Russia or "tolerating" such a war. — Opinions on the ego of Konrad and Berchtold. — Calendar of the Second Balkan War. - Orientation July 14 Konrad by his deputy and the answer of Konrad. — Konrad's thoughts on joint actions with Russia against Turkey. — Major military measures must be combined with decisive goals. — Konrad asks Berchtold on 25 August for policy guidelines for upcoming work on the war plan. — The political lines of Austria as understood by Konrad. - Politics must take into account the ratio of the military now. - Konrad again about the inclusion of Serbia in the monarchy by peaceful means. - Franz Ferdinand's attack against Konrad at the Austrian maneuvers in the autumn of 1913 - Konrad's request for resignation and a letter from Franz - Ferdinand. "Konrad remains as chief of staff. - "For every general, there comes a time"... - Moltke's mood and his thoughts on the second Balkan war. - "The Balkan lattice." - "Russia is planted in nettles." — Moltke's advice to Austria to reckon with reality. — Jagow on the role of Germany in the second Balkan war. - German maneuvers in the autumn of 1913 and correspondence between Konrad and Moltke. — Moltke's opinion on the tripartite alliance. - Konrad's trip and maneuvers are in question. — Moltke's chagrin. "Diplomacy is throwing stones in the way of the soldiers." — Moltke's hope that politics will not disturb his friendship with Konrad. - A meeting of the three chiefs of the general staff. Konrad's conversation with Wilhelm. "Pollio was not Igalia." — An Austrian military agent on Italian politics. - The policy of Rome in the coverage of Izvolsky. Romania is moving away from the tripartite alliance. — Aggressive intentions of Serbia. — Defeat of Bulgaria. — Position of Turkey. — Greece and Wilhelm. - Russia and the question of the "straits". - The main concern of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the summer of 1913. — Draft report Nemitsa and his fate. — Russian pressure on Turkey. - Bucharest peace and Sazonov's grief. - Consolation of Izvolsky and his projects. — The plight of French politics. — Temperance in England.

If we recall, then Wilhelm bitterly and not without reason called the Balkan: "a box of surprises." Once opened, this "box" began to present one surprise after another. The issue of Scutari had not yet been settled, when a conflict was brewing in the eastern Balkans between Serbia and Greece, on the one hand, and Bulgaria, on the other, over the division of the booty won. This dispute was joined by the Romanian-Bulgarian controversy over the issue of the border in Dobruja. In a word, the Balkans again "smell of blood."

As you know, according to the chief of the general staff of the Danube

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empire, fate again smiled at Austria-Hungary. The conflict was only just beginning, but Conrad was already pushing Berchtold to war.

In three letters to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on May 6-7, 1913, the Chief of the General Staff sets out his views on future events in the Balkans and outlines the monarchy's plan of action.

Pointing out that renunciation of the occupation of Albania is now the most correct, Konrad confirms this by saying that "the political situation is taking on a completely new turn, which places the monarchy in front of a decision of tremendous importance and gives advantages to achieve it strongly. compromised interests in the Balkans, if it (the monarchy) decides and goes into action with all its might. This situation consists in

raging Serbo-Bulgarian conflict. If Austria remains on the sidelines, then the Greater Serbian question will not

solved and will prove to be a constant threat for the future.

The solution proposed by Konrad is the most radical one: "to act on the side of Bulgaria, announce the mobilization of "B" and advance into Serbia."

Russia is unlikely to come out, since the Slavs are fighting with the Slavs, and even if it declares war, then the chances for the monarchy at the present time are more favorable than in the future, since Serbia is connected.

Italy will be neutral or invade Southern Albania. For neutrality, Romania must be promised the Negotinsky district of Serbia, or, in extreme cases, give up Silistria.

At this "great" moment for the monarchy, Konrad asks Berchtold to establish "firm" policy lines. Reporting on the visit of his Bulgarian military attache and on the conversation with him, the chief of the general staff quite clearly stated: "It is very important to know whether you approve of the above considerations: 1) with regard to military training, 2) with regard to the correct lines in conversations with foreign attachés.

Conrad strongly advises to stop paying attention to the European powers and start a war, because otherwise it would be difficult to justify before the government institutions of the monarchy those great sacrifices that are made both in financial appropriations and in diverting, for several months, the called-up reservists from works.

The chief of the general staff scares Berchtold with the growth of Serbia in case

the defeat of Bulgaria and proposes not to engage in "small" matters in Albania, but to embark on the path of "big" decisions.

Having set Serbia as an evil goal for the monarchy, Conrad does not reject the possibility of achieving this by peaceful means, developing before the minister his draft of 1912, which is already known to us, and therefore we will not repeat it.

"The main task, especially based on military considerations," Konrad explains, "I must make a choice without hesitation of one or another road, since otherwise there is a danger of being a loser if he hesitates in this respect or if he passively waits."

"I beg you," finishing the letter on May 7, the chief of the general. Headquarters, to make me quite definitely aware of everything that is within the scope of my competence, since the military training that lies with me depends on this, which is not carried out at the last possible

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ment, but is of a long-term nature. This is the case in every state, but especially in a state with a complex structure, as in ours."

Indeed, Konrad was in a difficult position when, on May 6, a Bulgarian military agent who visited him asked him to clarify the lines of Austrian policy in the event of a Serbian-Bulgarian conflict. "I explained to him," the chief of staff now writes, "that I can answer only after talking with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, since I, as a soldier, am not called upon to establish the lines of policy."

Letters from the Chief of the General Staff alarmed Berchtold, and on May 8 he appeared in Konrad's office. Speaking about the change in the political situation, Berchtold noted that, in general, one should go with Bulgaria, but it seems that under pressure from Russia, the Serbs and Bulgarians will end the dispute amicably.

The chief of the general staff was of a different opinion.

The interlocutor - a diplomat expressed doubts about the need for such large preparations as the mobilization of "B" for action against Montenegro, and the duration of the mobilization of 12 days.

"No," replied Konrad, "we need weeks in Bosnia, since we have no railways there. Only narrow gauge roads. Do not forget that. Montenegrins are ready in two days."

"Yes, why Montenegro, and not us?" Berchtold asked.

The chief of staff had to launch into an explanation of the advantages of the Montenegrin militia military system, while the Austrians had to take out the natives of Bosnia inside the monarchy, and from the latter deliver spares to Bosnia.

On the same day, the Minister of Foreign Affairs sent Conrad a written answer.

Berchtold selects four from the letters of the chief of the general staff.

moment, to which then, "point by point", and gives the answer.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs writes that major military operations in Albania could take place only if the Montenegrin question is resolved; now this is no longer the case, and order in Albania will be established by the gendarmes. Conrad's fears that Italy is trying to become a firm foot in southern Albania by occupying Valopa, Berthold dispels by pointing out that "official" Italy has gone off the wrong path.

According to the minister, Austrian diplomacy is constantly striving to eliminate the Romanian-Bulgarian dispute and to draw Bulgaria into the triple union.

Concerning Konrad's proposals to take advantage of the brewing Serbian-Bulgarian conflict and resolve the Greater Serbian question, Berchtold points out that friendly relations should be maintained both with Serbia and Bulgaria. For the monarchy, the union of the Serbs with the Bulgarians is unprofitable, since it can turn against it; besides, we have to reckon with the war against Russia. Any fight between Germanism and the Slavs, with Italy striving to occupy Valona, for the monarchy, for purely internal reasons, would be very undesirable at the present time.

Pointing out that everything stated was strictly confidential and only personally for the chief of staff, Berchtold ended the letter with the usual kindly
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The arguments of the MP, however, were far from conclusive for Conrad, who continued to be regarded as the next chance for Austria to enter the war.

He was disturbed by the position of Germany, in which even the chief of the general staff, according to a military agent, believed that the conflict in the Balkans would be resolved through diplomacy. The actions of the German ambassador to Cherpogorin again urged Konrad to address on this occasion with a letter to Berchtold on May 12.

Austria continued to keep conscripted reservists, whose spirits were falling and whose maintenance was a heavy burden on the budget. The vociferous emperor entered with the idea of demobilization, which greatly alarmed both Konrad and the foreign minister.

On May 20, the head of the general staff, at the report of Franz Joseph, also made a proposal for war against the Serbians, believing that fate once again favors the success of the monarchy.

As just pointed out, the demobilization proposal evoked a rebuff from Konrad, but, being an opponent of demobilization in this situation, on May 23, in a letter to Berchtold, he indicated that to keep the reservists under fire for a long time, without bringing them into action, *pelzya*, as it undermines the spirit and discipline of the army. It is necessary to clarify the political situation as soon as possible.

Noting that military preparations are expensive and affect the morale of the army, the chief of the general staff mentioned that they must be taken when important things are persecuted.

"Since," Konrad wrote, "these military preparations are primarily within the scope of my official duties, I ask you to let me know what the current foreign policy challenges are, so that I would be aware of the appropriate military measures." - acceptance.

In the end of the letter, the chief of the General Staff pointed out that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should by no means communicate directly with the army inspectors, because such relations should be conducted either with the military minister or with the head of the general headquarters.

The next day, during Koprad's meeting with Berchtold, the conversation turned again to demobilization. The Minister found it necessary to cover the rear of the Bulgarians.

"In order not to help the Bulgarians," Konrad replied. "It is highly likely that this is the last opportunity to resolve the Serbian question profitably." "So," the chief of staff declared decisively, "the announcement of mobilization according to option "B" and the invasion of Serbia. There should not be even a cover for the rear (Bulgarians - B. Shch.), as an offensive against the Serbs.

Berchtold was far from this and offered to tell Serbin that if she did not give in, then the monarchy would be on the sidelines of Bulgaria.

"Yes," answered Koprad, "but then we won't be able to make concessions at the last moment. Keeping aimlessly for a long time under the banner of the people is unacceptable for the "armed people".

Of course, Koprad's plans were no secret to the Serbs, and in his letter of May 23 he informed Berchtold that, according to available information,

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at the State Council held in Belgrade, it was stated: "The main enemies of Serbia are the Austro-Hungarian emperor, but above all the heir and yah. So wrote the chief of the general staff, pleased in his heart with such "popularity."

Berchtold's proposal for demobilization did not go unanswered either, and Berchtold sent him a "note" on May 24, copying it to Konrad.

Recognizing such a measure as "untimely", Berchtold said that the crisis on the southern border of the monarchy and the defeat of Turkey were coming to an end. Having initially sided with Turkey, the monarchy played an ungrateful and dangerous role, strengthening the Balkan union and thus creating a new state association on the map of Europe.

Having received the "note", the chief of staff immediately: 1) sketched out remarks to it, in which he outlined everything that he talked about with Berchtold and what we have already quoted above, and 2) these remarks, together with a letter on May 28, sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In the letter, Konrad considered it his direct duty, based on "military considerations", to establish the position that the monarchy would take in the event of a Serbo-Bulgarian conflict.

It is not necessary to repeat that the "position" of the mouth, according to Conrad, is to attack Serbia, for "Greater Serbia" would be a great danger to the monarchy.

Pointing out that he considers an attack on Serbia to be the only correct way, Konrad resolutely declares that if Berchtold takes this path, it is necessary now: 1) to obtain the emperor's indispensable consent to this; 2) negotiate with Bulgaria.

"The necessity of the proposed measures," Konrad wrote, "is dictated by the fact that a war between Bulgaria and Serbia can break out every day, and if the monarchy's assistance to the Bulgarians must be provided in a timely manner in order to prevent the military success of the Serbs, then the entry of the monarchy must occur immediately after the declaration of war. . But it must be taken into account that the mobilization and concentration of the forces necessary for this will take about 16 days, only after which the Serbian border can be crossed.

"This starting data, which, as strictly secret, is communicated only to you, must always be kept in mind."

"For war, mobilization according to option "B" is necessary. The aim of the war would be: the decisive overthrow of Serbia. And then Conrad, no. shy, divides Serbia into pieces.

Outlining a program of action for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Chief of the General Staff stubbornly walked towards his cherished goal.

The Viennese diplomat, as we have pointed out earlier, found herself in a difficult position, dividing her friendship between Bulgaria and Romania, a conflict between which was brewing. Both of the Balkan states were necessary for the Habsburg Empire. But for this reason, on the same dates in May, the Chief of the General Staff, writing to Berchtold, found it necessary to preserve the alliance with Rumania, and for this, try to eliminate her misunderstandings with Bulgaria. Konrad believed that Bulgaria should voluntarily transfer to Romania the areas up to the Linpi Turtukay -

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Balchik. Only in this situation can Bulgaria count on the support of Austria.

On May 31, Konrad had a conversation with Berchtold. The diplomat believed that the withdrawal of Bulgarian territory to Romania will always be a bone of contention between these countries, and Austria will not succeed in establishing their friendship. On the other hand, "great" Bulgaria would be a danger to Austria-Hungary.

"However, "great Bulgaria" is more profitable for us than "great Serbia," the chief of the general staff threw in response.

Intense activity of the head of the Austro-Hungarian general. headquarters was overshadowed by the severe betrayal of one of the chiefs of staff of the corps, Redai, who was convicted of espionage. As thunder broke the news about. this over Konrach, causing a great storm in Austria, and also resonating in Berlin. In its place, we will talk about this in more detail, but now we will note it only as a factor that complicated the position of the chief of the general staff.

"Yes, these difficulties are known to me," Berchtold ended the conversation.

June brought with it a decision: on 26 June the Bulgarian commander-in-chief received an order to start hostilities. "Everyone was tensely waiting," Konrad writes in his memoirs, "whose side the military success will turn to." Success began to lean towards the Serbs and Greeks.

The threat of Romanian intervention was becoming real. True, Romania, assessing the policy of Austria and gradually leaving the orbit of the tripartite alliance, began to fumble, as if not to receive a blow to the rear from the Danubian monarchy. However, it was impossible to miss the opportunity to profitably "straighten" the southern border, and on July 3 the mobilization of the Romanian army was announced.

We take the liberty of recalling the calendar course of events in the Balkans.

On July 10, Romania declared war on Bulgaria, and the Romanian army began to invade the latter.

On July 22 the Turvi captured Adrianople.

Surrounded on all sides, having lost all its previous acquisitions, on July 30, Bulgaria went to Canossa - to Bucharest - to negotiate peace with its former allies.

On August 10, the Peace of Bucharest was concluded, from which Romania, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro emerged greatly strengthened. Austria had no choice but to raise the issue of revising the Bucharest Peace Treaty. -

If Russia and Italy were not averse to reconsidering it, then Germany resolutely rebelled against this, and Wilhelm congratulated the Romanian Charles on his victory.

Vienna also had a chance to make a pleasant smile: on August 12, Franz Josich sent a telegram of greetings to Bucharest.

Turkey's active actions caused a rebuff from Russia: it began. diplomatic struggle around Adrianople, which Petersburg was not inclined to return to the Turks. On September 29, by the Constantinople peace of the Bogars with the Turks, this issue was also resolved in favor of the Turks. The second Balkan war has found its end, but... for how long?

Let's go back to Vienna. Since a peaceful mood was created in it, the chief of the general staff turned to his current work, spending time on field trips with the generals and the general staff. Conversations with Berthold were interrupted, but the correspondence went on all the time.

We already know the thoughts of Konrad, who looked with alarm at the military successes of the Serbs. It is clear that the more military happiness smiled at the Serbian army, the more the face of the Chief of the Austrian General Staff darkened.

His deputy, who remained in Vienna, on July 14 gave a report on what happened.

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aaa In the running events. He wrote that the mood of diplomacy is peaceful; there is no need to think about any rejection from Serbia of at least part of the territory; They want to keep Rumania in the union, so they are going to allow the passage of agricultural workers from Bukovipa to Rumania: if

Russia will take "serious" steps, then Vienna should also act; Greece begins to gravitate (apparently as a result of Wilhelm's policy) towards a tripartite alliance and is imbued with the most aggressive intentions towards Bulgaria; there is no need to talk about strengthening the occupation detachment in Scutari: Berchtold put forward a proposal to create a strong orchestra there.

The next day Konrad answered his deputy.

"In any case," wrote the Chief of the General Staff, "the sad prospect that appears as a logical, inexorably consistent result of the timid policy of 1908-09; we happily sit down between the chairs, like one who does not dare to pursue independent positive goals. We propose to live in peace, splitting into all "sides".

In the interval between zero trips, the chief of the general staff on July 27 had a conversation with Berchtold and, "in accordance with his custom to put the most important proposals in writing," Konrad "allows himself" this time to fix the conversation on paper on July 27.

The Chief of the General Staff dwells on the main thing - on Russia's threats to Turkey in order to force the latter to withdraw beyond the Epos-Media line, thereby saving Bulgaria and gaining influence in the Eastern Balkans.

The essence of Conrad's proposals boils down to the fact that, taking advantage of Russia's appearance in Armenni or on the European coast, Austria 6 in turn would second to Serdia. The Chief of the General Staff again repeats all the benefits of Serbia's apnexpi.

"In such an action against Serbia, one must reckon with the possibility of a Russian action against the moparchy and with the war of the entire tripartite alliance," Konrad warns, "and therefore I inform you with strict confidentiality that if the action of Russia occurs in the first fourteen days, then the transition from option "B" to option "R" is prepared and can be carried out."

Bitterly noting that Hermapia pursues its own selfish goals, Konrad comes to the conclusion that "chivalry in politics" is a bad thing, as well as "gratitude", which was proved by Serbia in 1886, when the moparchy saved it from the Bulgarian invasion.

Konrad points out that a big defeat of the Bulgarians is dangerous for Austria.

Turning to the possible actions of Russia against Turkey, the chief of staff first of all repeats that he considers it necessary to pursue the evil goal - the defeat of Serbia and for this use the main forces. Russia can limit itself to actions at sea, land on the Black Sea coast, or, together with the Romanians, advance on the European coast. In the first case, the Austrian fleet must defend the Adriatic coast. Konrad does not believe in the possibility of a Russian landing, because a landing with insignificant forces will not be made, and it is difficult to land large forces. Most likely the Russian offensive through Romania.

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If the monarchy does not want Russia alone to be the savior of Bol-

Garin, then she is also obliged to take part in this offensive, blaming 6 Romania Hl vortus, composed of Romanians, and subordinating it to the Romanian command.

Summing up all that has been said above, the chief of the general headquarters. writes: "The whole point is that major military measures will only justify themselves when they are combined with large decisive goals. It would be completely inappropriate to carry out such measures as, for example, mobilization, without those put on combat readiness not being strongly abandoned for a strike, as has already happened twice, and again demobilization.

wash them."

Koprade did not calm down on this and on July 30 again wrote to Berchtold, discussing the same question. On the one hand, the chief of the general staff, taking into account Germany's commercial interest in the independent Balkan states, is afraid that she will not seriously support the aggressive plans of the monarchy; on the other hand, the main obstacle to the advance of Austria in the Balkans, in his opinion, is Russia. Konrad is ready to come to an agreement and offer Russia the east of the Balkans and Turkey - with the fact that Austria will have "arched springs" in the west, that is, in Serbia, Cherpogoriyya and Albania. If the mouth succeeded, then the Serbian question could be settled either by a campaign against Serbia or by its peaceful incorporation—like Hanover or Bavaria in Germany—into a monarchy. If it is necessary to fight, then only now, since the reservists are already tired, and besides, the campaign in the autumn is fraught with great difficulties. In conclusion, the chief of the general staff asks Berchtold to give a written answer, tay. It is much better to condemn such major questions in writing than orally.

Berchtold limited himself to gratitude for the letters, and did not give any instructions.

When the question arose of compelling the Turks to purify Frakpi, and in Austria they began to incline to the need for this in order to save Bulgaria, Konrad on August 16 considered it necessary to write a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Referring to his already expressed views that it is impossible, for the sake of Bulgaria's gratitude, to embark on military adventures, Conrad believed that the military forces of the monarchy can only be used to achieve important goals, and not for demonstrations, secondary actions, etc. . P.

Usually in the summer, the operational bureau worked out options for the war plan for the next year. The chief of staff was aware that such work required political orientation, for which he wrote to Berchtold on August 25, 1913.

"In the near future, the main provisions for updating military considerations for 1914 should be given. This work requires me, first of all, together with you, to establish, on the basis of changes in the general political situation, new political foundations for future military measures for the defense of the monarchy.

The chief of the general staff considered the first of these foundations to be the strict and loyal preservation of the tripartite alliance, which is dictated by the emerging

the ratio of military forces. Disagreements in the alliance would be fraught with bad consequences for the monarchy. However, recent events show that Austria cannot fully rely on the assistance of the Allies in achieving her goals in the Balkans. The development of its own armed forces has lagged behind, and in the Balkans, as a result of two wars, the balance of forces is not in favor of Austria-Hungary.

As you know, Konrad continues to argue, in recent years one always has to reckon with the hostility of Serbia and Montenegro, as in the past years with Piedmont. This hostility of the said Slavic states is preserved in full measure in the future.

However, due to the military strengthening of Serbia, it is now no longer possible to count on its diversion by Albania and Bulgaria - states whose military power will not show itself soon.

The situation will become even more difficult if, in a future clash with Russia, Romania falls out of the alliance or even finds itself in the camp of enemies.

Konrad asks Berchtold to give him an orientation on the position of Rumania, and in the event of a hostile position, the military brigade will require significant changes and large assignments; he cannot and does not intend to bear responsibility for this with one optimism about Austro-Romanian relations.

The Chief of Staff asks to take into account that the transition of Romania to the camp of enemies deprives the tripartite alliance of assistance not from 15 Romanian divisions, but from all 30 divisions.

Konrad declares that his service obliges Berchtold to find out this, for: "an error in the correlation of military forces will inevitably lead to a situation from which even the most dexterous diplomacy will not find a way out and the most courageous army will not avert disaster."

In order to get out of the difficult political situation that has arisen, the chief of the general staff returns again to his former idea of incorporating Serbia into the monarchy by peaceful means, about which on September 6, before leaving for maneuvers, he writes a letter to Berchtold, in a copy bringing him to the attention of Franz Joseph and heir.

Coming up with this proposal, Konrad teaches that "although the military splices serve politics, the latter will lose ground if it does not take into account the correlation of military forces."

Politics should also keep Rumania in the alliance, although it must not be hushed up that in Bucharest the appetites for the capture of Semigradum are growing more and more.

"I must," says Conrad, "as I have often and repeatedly repeated, declare even now that the military forces of the monarchy cannot guarantee success in the event of a simultaneous war with Russia, Serbia, Montenegro and Romania, and therefore politics must enter on the path that I have outlined above.

At the end of the letter, the chief of staff advises the minister, when approaching Serbia, not to look back at other states, including even Italy and Germany, but to be guided only by the monarchy's own interests.

Having sent this letter, Konrad went to the German maneuvers, where he was invited by the chief of the Italian general staff. |

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The maneuvers, but to the composition of the units participating in them, were not of military interest, and visits to them by the chiefs of staff of friendly states should be considered as a political move towards rapprochement between the Austrian and Italian general staffs.

Below we will consider the political activities of Konrad during these maneuvers, and now, apologizing to the reader, we turn to the relationship between Konrad and Franpem-Ferdinand, which took on a rather sharp character during the subsequent German Austrian maneuvers in Bo.

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As is known, at first Conrad found active support in the person of the young Habsburg, but over time, their remissions began to deteriorate.

The incident with Redl, whose forced suicide was contrary to the "pious" views of the "orthodox catholician" what the heir was, and then his sharp review of the entire general headquarters - served as a pretext for disagreement between these two comrades-in-arms in the struggle to strengthen the military power of Austria-Hungary.

Army maneuvers were scheduled for mid-September in Bohemia and were intended to give practice to the army command. Francp-Ferdinand was the leader of the maneuvers, and Konrad was his chief of staff.

September 12 Konrad departed for maneuvers. On the 14th, Franz-Ferdinapd arrived with his retinue and immediately went to the church. Having met Habsburg, the chief of staff did not follow him to pray, but went to the headquarters, and when an hour later he appeared with a report to the leader, he found him in a highly excited state.

The gray-haired chief of staff was severely reprimanded for his absence from the church, because Habsburg did not allow the thought that, once he went to church, someone would not go there, no matter what the religious convictions of this person were.

Koprad was lost in conjectures about the reason for such disfavor. Its continuation did not slow down. On the very first day of the maneuvers, Francpe-Ferdinand, finding fault with the disorder in the cars parked at the entrance, burst into anger at the entire general headquarters. On the way, in the car, he started a conversation with Konrad about Wallenstein's "piss" against the dynasty, thereby making it clear to his interlocutor that he should not be very popular in the army either.

The matter ended with Francp-Ferdinand, having confused all the dwarfs of the chief of staff for directing a bilateral maneuver, took it directly into his own hands, reducing the maneuvers to an offensive against the designated counter-pak.

Konrad remained a mere spectator, for all the orders went beyond him and the headquarters.

Returning to Vienna on September 18, the chief of the general staff sent a letter of resignation to Frapp-Ferdinand, while he himself went on vacation.

Habsburg began looking for a substitute, but on September 23 unexpectedly sent a letter to Konrad.

Spreading courtesies to Konrad in appreciating his high

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honors as a military man and as a "patriot", Habsburg hoped that Konrad would continue to serve elsewhere. However, the op asks Konrad to wait until spring and remain in the post of chief of the general staff. Reasons for this: 1) there should not be a conviction that Konrad is leaving because of disagreements with Franz-Ferdinand, since the whole world knows how the young Habsburg defended the second appointment of Konrad; 2) Konrad is now so highly valued by Wilhelm that his departure would be undesirable, 3) it is necessary that the opposition newspapers do not trumpet this incident.

As a conclusion, in the interests of the service, Franz Ferdinand asked Konrad to make a sacrifice and remain in the post of chief of the general staff, at least for the winter.

The "tone and content" of the letter, according to Konrad, ruled out for him to resign, and he, having answered Franz-Ferdinand, returned to Vienna on September 28 to his office.

After listing all the reasons that forced him to submit his resignation, the chief of the general staff wrote to the offender that he did this without much distress, "since I am very well aware that for every general there comes a time when, in the interests of service, should be replaced by a younger one".

Thanks for the trust and the "gracious" letter, the chief of the general staff again returned to his duties.

We deliberately dwell on this quarrel between the two leaders of the "Pesar" army, as a characteristic in general in the life of the general staffs of various armies, and not only the Austro-Hungarian one. No matter how hard it is for self-esteem, but we must not forget that "for every general there comes a time when, in the interests of service, he must be replaced by a younger one." We do not know the true feelings of Konrad, but even such an authority as Schlieffep, and he experienced his resignation rather painfully.

The reader of our work remembers well that the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff made the preservation of the triple alliance an indispensable condition for Vienna's policy. However, the allies were not as unified in achieving their goals as Wonrad would have liked.

We know that Berlin has been reticent in helping Austria, and there is nothing to say about Italy.

Hogya was a German military agent and E May Konrad's assurance that Germany would support Austria in the event of a conflict, but the Chief of Staff had no

mouth of firm confidence.

If we remember that Wilhelm did not want to sacrifice the bones of the Pomeranian grenadiers for the sake of the Balkans, and the German envoy in Montenegro openly went against the Viennese demands, then Conrad's distrust will become understandable.

The mood of the Berlin political circles was guided partly by the chief of the general staff from conversations with Berchtold, and partly from the reports of his military agent.

Although Koprad's intimate correspondence with the Chief of the German General Staff was temporarily suspended, both friends continued to receive information about each other from the reports of their military representatives.

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We know that Moltke was firmly convinced of the impending war between the Slavs and Germanism, and therefore the events in the Balkans, which threatened to turn into this struggle, attracted his attention.

Anticipating again "dances in the Balkans," the chief of the German General Staff wrote in his intimate letter: "How this war will affect the position of the great powers, no one can say. We eat a lot. far from peaceful relations.

On May 20, a military agent from Berlin wrote to Konrad that Moltke fully believed in the loyalty of Italy and was very glad that the matter of concluding a naval convention between Austria and Italy was moving forward.

The second Balkan war was brewing. In addition to it, Germany was closely interested in the question of Asia Minor, with the construction of railways in it, where French capital wanted to get a concession, and Russia stubbornly strove. invade Armenia. For Berlin, a strong Turkey was needed, about which: Moltke had already spoken earlier and what so far remained under doubt.

On June 18, the Chief of the German General Staff spoke with an Austrian military agent, handing him the published books to send to Konrad. "Because Moltke only considers the next European war. into which all the states of the continent will be drawn, it is necessary, in his opinion, to strive to create the most favorable environment .. in order to act strong," wrote military agent Konrad. For this, it is necessary to establish friendly relations with Italy and to see a strong military factor in Turkey, which is not yet the case. "War can hardly be avoided" - . the chief of the German General Staff denounced the political situation.

His conclusions were correct. The war was in full swing. "Events: in the Balkans, things are not going the way I wanted them to. The Bulgarians seem to be the losers everywhere," wrote Moltke in an intimate letter on 11 July. Considering that the Bulgarian Ferdinand completely fell under the influence of the military party,. Moltke came to the conclusion that Bulgaria was playing for broke. The Turks stirred and it would be foolish of them not to take advantage of the current situation.

"We are all crushed by the events in the Balkans," says the letter from the Chief of the German General Staff dated July 19 from Norway, where

he went with Wilhelm. "No one knows what it is. should come out" after the entry into the war of Romania and yeshe. The Bulgarians have driven the strategist from the banks of the Spree into despair, and he comes to the conclusion that. "The best thing was to enclose the Balkans with bars and not remove them. until they all kill each other."

"Until Austria and Russia intervene in the fight, until then I do not see the danger of a European conflict," Moltke wrote on July 19, and on July 22 he was already "satisfied" with the course of military events in the Balkans and their political turn. The joy of the Chief of the German General Staff and his companions is explained by the fact that Russia, which claimed the role of a judge, was "put in nettles" by the belligerents, saying that they were asking not to interfere in their case. For the forthcoming struggle of Germanism with the Slavs, the situation is developing quite favorably, since Greece is getting stronger and its alliance with Rumania is creating an anti-Slavic grouping in the Balkans.

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"Austria seems to have seen," continues Moltke, "that one must reckon with circumstances as they actually are, and not with those that are desirable. Her hostile relations with Rumania seem to be aggravated, which for us, bearing in mind the probable clash of Germanism with the Slavs, is of tremendous importance.

Expressing dissatisfaction with Bulgaria, which showed an example of transition from enormous successes to utter impotence, unprecedented in history, lamenting the cruelty of the warring in the Balkans and China, the chief of the tender staff hit pacifism: "How many people are killed daily
it's brewing."

So frantically assessed the position of Moltke in letters to his wife, in front of whom he hardly considered it necessary to be a diplomat.

Jagow in his book "The Causes and Beginning of the World War" writes: Germany sought to maintain peace in the Balkans, which contradicts. assertion 0b of the aggressiveness of German policy in the Middle East. We very often advised our Austrian ally to improve relations with Serbia as much as possible."

Germany's goal was to strengthen Turkey, keep Rumania in an alliance and win Greece over to its side, which was also dictated by the family ties of both courts. Bulgaria did not represent a special price for Berlin. "At the present moment, Austria is completely isolated morally and politically, and even Germany is turning away from her impossible policy," Izvolsky wrote to Sazonov on August 14, 1913.

How deep this was, our further narration will show.

On August 23, Koprade learned at the Foreign Office of his forthcoming invitation to the German Mapeuri, which would have political significance and, probably, desirable for Berchtold.

Correspondence about the maneuvers began in the summer. On July 1, Konrad received a letter from a military agent from Berlin, in which it was written in strict confidence that an invitation would follow through the ministry to the chief of the general staff for mapevres. Although Moltke still did not say anything to the agent 0

maneuvers, but it was clear that the Chief of the German General Staff wanted to get Koprads closer to Pollno. The maneuvers are in the nature of corps, and therefore "their military significance is decisively inferior to the political."

On June 29, the Chief of the German General Staff, in a letter to Konrad, expressed his warm comradely sympathy to his colleague in Vienna on the incident with Redl. "A long time passed," Moltke wrote, "during which we did not correspond, but my thoughts often turned to you, and I acutely felt the full weight of the unfortunate incident that happened to you."

Moltke wrote that he had already transmitted through a military agent about his report to Wilhelm, which emphasized that "change in the existing relations of the allies is excluded" (insurance was made just in case, and, according to Ludendorff, the ally on the Danube was not informed in detail war plan, because Vienna was not trusted).

"But enough of that," continued Moltke, and invited Konrad to look to the future with confidence, walking hand in hand with Germany. Letter

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was written even before the outbreak of the second war, and speaking of the impending events in the Balkans, Moltke noted: "I am not orientated on what position your government will take in the Balkans, but I only know that if it comes to a collision, then the triple alliance will fulfill its duty". In these views, Moltke warmly welcomed the rapprochement between Austria and Italy and said that from the private letters of the Italian Chief of Staff it could be concluded with confidence that both he and the government were firmly on the side of the alliance. Pollio, as well as Konrad, will be invited to the maneuvers, and the Italian Chief of Staff is eager to meet Konrad.

Pointing out that due to economy, this year's maneuvers would be only corps-based and therefore of no particular interest, Moltke still expressed the hope of seeing Konrad. "So, isn't it true, you will come? .. It would be a great joy for me to see you again and shake your hand. You see, dear comrade, that I am telling you everything quite frankly and I ask you to consider the foregoing, first of all, as a private opinion."

July 0 Konrad replied to Berlin. Koprads, noting the joy with which he read Moltke's letter, wrote that in the past time he had to endure quite a few troubles: first of all, the events in the Balkans that were important for him, which negatively responded to the positions of the tripartite alliance, then "a role that is not very pleasant for a soldier played by the monarchy all this time" and, finally, Redl's crime; worries Konrad and Romania. "How rightly you say: one should reckon with circumstances in their present form, look into the eyes of the future, and, with complete unanimity, hold fast to each other."

In the events in the Balkans, which are not yet clear, Konrad, however, saw a favorable situation emerging. At the same time, he expressed a desire to see Pollno, who, from the negotiations on a maritime convention, could judge how impartial Koprads was.

"For the rest, God knows what summer will bring with it," concluded the letter.

Koprald, for his part, expressing the very best and comradely wishes of Moltke.

Meanwhile, the question arose about the participation of Franz-Ferdinand himself in the maneuvers, which was supposed to serve as an indicator of the political unity of Berlin with Vienna. Conrad's trip was out of the question, which he informed Moltke.

On August 27, the Chief of the German General Staff regretted this in writing. If the Mapevres were not of military interest, then Moltke ardently desired, after a long break, to see Conrad again and have a talk. "Well, now," wrote Moltke, "as often happens, diplomacy is throwing stones in the way of a soldier." Thanking for his frankness, the Chief of the German General Staff added: "You know that I always firmly adhere to the tripartite alliance. I will not go out of my mouth, and I know that we will both be on it when thunderclouds appear in the sky.

"If the allied states," Moltke continued, "now do not pursue common interests in everything, this is natural, but the main thing still remains, namely: the triple alliance continues to be a powerful factor in world politics. Every crack in it must be repaired by each of the allies."

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Pointing out that cooling was taking place between Austria, on the one hand, and Rumania and Greece, on the other, the Chief of the German General Staff came to the conclusion that it would be very bad if Rumania were on the opposite side. "However," Moltke says at once, "I don't want to write to you about politics. I understand your frustrations and I know what painful feelings you are going through. But I hope that politics will not have any effect on our personal relations and we will always remain people who completely trust each other. At the end of the letter, Moltke again expressed his hope to see his comrade, despite the intrigues of politicians.

Indeed, as we know, Konrad went to the German maneuvers, where he acted more as a politician than a strategist. The meeting of the three chiefs of the general staff was supposed to signify the unity of the tripartite alliance, if not political, then military in any case. Such. there was a sign, but we will give a different opinion about the essence, and not ours.

During the maneuvers, Konrad became intimately acquainted with Pollio, had conversations with him and with Moltke, and even with Wilhelm himself.

On September 8, Wilhelm spoke with pleasure to an Austrian imperialist in military uniform. Conrad began by pointing out the changed political situation in the Balkans. Relations with Serbia can proceed only along two paths: either its peaceful entry into the monarchy, or war, in which case the Allies must help Austria.

Wilhelm agreed that it would be more profitable for Germany to see Serbia as part of Austria rather than an independent state, but this is hindered by the support of Bulgaria by Vienna and its cooling towards Romania.

Konrad tried to convince his "high" interlocutor that there was no special flirting with Bulgaria and that "great" Serbia was much more dangerous,

than Bulgaria. In 1909, despite Konrad's suggestion, Vienna did not agree to war with Serbia.

"I did not stop your army," Wilhelm answered, "and I declared that Germany is entirely on your side."

"This year also presented an opportunity to oppose Serbia," remarked the Chief of Staff.

"Why didn't that happen? Nobody bothered you," Wilhelm replied.

"The reasons lay in the London conference," Konrad rightly pointed out, "everything depended on France and Russia."

Further, the conversation turned to the need to keep Romania in the union, and both interlocutors were of the same opinion about this. When Conrad noticed that Germany was pursuing an independent policy in Greece, Wilhelm pointed out that the country should also join the triple alliance. To the remark of the chief of staff that Greek public opinion gravitates more towards France than towards Germany, Wilhelm replied: "After the victory, the king in his country can do whatever he wants. He will conduct politics as he pleases." Such was Wilhelm's view of politics.

From conversations and meetings during maneuvers, the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff got the impression of the need for close unity among the members.

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tripartite alliance, saw Moltke's confidence in the military assistance of Italy, appreciated the personality of Pollio and his loyalty to the alliance. "But General Pollio was not Italy," Konrad summarizes his attitude towards his neighbor.

As early as June 30, in his report, the military agent in Rome, Sheptytsky, opened the lining of Germany's invitation to the maneuvers of the Allied Chiefs of Staff and the policy of Italy.

Sheptytsky reported that on the German side, the invitation to the maneuvers of Pollio and Konrad was explained to him as a desire to bring these two military leaders closer.

However, he was skeptical of such explanations and believed that Germany wanted to tie Italy more closely with herself and show her that she would receive everything from Prussia and that Germany in the 6th alliance would play a leading role.

The blow by the military agent was correctly calculated and hit the most sensitive place - the vanity of the monarchy, and indeed of Conrad himself, who by no means wanted to see himself in the position of a subordinate.

Germany's sympathy for Italy was explained by Sheptydkoy: 1) by the common enemy - France, and 2) by the desire, having Italy at hand, to lower the significance of the monarchy in the union and to put more pressure on the policy of Vienna. Germany sought to give Italy various tokens of preference.

Italy is very pleased with this policy of Germany, because it: 1) gives her a firm footing in world politics and 2) allows her to hold her head high,

despite the military weakness caused by the Tripoli war.

Pteptidky advised that if Austria still wanted to play a leading role in the alliance, then it would be necessary to embark on the path of independent rapprochement by Italy, and not through German hands.

We already know that Italy sought to bind Austria's freedom of action in Albania, because Vienna deliberately delayed the establishment of order in that country. A report to Sazonov from Paris dated October 9, 1913 states: "Such a policy of Austria here is due solely to its inherent inconsistency; this power is considered here to have completely lost the ability to correctly think about its own interests and coordinate its policy with them.

On November 5/18, from Rome, the same Sazonov was informed:

"Relations between France and Italy are going through a crisis, perhaps not as acute as this summer, but nonetheless so serious that it is impossible to pass it by in silence."

During the war in Libya in Italy, there were no doubt reasons to be dissatisfied with France, and this was not denied even by the French representative in Rome. Since then, however, circumstances have changed. In recent years, Italy's policy has become aggressive. She captured Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, occupied the islands of the Aegean Sea, in every possible way tries to expand the sphere of her interests in the eastern part and the Mediterranean Sea, and in Asia Minor, and finally established her influence in southern Albania.

All this taken together caused a distrustful attitude on the part of France towards the ultimate goals of the Italian politics and gave rise to that atmosphere

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irritation, an indicator of which is the current polemic between the press of both states.

In Rome, with all the outward correctness towards France, there is a quite definite, complete absence of the former courtesy towards the neighbor, and if at all they regret the bad relations © France, then openly, at least, they do not make any attempts at rapprochement, which, however, does not in the least perhaps does not prevent the Italian representative in Paris from carefully feeling the ground for a future agreement with France, the achievement of which involves considerable difficulties, but is just as necessary. now for Italy, like the previous one, 1902, which had the object of Tripo-

litany."

At the same time, on November 20, Izvolsky wrote to Sazonov about the "extreme mistrust" with which Paris treats Italian politics. |

"The Franco-Italian rivalry in the Mediterranean, which has now resumed in such a sharp form, speaks especially strongly about sending an impressive French squadron to the Asia Minor shores."

These contradictions took such a form that in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation "the question was seriously discussed whether the time had not come to categorically demand from Italy an answer: whether the acts of the triple

union, in its latest form, with the special agreements existing between France and Italy.

Although, according to Izvolsky, the Russian ambassador in Rome treats Italian politics with "great condescension" and explains it by fear of Austria, Izvolsky considers it necessary to draw Sazonov's attention. on the Franco-Italian contradictions, because they can lead to rapprochement. France with Austria, what Austria is striving for and what, of course, its blood enemy, Izvolsky, could not allow.

In a word, Italy gravitated toward a tripartite alliance, and her naval convention remained no secret to the opposing camp.

As for the fourth enemy, Romania, the beginning of the cooling in Austro-Romanian relations and the rapprochement of Romania with the tripartite agreement was noted above, which greatly worried Germany and Conrad.

We heard how the Chief of the Rumanian General Staff feared for his rear at the outbreak of the Second Balkan War, and how the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs whether it was time to begin preparations in case of a war with Rumania. The latter remained in the triple alliance only thanks to the family ties of the Hohenzollerns, who were sitting in Berlin and Bucharest, but the policy of the Rumanian government clearly gravitated towards the opposite camp.

"Your diplomatic masterpiece," Iz-. wrote to Sazonov on August 14. Volsky, - I considered and continue to consider the diversion of Romania from Austria .. which I always dreamed of, but which I could not or could not achieve.

Such were the internal relations in the tripartite alliance, on which the chiefs of the Austro-Hungarian and German general staffs placed so much hope.

Now let's turn to the protibial group of states.

We heard; that the blood enemy of the Danubian monarchy was Serbia.

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which has now emerged victorious from the struggle for the division of booty. Bogaevich reveals to us that ŷašÿ's program was slowly but surely carried out. into life: first Macedonia, and then Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the conclusion of the Bucharest peace, according to Bogaevich, the Serbian premier frankly told the Greek representative: "The first game has been won, now the second game must be prepared—against Austria."

German and Austrian sources accuse Serbia of preparing a world war, while sources on the Russian and Serbian side portray this small country as a lamb that Austria was about to swallow.

Without hiding the greedy appetites of Vienna, it must be admitted that the lamb also wanted to snatch as much as possible from the captured, in particular, in Albania, and the "ardent patriots" were ready to go into a clash with Austria, if only mine Bosnia and Herzegovina. Success certainly turned his head even Pasic. One thing should be noted - that Serbia was not so willing: it was going to make concessions to the Viennese diplomats, as it was before.

Bolaria, having lost the war and left with nothing, lost much in its political weight, striving now to find a savior in the face of Russia or even Austria.

Turkey, holding Adrianople and Thrace, again taken from the Bulgarians, sought to preserve them, pursuing a policy of rapprochement with both Germany and France at the same time. Relations with Russia were aggravated both because of Adrianople and Thrace, and because of concessions for railways in Malaya Azip. Italy also made claims in Malaya Azip. In a word, the pressure came from all sides, it was necessary to recreate the military power in order to stand on an independent road. Austria's sympathies for the Bulgarians were well taken into account by the Turks, and when the question arose of inviting instructors: for the army, the Austro-Hungarian officers were rejected, and the invitation went to Berlin and for the Navy to London.

Greece, as we know, must have gravitated towards the triple alliance and. Indeed, Constantine aspired to it, but money matters pulled the country towards Paris.

We have heard how the tripartite alliance reacted to the events in the Balkans; let us now see what the triple agreement thought.

First of all, what did Russia, whose interests are closer and more sensitive, think?

Were you most offended by the events taking place in the Balkans? We know that the central issue of Russian policy was the question of the strait with Constantinople and, in the East, Turkish affairs. We also know that until the strengthening of military power on the Black Sea, the decision of these matters was temporarily postponed and considered necessary to preserve Turkey, so as not to give Constantinople and the straits into the hands of the Slavic allies. A Russian naval military agent in Constantinople, in conversations with his Austrian colleague, pointed out that if the straits were currently closed by Turkey with one key, then with the appearance of Slavic allies on the shores of the Sea of Marmara, they would be under three locks. Petersburg did not like this situation.

The temptation to get Constantinople during the troubles in the Balkans was great in St. Petersburg. Talking about a conversation with Nikolai P on April 4

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1913, English staff Buchanan writes in his memoirs: "Returning to the Balkan war, the Tsar said that in the event of the alleged occupation of Constantinople by Bulgarian troops, Bulgaria intended to offer it to Russia as a gift of gratitude for the liberation from the Turkish yoke. . He made it clear to her that Russia could not accept such a gift, and recommended that she give up trying to borrow it.

This attempt did not follow, because the actions of the Slavic allies were taken under the control of Russian diplomacy. The latter was also preoccupied with other questions: the settlement of the financial relations of Turkey, and then Asia Minor affairs, because in Asia Minor a struggle began between Germany, France and England for railways, which radically affected the interests of Russia.

If it was so necessary for Russian policy to preserve Turkey, then "death

another "sick man" - the Danube Empire - would be very desirable for her. The end of the first Balkan war, which gave Russian diplomacy a united force in the form of the Balkan states, promised success in the impending clash with Austria-Hungary.

However, as we have heard, the Balkan federation "planted in nettles" Russian diplomacy, refusing to recognize St. Petersburg as an arbitrator and starting a heated dispute over booty that threatened to end in war. It is clear that, "sitting in nettles," Russian diplomacy felt the awkwardness of such sitting and angrily tried to call the presumptuous victors to order. Efforts were in vain, and the second Balkan war broke out. The straits, for which secret preparations had been made all the time, were again under threat.

On June 4, 1913, Nemits, known to us, visits, on behalf of the Chief of the Naval General Staff, the Chief of the Capdelariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who frankly declares in a conversation that "the main concern - the goal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - is to ensure that Russia is blocked by the straits in the event of a pan-European or, in general, a great European war." On July 10, the same Nemits sends a letter to Basili (assistant head of the capellari of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in which he forwards a draft report to Nicholas II on the question of the straits.

Nemits, in a summary of his draft report, concludes: "Russia 'needs to have both Turkish prolavages ... to be ready to do this in the next few years.'" According to the author of the project, this period should be 1917-1919, when the Russian fleet will be strengthened.

For unknown reasons, the draft report, which was basically approved by both departments, remained unrealized, but served as the basis for further reports, which will be discussed below.

If the defeat of Bulgaria by the Serbs, Greeks and Romanians was, of course, unpleasant for Russian diplomacy, then the occupation of Adrianople and Thrace by Turkey led her into the strongest pandering. It seemed to Sazonov that \$4a(\$ Chao in the area of the straits, which was desirable, was violated by this, and then it was clear that Turkey, going for such a seizure, hoped to get the support of Germany, thus leaving the orbit of the Russian influence.

All kinds of plans for influencing Turkey began to be created in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ambassadors were instructed to negotiate a naval

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demonstrations and, in general, even about Rossin's speech against Turkey. After long hesitation, France gave its consent to the naval demonstration, Germany made it a condition that the action would affect only European Turkey, that it would be temporary, and that Russia would notify about it in advance. Russia even went to a joint performance with Austria. In a word, Petersburg was indignant and the matter was settled only when the Turks made concessions and cleared part of Thrace.

The peace of Bucharest, which put an end to the second Balkan war, also did not satisfy Russian diplomacy and, in its opinion, was subject to "revision", which Austria also wanted, but which was prevented by Wilhelm's telegram, known to us, congratulating Romania on its success and thereby strengthening shay peaceful

contract.

The second Balkan war greatly upset Russian diplomacy, and Izvolsky had to comfort Sazonov. On August 14, "Napoleon, who began his career with Waterloo" - Izvolsky - wrote:

"First of all, I cannot understand why we are so dissatisfied with the Treaty of Bucharest and the collapse of the plan to revise it? It seems to me, on the contrary, that events have turned out for us in an extremely advantageous and favorable way; The second Balkan war, sad as it is from a humanitarian and sentimental point of view, relieved us of the very heavy duty of taking upon ourselves the distribution of Macedonia between the Allies. This task was absolutely insurmountable and would have quarreled us at once with all the Balkan states.

"That from the very beginning of the crisis Bulgaria was in close contact with Vienna, I think there is no doubt. If Austria had not made a mistake in the calculation, and if Bulgaria had emerged victorious from the second war, I think that this would have been extremely dangerous and unprofitable for us, for Greater Bulgaria, of course, would have been an element of imbalance in the Balkans, and further our Bulgarian plans towards Constantinople and, probably, a member of the Austro-Hungarian bloc directed against us "...

"If we were talking about the dismemberment of Bulgaria, then it is clear that we would have to oppose this ... the blow was not dealt to her really vital interests, but only to her excessive desires."

"They say," Izvolsky continued, "that the peace of Bucharest is short-lived and will lead to a new war for Macedonia, but if Bulgaria's plans were realized, this would also inevitably cause, in a few years, attempts of revenge on the part of Serbia and Greece." "

"As for the question of revising the Bucharest Treaty," Izvolsky says at the end of the letter, "here we can rejoice at the outcome of things; The treaty strikes a blow not to the interests of Russia, but to Austria, which, by all means, including the initiation of a fratricidal war, sought to weaken Serbia and, as a result, received a strengthened, morally and physically stronger Serbian state. To insist on a revision is to give Austria a reason and opportunity to challenge this result and, perhaps, recover everything that was lost. At the present moment Austria is completely isolated both morally and politically, and even Germany is turning away from her impossible policy; Is it possible that at such a moment we will support it and, thereby, immediately destroy all the results we have achieved.

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Our joint actions with Austria in the Balkans have never brought us happiness; I know this from my own bitter experience... I'll go even further and say that I don't understand why we stand so ardently for the return of Adrianople to the Bulgarians? After all, if at the beginning of the crisis our general staff stood for the preservation of its Turkey, then there were serious reasons for this. Then, for political reasons, we must refuse it; Now the Bulgarians have lost it through their own fault, and it would seem that for the Paz it could only be beneficial. For Adrianople. the Turks are ready to give us everything: the straits, and the railways, and, perhaps, indeed, their friendship and gratitude in the future. After all.

We occupied Adrianople ourselves and nevertheless gave it to Turkey.

"I am doing my best to secure the active support of France for us," Izvolsky concluded the letter.

Indeed, fear for the loss of the straits pushed Sazonov to "revise" the Bucharest Treaty, which Austria also fussed about, and its chief of staff, although skeptical of joint performances with Rosspey, even outlined operational considerations for these two hidden actions. enemies.

If we compare Izvolsky's thoughts with those of Konrad, we will see how two extreme imperialists, ready to cut each other's throats, came to the definite conclusion that either Austria alone or Russia alone could rule the Balkans. The atmosphere was so tense that the conflict between these countries was inevitable and the whole question was only in time.

Izvolsky tried to enlist the support of France in relation to Russian policy in the Balkans. It must be said that in the relations of allies. all the time shadows of displeasure flickered: it seemed to France that Russia was getting too close to Germany, and St. Petersburg was worried about its influence in Malaya Azpi, where French capital sought to get railway concessions and conducted negotiations both with Turkey and with England. and Germany. When it came to Sazonov's proposal to force the Turks to clear Adnanopol by refusing to make financial deals, Izvolsky wrote to Sazonov on August 1st: "I allow myself to say frankly that by presenting a demand to the French government to prohibit its subjects from any financial transactions with Turkey, we we put him before an almost impossible task; I have had occasion to point out several times the fact that in France the financial institutions sometimes have more influence on the government than the government has on them. As an argument in favor of his positions, Izvolsky cited the Turkish loan of 1910 as an example, "which could not be realized on the Narizhek Stock Exchange due to the refusal of the Frappese government, but which was subsequently concluded in Germany with the indirect participation of the French banks."

For the French government, a difficult situation developed: on the one hand, the aggravated relations with Italy and fears for the Mediterranean Sea, the struggle of French capital with German influence in Greece, interest in Asia Minor, and on the other hand, the demands of St. Petersburg, by virtue of the alliance, to put pressure on Turkey in the issue of Adrianople.

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"Our actions," Izvolsky wrote, "against one or another point in the Asian possessions of Turkey, on sea or on land, seem to Pichon especially dangerous, because this could open the entire Asian question and cause the intervention of Germany, which, according to everyone's conviction, more and more focuses its policy on securing for itself in the future the entire zone cut through by the Baghdad railway. "If on the part of France," Izvolsky prophesied, "we will not be given sufficient support in this matter, which affects our dignity and our historical traditions, this may have the most harmful effect on the future of the Franco-Russian alliance." Nevertheless, on August 12, the French government told Izvolsky that Russia could

it is quite possible to count on firm assistance from France in the question of Adrianople, which then expressed itself in diplomatic influence on Turkey.

It was still up to Apglia. "No one more than Sir Edward Grey," Buchanan writes, "worked for the preservation of European peace during these two critical years (1912-1913—B.Sh.); and then the war was averted only thanks to his tireless efforts, his restraining influence and the moderation recommended by him in Petersburg and Vienna.

And since Sazonov's demands went beyond the limit of "moderation," Russia could not count on decisive pressure from England on Turpia and was satisfied with the cession of part of Thrace by the Turks while leaving Adrianople behind them, which we talked about in vipe.

Although Gray was concerned about the preservation of European peace, however, during 1912 and 1913 in England, intense preparations were made for war. The development of the Fleet, the development of measures to protect the islands from German landings, work on providing the Fleet with oil reserves, etc. - all this was the subject of serious discussions and measures of the British government. Proving the need to strengthen the Fleet, Churchill in his memoirs also leads to this political arguments, namely: 1) we (British - B. Sh.) are not a young or poor people. At the conclusion of his document, Churchill pointed out: "The world is arming as never before. All hopes of stopping armaments or limiting them were in vain. From time to time, events occur that require the strengthening of our naval forces in one or another part of the world." Churchill concluded that he had no right to remain silent about the need to strengthen the Navy: "This would not be compatible with my duties," he writes, "if I had not protected the country from

danger."

The advice of "moderation" in St. Petersburg, taught by Gray, was based on Asiatic issues that had not yet been settled with Russia, as we will say more below.

Balkan Wars 1912 - 1913 not only failed to defuse the atmosphere of military danger, but, on the contrary, thickened it and brought European war closer. The contradictions between the "great" powers are already getting worse

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they argued that because of any, even petty, reason, a war could break out. As for the Balkan "dogs," as Moltke called the Balkan states, they only licked their wounds, damn it! again bro-

go to the landfill. The war - and not only the Balkan, but the European one - was supposed to break out

suck inevitably...

CHAPTER X RESULTS OF THE BALKAN WARS

The Bucharest world and its underside. — Collisions between Austria-Hungary and

Serbia. - Occupation of part of Albania by Serbia. — Konrad for the war with Serbia. Conrad dissociates himself from Franz Ferdinand. - The Council of Ministers in Vienna on 3 October. - The decision to present Serbia with a demand for the evacuation of Albania. — Konrad insists on war with Serbia. "Most wars have been lost by missing opportunities." — Council of Ministers on 13 October. - Konrad is for the war with Serbia and against constant mobilizations. — An example of mobilization in 1870. - Kovrad at the Leippigi celebrations and the second collision with Franz Ferdinand. — The consent of Serbia on October 31 to the evacuation of Albania and a letter to this from Conrad to Moltke. "In the Balkans, only strength and power decide." - Conrad's "Memoir" for 1914. "The ratio of military forces is the basis of every real policy." "We need a military success over Serbia and Montenegro. Romania is the enemy. — The ratio of the military forces of the triple alliance against the tripartite agreement. — Variants of the war plan to be developed in 1914. - Austria and Germany. Conrad's Conversations with Wilhelm and Bethmann. — Relations between Vienna and Italy. - Sheptytsky's report and the project of the trip to Rome of the heir. — The dual policy of Rome. — Rapprochement of Romania with the tripartite consent. - The defensive policy of Serbia and Pasic's tour. - Türkiye and Austria. — Franco-Russian military convention. - Konrad and a military agent from Petersburg; rga. — Russia's penchant for peace. - Straits again. - Report of the Naval General Staff of November 7 on the strengthening of the Fleet necessary to ensure the sea route from the Black to the Aegean Sea. - Sazonov's report on November 93 on the convening of a special meeting to prepare an operation to seize the straits. "Any legal norm is valid only in peacetime." - Feedback from the Naval Ministry on Sazonov's report. — The need to begin immediately preparations for the strategic task in the Constantinople Canal. - Report on this from the Minister of the Navy of December 23. — Lyman Von-Sanders mission. — Bethman and Jagow on the Purpose of the Mission. - Sazonov's report of December 23 on Liman's mission. — Report of the Naval General Staff. - "Russia should receive at the end of the war Constantinople, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles." — Special Meeting December 31st. - The Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff on the readiness of the Russian army for war. — Concessions to Germany. - Sukhomlinov on the landing operation on the Bosphore and the readiness for war of the Russian army. — Kokovpov on the policy of France. - Peacefulness of England. - The policy of the northern states of Europe.

The peace of Bucharest, which ended the second Balkan war, was nothing more than "a continuation of the war, but only by other means."

The ensuing lull in the Balkans was to be considered only a short respite before a new war on the peninsula, which this time already threatened to turn into a European war. By 1911, the economic interests of the big states of Europe had become so intertwined in the Balkans that the Balkan question finally became a matter of common European policy. We have already pointed out the economic interest of England, Russia, Germany and Austria in Turkey. Here it remains only to add

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It can be seen that Germany actively began to complete the construction of the Baghdad railway, and, in general, increased its economic penetration into the Balkans, causing an unfriendly attitude towards itself even from its ally Austria.

France, which was the last to invest its capital in the Balkan Peninsula, also invested more than 2/3 millimeters in various Turkish enterprises.

ardov Frankov received new concessions for the construction of railways in Asia Minor.

It becomes quite understandable why the "great powers" took control of the policy of the Balkan states, tried to establish at least a temporary peace on the peninsula, in order only to suffer losses on the capital invested there, and were very sensitive to every slightest unrest in the Balkans, excellent realizing that it leads to a European skirmish.

The Treaty of Bucharest now placed Austria-Hungary face to face with Serbia, which was growing stronger in every respect, and victorious Montenegro, who were by no means inclined to make concessions to the Viennese diplomats. True, two wars left their mark on these states, undermining their economic condition, but on the other hand, Serbia, by its victories, acquired a certain credit on the European market and could, with greater success than before, obtain a loan for military needs.

In addition, the victories of the Serbs and Romanians, in addition to strengthening their desire to tear off the regions inhabited by fellow tribesmen from the Danube Empire, caused the latter to have an irresistible desire to be under the roof of the victorious states. That is why even Berchtold was inclined to Erenthal's former idea - first of all to resolve the Greater Serbian question within the monarchy itself, to solder the state again within it, and only then turn to war.

The unstable situation in the Balkans was clear to all the states of Europe, and therefore, summing up the results of the Balkan wars, they actively and feverishly began to prepare for a new war.

The clash of interests of various states in the Balkans did not end with the Treaty of Bucharest and resulted in a number of misunderstandings between Austria and Serbia, in the mission of M. Liman Von-Sanders in Constantinople, in connection with which the issue of the seizure of straits.

By creating an autonomous Albania, Serbia broke away from the Adriatic Sea, and if she temporarily reconciled herself to this idea, she did not want to give up a number of strategically important settlements on Albanian territory. At the same time, access to the Aegean Sea of Austria was in the hands of the Serbs, which could always obstruct the transit of Austrian goods to the southeast.

These two questions - the Albanian and the Balkan railway - again aggravated relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which with difficulty managed, at least outwardly, to normalize.

We know that the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff considered the Albanian question always of secondary importance in the Balkan policy of the monarchy and did not at all want to sacrifice the bones of the soldiers of the "dpešar" army because

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this country. But on the other hand, but in his opinion, the Albanian question would be a good excuse to settle accounts with Serbia because of it. It is from this point of view that Yokoprad's views on Vepa's Albanian policy should be considered.

On October 1, the Chief of Staff received a report from Belgrade that

Serbs, in view of the unrest in Albanpi, mobilized part of the divisions and that, in general, Serbia, apparently, is far from fulfilling the London Treaty, not thinking of clearing the strategic points occupied by it on Albanian territory.

On October 2, Konrad appeared with another report from Franz Josef, starting with the Serbian-Albanian issue. Needless to say, the Chief of Staff made a definite proposal: using the Albanian trickery, to settle accounts with the glorious liar - Serbia. In addition, Rumania, in his opinion, should be considered an open enemy and start preparing for war with her.

Like an ancient pythoness, the chief of the general staff predicted the fate of the monarchy. Speaking about Serbia, Koprud hung up: "The danger is coming – now may be the last moment to speak." Convinced of the peaceful tendencies of the old Habsburg and suggesting that he talk to Berchtold on this subject, Konrad concluded: "The monarchy is facing a turning point. ".

At the end of the report, the conversation turned to the incident between Franz Ferdinand and Konrad during the maneuvers, and the old man thought that the change in the course of the maneuvers had taken place at the suggestion of the Chief of Staff.

"Your Majesty, I ask you not to identify my actions with the proposals of the Belvedere (Franz-Ferdinand Castle - B.Sh.). I am going my own way," Konrad replied, setting out in detail the entire incident and the reasons for his decision to remain in the post of chief of the general staff. "I did not try to return to the post of chief of the general staff and was satisfied with my former position as an army inspector," Konrad reported.

On October 3, a council of ministers was held. Although he had the main task of reviewing the military budget and increasing the contingent of the army, but on which fundamental views on foreign policy issues were expressed.

The Council opened with a speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Berchtold, who was also chairman at the same time. Berchtold considered it necessary to shed light on the current external political situation of the monarchy and cast a glance at the future.

Pointing out that a Greco-Turkish clash could be expected as a result of skirmishes in the Balkans and that Serbia was striving to use the Albanian uprising to expand its borders, the Minister of Foreign Affairs came to the conclusion that Belgrade should be warned in a "friendly" form against ignoring the decisions of the London Conference. .

Austria stands between two alternatives: either tacitly agree to Serbia's invasion of Albania, or present an ultimatum to Belgrade.

Noting that in foreign policy for the monarchy it was important to establish an independent Albania and maintain a balance of power

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in the Adriatic Sea, Berchtold declared that the same goals should be pursued in the future.

According to him, the current political situation outlined by the PM speaks

that in the future one has to reckon with a weak Turkey and strong, nationalist-minded, Slavic states, seeking to expand the swap's limits at the expense of the monarchy. It is true that the Treaty of Bucharest sowed antagonism between Bulgaria and Serbia with Greece, but it may happen that in return for a concession in the Macedonian regions, Bulgaria will join the Balkan Federation in the event of its war with Austria.

Berchtold finds that the current policy of the monarchy has not undergone any significant changes in recent times and the renewal of the tripartite union of tberdo is established on the dollar of the time.

True, there were differences with Germany, but they were not of a serious and lasting nature. Relations with Italy are developing to the benefit of the monarchy. Relations with the Triple Powers are improving: England has been loyal all the time, supporting Austria in the Balkan crisis; France and Russia seem friendly. If Francia is feverishly arming, then the task of calculation is still farther away, because French capital first strives to establish itself in the Balkans.

Summarizing what has been said, the Minister of Foreign Affairs comes to the conclusion that the Balkan Crisis, which ended for the monarchy after the shedding of Yorovi, does not foretell in the nearest future the upheavals that have caused the monarchy to collapse. However, circumstances require the constant availability of armed forces to protect the southern and eastern borders.

The independent and strong-willed Minister-President of Hungary, Tissa, welcomed the path outlined by Berchtold for settling the Albanian question, and found that the more resolutely Austria steps in defense of the provisions of the London Treaty, the more sympathy there will be on the part of the "great" powers that signed mouth contract. "Europe", as a copper of the powers, has lately been undermined by the Balkan states, and its influence should be restored again.

The Chief of the General Staff expressed a different opinion. Koprad acknowledged two hardships for the monarchy; first: the constant threat of the moparchy from Serbia and Montenegro, who are only waiting for the moment to attack it; second: relations with allies. Germany is on the side of Austria, but Italy's help can be relatively counted on. Serbia is supported by France, Russia and Romania. It is necessary to find out the relationship with the latter. Relationships with Serdia the bosses are conceived in two ways: either the peaceful entry of Serdia into the monarchy, or a massacre with her, for which now is an opportune moment. Improve. Koprad does not think of any other way of making amends with Serbia, for Serbia is only gaining time for its strengthening. In these aspects, it is necessary now to directly put and receive an answer from Serbia, so as not to give her and the "great" powers time to prepare.

Berchtold wholeheartedly joined the chief of the general staff, but Tissa strongly opposed the inclusion of Serbip in the monarchy, recognizing this as a utopia. Serbia should be an independent and self-sufficient neighbor who has much to do with Bulgaria and Albapnia. In the last.

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the question of Serbia must show the inflexible will of the monarchy. If a vigorous protest did not help, then it is necessary to send an ultimatum, thus setting the stage for the diplomatic and military defeat of Serdia, and in this case

there is no place for GaKim-lido Goledaniam.

The General Imperial Minister of Finance strongly opposed Conrad's proposals, considering them unfeasible at the present time. Since the majority of the population of Bospiya and Herzegovina are Serbs, this has to be taken into account. It is possible that earlier such a decisive action against Serbia was possible, but now the whole of "Europe" looks at Austria as an enemy of peace, and the proposed action would only strengthen this unjust opinion. You can still save up for a war with Serbia, but think. it is impossible to peacefully include it in the composition of the monarchy. The Minister of Finance also does not agree with Tisza's proposal to show the whole world the power of the monarchy, for precisely Serbia gives no reasons for this, and this at a time when all of Europe wants peace. There can be no doubt that Serbia is thinking about the capture of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and therefore the monarchy must prepare for this decisive battle, despite the poor financial and economic situation of the country.

The Chief of the General Staff considers it necessary to point out that his task was to outline two ways of settling Austro-Serbian relations. (He is glad that the highly competent statesmen have rejected the peaceful path and that only the path of war remains, but he believes that war should be waged when the situation favors it. "Most wars have been lost due to missed opportunities," Koprads instructs. Every postponement of the war, from a purely military point of view, only worsens the position of the monarchy. If a decision is made to wait, then an extraordinary development of the armed forces is necessary.

Subsequently, the Council of Ministers dwelled in detail on the consideration of the large military program known to us from the first book, and when considering the correlation of forces, the voices on the future policy of Rumyshia were divided. While the Minister-President of Austria regarded her as a faithful member of the tripartite alliance, Berchtold, Azan him and Conrad considered it more cautious to look at Rumania as a future enemy.

So, the council of "statesmen" of Vienna decided not to get involved in a war with Serbia for the time being, but to warn the latter about the strength and power of the monarchy, continuing to prepare for an inevitable war in the future. The Chief of the General Staff had no choice but to "welcome" such a decision of the Council of Ministers.

Meanwhile, the Albanian question was expanding: information from Cetinje spoke of the proposed general mobilization of Montenegro. Communicating these data to Berchtold, the chief of the general staff wrote on October 8: "With the kaleidoscopic change in the situation in the Balkans, it is extremely difficult to figure out what will fit in with reality and what remains a fairy tale."

"But since everything is possible in the Balkans," Konrad continues, "we need to be ready for decisive action if circumstances take a military turn. My only desire is war with Serbia. Maintaining prestige and protecting Albapia can give extremely important

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grounds for this, making it difficult to search for any other pretexts for war.

On October 13, the Council of Ministers met again to discuss measures against Serbia if the latter did not fulfill her obligations in Albania.

Tissa pointed out the need to restore the lost prestige of the monarchy, for which it was necessary to resolutely demand from Serbia the cleansing of Albanian lands and compliance with the London Treaty. Of course, it is desirable to avoid war and achieve success through diplomacy. There is no need to think about the complete defeat of Serbia - one must think only about her defeat.

The Minister-President of Austria, the All-Imperial Minister of Finance and Buryan supported Tisza, speaking with one voice about raising the prestige of the monarchy and thinking of achieving this by financial boycott, occupation of disputed areas, etc. d.

Berchtold was convinced of the need to take decisive steps against Serbia, and only Romania and Russia caused him doubts.

"Already seven years ago," the Chief of the General Staff began his speech in the Council of Ministers, "in writing and orally, in the high institutions of the monarchy, I proved that the monarchy was at a turning point in its active policy in the Balkans, that it should decide the Balkan, or rather Serbian, question. Since it will not be possible to reach an agreement with Serbia on a peaceful basis, it is necessary to consider her as an enemy and not wait until circumstances finally turn against us.

"I join," Konrad said, "to the proposal of Tisza! raise the prestige of the monarchy and now use the opportunity to regulate our relations with Serbia. But I believe that one diplomatic success will not solve the essence of the issue, we must achieve military success with all our might, without seeking the consent of other powers.

"Experiments with mobilization and subsequent demobilization must be avoided—neither the army nor the people will endure this. If Serbia does not bow to the presented ultimatum, then no later concessions from her side should be accepted - then only one thing remains: mobilization and war.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs remarked to this: "If you start a war, then without delay and not in three weeks! How to avoid this?

"It doesn't change anything," Konrad had to explain, "because it lies in the nature of things. In 1870, mobilization began on July 15, and the first battle took place on August 4, that is, 20 days later.

With this, the council of ministers ended, and Berchtold went with a report on him to Franz Josich.

On October 15, the latter also had a report with Konrad, again citing his arguments for the war with Serbia, so as not to miss a good opportunity. It seemed to the chief of staff that the old Habsburg was beginning to assimilate the situation and the need for war.

The next day Konrad left for Germany, 6 Leipzig, for the celebration on the occasion of the opening of the memorial to the "Battle of the Nations" in 1815, where representatives of Russia and Sweden also gathered. From Austria-Hungary, in addition to a deputation from the highest military representatives of the army, Franz Ferdinand also left.

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We will talk about the political significance of this festival a little lower, and now we will focus on everyday trifles, which, however, were of great importance in the life of Conrad.

As is known, Conrad's relations with Franz Ferdinand were strained on purely official grounds, spiced with hidden hostility on both sides. During the trip to Germany, both did not see each other.

We are also well aware of the high regard Wilhelm held for the Austrian general staff's butcher, and therefore it is quite understandable that after one of the ceremonial dinners, the Kaiser wished to speak with his like-minded political and strategist. After the conversation, Wilhelm asked Conrad to introduce to him the members of the Austrian delegation, many of whom he did not yet know. Conrad, with the help of a military agent in Berlin, began to collect the Austrian officers who had scattered around other halls.

Suddenly Francp-Ferdinand came in, in great excitement, and, turning to Conrad, asked what was the matter. Upon learning of Wilhelm's request, Frann-Ferdinand, not embarrassed by the presence of Wilhelm, Moltke and other German generals and members of the delegates of Russia and Sweden, sharply said to Conrad: "This is my business! Are you the commander in chief? I ask you to grant it to me!" To the remark of the chief of staff that Wilhelm turned to him, Conrad, the young Habeburg sharply replied: "You should have reported this to me!"

The span was, of course, heavy, but quite understandable for the etiquette of the Vepsian court, which still retained signs of the Middle Ages. Franz Ferdinand began to represent the deputation, and Konrad left the hall.

Reassured by Moltke, the head of the staff came to his senses and, not seeing Franz Ferdipand anymore, returned to Vienna. Here, in his office, in the closest circle of his colleagues (deputy Hbfer, Metzger and Kundman), Koprak grieved for all the severity that was characteristic of his service. The chief of the general staff firmly decided to leave his post and not return to it again, and only the complexity of the political situation stopped the "faithful son" of the monarchy from this

step.

Indeed, on October 18, Berchtold was sent to Belgrade by Ver-

a ballroom note demanding in a firm tone from the Serbian government the implementation of the London decrees and the purification of the comma parts of Albania.

On October 20, the Minister of Foreign Affairs informed Konrad that a speech could not be expected from Russia, that France recognized the correctness of Austria's note, and Germany was walking in step with the latter.

October 21 brought a decision: Serbia agreed to the evacuation of its combatants from Aldanya, about which Berchtold informed Koprak.

Under the influence of St. Petersburg and Paris, Serbia decided to clear the disputed territory of Albania, and Sazonov "as a reward for the prudence shown by Serbia" petitioned in Paris for the speedy placement of a Serbian loan there.

Remaining unresolved is the second contentious issue between Vienna and Belgrade

— the issue of the transport of Austrian goods on the Serbian railways. On the one hand, the Austrians bought up to 50% / shares of iron

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roads and, thus, were, as it were, their masters, and on the other hand, Serbia intended to show its right, as the right of a sovereign state, to buy out these roads. The St. Petersburg and Parisian cabinets again showed increased efforts: to eliminate a possible conflict, putting forward a project for the internationalization of roads, to which Serbia was also inclined, not hoping to get Russia's support.

The project of internationalization was not particularly sympathetically received by Spoy, Berlin and Rome, who made their own amendments, and passed into the stage of extensive diplomatic negotiations.

On October 23, in a candid letter to his friend Moltke, Konrad wrote that the "events of history" of late had again not taken place in accordance with his wishes. "The fleeting diplomatic success," stated the Austrian staff chief, "did not change anything in the essence of the matter and did not alleviate the difficult situation for the future. What I considered seven years ago, and especially in 1907, to be the only correct one, seems to me even more just now, and I continue to affirm it.

"So," Konrad continued, "it remains only to face the impending events and prepare as best as possible for their meeting in the future."

At the end of the letter, the chief of staff wrote that his service was going along normally for the time being, but, as Moltke knows, all this in Austria hangs "in the balance."

On November 14, a peace treaty between Greece and Turkey was signed, and the military storms in the Balkans ended, but, according to Conrad, not for long.

He continued to be disturbed by Serbia and, in particular, Romania, which already had to be considered among the enemies, about which the chief of staff asked Berchtold.

On November 28, Conrad appeared to Franke-Joseph with a report on the war plan for the next year. The conversation naturally turned to foreign policy. The chief of staff insisted on the need to immediately begin preparations for war with Rumania. When it came to "exposing" the secret treaty between Serbia and Bulgaria against Austria, Konrad firmly stated: "There is nothing reliable in the Balkans, only strength and might decide there."

"It's everywhere," remarked the old Habsburg. "In politics, power is always the only right."

In December, Chief Quartermaster of the German General Staff Waldersee, Chief of the Operations Bureau Tappen and Chief of the Italian Operations Bureau Montanari arrived in Vienna for negotiations on the war plan. How bad the union was, but the common danger introduced a certain adhesion into it, at least in military work.

The work of the Chief of the General Staff proceeded in a normal way, and he was preparing a memoir for the coming 1914 year with an overview of the past 1913. In view of the importance of this document and since it was the last one before the war,

we will allow ourselves to turn to its consideration.

"The Balkan events of 1912-13. changed the political situation so much that it is necessary to consider it from a military point of view, especially since this is an essential part of my duties, and then to establish the conclusions arising from this analysis.

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Dividing the "memoir" into 3 parts: 1) the political situation, 2) general military training, 3) specific military training, Konrad considers it necessary to warn that if the first and second parts are sent to them for information to other military leaders, and the first part, apart from In addition to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he provides the third part exclusively for Frapts-Joseph and his heir, as a strictly secret document.

In this chapter, we will touch upon only the first part of the "memoir", as defining the work of the General Staff in the political field.

"The correlation of military forces is the basis of every real policy," the chief of staff begins his first part of the memoir, "since even the most skillful and apparently successful diplomatic structure must collapse if the latter fails when it is turned to the armed force. From an oral point of view, it is necessary to assess the political situation.

Balkan events of 1912-13 in this respect a great revolution has been made, and Konrad considers it necessary to dwell on his proposals before and during this period.

We will not repeat here everything that we know from all the previous arguments of the imperialist in military uniform from the banks of the Danube. Their essence boils down to the fact that since 1906 the chief of the general staff has always proposed, first of all, to win a military success over Serbia and Chernoyuria, and not to engage in pouring streams of diplomatic ink. All Conrad's projects were rejected, and as a result of the "lost" cases, Serbia strengthened militarily and finally deteriorated allied relations with Romania.

"This turn of Romania and the missed opportunity of war with Serbia and Montenegro," Conrad concludes, "I consider a great misfortune for the monarchy, which has come to light as a result of the present Balkan crisis. In comparison, the diplomatic successes achieved by Austria in matters of Albanian independence, the retention of Scutari and the evacuation of Serbian troops from Albania seem insignificant.

"Only a military success over Serbia and Montenegro could, in a desirable sense, resolve such a vital issue for the monarchy as the Balkan one and raise its prestige" in the eyes of both the Balkan states and other countries. "This," Konrad declares, "is the essence of my views."

Serbia and Romania, according to Conrad, are the "closest and most dangerous enemies" of the monarchy, supported, moreover, by Russia and France.

The Triple Entente surpasses the Triple Alliance not only in military strength, but on the side of the former there is such a strong state in terms of Finance as France.

It can be said in advance that with the war of France, Russia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, on the one hand, and Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy, on the other, the advantages not only in the quantitative balance of forces, but also in the geographical position will be in a hurry the first states. It will be especially difficult for Austria-Hungary, even with the neutrality of Romania; for the Russian empire, a great danger will be created if this state finds itself in the camp of enemies.

Porto's "goal of politics," according to Conrad, is to prevent such

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combinations and, above all, either to establish open loyalty to Romania to the tripartite alliance with all the obligations that follow from this, or to consider her an enemy, in which case to join the allies in order to tie the Romanian forces in other directions. Conrad finds that the second assumption was more correct, as hostile sentiments are developing in Romanian monarchies. Even if we assume that Romania will remain in the alliance, it is still more correct to consider her as a future enemy and prepare for war with her, which should also be taken into account by Germany and Italy.

As for Serbia, the time has passed when it was possible to think about its peaceful inclusion in the monarchy, and now it is an open enemy. The same applies to Montenegro, whose king has no choice but to follow Serbia.

Turning to the powerful states of the tripartite accord - Russia and France, Conrad expresses the opinion that it would be a great success if, in the event of a war of the monarchy against Serbia and Romania, it would be possible to keep Russia neutral or, by distributing spheres of influence, act in the Balkans together with her. "But such a combination," the chief of staff immediately stipulates, "seems quite improbable, and one should almost certainly consider that a war will break out between the tripartite alliance and the tripartite agreement."

It seems irrefutable to Conrad that if Russia takes up arms, then Germany will come out, and this will lead to the intervention of France, and then Italy. The contradictions between France and Italy at this time are very significant and most likely Rome will remain in the bosom of the triple

union.

"Therefore, the efforts of the monarchy must be directed," continues the chief of staff, "to stir up the enmity of Italy with France, on the one hand, and on the other, to improve our relations with Italy so that the armed forces will be thrown against France, which will allow Germany to send more forces to the east against Russia."

Konrad points out that if the rear of Austria is free from the threats of Russia and Italy, then the monarchy can count on success in the war even against the forces of Serbia, Rumania and Romania taken together.

Not believing in the return of Romania to the tripartite alliance, the chief of the general staff considers the balance of power based on the following political situation.

"Germany will always be an ally, the interests of her and Austria-Hungary

match up; the defeat of Germany would be a grave for the monarchy, just as the defeat of the monarchy would be a heavy blow for Germany.

Italy must be kept in the alliance; her falling away would be harmful to Germany and Austria.

A coalition of France, Russia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania would be so outnumbered by the tripartite alliance that one should seek to weaken this balance of power by tying Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania in the Balkans; for this purpose, the tripartite alliance must bring to its side Albania, Bulgaria and Turkey, and, if possible, also Greece.

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In order to bind Russia in the coming great war, it is necessary to draw Sweden into the tripartite alliance, complicate the position of Russia in Asia Minor and then support the national movement in the western border regions of Russia.

"If it was possible," Conrad continues, "to keep England aside, then this would be a great success for the tripartite alliance"; At the same time, it seems to Conrad that Anglo-Russian relations do not make such a hypothesis improbable.

To prove his arguments, the chief of staff cites the following numerical data on the balance of military forces:

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88 88

A. 1 Sorbia..... 6 10 (1918) 5 10 (193^ and 90 | Montenegro 4 6 (1917) - - 4 6

| Romania eeee. 10-10 61/. 10 (1915) 161, 20 Total...! 1971, | 138_851, | 100 213 | 938

| | |

{ Germany..... 50 | 50 (1920) 98 = 40 (1920) 78 90

B.] Austria-Hungary. - 48 © 48 — — city 12 12 , 48 48 | Italy 25 96 (1917
37 38 Total...' 193 194 40 5 168 | 176

England 6 - 6 - - 6 6 Bulgaria IT i, 5 17, 15 Greece C 15 (1920) - ? 11 15
Turkey..... 84 34 35 35 ° 69 69 Sweden..... 6 6 | — — 6 | 6

Conrad did not include in this table for Russia the Caucasian corps and one reserve division left in the Caucasus against Turkey.

Having clearly shown the difficult situation of the tripartite alliance, the chief of staff once again emphasizes the importance of Rumania.

In conclusion, Koprad believes that "all worries" should be directed first of all:

1) in foreign policy - to linking the forces of a hostile group in other directions and closer adhesion of the powers of the tripartite alliance;

2) to the extraordinary development of the armed forces;

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3) to the settlement of the question of internal politics, which we spoke about in the corresponding chapter of the first book of our work.

In accordance with this political situation, in the "Specific Military Training" section, Koprad notes the following options for working on a war plan.

1) The triple alliance against the tripartite concord - the monarchy is on the side of Germany and Italy against Russia, France and their allies, and the enemies of the monarchy are: a) Russia, Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania; 6) Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Romania - neutral; c) Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Romania - on the side of the moparchy.

2) Austria-Hungary against Serbip, Montenegro and Rumania, with Russia waiting or bound by Germany or in some other way.

3) Austria-Venzria against Serbia and Chernolorim.

4) Abstro-Venlria against Chernozoriya.

5) Austria-Henry against Italy, Serbia and Cheriozorimi.

On December 27, handing over this memoir to the head of the operational bureau Mepger for additions, the head of the headquarters gave the following assessment of the political situation: "The Balkan war put an end to the past, we must start over and live in a new environment."

We heard that the Chief of the General Staff found it necessary to strengthen the Triple Alliance, because as soon as the situation on the external borders of Austria-Hungary became more acute, doubts immediately arose in Vienna about the support of friends.

The Albanian question was again such a touchstone of the strength of the tri-union.

At a time when it was still in the process of resolution, Koprad, together with Franz Ferdinand, appeared in Germany at the celebrations on the occasion of the opening of the monument. During the festivities, the pride of the sons of the Habsburg Empire was to be tested. The chief of staff stated that although the celebration should have been of an allied nature, however, it was given the character of a papional celebration of Germapiv, since her merits in history were glorified everywhere, and participation in the victory of the Austrian troops was obscured. Russian, Austrian and Swedish representatives felt like "guests" and "spectators" of greatness

German empire.

However, it was not yet necessary to speak of whispering, because support was needed in the Albanian question.

Despite the celebrations, Conrad managed to exchange views on the political situation with Wilhelm and Chancellor Bethmann.

Wilhelm was inclined to take Austrian action against Serbpi in arms and believed that vigorous measures should be taken by the monarchy in order to force Serbia into submission. "I am with you," Wilhelm said. — Other states are not ready, they will do nothing. I have always been a supporter of peace, but this has its own engravings. I have read a lot about war and I know what it is, but finally a situation may come when a great power can no longer remain a spectator and must grab the sword.

Moltke was of the same opinion. During the incident between Konrad and Franz Ferdinand, the German General

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of the headquarters, persuading his friend not to resign, he said: "I ask you not to do this at the present time! Hold back! Now, when we go into conflict, you must stay."

Berlin diplomacy was also ready to provide support, but not over the top. Bethmann-Hollweg specifically pointed out that "Austria no longer needs the Slavs." However, in the Albanian question, in the words of Jagov, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Germany, "Vienna was rightly worried." "I called to my place," writes Yagov, "the Serbian envoy, in order to make a serious reminder to his government." Jagow rejects the revelations of the Italian Prime Minister S. Giuliano that Austria already in the autumn of 1913 wanted to attack Serbia. In his opinion, Austria only wanted to protect itself from Serbia. How fair this is is evident from the foregoing, and we will not explain.

One way or another, but Germany supported the monarchy, and on October 21, Francp-Josich and Koprad admitted that Wilhelm had acted very loyally this time.

The third ally, Italy, raised doubts. On December 13, the German ambassador in Vienna told Conrad that Germany did not trust Italy. Jagow, in his book *The Causes and Beginnings of the World War*, writes that Italy was playing a dual game, using Serbian actions in Albania against Austria.

There could never be two opinions about the position of Romania, and, as the Chief Quartermaster of the German headquarters, Waldersee, said on December 20,
make her show her lipo.

Willy-nilly, but it was necessary to take measures to keep at least Italy in the union.

On November 19, an Austrian military agent in Rome, Sheptytsky, appeared in Koprad's office, with whom the chief of staff exchanged thoughts about Italy.

Sheptytsky assured Conrad that at the present time Italy was not against Austria, because: 1) he needed Austrian help, 9) he was afraid of the army of the monarchy. In his opinion, in 10 years Italy will be a first-class power, and its policy will be directed along four lines: the inclusion of the Austrian regions with an Italian population, expansion in the Balkans, Asia Minor and Tunisia. In the meantime, the Italian government is working to strengthen the army, which is becoming popular in the strap.

To strengthen Austro-Italian ties, Sheptytsky suggested sending Frappets-Ferdinapd to Rome, which would shake the vanity of the Roman government. Conrad, given the strong Catholicism of the pastor, doubted that he would go. Conrad believed that a trip to personally meet him would be the resistance of Frapp-Ferdinand, and thought that perhaps another high-ranking general could be sent on this mission.

Konrad seized on Sheptidsky's idea and, in his report to Franz Joseph on December 23, proposed sending Franz Ferdinand to Italy.

"Would you like to go?" asked the old Habsburg.

"That would be worse than not sending at all," Konrad answered. - The Italians can tell us: "You do not want to send the prince, and therefore send the general."

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Persuading Franz Joseph of the need for such a journey of Franz Ferdipand, the chief of staff was firmly convinced of its benefits.

The conversation ended with the old Habsburg promising to try to persuade the last peak to undertake a trip, doubting, however, the success of his undertaking.

We heard that Konrad in his memoirs proposed to inflate the Italo-Kranpuzian misunderstandings, which, indeed, were aggravated. But, on the other hand, relations between the monarchy and Italy were not being established in Albania. If Italy tried to establish at least some order in Albania, then Austria opposed this. In his letter to Sazonov, the Russian ambassador in Paris of October 9 reported: "Such a policy of Austria here (in Paris — B.Sh.) is due exclusively to its inherent inconsistency; this power is considered here to have completely lost the ability to think correctly about its own Peters and to coordinate its policy with them ... Italy also judges Austrian policy according to the danger associated with this latter.

However, during the meeting of the chairman of the council of masters Rosspi Kokovtsov with S. Giuliano, the latter definitely and clearly stated (Kokovtsov writes about this in his report of November 30, 1913) that the Italian government fully justifies the policy of Austria, expressed most recently in its sharp action against Serbia. Although Italy was not warned by Austria about the last eight-day ultimatum presented to Serbia by the latter, "he (S. Giuliano - B.S.) fully accepts this step, since he was exactly aware that the Austro-Hungarian government was watching extremely serious about Serbip's attempt to advance in Albania beyond the boundaries drawn by the London Conference, and that the called government had taken a decision in advance to put Serbia in

even by armed force, to go back beyond the line indicated in Lopdon.

Kokovtsov pointed out to S. Giuliano that "the Balkan crisis has so far proceeded relatively well only because all states were in solidarity and acted together."

"According to our ambassador to Italy," writes Kokovtsov, "Marquis S. Giuliano's response to the proposals is more in the nature of justifying his ally than objections to the principles outlined, and instead of any objections on the merits, I met a rather unpredictable proposal to proceed to an exchange of views on further rapprochement between Russia and Italy. Kokovtsov refrained from a definite agreement on this, considering such a proposal to be unrealistic.

The fourth member of this union, Rumania, according to all data, was considered lost to the middle states.

We already know the impression of the policy of Rumiysia, the chief of the general staff of the monarchy, who was sklopei finally considered her an open enemy, convincing both Berchtold and Frand-Joseph, as well as his friends from the banks of the Spree, with his mouth.

If in Romania King Charles was still loyal to the tripartite alliance, then in leading political circles, headed by the heir Ferdinand, the turn towards the future Antapta was finally decided.

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Above, we cited Sazonov's congratulations by Izvolsky on the successful policy that separated Romania from Austria, and on October 9 the Russian attorney in Paris wrote to Sazonov: politically, Romania gravitated toward Austria and the tripartite alliance, now, in view of the new political situation that has arisen in recent months, it has changed the position it had previously comma and was unambiguously expressed in favor of the desirability of issuing a Romanian loan in France. True, there is no misunderstanding with a loan; "The government is fully aware of the importance of Rumanian friendship, and in connection with this the news of the breakdown in affairs was extremely unpleasant for him." It is well known that loans best of all determine the political physiognomy of the State, which was at that time in Rumania, rushing to Paris for money.

There is no need to repeat that Serbia, according to the chief of the latter's general staff, was an open and main enemy for Austria, and Montenegro along with it.

Having hardly come to terms with the failure in the issue of getting access to the Adriatic Sea, Serbia did not leave, of course, the dream! about correcting not only this failure, but even something more. It was only necessary to accumulate forces and means. For the latter, Prime Minister Pasic went to Paris.

The decisions of the "London Conference" regarding Albania did not particularly satisfy Serbia, but for the time being they had to wait. "Pashic understands very well," Sazonov was informed on September 30 from Paris, "that Serbia

one should take only the defensive position established by the London meeting, and one should not cross the border, except, in extreme cases, to commemorate some strategic points necessary to repel an attack on one's own territory.

This striving to occupy "some strategic points" and temporarily "take a defensive position" are characteristic of Serbian policy, which was preparing for a future battle with the monarchy.

France, "due to the alarming situation in the Balkans," refused Serbia a loan, and Montenegro an advance payment. "Pashic is very concerned about this delay in receiving the money," the Russian solicitor reported on October 1 to Sazonov.

On October 18, Izvolsky wrote: "Concerning the last speech of Austria in Belgrade, Minister Chishon advised Vesnich (Serbian ambassador in Paris — B.Sh.) to start clearing up the points occupied in Albanip, not waiting for a speech in more categorical form. In order to relieve the Serbian of such a measure, the French government decided in principle not to delay the Serbian loan any longer ... Pishon would also like to achieve a solution to the issue of Serbian railways through redemption and internationalization.

As we know, Serbia yielded on the Albanian issue.

Serbia went into a "defensive position", it was felt that this was for the time being. "Pishon," Izvolsky wrote on October 93, "expressed to me the most serious fear that the conflict between Austria and

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Serbia may soon resume, and at the same time in an even more dangerous form, on the question of railways in the newly acquired part of Macedonia by Serbia. The Austrian imperialists did not want to go to Thessaloniki, and therefore they bought from the Germans up to 9519 /, the entire number of shares of the Eastern Railway Company with the aim of becoming the owners of the enterprise. There was a danger that Serbia would not allow the "owners of the enterprise" to the railways passing through its territory, and therefore the question arose either of buying them out, or of internationalization. We have indicated above that this question entered the stage of negotiations and was settled only at the end of January 1914.

Conrad harbored hopes of winning over Turkey and perhaps Greece to his side in order to weaken the Balkanian enemies.

However, Turkey, according to the Austrian military officer in Constantinople, did not have confidence in the monarchy, and Turkey could be attracted only by concluding a defensive-offensive agreement with her, securing her former position. Conrad resolutely rebelled against this and did not want to tie his hands.

Both states, both Turkey and Greece, took into account the weakness of Austria-Hungary, and if they leaned towards a tripartite alliance, then they gravitated towards its stronger member, Germany.

The Chief of the Austrian General Staff knew well that the main opposition to Vienna's active steps in the Balkans would not be met with

on the part of the Balkan states, but on the part of the states included in the tripartite agreement. Of these, Russia was the most dangerous foreign activity.

As is known, in the summer of 1913 the presence of the three chiefs of the general staffs of the states of the triple alliance at the German maneuvers should have been regarded as a demonstration of the strength of this alliance. It can be noted that in order to confirm its inviolability before the tripartite agreement, the tripartite alliance chose a meeting of representatives of the military force, on which, in fact, the power of the alliance rested. Reliance on a good saber was considered the best proof of the unity of the union than any congress of responsible diplomats or even representatives of dynasties. The situation in Europe developed in such a way that the military unity of the tripartite alliance came to the fore.

It cannot, of course, be said that such a method was peculiar only to the tripartite alliance. The pen of such a diplomat as Poincaré would use this circumstance to prove the aggressive plans of the middle states. But we must point out that the Tripartite Entente was no less willing and far more likely to resort to such military demonstrations.

As we know, France and Russia have been bound by a military convention since 1892. Due to the size of our work, we cannot delve into a detailed study of this convention, but we do not dare to pass it by. Those wishing to get acquainted with it in detail are referred to the works of Valentinov, Zayopchkovsky and, finally, to archival materials.

Here we will only take the liberty of touching briefly on the essence of this military union.

August 17, 1892 between the peak of the French General

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Headquarters Buadehfre and the chief of the Russian main headquarters Obruchev signed the following military convention:

"France and Russia, animated by one desire to preserve peace and not singing another, apart from preparing the measures necessary for a defensive war, which could be caused by an attack by the forces of the triple alliance, agreed on the following:

1. If France is attacked by Germany or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia will attack Germany with all the forces at her disposal.

If Russia is attacked by Germany or by Austria supported by Hermann, France will use all the forces at her disposal to fight Germany.

2. In the event of the mobilization of the forces of the Triple Alliance or one of its constituent Powers, France and Russia, at the first notification of this event and without prior agreement, immediately and simultaneously mobilize all their forces and concentrate them as close as possible to their own borders.

3. Forces to be deployed against Germany

from the French side 1,300,000 people, and from Russia - from 700,000 to 800,000 people.

These forces will be put into action fully and as soon as possible, so that Germany will be forced to fight simultaneously in the east and west.

4. The General Staffs of the two countries will agree at all times to prepare and facilitate the implementation of the above measures. They will communicate to each other even in peacetime all the information they have and receive in the future about the troops of the triple alliance.

5. France and Russia will not conclude a separate peace.

6. The term of this convention shall be the same as that of the tripartite alliance.

7. All the above decisions will be kept in strict secrecy."

This is the original text of this document.

The first French draft convention was directed exclusively against Germany, bypassing Austria and Italy. The clear and far-sighted mind of Obruchev brought both of these states into the convention, providing Russia with support even if only Austria had come forward first. The note submitted by Obruchev, which dealt with the Francoise project of covenpipi, is full of deep interest. With great regret we pass it by, we note only some of the views of its author.

Obruchev says that at the beginning of every European war it is always a great temptation for diplomacy to localize and limit its actions as much as possible. But, in the current armed and excited state of continental Europe, Russia should be especially distrustful of such a localization of the war.

Elsewhere, dwelling on the conditions of modern warfare, Obruchev comes to the conclusion that the reversal of modi- lization

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the most decisive act of the war. Noting the need not to be late with mobilization, but to start it at the same time as the enemy, Obruchev points out that the word "mobilization" should now also mean the opening of hostilities. There should be no diplomatic hesitation the minute the mobilization is announced.

M: I will pompously remember these views of the chief of the Russian main staff in order to return to them in the difficult days of the beginning of the world war.

The convention, concluded in 1892, was approved in August of the same year by an exchange of letters between the military ministers of both countries and in the end of 1893 by the same exchange of letters from the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs with the Khranpuz ambassador in St. Petersburg.

Already the first meeting of the Chiefs of General Staffs, held in St. Petersburg on June 19 (July 2), 1900, made a significant change to the convention.

Leaving unchanged the question of mutual mobilization without prior agreement, in the case of the mobilization of the entire tripartite alliance or only Germany, the chiefs of staff ruled out the obligation of such a mobilization in the mobilization of Austria or Italy. Obruchev's efforts were reduced to nothing, and the French point of view triumphed. At the suggestion of the French, commitments were made for mutual assistance in the event of war with England, and consideration was given to applying the convention in the event that Germany expanded its territory at the expense of Austria in view of the expected death of Franz Joseph.

In February 1901, the second meeting took place, which is interesting in the sense that it was the first time that the French offered to help Russia in the construction of strategic railways.

Then, until 1906, the meetings of the chiefs of staff ceased. The third meeting took place in the summer of 1906 in Paris, and in the future such meetings took place annually, ending with the last turning point in the war with a meeting in St. Petersburg in August 1913.

France's desire to seize Russian policy in its entirety also had an effect on the meetings of the chiefs of general staffs. On them, starting from 1906, almost all articles of the convention were revised and supplemented.

First of all, in 1906, a condition was introduced that the resolutions of the conference become valid only after their approval by the governments, which the French sought in vain in 1892, and Petersburg refused, not wanting to tie their hands.

Art. 1 has been changed in that the convention is directed chiefly against Germany, of which Austria and Italy are only occasional satellites. The article was supplemented with an indication that "the German army is the main object against which both general staffs must direct and fight with full energy and all means at their disposal."

In 1908, instead of discussing mutual assistance against England, on the contrary, according to the Russian proposal, the question of mobilization without prior agreement was discussed in the event of a war between Germany and England, of course, not on the side of Germany.

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In accordance with © introduced in Art. changes, mobilization without prior agreement was envisaged only against Germany. The mobilization of Russia and France during the war with Austria or Italy, without Germany, could follow only by prior agreement. The latter condition was confirmed in 1911.

The words "defensive war" should not be understood in the sense that "the war will be fought defensively", but, on the contrary, it is necessary to strive for a simultaneous offensive against Germany.

If the first meetings of the chiefs of staff concerned the strategic deployment and plans of the parties in general terms, then, starting from 1906,

French! every year they approached this issue more and more specifically.

Russia's loans in France made the French General Staff persistent, feeling the ground under their feet.

The French general staff argued the necessity of: 1) conducting the main operation against the German forces deploying in the east, and 2) accelerating the concentration of Russian armies in order to simultaneously, if possible, go on the offensive with the Prussian army. At a meeting in 1912, Joffre argued that with the victory of the Russian armies on the German Front, everyone would fall away; Vistula to Berlin. The Chief of the Russian General Staff promised to concentrate 800,000 men on the German border and, after the 15th day of mobilization, "to let the Germans feel the action of their armies."

On July 16, 1912, the naval convention between France and Russia was also concluded.

The last conference before the war in 1913, in the person of Joffre and Zhilinsky, reaffirmed the mutual mobilization of France and Russia against Germany without prior agreement, with any action by Germany. At the same time, the meeting emphasized that the separate mobilization of Austria or Italy does not lead to the mutual mobilization of the Allies.

The meeting again emphasized the need for the readiness of 800,000 people. Russian army on the 15th day on the German border and go on the offensive with the goal of "destroying the forces of Germany at the very beginning of operations." Joffre found it desirable for the Russians already in peacetime to have such a grouping of forces in the Warsaw district, which "would present a direct threat to Germany."

Further, the minutes of the meeting focused on the development of the rail network, and along the way, the French government provided Russia with a large railway loan of 400-500 million francs a year, provided that: 1) Russia undertakes the construction of new railways in agreement with the French general staff and 2) increase the numerical strength of the peacetime army.

With great reluctance, Kokovtsov negotiated a loan, trying to defend freedom in choosing the outline of the newly built railway network, but in vain, because the Russian General Staff paid only in their own interests.

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We briefly familiarized ourselves with the Franco-Russian military convention in order to make clearer the events of the days that marked the beginning of the world war.

If we look into the work of the French and Russian general staffs in working out a common war plan and compare it with that of the middle states, then we must impartially say that the meeting of the three chiefs of the general staffs was a political hype, but not a military one.

agreement.

On October 1, Konrad received a military agent who arrived from St. Petersburg, who guided the chief of staff in the mood of his northern neighbor.

According to the report of the agent, the court, as well as the chairman of the council of ministers, Kokovtsov, were in a peaceful mood, because they understood that in the near future the situation was far from being favorable for speaking out in the Balkans and Asia Minor - the conflict with France, England and Germany was would be inevitable. The court seeks to free itself from the hravpuz influence. Who is hostile to Austria is Nikolai Nikolaevich, who accuses Austria of aggressive designs, and above all Franz Ferdinand.

To this Konrad remarked that the Russians should have been better informed.

Atent reported that French and Russian influence was growing in Romania.

When asked by Konrad what Russia would do in the event of a war between Austria and Serbia, the military agent replied: "It is difficult to say about this, but I believe that if unexpected and quick actions follow from our side, then nothing will be done from the Russian side." Russia is now concerned about strengthening its position in the Far East, where it expects clashes in the next three years.

In the event of a Khranka-German war, according to the agent, it is possible that Russia will not act, because Kokovtsov, due to financial difficulties, is against the war. Subsequently, the agent portrayed Sazonov as a real politician with a knightly appearance, Rennenkampch as a supporter of the war and the future commander of the army against Germany, Ivanov, commander of the troops in Kyiv, - also as a general, skeptical of war. As for the internal state of Russia, it is not for war. Many of the office workers got married, got into debt and are dejected by this. Troop maneuvers are still conducted in the old fashioned way.

However, this intelligence said that Russia was actively preparing for war, and the chief of staff of the Moparkhpi intensively studied the military measures of his enemy.

Quartermaster Waldersee, who arrived in Wepa in mid-December and conveyed to the chief of the Austrian headquarters information about the concentration and mobilization of the Russians, believed that the Russians at this time were very concerned about the internal state of the country and were forced to leave the guards and grenadier corps inside, not attracting them to the front. .

We heard that Conrad, in his memoir, wanted to keep Russia from speaking out or even to fight side by side with her, but he immediately rejected these thoughts as unrealizable, and considered, in the end, Russia the evil image of the monarchy, although the minister was a foreigner Affairs noted the improvement of friendly relations between the two States.

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Now we allow ourselves to look into St. Petersburg and see what really happened there, and, in view of the importance of Russia's role in the beginning of the world war, we are forced to dwell on the analysis of documents in more detail.

We know that in the summer of 1913 the responsible officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered that "the main concern of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to secure for Russia the possession of the Proles in the event of a general European or, in general, a great European war."

If in Vienna everything was concentrated on the defeat and destruction of Serbia, then in Pegerburg all thoughts revolved around Constantinople and the straits. Since the autumn of 1913, these questions have seized the Petersburg spheres and more and more crystallized into a definite solution, to which they should inevitably arrive.

We indicated above that Nikolai II was supposed to receive a joint report from the ministries of foreign affairs and maritime affairs on the straits, but the report, for unknown reasons, was delayed and was not compiled at all.

On the other hand, on November 7, 1913, a report was received from the naval general staff to the naval minister on the need to strengthen the Fleet.

Having listed everything that has been done to strengthen the Fleet, Naval General. The headquarters established that the work had stopped due to the lack of a solution to "the main issues." These questions, the report said, "are not achieved independently by the Naval General Staff, but require the general directives of Your Excellency and the highest instructions of His Imperial Majesty the Sovereign Emperor."

The "basic questions" were that by 1918 Russia should receive a strong Fleet, and therefore, in addition to defending its coasts, the FLEET could assume the protection of the freedom of Russia's sea lanes. After pointing out that in the Baltic Sea and the Pacific Ocean this task would nevertheless remain overwhelming for a long time, the author of the report proceeded to the conclusions: "Now our fleet is given only one active task: to ensure Russia's freedom of passage from the Black Sea to mediterranean. The interna- tional political conjuncture of the present time and the possible assumptions in connection with it about the near political future of the eastern half of the Mediterranean Sea make this strategic task of our fleet, apparently, absolutely urgent. The final solution of the "Eastern question" will probably take place in the coming years, and then (whatever this decision may be in relation to Russia), our fleet should be ready for military operations in the Cherpom and Mediterranean Seas.

The report asked for indications: 1) whether it is possible to base the plan, "as the guiding idea" of our entire naval policy for the coming years, on the general strategic idea of the readiness of our Baltic and Black Sea Fleets for operations not only to defend our coasts, but to an active joint operation in the Mediterranean and Black. seas to ensure, under any circumstances, the sea route of Russia from the Black to the Aegean Sea"; 2) whether it is necessary to base the new shipbuilding program on "the idea of an active, and not just defensive, Russian Navy."

The report confirmed its arguments by the fact that representatives of the foreign

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The politicians insisted on concentrating all our naval efforts in the Black and Mediterranean Seas, as this would give a weighty voice in solving the Eastern question and in the interests of France, making it easier for the Navy of the latter

position against the fleets of Austria and Italy.

The Minister of the Sea "fully approved" the report and ordered "to work in the indicated direction."

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was working in the same direction: on November 23, Sazonov presented a report to Nikolai P.

"The events in the Balkan Peninsula," says the minister, "which have created an unstable situation in the entire southeast of Europe and in Asia Minor Turkey, put forward the task for the Ministry of Post-Soviet Affairs to determine 'our own responses to the conditions of the new political situation.'"

Sazonov begins his consideration with the position of Turkey. Recognizing that "the durability of Turkish rule is subject to serious doubt"; that "all the great powers, without exception, are already taking into account the possibility of the final disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and are asking themselves the question of securing their rights and interests in advance in various areas of Malaya Azip"; that "although the desire for peace seems to prevail among the great powers at the present time, it is not possible to vouch for the stability of the general political situation in Europe"; that "his confidence is reinforced by the markedly unstable situation in the Balkan Peninsula as a result of the Bucharest peace," the minister comes to the following conclusion: "The above conditions, without a doubt, create extremely complex and difficult tasks for Russia. It is not our immediate interest to pursue any land gains. All the needs of our internal development place the task of maintaining peace in the first place. Without abandoning this main and primary task, we cannot, however, turn a blind eye to the dangers of the international situation, the elimination of which does not depend on us alone. In this regard, we, like other powers, cannot help but wonder about the need to ensure our rights and interests in advance if events make it necessary for us to protect them with an armed hand."

"Doubts about the strength and durability of Turkey are connected for us with the formulation of the historical question of the straits and the assessment of their entire significance for us from the political and economic points of view."

"There can be different views on whether Russia should or should not strive to take possession of the straits," writes Sazonov. But "on disputed bases, it is impossible to justify the direction of foreign policy in such an issue of paramount importance."

The Minister is concerned that, due to the weakness of Turppi, the straits may go to "another state". Arguing that with the temporary closure of the straits in 1912, Russian trade lost 100 million rubles, and this closure of the straits "had an impact on the entire economic life of the country," Sazonov is convinced that "whoever takes possession of the straits will receive seas of the Black and Mediterranean - he will have the keys for an offensive movement into Asia Minor and for hegemony in the Balkans."

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Sazonov is so secure in the passage of the straits to "another state" that he vehemently objects to the neutralization of the straits "from the

the removal of fortifications from them and the prohibition to build new ones. "Any legal form is valid only in peacetime; when war breaks out, it requires strength to protect itself," the minister instructs, adding

citing, as an example, the aspirations of the Bulgarians to seize Konstantinople, from which Russia is not immune even now.

"Already 30 years have passed since the time when the Black Sea Fleet was revived by the sovereign will of the late Emperor Alexander III," the minister goes on to the military part of his report. Pointing out that the development of the Fleet was connected "with the idea of the power of Russia, of the possible assertion of our interests in the straits", what was spent on this, as well as on the preparation of the landing force "hundreds of millions", that in 1895 the question was raised "about the temporary occupation of Constantinople by our troops, with the knowledge and consent of the most dangerous of the rivals possible for us at that time - England", that this plan had to be abandoned due to the lack of vehicles and the imperfection of land mobilization "- Sazonov is saddened, as now, "when it comes to the desirability of this or that major landing operation, the government stops at the almost impossibility of carrying it out."

"Last year," the minister continues, "when we talked about the possible movement of our troops to Constantinople, it turned out that within two months we could gradually move two corps, and preparations for mobilizing transport ships and bringing troops would take so much time that the operation could not have been unexpected for anyone. In other words, it simply turned out to be unfeasible, not to mention how much the size of such a decapitated army did not correspond to the tasks that it would have to perform.

"However, at the present time we have to talk not only about the impossibility of serious active actions against Turkey, but also about the insignificance of our defensive means against the naval program, which can be implemented in the near future by Turkey."

Citing the relevant data, Sazonov comes to the conclusion that "in the period 1914-1916. the Turkish fleet will have the predominance of power in the Black Sea in terms of the quality of its vessels and the strength of their artillery. To strengthen the Fleet in the Black Sea, a release of funds is necessary: "Russia can neither allow naval superiority in the Black Sea at the present time, nor remain indifferent to the solution of the issue of the straits in the future. We cannot guarantee that this question will not be raised in the near future."

"Consequently," continues the minister, "state foresight requires us to carefully prepare for the speech that may be required. This preparation cannot be of the nature of a comprehensive systematic program with the involvement of various departments in the work.

The tasks set by the minister are: 1) to find out what can be done to strengthen the military and naval power of Russia in the Black Sea; 2) in establishing those means that are required to accelerate

mobilization, in connection with the construction of new tracks and vehicles; 3) in finding out what tasks can be scheduled; 4) in establishing whether or not it is possible or not to set as a task for our army and fleet a breakthrough through the straits and the occupation of Constantinople, if circumstances so required.

"Returning to the aforementioned political side of the preparation," Sazonov writes, "we have to repeat again that the disintegration of Turkey cannot be desirable for us and that, within the limits of diplomatic influence, everything possible must be done to delay such a denouement ..."

The report then also outlines specific measures: 1) accelerating the mobilization of the desert troops; 2) equipment for this communication lines; 3) the strengthening of the Black Sea military fleet; 4) an increase in vehicles on the Black Sea; 5) construction of a railroad across the Caucasus Range.

In justifying his last sentence, Sazonov complains that the diplomat has to defend impassability in Turkey, when the latter is being offered concessions from all sides.

"It goes without saying that our military and naval departments have the right to ask the Foreign Office what can be done to create the most favorable political situation in the event of events that may require us to take decisive action."

"Repeating the wish expressed in the report for the longest possible maintenance of 5211 \$ fio, one also has to repeat again that the question of the straits can hardly be put forward except in the context of pan-European complications. The latter - one can hardly judge by the current conditions - would have found us in an alliance with France and a possible, but far from secured alliance with England, or the benevolent neutrality of this latter. In the Balkans, Sazonov counted on Serbia and, perhaps, on Romania.

"Two factors play a major role in the instability of the current situation in the Balkans: the first of them is Austria-Hungary, in which tribal ferment has intensified, caused by the success of the Serbs and Romanians and the attitude of their fellow tribesmen within the Habsburg monarchy; the second factor is the inability for Bulgaria to come to terms with the grave consequences of the Bucharest Treaty."

Sazonov does not lose hope of uniting Bulgaria with Serbia again, "for the Balkan states left to themselves are inevitably doomed to civil strife."

"We have to speak about these conditions not from the point of view of abstract dreams or enthusiasm for the mission of Russia. Looking ahead and realizing that the preservation of the world so desirable for us will not always be in our hands, we have to set ourselves tasks for more than one day today and tomorrow, in order not to justify the so often made reproach that the Russian state the ship sails with the wind and is carried by the current without a solid rudder to guide its path.

In conclusion, Sazonov asks for the convening of a "special meeting" to discuss the issues raised in the report.

If Sazonov "diplomatically", playing "preservation of peace", found

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necessary to prepare for the war for the straits, the Naval Ministry went on more decisively.

In its "review" to the report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of December 9, the Naval General Headquarters was afraid that with the strengthening of the Turkish Fleet, "the idea of offensive operations against the straits and Constantinople would disappear at all".

"In turn, such threatening strategic prospects, even if there are no wars during 1914-1916, which we hope, can undoubtedly be heavily reflected in the firmness and weightiness of the Russian voice in the international concert and in relations with Turkey in the near future, meanwhile as this voice, admittedly, is no longer impressive enough.

The Naval General Staff proposed: 1) speed up the completion of ships; 2) diplomatically achieve the detention of two dreadnoughts under construction in Anglip for Turkey; 3) to buy two ready-made dreadnoughts abroad and to fly them to the Black Sea, n 4) to develop a plan for sending the Baltic Fleet to the Mediterranean.

On December 20, the Minister of Marine settled on the first proposal and on the same day wrote to Sazonov that the Marine Ministry was in full agreement with Sazonov's arguments about the impossibility of allowing another state to dominate the straits, and therefore it was necessary to prepare for "the onset of events that could fundamentally change the situation." Straits of Constantinople", i.e., Russia must "prepare from the political and strategic side a reliable operation to seize the Constantinople Canal in the event of major international complications that threaten to liquidate the Eastern Question."

"Having in mind the idea hormulized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and approved by His Imperial Majesty the Sovereign Emperor - to begin now serious preparation of the fatherland for the strategic task in the Constantinople Canal," the Naval Ministry speaks of the new plans for these operations being developed by it, of the desirability of diverting the Rums - niyu from the tripartite alliance and attract Bulgaria.

"In connection with the foregoing," the letter says, "there is also the full agreement of the maritime department with the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which says that in the coming years it is desirable for Russia to delay the final liquidation of the Eastern question, while maintaining strict political "z (a (and \$ name").

The Naval Ministry also joined Sazonov's idea of convening a "special meeting."

On December 23, the Minister of Marine "came in with a report" to Nikolai P, in which, based on the operation already decided for the Black Sea Fleet to master the straits, the Minister of Marine reports that the development of this operation is already underway.

From a note by Sazonov dated November 23, "the Ministry of the Sea sees that the main external political task for the coming years should be recognized as the reliable protection of the complete and permanent freedom of the most important

sea trade route of Russia - from the Black Sea by the Constantinople Canal to the Mediterranean Sea. This task can only be solved

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in one single way: Russia must acquire command of the sea in these waters. And this latter, in the opinion of the Naval General Staff, can be achieved only if there is a corresponding sufficient Russian naval force in the mentioned waters, and, moreover, not only in the Black, but also in the Aegean Sea.

Pointing out that the strength of the Fleet would change every year, that the preparation of operations would require training from other departments, in particular the military, the Naval General Staff also petitioned for the convening of a "special meeting."

At the end of the report, "an order was requested to base the further development of our Fleet on the task mentioned above: the acquisition of dominance at sea and in the Constantinople Canal and the waters adjacent to it."

Thus, both ministries insisted on preparations for resolving the "Eastern question", but they wanted to solve this in the future, but for the time being they considered it necessary to maintain military and diplomatic \$4a{115 dio on Bosfoor, if only there were no encroachments " another state" to establish itself in the straits - this could not be allowed. In such a case, there could be no question of the preservation of peace, and Russia's policy had to be aggressive.

The "special meeting" scheduled by Sazonov was not convened, but the question of the straits received its illumination at two meetings that were held on December 31, 1913, and February 8, 1914.

The first meeting had the task of working out measures of pressure on Turkey in the aftermath of the well-known "mission of Liman Von-Sanders."

There is no doubt that, pointing out the attempts of the "other state" to establish itself in the straits, Sazonov already had in mind this "other state" in the person of Germany, which agreed to send its military instructors to Turkey.

We already partly know that Turkey has long wanted to invite instructors to raise its armed forces to the proper height, that its sympathies in this were inclined to the side of Germany and that, on the other hand, the latter was also interested in the fact that the Turpian army was a significant Factor in the Balkans.

Due to the size and objectives of our work, we cannot dwell in detail on the so-called "Limap Von-Sanders mission" in Turkey.

On October 20, the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, Girs, informed Sazopov that the Sanders mission, unlike the others, would receive not only instructors, but also command staff, and a German officer would be placed at the head of the [Turkish Korius, located in Kopstantinopol.

For the reader, it is clear from the above that such an act on the part of Germanpi Sazonov will be considered as an attempt by "friends

gogo state" to the straits.

Russia protested against the appointment of Sanders as commander of the Constantinople corps, and Kokovpov, who traveled around Europe in November, had conversations about this with both Wilhelm and Chancellor Bethmann.

From these conversations it became clear that, although the sending of military

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instructors by Germany and Wilhelm negotiated in May with Niko

barking Shi by the English king George V, without meeting any objections from their side, "since the instruction of German officers in the Turkish army continued uninterruptedly for more than twenty years, but then all further management of this issue, in the sense of organizing an exemplary corps under German command with the location of this corps in the capital Turtsyp was not at all known to Mr. Von Bethmann-Hollweg and proceeded exclusively among the military establishments of the German Empire. "The Imperial Chancellor did not hide from me," writes Kokovtsov, "in his repeated and frank conversations with me, that he was especially saddened by the thought that he participated in the development of an assumption that was unpleasant for Rosspi, and, moreover, did not inform him in a timely manner. about this our Minister of Post-Construction Affairs. Jagow, who is known to us, will also confirm that the details of the agreement by Turkey on sending a mission, as technical details, were worked out in military institutions and were not reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Kokovtsov came to the conclusion that the very idea of commanding the German officers of a corps in Constantinople really became known to Bethmann-Hollweg either in the very last days before his arrival, or even partly from his explanations.

This, of course, did not make Russian diplomacy any easier, and Kokovpov, recognizing that Turkey's appeal to Germany was completely natural, found "that Turpiy's appeal to Austria-Hungary would be even less desirable for us," and suggested either replacing command organized. by an inspection, or "concentrate an exemplary corps not in Constantinople, but in some other point, for example, in Adnanopol or in one of the points in Asia Minor, but, of course, not on our border and not in the sphere of special interests of France."

Kokovpov's explanations with Vplhelm were conducted in the same spirit, and, according to Kokovpov, he "had the impression that my judgments were very unpleasant to the German emperor"; the latter pointed out that the idea of commanding a corps was put forward "by Turkey itself, so that he is ready to reconsider the question of choosing another point for this corps than Constantinople."

In conclusion, Kokovtsev reported: "My explanations in Berlin left an unsatisfactory impression on me and give me reason to think that the German government will not easily give in, if it will give in at all to the position it has chosen."

Thus, the struggle should be hot, but the Russian government decided on it, since the threat of "another state" to the straits was too great. Sazonov dratilea for assistance 6 Paris and London. Paris promised to give relative support, and England, which itself,

sent an admiral to the Turkish Navy, not only decided to refrain from making a speech, but started some sort of behind-the-scenes negotiations with Burlip. I had to refuse the assistance of the allies and start negotiations with German diplomacy again.

On December 23, Sazonov addressed a report to Nikolai P, in which, speaking of behind-the-scenes negotiations, he found it necessary now, in advance,

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to agree on the extent to which Russia can "count on the assistance of both powers (France and England — B.Sh.) in further joint actions ..." "We will, therefore," wrote Sazonov, "be aware of whether France and England are disposed in principle to such measures of encouragement, and what they might consist of."

"Leaving our military and naval departments to determine how coercive measures would seem most feasible, for my part, I dare to report that from a political point of view, perhaps the most expedient would be, in the event of an unsatisfactory response from the Porte, the simultaneous joint occupation of Russia, France and England at the well-known points of Malaya Azni with a statement that the three powers indicated will remain at these points until their demands are met ...

"When resolving this issue," wrote Sazonov, "one must not, of course, lose sight of the fact that, on the basis of pressure on Porto, the possibility of an active action by Germany against her sway cannot be ruled out. In this case, the solution of the issue can be transferred from Konstantinople and Turkey to our western frontier, with all the consequences that follow from here.

"It belongs to your imperial sovereignty to make such a responsible decision," says Sazonov, and anticipates that a concession to Russia would lead to: 1) a major political defeat; 2) to strengthen in France and England "the dangerous conviction that Russia is ready to make any concessions for the sake of preserving peace"; 3) to the possibility, at Russia's expense, of negotiations between England and Germany.

"If these assumptions had been confirmed," continues Sazonov, "then Russia at the end of Kovtsov would have been left in complete political isolation, political interests in favor of lucrative Fipence deals"...

"If our military and naval departments, for their part, admit that it is possible to run the risk of serious complications, provided, of course, that France is adequately determined to support us with all its might and England to provide substantial assistance, then we should immediately enter © with both powers in a very confidential exchange of opinions on this question. If this exchange of views were to reveal the evasive course of action of our friends and allies, then, of course, in our further actions we would have to reckon with the very serious risk of individual actions by Russia. If, on the other hand, the answers of France and England would be considered satisfactory, then, observing all the necessary restraint and caution to prevent possible complications, we should defend our interests until the end.

At the end of the report, Sazonov asked: 1) to convene a special conference under the chairmanship of Kokovtsov with the participation of the Ministers of War and the Navy, the Chief of the General Staff and him, 2) permission to communicate copies of the report to the Executive Lira.

The Naval General Staff quickly responded to Sazonov's report and presented, in turn, a report in which he said that "on the question of

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mission of the German General Liman Von-Sanders and the last aggressive steps of Germany in Constantinople, Russian policy, striving to preserve the most important interests of Russia inviolable, must obviously proceed from the main idea - the importance for Russia of Constantinople and the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits. Only from this point of view can any particular question arising from or in connection with the so-called Eastern political question be correctly elucidated.

Having cited the strategic and economic significance of the straits for Russia and establishing for the latter the need to own them, the compiler of the report says: "This decision should be put on the agenda only when the fatherland is prepared for it in military resignation." Until then, it is desirable to keep the straits and Constantinople in the hands of Turkey, not allowing anything on the part of third powers that could make it difficult for Russia to achieve the above goal in the coming years.

"We find ourselves at the present time," says the report, "compelled to take the risk of a general European war in order to show the necessary firmness in order to preserve peace for the next few years, which we need for the military, naval and diplomatic preparation of our active steps (with the final liquidation of the Eastern question) in order to preserve the current situation in the Balkan Peninsula for these few years, preventing Germany or other powers from expanding their rights and influence in Turkey. Being aware of this, the Naval General Staff fully supported Sazonov's proposal.

The Naval General Staff goes further and wants to be aware of what Russia will do and achieve, "if it (the pan-European war — B. Sh.) breaks out." "In this regard, the Naval General Staff considers that the interests of Russia require, at the risk of a European war, to accept now that if we are involved in it, Russia should receive Constantinople, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles at the end of it, or at least the European coast of these straits.

"So that the Fleet and the Army would know their swap missions and could 'prepare their initial strategic position' in accordance with them," the report put forward a proposal to "agree" with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Military and the Naval.

In pursuance of the planned program, Sazonov began negotiations with France and England. After decisive steps in front of Poincaré, Izvolsky could inform Sazonov: "France has decided to act firmly with us at the same time in all the steps we are taking in this case." As for England, her position was unclear.

On December 31, a special meeting was held in the composition that was planned

Sazonov.

The conference concerned mainly those measures that could force Germany and Turkey to renounce the agreement they had concluded.

The financial boycott of Turkey, which Sazonov wanted to limit himself to, raised doubts both in him and Kokovpov, since "the material damage to the Khrappuz holders of Ottoman papers and the cessation of Turkey's coupon payments can cool the most ardent patriotic aspirations of the French."

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There was no doubt about France's support in the occupation of points on Turkish territory: "the Russian government can count on active support to the utmost"; England's position remains unclear.

Assuming that the impact on Turkey threatens war with Germany, Sazonov, however, does not consider this unconditionally probable. The common actions of the three powers could put pressure on Germany, but she is not afraid of Russia and France alone, because "both powers are hardly capable of delivering a mortal blow to Germany even in the event of successes on the battlefield, which are always guesswork."

"A struggle with the participation of Apglia may be fatal for Germany, which is clearly aware of the danger of being brought by Apglia within six weeks to a complete internal catastrophe." In a word, according to Sazonov, it is necessary to secure Applin's consent, which "is the weak side of Russia's position in the present case."

Against the occupation of Turkish territory, which would entail an "imminent war with Germany," Kokovtsov objected and raised the question: "Is war with Germany desirable and can Russia go to it?"

The Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke out for the undesirability of a war, and left the military minister to decide the question of Russia's readiness for a war.

"The Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff categorically declare that Rosspi is fully prepared," as the minutes of the meeting say, "for a single combat with Germany, not to mention a one-on-one clash with Austria; However, such single combat is hardly probable, and one will have to deal with the whole tripartite alliance.

After such a statement by the representatives of the armed forces, the point of view of Sazonov prevailed, which was adopted by the meeting, namely: to take decisive measures: influence against Turkey.

The resolution of the meeting read:

"1) It is necessary to continue insisting in Berlip on the inadmissibility, from the point of view of Russia's interests, of commanding a German military unit in Constantinople by a German general, and even more so of providing him with an inspection in the sense of commanding one or another district, while recognizing at the same time it is permissible to provide the head of the German military missions of authority for general inspection of the Turkish Army.

2) The negotiations in Berlin should be continued until their complete failure is clear.

3) Following this, it is necessary to move on to the planned measures of influence outside Berlin, in agreement with France and England.

4) In the event that the active participation of both France and England in joint actions with Russia is not ensured, it is not possible to resort to methods of pressure that could lead to a war with Germany.

And so, from now on, the path of Constantinople lay through Berlin—this was clear to everyone.

Two days later, on January 2, 1914, Germany made concessions, and Liman was not appointed commander of the corps, but Russian diplomacy, according to

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to you the Russian ambassador in Berlin, should have considered this concession formally by no means depriving Liman of a decisive influence on military affairs in Turkey. "Whatever General Sanders is and whatever his name is, he will obviously be able to concentrate military power in his hands and be the actual head of the Ottoman troops."

Why Germany conceded, we will see later, and now we will turn to representatives of the ground armed forces, who declared Russia's full readiness for war.

The Minister of War Sukhomlinov writes in his "memoirs": "Based on my observations on the landing maneuver in 1903, I could not refuse the conclusion that our landing on the Bosphorus is an expensive toy and, moreover, can become dangerous fun, according to at least for a long time. But after the Japanese attack on Port Arthur succeeded with such a brilliant success, the latter turned his head! many publicists, fantasizers, just speculators, and, unfortunately, gosh! our responsible diplomats."

"In 1913," continues Sukhomlinov, "I proved to the sovereign my wild point of view regarding the riskiness of the very operation to occupy the straits from the technical side."

"After listening to my report, Emperor Nicholas II, apparently optimistic, - without ripping off the difficulty of the operation from the military side, - made me understand that in the oral business, the idea and purpose of the whole issue are of such dominant importance that technical details recede into the background. ".

Everyone knows that such a "paredvored" as Sukhomlinov was, of course, did not particularly object, just as he did not speak out against it at the session of December 31. Sukhomlinov does not explain to us why he, together with the chief of the general staff, announced the readiness of the army.

"For many years it was not entirely clear, but since 1913 the possibility of a clash with the Habsburg Monarchy became absolutely clear for me," writes the former Minister of War. — In 1909, and even more so in 1912, I became convinced that, in the event of this clash, Germany would take the side of the Habsburgs. Thus, with my complete apoli-

tichposti, - before me was clearly outlined the probability with which it was necessary to reckon with the maintenance of our combat readiness. Consequently, the scale for the equipment of our armed forces had to meet not the combat readiness of the Austro-Hungarian army, but the German one. Therefore, the starting point of all my activities was the goal of achieving the creation of a Russian army, equivalent to the German one.

In its place, we will talk about Sukhomlinov's "brave" statements, especially before the war, when he came up with the article "Russia is ready", but, speaking of the mobilization of the army in 1914, he establishes that "the guy ordered the mobilization of the army and provided an unready tool ambition of the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich", and a few lines below declares that "two more years of peace, and Russia ... would have such a powerful army" ...

A close collaborator of Sukhomlinov, the former quartermaster general of the general staff Yu. Danilov, in his book Russia in World War

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tova - neither politically, nor in terms of the state of their finances and industry, but in a narrow military sense.

Thus, at the turn of 1914, the statements of the military minister and the chief of the general staff about the readiness of the Russian army for a world war must be regarded as irresponsible statements by Russian officials.

Having received such a trump card, Russian diplomacy could go for broke, and if anything kept it from the war, it was the moderating influence of the allies - France and England.

We are already somewhat familiar with these states' positions in history with the Lyman Fhon-Sanders mission.

About France in the summer of 1913, a military agent from Paris wrote to the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff that the rulers of the country, the big banks of France, were against the "big war" and, in general, were tired of all the Balkan squabbles, welcoming their end.

Kokovpov had the same impression from his trip to Paris in 1913.

"The French government," the prime minister wrote in his report, "in its current composition, shows an undeniable and, moreover, little concealed desire to avoid any accidents that could lead France back to the path of so-called adventures" ...

"I don't want to repeat the information that has come to me from different quarters that some doubt is noticed in the deep layers of public opinion about the combat readiness of the French army and about the talents of its generals"...

"All of modern France, and not only France, is experiencing great fatigue from a prolonged political crisis, a great stagnation is noticed in business, industry is beginning to experience disadvantageous consequences from an unstable state of affairs, in the last two years everything

French society lives in a mood of some anxiety "...

"The financial position of the state, strange as it may seem, is far from satisfactory."

As a conclusion, Kokovtsov declared: "France will never depart from us in major issues of general policy, especially those deeply affecting its vital interests, but where these interests are not affected, where other interests prevail - Russian and pan-European - there France will be undoubtedly very restrained and, in all likelihood, will begin to influence us in the sense of a softer resolution of emerging issues.

My: we see that in the Albanian question, when the "adventure" with Serbia happened, France advised the latter to make concessions and, finally, when the "adventure" with Lyman ffon-Sanders was ripe, Izvolsky had to turn to Poincaré for assistance in order to compel France to war across the straits. It is true that today, in his book *The Origin of the World War*, Poincaré ascribes aggressiveness to the German Emperor and his chief of staff, who everywhere trumpeted the inevitability of war.

"In the month of December," writes Poincaré, "the German military mission established itself on the banks of the Bosphorus, and its chief, Liman von Sanders, was

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placed at the head of the army corps of Constantinople ... In the face of all these alarming symptoms, France remained, as before, true to its policy of peace. Why, indeed, to say that Frandia could get involved in the war, since this "adventure" was over?!

It was much more difficult to call on the path of "adventure" England. Having placed their admiral at the head of the Turkish Navy, Apsleyan diplomacy, naturally, could not particularly object to the mission of Liman von Sanders.

We heard that on December 31 Sazonov was not sure about England, because negotiations with her did not lead to the desired results.

Chargé d'Affaires in London wrote on December 19 to Sazonov: "Grey was sincerely saddened to learn that you reproach him for England's failure to provide us with sufficient support, but again confirmed that it was possible, in his opinion, to decide on such radical steps, only knowing ahead what measures would the powers be ready to support their demands, which in such a case would turn out to be presented not only to Turkey, but also to Germany.

"The initiative for the whole course of action of the three powers," he added, "should come from Russia, which is more interested than others in the present question and in its future development, depending on the turn that further negotiations with Germany and Turkey may take."

Buchanan, known to us, outlines the position of England in this way: "Returning to St. Petersburg at the end of the year, I found the Russian government very busy with the issue of appointing Liman von Sanders as commander of the Turkish army corps in Constantinople ... We promised the Russian government our diplomatic support in this matter. , but, at his request, the introductions to be made by the ambassadors of the tripartite accord were temporarily postponed. And only after the publication of the Sultan-

irada on the appointment of General Von-Sanders, it asked us to speak."

"According to the information received by us during this time, we had reason to think that the importance of this appointment was exaggerated, we were even more shaken by the fact – and it was strongly emphasized by the German government – that the responsible command of the Turkish Fleet was carried by a British general. Therefore, we did not intend to go as far as Mr. Sazonov wanted. Instructions sent to Louis Mallet (British ambassador in Constantinople - B. Sh.) were subsequently canceled. Upon learning of this, Mr. Sazonov expressed his strongest disappointment. In his opinion, Russia for the first time asked for the support of England in a matter that seriously offended her interests. It was an experience on which the triple agreement could test its strength.

Citing Sazonov's opinion that a strong tripartite agreement, by its concessions, by its fear of war, could only provoke it, Buchanan agrees with this, pointing out that it was decided in Constantinople that Russia would not fight. "The Turks even told the German ambassador that he had nothing to fear from any action by Russia."

"Sazonov," continues Bukepan, "however, was mistaken in pointing out that the tripartite agreement in this case proved to be untenable. Sir E. Gray again mediated, adding to the many

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them to Russia and Europe of peacekeeping services one more. And, indeed, as later © Sazonov himself admitted with gratitude, with his confident language, which he spoke © Prince Likhnovsky, he achieved an agreement according to which General Liman Von-Sanders, having received the rank of Turkish field marshal and remaining at the head of the German mission, refused from the command of the army corps of Constantinople.

The mission of Liman Von-Sanders, of course, was not the cause of the world war that broke out six months later. It was only an external reflection of the economic struggle waged in Turkey by Russia, Germany and England. In other respects, if we recall the figures we cited earlier on the trade of the aforementioned states with Turkey, it will become clear that in the Bosphorus there was a division not of the Turkish, but of the English inheritance between Russia and Germany. English imports fell every year and at its expense the import of goods by Russia and Germany increased, with a preponderance towards Russia. Thus, in addition to politically and militarily undesirability of Germany's assertion in Constantinople, in the straits, Russia could not allow Germany's influence in Turkey to increase due to purely commercial benefits. Liman Von-Sanders was also undesirable for Russian merchants.

At the same time, the history of the mission and the role of England in it showed that Russia would not be able to count on the unconditional support of England in the Balkan affairs, and in Berlin they saw in England's hesitation evidence of her possible neutrality in the event of a war of a tripartite alliance with Russia and France.

Petersburg again went at the behest of Paris and London, who prepared a golden bridge for the presumptuous Wilhelm, but Sazonov, having achieved a concession to Germany, adopted an even firmer tone in negotiations with Berlin than

it has been so far.

As for the northern states of Europe, according to the report of the military agent Konrad, in the summer of 1913 the political credit of Austria-Hungary was extremely low there, and Vienna's peace policy was considered an indicator of uncertainty in its forces; in the Balkans, Austria found itself in the second line, yielding the vote to Russia. It was not possible to think about the active intervention of these states in the war.

We apologize that, perhaps, we dwelled in too much detail on the events of Russia's foreign policy, but we considered it necessary to do this, since here, on the threshold of 1914, a knot was tied, which could only be cut with a sword, which happened. in the middle of the new year. Documents passed before us not only by politicians, but also by representatives of the general headquarters of the opposing camps, who gradually darkened the atmosphere of external relations between the states of Europe.

Sooner or later, she had to discharge ...

AFTERWORD

The fact that in this book I have described the shortest diplomatic history of Europe during the 20th century already allows us to judge that the war was not far off.

We tried to show how in various countries the torch of war was constantly blown up, threatening to set fire to the building of Europe, and then to turn over to the rest of the world.

Already in the introduction we warned the speaker of our truth that our goal was to study, in the main, the activities of the General Staff in the diplomatic field. For this purpose, we concentrated our attention primarily on the thoughts, dreams, and behavioral pitfalls of the general staffs.

They tried to show how "soldiers" in general's uniforms, declaring at every convenient and inappropriate occasion about non-interference in the affairs of foreign politics, actually participated in it and even, moreover, created this policy.

As is customary in venerable works, we ought to move on to our conclusions on the delineation of the activities of the General Staffs and present the reader with a collection of opinions in this area. It would be possible even now to analyze all the documents that we have cited and build a theory of mutually beneficial policy and strategy.

However, we will refrain from such quick steps, for who can be a better critic than experience itself, verifying in practice the viability of all those paper assumptions that came from the pen of the chiefs of the general staffs of various countries and those preliminary measures that they were carried out. This experience, knocking on the doors of the offices and the chiefs of staff and the diabolists, advanced a world war.

Therefore, we postpone our critical analysis for the next book, in which, having given an analysis of the beginning of the world war, we will then try to satisfy the reader's desire to listen to our judgments as well.

f. Shaposhnikov. October 1927 Moscow.